【来一首好听的歌下饭精神食粮】
在美国精神分析协会出版的《Psychoanalytic Terms & Concepts》（第三版）(1990)中，共情有以下定义：
A mode of perceiving by vicariously experiencing (in a limited way) the psychological state of another person. Literally, it means "feeling into" another person, as contrasted with sympathy, which means "feeling with".
共情是通过(以有限的方式)间接体验另一个人的心理状态来感知的一种方式。从字面上看，它的意思是“进入”另一个人“去感觉”，与之相对的是“同情”，意思是“与另一个人一起感觉”。
The capacity for empathy is thought to be developmentally related to preverbal mother-infant interactions in which there is a concordance of wish, need and response. It is an essential prerequisite for the practise of psychoanalysis. In the analytic situation empathy derives in part from the analyst's evenly suspended attention and the developed autonomy that is part of his or her work ego. Analysts do not view empathy as a mystical or transcendent experience. The patient's verbal and nonverbal activities and affects impinge on the analyst at work, producing resonating, parellel states. The analyst's self-perceptions or introspections then become a source of information about the analysand. Empathy, therefore, is a temporary, partial ego regression in the service of the analytic process, permitting an easily reversible trial indentification with the analysand. It may occur during a loss of verbal communication and understanding--and may constitute a reaction to the resulting experience of loss in the analytic relationship.
共情能力被认为与前言语期的母婴互动有关，在这种互动中，母婴的愿望、需要和反应是一致的。共情是精神分析实践的必要前提。在分析情境中，共情部分源于分析师均匀暂停的注意力和充分发展的自主性，这是分析师工作自我的一部分。分析师并不认为共情是一种神秘或超然的体验。病人的言语和非言语活动和情感冲击着工作中的分析师，产生出共鸣的和平行的状态。此后，分析师的自我觉察或内省成为关于受分析者的信息来源。因此，共情是为分析过程服务的一种暂时的、部分的自我退行，产生对受分析者容易逆转的尝试性认同。它可能发生在语言交流和理解能力丧失的时候，也可能是对分析关系中丧失体验的一种反应。
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美国精神分析协会在2012年再次修订并出版的《Psychoanalytic Terms & Concepts》（第四版）中，这样定义“共情”：
Empathy is a complex affffective and cognitive process of feeling, imagining, thinking, and somatically sensing one’s way into the experience of another person. The capacity for empathy lies at the heart of our ability to understand other people. As such, it is central for all human relationships, especially relationships that include intimacy and concern for the other. Empathy can also be misused to coerce and control others. The capacity for empathy develops in childhood in the interaction between inborn capacities and the attunement of caregivers. Empathic responsiveness on the part of caregivers is vital to the development of many aspects of the child’s psychological life, including the basic sense of self. Empathy also plays a central role in psychoanalytic treatment, contributing both to the process of understanding and, in some views, to therapeutic action. Empathy overlaps with other psychoanalytic concepts, such as mentalization, intersubjectivity, attunement, and reverie. Empathy is often incorrectly conflated with sympathy (“feeling with”), as well as with compassion, concern, engagement, rapport, oneness, and altruism.
共情是一个复杂的情感和认知过程，包括感觉、想象、思考和用身体感知进入另一个人的体验。共情是我们理解他人能力的核心。因此，它是所有人际关系的核心，尤其是包括亲密和关心他人的关系。共情也可能被滥用于强迫和控制他人。共情能力发展于儿童时期，是在先天能力和照顾者调谐的交互作用中得以发展。照顾者的共情反应对儿童心理生活的许多方面的发展至关重要，包括基本的自体感。共情在精神分析治疗中也起着核心作用，有助于理解过程，以及在某些观点中，有助于治疗行动。共情与其他精神分析概念有重叠，如心智化、主体间性、调谐和遐思。共情经常被错误地与同情(“与别人一起感觉”)，以及怜悯、关心、参与、融洽、同一和利他主义混为一谈。
Empathy is not a discrete function, but includes many components, conscious and unconscious. It may begin unprompted, as affective resonance and/or imitation, progressing to include hypotheses and reflection about another. However, empathy may begin with thought. Different theoretical models conceive of empathy as constituted by various processes, including inner imitation, autonomic and motor mimicry, emotional contagion, merger, symbiosis, mirroring, identifification, projection, projective identifification, temporary and partial regression, signal affect, affective resonance, attunement, concordant countertransference, and, most recently, embodied simulation mediated by mirror neurons.
共情并不是一个独立的功能，而是包括许多有意识和无意识的组成部分。它可能从无意识的情感共鸣和/或模仿开始，发展到包括对另一个人的假设和反思。然而，共情可能始于思考。不同的理论模型认为共情是由不同的过程构成的，包括内在模仿、自主和运动模仿、情绪传染、合并、共生、镜映、认同、投射、投射性认同、暂时和部分退行、信号情感、情感共鸣、调谐、一致性反移情，以及最近提出的，由镜像神经元介导的具身模拟。
The definition and conceptualization of empathy, as well as its clinical role, has provoked much controversy: Is empathy sui generis, that is, a relatively discrete, spontaneous and direct affective perception? Alternatively, is empathy the cognitive outcome of inference using analogies drawn from knowledge and experience? How do we demonstrate the accuracy of empathy? What role does theory play in empathy? Can empathy be a mode of observation, free of values, or is it always in the service of some value and motivation, whether therapeutic, sadistic, or deceptive? What are the origins of empathy, and how does it happen? Does empathy afford access only to another person’s momentary subjective state, or does it also afford access to enduring intentions, beliefs, and desires? Is empathy confined to another’s conscious or preconscious experience, or can we gain empathic entrance to another’s disavowed, split- offff , denied, repressed, unformulated experience? What role does empathy play in the therapeutic process?
共情的定义和概念化，以及它的临床作用，引起了很多争议:共情是自生的，即一种相对离散的，自发的和直接的情感感知?还是说，共情是使用从知识和经验中得出的类比进行推理的认知结果吗?我们如何证明共情的准确性?理论在共情中扮演什么角色?共情是不是一种无关于价值的观察模式？还是说，共情总是服务于一些价值和动机，无论是治疗性的，虐待性的，还是欺骗性的?共情的起源是什么，它是如何发生的?共情是否只连接到了另一个人短暂的主观状态，还是说它也连接到了另一个人持久的意图、信仰和欲望?共情是否局限于他人的意识或前意识体验之中，还是说我们是否可以通过共情进入他人不承认的、分裂的、被否认的、压抑的、未能表述的体验?共情在治疗过程中扮演什么角色?
The word empathy was coined by the psychologist Titchener in 1909 as the En glish translation of the German word Einfühlung (“feeling into”), a term originating in the works of Herder and Novalis in the eigh teenth century and reintroduced in a more methodical fashion by the art historian Vischer in 1873. As Freud was launching his career, the word empathy had already gained considerable conceptual prominence in aesthetics, ethics, philosophy, and psychology. Lipps, whom Freud acknowledged as one of the pioneers in the discovery of the unconscious, brought the concept of empathy to the understanding of other minds. Lipps and, in divergent ways, Husserl and others in the phenomenological philosophic tradition argued that empathy is an epistemically sound, noninferential, and nontheoretical method that offers a direct and reliable way of knowing other minds. Dilthey and others in the hermeneutical tradition of philosophy linked empathy to “understanding” (the goal of psychology and the humanities) as opposed to “explaining” (the goal of the natural sciences). This dichotomy between understanding and explaining may have contributed to Freud’s (and later, Hartmann’s [1964] distrust of empathy and his accentuation of the “objectivity” of both the analyst’s observations and the interpretive stance (Pigman, 1995).
1909年，心理学家Titchener将德语单词Einfühlung(“感觉进入”)翻译成英语，创造了“共情”这个词。这个词起源于18世纪的Herder和诺瓦Novalis的作品。而在1873年，艺术史学家Vischer以一种更有系统的方式重新引入了这个词。当弗洛伊德开始他的职业生涯时，共情这个词已经在美学、伦理学、哲学和心理学中获得了相当重要的地位。Lipps被弗洛伊德认为是发现无意识的先驱之一，他将共情的概念引入了对他人心理的理解。Lipps、Husserl 和其他现象学哲学传统中的人以不同的方式认为，共情是一种认识论上健全的、非推理的、非理论的方法，它提供了一种直接和可靠的方式来了解他人的心理。Dilthey和哲学解释学传统中的其他人将共情与“理解”(心理学和人文学科的目标)而不是“解释”(自然科学的目标)联系起来。这种理解和解释之间的二分法可能促成了弗洛伊德(以及后来的Hartmann[1964])对共情的不信任，以及他对分析师观察和解释立场的“客观性”的强调(Pigman, 1995)。
Freud (1905d) first used empathy in “Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious,” wherein he discussed mimetics and empathy. In his paper “On Beginning the Treatment” (1913a), he urged the analyst to adopt a position of empathy (Einfühlung in the original, but translated as “sympathetic understanding”) as opposed to a “moralizing one.” Later, in 1921, Freud (1921) observed that a path from imitation and identifification leads to empathy, the only means by which we are enabled to understand another’s mental life. Despite the importance he attached to empathy, Freud and his immediate followers veered away from in- depth discussions of the word. Indeed, Strachey obfuscated Freud’s use of empathy by often not translating Einfühlung as empathy in the Standard Edition. Ferenczi (1928) predicated technical decisions in analysis on psychological tact, equating tact with empathy; while Freud concurred, in a letter to Ferenczi, he worried that inexperienced analysts might misuse tact or empathy to justify lapses in their objectivity (Grubrich- Simitis, 1986). After Ferenczi, the first concerted effort to describe the analyst’s empathy was in 1942 when Fliess (1942) defined empathy as “trial identification” (see also H. Deutsch, 1926).
弗洛伊德(1905d)在《笑话及其与无意识的关系》一书中首次使用了共情这个术语，他在书中讨论了模仿和共情。在他的论文《论开始治疗》(1913a)中，他敦促分析师采取一种共情的立场(原文为Einfühlung，但翻译为“同情的理解”)，而不是一种“道德化的立场”。后来，在1921年，弗洛伊德(1921)观察到从模仿、认同抵达共情的路径，是我们能够理解他人精神生活的唯一途径。尽管弗洛伊德认为共情很重要，但他和他的追随者们却偏离了对这个词的深入讨论。事实上，Strachey混淆了弗洛伊德对共情的使用，因为他在标准版中经常没有把Einfühlung翻译成共情。Ferenczi(1928)将机智等同于共情;弗洛伊德在给Ferenczi的一封信中表示同意，但他担心缺乏经验的分析师可能会滥用机智或共情来证明他们客观性上的失误(Grubrich- Simitis,1986)。在Ferenczi之后，第一个描述分析师共情的是1942年Fliess(1942)将共情定义为“尝试认同”(也见H. Deutsch, 1926)。
In the 1950s there was a surge of interest in empathy, stimulated in large part by an undermining of notions of objectivity. Contributing to this renewed attention to empathy was the “widening scope” of psychoanalysis to include patients with narcissistic and borderline character organizations, and an expanded understanding of object relations and the analytic relationship. These trends were accompanied by a reexamination of the privileged role of insight in therapeutic action as well as by concerns that analysts were too authoritarian and too often hearing their own theories when listening to patients. Racker (1957), while he did not use the word empathy, described concordant and complementary processes of identification as contributing to countertransference, now conceptualized not as a problem to be overcome, but as a way of understanding the patient. Schafer (1959) (influenced by early work of Loewald [1960]) described what he called generative empathy, defined as a “sublimated creative act” in personal relationships (including in the psychoanalytic relationship), which combines the pleasure of intimate merger with the recognition of separateness. Greenson (1960) distinguished empathy from identification, arguing that empathy is transient in nature and preserves the analyst’s separateness, allowing him to understand the patient’s feelings. In the realm of developmental psychoanalysis, Olden’s (1958) pioneering work described the development of the capacity for empathy between mothers and children.
在20世纪50年代，人们对共情的兴趣激增，这在很大程度上是由于客观性概念的损坏。对共情重新关注是因为精神分析“扩大了治疗范围”，包括自恋和边缘性格组织的患者，以及对客体关系和分析关系的扩展理解。这些趋势伴随着对洞察在治疗行动中的特权角色的重新审视，以及对分析师过于专制和在倾听患者时总是听到自己的理论的担忧。Racker(1957)虽然没有使用共情这个词，但他描述了反移情中认同的一致性和互补性过程，现在将其概念化，反移情不再作为需要分析师克服的问题，而是作为理解患者的一种方式。Schafer(1959)(受到Loewald[1960]早期工作的影响)描述了他所谓的生成共情，将其定义为人际关系(包括精神分析关系)中的“升华的创造性行为”，它结合了亲密合并的快乐和对分离的承认。Greenson(1960)将共情与认同区分开来，认为共情本质上是短暂的，保持了分析师的独立性，使分析师能够理解患者的感受。在发展性精神分析领域，Olden(1958)的开创性工作描述了母亲和孩子之间共情能力的发展。
A watershed in psychoanalytic discourse on empathy was the work of Kohut. In his 1959 paper “Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis,” Kohut(1959) proposed that empathy (defifi ned as “vicarious introspection”) is a mode of listening, of observation, and of data collection and, as such, defines the field of psychoanalysis. For example, Kohut argued that Freud’s drive is a biological concept; the psychoanalytic concept is the individual’s experience of drivenness. Kohut described empathy as both an affective and cognitive mode of experience- near understanding. Empathy plays a central role in all aspects of Kohut’s self psychology. The empathic responsiveness of caregivers during each phase of infancy and childhood is vital for the development of the healthy self. Serious failures in empathy during childhood, along with selfobject failures, lead to disorders of the self. In psychoanalytic treatment, unmet selfobject needs reemerge in the form of selfobject transferences.
Kohut的工作是精神分析中关于共情的讨论的分水岭。在他1959年的论文《内省、共情和精神分析》中，Kohut(1959)提出，共情(被定义为“代理内省”)是一种倾听、观察和数据收集的模式，因此，它定义了精神分析领域。例如，Kohut认为弗洛伊德的驱力是一个生物学概念;精神分析的概念是个体对驱力的体验。Kohut将共情描述为一种情感和认知的体验模式——近似理解。共情在Kohut自体心理学的各个方面都起着核心作用。照顾者在婴儿期和儿童期每个阶段的共情反应对健康自体的发展至关重要。儿童时期共情的严重失败，以及自体客体的失败，会导致自体障碍。在精神分析治疗中，未满足的自体客体需要以自我客体移情的形式重新出现。
The empathic immersion of the analyst in the patient’s experience plays a central role in psychoanalytic treatment as conceptualized by self psychology. Psychoanalytic empathy requires that the analyst feel and think his way into the patient’s perspective, using his own fantasies and thoughts as well as his theories, experience, and cultural knowledge. Through this complex sustained empathic immersion (rather than through isolated moments of empathy or trial identification), the analyst arrives at understanding the patient and at interpretations. Self psychology thereby shifts the focus from the analysis of the “mind in conflict” to the analysis of “complex mental states,” that is, of the self in relationship to selfobjects, and the structural defificits that result from traumatic selfobject failures. Empathic immersion in the patient’s inner life enables the analyst to recognize more specififi cally what the patient needs from the analyst to resume development.
分析师对患者体验的共情沉浸在自体心理学概念化的精神分析治疗中起着核心作用。精神分析的共情需要分析师用他自己的幻想和想法，以及他的理论、经验和文化知识，在患者的角度中去感受和思考。通过这种复杂的持续的共情沉浸(而不是通过孤立的共情时刻或尝试认同)，分析师理解了患者，获得了诠释。因此，自体心理学将重点从分析“冲突中的心智”转移到分析“复杂的心理状态”，也就是说，分析自体与自体客体的关系，以及由于创伤性的自体客体失败而导致的结构性缺陷。共情沉浸在病人的内在生活中，使分析师能够更具体地识别病人需要从分析师那里得到什么来恢复发展。
Kohut distinguished between the analyst’s empathic listening and the applications of empathic understanding, such as the communication of empathic understanding and interpretation. Empathy alone is not a therapeutic technique. Empathy is utilized to diminish the patient’s need for defense and to expand his capacity for introspection, promoting the emergence of warded- off affects, memories, and selfobject needs. The examination of the analyst’s inevitable empathic failures and selfobject failures promotes, through transmuting internalizations, the further development and structuralization of the self (Kohut 1959, 1984).
Kohut区分了分析师的共情倾听和共情理解的应用，如共情理解和诠释的沟通。共情本身并不是一种治疗技巧。共情被用来减少病人的防御需求，扩大他的内省能力，促进被隔离的情感、记忆和自体客体需求的出现。对分析师不可避免的共情失败和自体客体失败的检查，通过转化内化，促进了自体的进一步发展和结构化(Kohut 1959, 1984)。
The work of Kohut led to an explosion in the study of empathy, both in psychoanalytic developmental psychology and in the study of psychoanalytic treatment. Working within the tradition of ego psychology, Beres and Arlow (1974) explored empathy as including signal affect, trial identifification, and unconscious fantasy. T. Shapiro (1974) explored the origins of empathy, warning of its potential for inaccuracy, as did C. Brenner (1968) and Shevrin (1978). Schwaber (1981, 2010) continued to investigate the role of empathy defifined as “that mode of attunement which attempts to maximize a singular focus on the patient’s subjective reality, seeking all possible cues to ascertain it.” Basch (1983a) offered an important review of empathy and the reasons for the ongoing confusion about its nature as well as the mistrust of the concept within the field. Basch argued that empathy is a complex amalgam of affect, cognition, perception, and communication. It begins with automatic and unconscious imitation or simulation of the sender’s bodily gestures, facial expressions, and tone of voice, which generates similar or identical (although muted) affects and bodily states in the receiver. This affective communication creates reciprocal influences in which affective resonance, thoughtful evaluation, and interpretation all play an essential role. Verbal narrative adds another layer to understanding. Further interactions, reflections, and observations validate or disconfirm one’s empathic discernment, contributing to increasingly accurate empathic understanding.
Kohut的工作导致了共情研究的爆发，在精神分析发展心理学和精神分析治疗研究中都是如此。在自我心理学的传统中，Beres和Arlow(1974)探讨了共情，包括信号情感、尝试识别和无意识幻想。T.Shapiro(1974)探讨了共情的起源，警告其可能不准确，C·Brenner(1968)和Shevrin(1978)也有同样的观点。Schwaber(1981,2010)继续研究共情的作用，将其定义为“一种调谐模式，它试图最大限度地关注患者的主观现实，寻找所有可能的线索来确定。”Basch (1983a)对共情进行了重要的回顾，并阐述了对其性质的持续困惑以及在精神分析领域对这一概念的不信任的原因。Basch认为，共情是情感、认知、感知和沟通的复杂混合体。它开始于自动和无意识地模仿或模拟发送者的身体姿势、面部表情和语调，这在接收者身上产生类似或相同的(尽管是静音的)情感和身体状态。这种情感沟通创造了相互的影响，其中情感共鸣、深思熟虑的评估和诠释都起着至关重要的作用。口头叙述增加了另一层理解。进一步的互动、反思和观察证实或证伪了一个人的共情辨别，有助于越来越准确的共情理解。
Kleinian analysts explained empathy as the result of mature, normal, and benign projective identififi cation. For example, Hinshelwood (1989) defined empathy as a process in which the analyst inserts a part of his capacity for self reflection into the patient to gain, in fantasy, the patient’s experience. Bion (1962a,1970) elaborated a complex concept of reverie, operating both in development and in treatment, in which the mother (or analyst) receives, contains, and reflectively transforms the child/patient’s projective identifications, before returning them to the child/patient through the interpretive process. Rosenfeld (1987), following Bion, described a “communicative” form of projective identififi cation, which serves as the basis for all empathy.
克莱因学派的分析师解释说，共情是成熟、正常、良性的投射性认同的结果。例如，Hinshelwood(1989)将共情定义为一个过程，在这个过程中，分析师将他自我反思的能力的一部分插入到患者中，从而在幻想中获得患者的体验。Bion (1962a,1970)阐述了一个复杂的遐思的概念，遐思在发展和治疗中都起作用，在这个概念中，母亲(或分析师)接收、涵容并反思地转换儿童/患者的投射性认同，然后通过诠释的过程将它们返回给儿童/患者。继Bion之后，Rosenfeld(1987)描述了投射性认同的“沟通”形式，它被认为是所有共情的基础。
Developmental psychoanalysts have explored both the emergence of empathy in childhood and the importance of empathic responsiveness in caregivers for the development of the child. Winnicott (1965) described the importance of the mother as a“mirror” for the true self of the developing child. Mahler, Pine, and Bergman (1975) described the importance of the mother’s accurately reflecting the child’s experience during the process of separation individuation. Lichtenberg, Bornstein, and Silver (1984) offered a compilation of research related to development and empathy. Recently, attention has been paid to the more- affective, bodily, nonverbal, and procedural constituents of empathy, such as affective attunement. D. N. Stern (1985) described affective attunement as including both emotional resonance to another person and an intrinsic and spontaneous cross- modal responsiveness that conveys a shared feeling state; affective attunement is important for the development of the self and for the child’s capacity for intersubjectivity. It is also essential to the capacity for empathy, as affective attunement proceeds to reflection. In a similar vein, Fonagy et al. (2002) described how the mother’s ability to accurately reflect and“mark” the child’s inner state is necessary for the development of the child’s own capacity for mentalization.
发展精神分析学家探索了儿童共情的出现和照顾者共情反应对儿童发展的重要性。Winnicott(1965)将母亲的重要性描述为孩子成长过程中真实自体的“镜子”。Mahler, Pine, and Bergman(1975)描述了母亲在分离个性化过程中准确反映孩子体验的重要性。Lichtenberg, Bornstein和Silver(1984)提供了一个关于发展和共情的研究汇编。最近，人们开始关注共情的情感、身体、非语言和程序的成分，如情感调谐。D·N· Stern(1985)将情感调谐描述为既包括对另一个人的情感共鸣，也包括一种传递共同感受状态的内在的、自发的跨模态反应;情感调谐对于自我发展和儿童主体间性能力的发展非常重要。它对共情能力也是至关重要的，因为情感调谐会带来反思。类似地，Fonagy等人(2002)描述了母亲准确反映和“标记”孩子内心状态的能力对于孩子自身心智化能力的发展是必要的。
Finally, discoveries in cognitive neuroscience, especially research in mirror neurons (Gallese, 2006), emotional recognition (Ekman, 1983; Zajonc, 1984), and the development of theory of mind in children (Premack and Woodruff , 1978) have reinvigorated philosophical controversies about the nature of empathy and its epistemological status. In philosophy and cognitive neuroscience, debates about empathy and theory of mind have frequently occurred between two (now interdisciplinary) positions known as “simulation theory” and “theory theory”; these debates have contributed to the psychoanalytic discussions of empathy (Ea gle, Migone, and Gallese, 2007). In addition, overlapping debates flourish under the rubric of “mind reading,” originating in cognitive neuroscience and communications science.
最后，认知神经科学的发现，特别是对镜像神经元(Gallese, 2006)，情绪识别(Ekman, 1983;Zajonc, 1984)和儿童心智理论发展(Premack和Woodruff, 1978)的研究重新激起了关于共情本质及其认识论状态的哲学争论。在哲学和认知神经科学中，关于共情和心智理论的争论经常发生在两种(现在是跨学科的)立场之间，即“模拟理论”和“理论理论”;这些争论促成了对共情的精神分析讨论(Ea gle, Migone, and Gallese, 2007)。此外，在“读心术”的分类下，认知神经科学和通信科学对此有交叠的争论也在蓬勃发展。
