节选翻译自《Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique》
by R.Horacio Etchegoyen
以下是中英文对照：
Within comprehensivepsychology, Jaspers distinguishes inturn two types of comprehension: static and genetic. Static comprehension isconcerned with states of mind that the observer can reach through experience (phenomenology); genetic comprehension, on the other hand, describes how one state ofmind arises from another, through the connection of motives (comprehensive psychology)（p271)
在理解心理学中，Jaspers区分了两种理解的类型:静态理解和起源理解。静态理解与观察者通过经验(现象学)所能达到的心理状态有关;而起源理解则描述了通过动机（理解心理学）的连接，一个心理状态怎么源自另一个心理状态。 (p271)
Genetic comprehension has, in its turn, two variants. Rationalcomprehension means that we understand according to the rules of logic; we understand the spokenword. Empathic (or psychological) comprehension enables usto understand the person speaking and takes us into the realm of psychologicalrelationships and into psychology itself (ibid.). Jaspers' conception recognizes empathy as the basic instrumentof his comprehensive psychology and hence of psychotherapy.（p271）
起源理解有两个变体。首先是理性理解，是指根据逻辑的规则来理解事物;以及我们对说出的词汇的理解。第二个是共情(或心理)理解，它能使我们理解说话的人，并将我们带入到心理关系领域和心理学本身之中。Jaspers认为移情是理解心理学以及心理治疗的基本工具。(p271)
Ferenczi, as Bion was to say many years later, thinks that psychoanalysis cannot be carried on without pain, and one of his aims is to learn to bearit.（p273）
Ferenczi认为精神分析不可能没有痛苦地进行,精神分析的目标之一是学会忍受痛苦。Bion多年以后也说过这话。(p273)
To Ferenczi empathy means taking into account, and up to a point foreseeing, the patient's reaction, so as to be able to speak or be silentat the right moment; but it must never be a naive or sentimental attitude. The analystmust keep his eyes open, while "his mind swings continuously between empathy, self-observation and makingjudgements" (Final Contri butions, 1955, p. 96)—an admirable synthesis, which is as valid today as it was then. （p273）
对Ferenczi来说，共情意味着考虑、并在一定程度上去预见病人的反应，以便能够在适当的时候说话或保持沉默;但这绝不能是一种幼稚或多愁善感的态度。分析师必须睁大眼睛，同时“他的心智不断在共情、自我观察和做出判断之间摆荡”(Final Contributions,，1955年第96页)——这是Ferenczi一个令人钦佩的总结，在今天这句话也和在当时一样有效。(p273)
In 1960 Greenson wrote a very comprehensive essay on empathy andits vicissitudes. For this author, empathy is the emotional knowledge of the feelings of another, a preconscious phenomenon that helps usto understand the patient insofar as it enables us to share his feelings.（p273）
1960年，Greenson写了一篇关于共情及其变迁的非常全面的论文。对于这位作者, 共情是对另一个人感受的情绪了解，是一种前意识的现象, 它使我们能够分享患者的感受，因此有助于帮我们理解患者 (p273)。
Empathy implies a delicate balance, the possibility of entering into the other's feelings but withoutbeing emotionally involved, playing the part of a participant observer—as Sullivan said.Greenson thus considers that the analyst's empathy may fail through lack orthrough excess. If empathy is inhibited, the analyst maintains too great a distance through fear of beinginvolved in the patient's feelings; if it is out of control, the analyst's involvement with the patient's feelings is toointense, so that he loses the ideal distance and also his objectivity.（p273）
正如Sullivan所说，共情意味着一种微妙的平衡，即在不情绪卷入的情况下，进入到对方的感觉之中，扮演着参与观察者的角色。因此，Greenson认为，分析师的共情可能会因为缺乏或过度而失败。如果共情受到抑制，分析师会因为害怕被卷入病人的感觉而与病人保持太远的距离;如果共情失控,分析师卷入病人的感觉太过强烈,他就会失去理想的距离以及分析师的客观性。(p273)
Greenson distinguishes empathy from sympathy, in which there is an element of agreementwith what the other feels, and therefore a greater degree of emotional involvement.（p273）
Greenson区分了共情与同情的差别，同情有同意对方感受的成分，因此有更大程度的情感卷入。(p273)
Following the ideas of Melanie Klein, Nora Barugel (1984) distinguishes sympathy and empathy, like Greenson: but she defines them in a different way. In sympathy one feels or suffers with the other [synpathos] as a result of touching on aspects of oneself that one feels are similar to the object. In empathy, on the other hand, one feels or sufferswithin the object [em-pathos], so that identification occurs on the basis of one's own qualities located in the object—that is, from the point of projective identification. Barugelconsiders both processes as the result of identification and understands them, from the Kleinian point of view, as two modes of identification:introjective and projective.（p274）
Nora Barugel (1984)像Greenson一样区分了同情和共情，但她是用另一种方式定义。在同情中，一个人与另一个人一起感受或遭受痛苦，这是由于触及到自己与客体相似的方面。而在共情中，一个人在客体内感受或遭受痛苦，因此认同发生在客体内的个人特质的基础上——这就是从投射认同的角度来定义的共情。Barugel认为,同情和共情这两个过程都是认同的结果, 并且从克莱因理论的角度来理解这两种模式的话，分别是内摄和投射 (p274)。
Yampey (1985) recognizes empathy as a very important condition ofpsychoanalytical understanding and defines it as the ability to put oneself inanother's place and share and experience whatever the other thinks and desires; but he warns against its dangers, when it is dominated by magic, narcissism or infantilism.（p274）
Yampey(1985)认为共情是精神分析理解的一个非常重要的条件，并将其定义为把自己置于他人的位置，以及分享和体验他人的想法和欲望的能力;但他也警告了当共情由魔法,自恋或婴儿性主导时共情的危险(p274)。
Coderch (1995) defines empathy as a subject's affective participation in a humanreality other than his own, involving the joint operation of the mechanisms of integrationand projection. In the former case we allow the other person's feelings and wishesto penetrate us, whereas inthe latter it is we who place ourselves in that person's mind in order tounderstand him. For this author, we attempt by empathy to understand what the analysand iscommunicating to us "by allowing the emotional experiences he wishes toconvey to us to resonate in ourselves" (ibid., p. 311). Coderch holds that empathy is always connected with thecountertransference, but is distinct from it.（p274）
Coderch(1995)将共情定义为一个主体对自身之外的人类现实的情感参与，包括整合和投射机制的联合运作。在整合的情况下，我们允许他人的感觉和愿望渗透我们，而在投射的情况下，为了理解对方，我们把自己放在对方的心智当中。对于Coderch来说，我们试图通过共情来理解受分析者想要沟通的内容，“通过允许受分析者希望传达给我们的情感体验在我们自己身上产生共鸣”(同上，第311页)。Coderch认为共情是总是与反移情有联系,但不同于反移情。(p274)
Since his inaugural work in 1959, Kohut has categorically asserted that the psychological fact isachieved only by introspection or empathy, which, in his view, is a vicarious form of introspection; and, reciprocally, that what is achieved by these methods is psychological, and the rest is not. In this way Kohutlimits psychoanalysis to what happens in the session, what passes between analyst and patient.The rest, that which comes from other fields ofobservation (such asethology and the neurosciences,for example), may be useful to us but will never belong to our discipline.（p274）
自1959年科胡特的第一部作品以来，他就明确地宣称，只有通过内省或共情才能发现心理事实，在他看来，共情是一种替代性的内省形式；反过来，只有通过共情和内省所得到的才是心理学的，而其他的则不是。这样，科胡特就把精神分析限制在咨询小节所发生事情的范围内，限制在分析者和病人之间的交流之中。其余的,比如来自其他领域的观察(例如,动物行为学和神经科学等),可能是有用的但永远不会属于我们这个学科的范畴。(p274)
Kohut, however, says something more—that empathy must be considered as anessential component of the psychoanalytical method: "We designatephenomena as mental, psychic or psychological if our mode of observation includesintrospection and empathy as an essential constituent" (1959, p. 462; Kohut's italics). In this lies Kohut's great innovation: empathy ceases to be anecessary condition of the work of analysis (as we have all thought since Ferenczi), to become the very essence of the method, so that it is given a realmethodological blank cheque.（p275)
科胡特还指出，共情必须被视为精神分析方法的一个基本组成部分:“如果我们的观察模式是把内省和共情作为一个基本组成部分，那么我们就把现象定义为mental、psychic或psychological。”(1959年，第462页;科胡特的斜体)。在这句话中科胡特的伟大创新在于:共情不再是分析工作的必要条件(如Ferenczi以来我们都这样认为),而成为精神分析的本质。(p275)
The 1959 definition is repeated and perfected in 1971, when empathy is recognized as "amode of cognition which is specifically attuned to the perception of complexpsychological configurations" (1971, p. 300).
Kohut在1959年对共情的定义在1971年得到重复和完善，当时共情被认为是“一种特定地与复杂心理结构的感知相协调的认知模式”(1971年，第300页)。
In this chapter Kohut reviews the limits of empathy and its wronguse. If empathy is applied to the observation of areas that are outside thefield of complex psychological states—that is to say, to non-psychological processes—it leadsto an erroneous perception of reality, pre-rational and animistic. If, on the other hand, we do not use empathy when we have to observe complexpsychological phenomena, then we fall into an error that is diametrically opposed to theformer, which leads to a mechanistic and inertconception of psychological reality.（p275)
Kohut回顾了共情的局限性和它的错误使用。如果将共情应用于复杂心理状态领域之外的观察——也就是说，应用于非心理过程——就会导致对现实的错误认识，非理性和万物有灵论。另一方面，当我们观察复杂的心理现象时，如果我们不使用共情，那么我们就会误入和非理性及万物有灵论完全相反的歧途，导致对心理现实产生机械和惰性无效的概念。(p275)
Kohut, however, strenuously denies this possibility, maintaining that empathy fails when, instead of using it as an instrument for the collection ofpsychological data or as a mode of observation, claims are made that it can replace the explanatory phases ofscientific psychology. In this way—Kohut goes on—we arrive at comprehensivepsychology in the sense of Dilthey and Jaspers, but not at explanatory psychology, so that the scientific standards deteriorate, and there begins a sentimentalregression to subjectivity (Kohut, 1971, pp. 300 301).（p275)
科胡特坚持认为，当人们声称共情可以取代科学心理学的解释阶段，而不是将共情用作收集心理数据的工具或作为一种观察模式时，共情就会失败。Kohut认为，共情将得以实现Dilthey 和 Jaspers所指的理解心理学，而不是解释心理学，因此科学的标准恶化，并开始有情感地回归到主体性之中(Kohut, 1971, pp. 300 301).（p275)
A little further on in the same chapter we find a very clearpassage: "The scientific psychologist in general, and the psychoanalyst in particular, not only must have free access toempathic understanding; they must also be able to relinquish the empathic attitude. Ifthey cannot be empathic, they cannot observe and collect the data which they need; if they cannot step beyond empathy, they cannot set up hypotheses andtheories, and thus, ultimately, cannot achieve explanations" (ibid., p. 303).（p275)
在Kohut（1971）这本书的同一章，还有另一个阐述得非常清晰的段落:“一般来说，科学心理学家，尤其是精神分析师，不仅必须能够自由地进行共情性理解，他们还必须能够放弃共情的态度。如果他们不能共情，他们就不能观察和收集他们所需要的数据;如果他们不能超越共情,他们就不能建立假设和理论,因此,最终难以形成解释”(Kohut, 1971,第303页)。(p275)
In chapter 9, "The Role of Empathy in Psychoanalytic Treatment", he tells us clearly that the analyst'sempathy consists in unconditionally accepting the patient's narcissistictransference, toleratingmirror transference with its accompanying exhibitionism and control, and idealized transference withoutlimiting it by appeals to reality or interpretations that imply its rejection.Kohut believes that thanks to empathy the analyst genuinely grasps thepatient's perception of his psychic reality and accepts it as valid. In orderthat this key affirmation may be clearly understood, Kohut gives an example that is worthnoting. If a patient confesses to him that he has felt wounded because he, Kohut, arrived a minute late, he will not reply that his perception of reality is distorted orthat he is confusing him with his mother or father; he will tell him, rather, that we are all sensitive to the actions of those persons whohave become as important to us as our parents were in our childhood; and that, in view of the unpredictable character of his mother, and his father's lack of interest in him, it is logical that his perception of theimportance of his (Kohut's) actions and omissions should be intensified, and his reactions also.(p276)
在Kohut（1971）《自体的分析》中的第9章《移情在精神分析治疗的作用》，他清楚地告诉我们,分析师的共情包括无条件地接受患者的自恋移情，容忍镜映移情以及它所伴随的患者的爱出风头和控制，容忍理想化移情，而不会通过告诉患者现实或者拒绝被理想化的解释来限制患者的理想化移情。科胡特认为，多亏了共情，分析师才能真正掌握患者对他自己的精神现实的感知，并接受这些感知是有效的。为了使这个关键的观点被清楚地理解，Kohut给出了一个值得注意的例子。如果病人告诉Kohut他感受受伤，因为科胡特迟到了一分钟，Kohut不会回应病人说病人对现实的感知是扭曲的，或病人把Kohut和病人的母亲或父亲混淆了；相反，Kohut会告诉病人，我们都会对那些对我们来说重要的人的行为很敏感，这些人对我们的重要性不亚于我们童年时的父母；而且，鉴于病人母亲不可预测的性格，以及病人父亲对他缺乏兴趣，病人对科胡特的行动和疏忽的重要性的感知会被加强，这是合乎逻辑的。病人的反应也是合乎逻辑的。(p276)
With respect to the empathic moment of the interpretation, I believe Kohut is right to accept fullythe psychic reality of the patient who felt wounded because the analyst madehim wait. The interpretation that Kohut thinks up—and rejects—that the patientis distorting the real facts or that he is confusing the analyst with hismother or father, is not, in my view, strictly an interpretation but a disqualification of thepatient's feelings and judgement, and probably an acting out on the part of the analyst who istrying to discharge his aggression and guilt. Only analysts who identify themselveswith a very strong superego (and/or those with little experience) would be able to formulate an interpretation like this..(p276)
关于解释的共情时刻，作者认为科胡特完全接受病人的心理现实是正确的，病人感到受伤是因为分析师让他等待，这确实是病人的心理现实。但作者认为，Kohut所反对的解释，即病人歪曲了事实或病人将分析师和病人的父母混淆了，实际上并不是一个解释，而是对病人感受和判断的不允许，这可能是分析师尝试释放分析师自己的攻击性和内疚的一种付诸行动。只有那些具有非常强的超我(和/或经验很少的)的分析师才会做出Kohut所反对的那样的解释。(p276)
As for the second moment of the interpretation, we must begin by specifying what Kohutis claiming to explain; and this is, without a doubt, that the analysand's transference feelings in face of the (very short) wait he experienced are a logical response to the erraticbehavior of the parental self-objects of his childhood. But what is he reallytesting with this interpretation? It is certainly not the quality of thoselong-ago parents, becauseKohut has no doubt of this; he knows by empathy that they were not empathic. Nor could he betesting his theory of self-objects, because then he would enter upon a vicious circle; he would be begging the question. WhatKohut is testing, and I cansee no other possibility, is whether the transference reaction of his patient is explainedby what his parents did in his childhood, as deficient self-objects. If this is so, it is obvious that what Kohut is testingis scarcely significant. The analysand cannot but confirm the interpretation, since it is by empathy with what he hassaid many times that Kohut affirms that the mother was unpredictable and thefather uninterested. It is difficult to say how much complicity there may behere between analysand and analyst to convert the present conflict into a pastconflict, which would absolve both protagonists; but it is something to be taken intoaccount, which does not enter into the expectationsof self psychology. It could be, for example, that the analysand is displacing on to the very short wait somegreater grievance against his analyst, which he does not dare confess.(p277)
至于解释的第二部分，我们必须首先说明科胡特声称要解释什么;毫无疑问，在面对短暂等待时，受分析者的移情感受确实是对受分析者童年的父母自体客体的古怪行为的合理反应。但Kohut究竟用这个解释来检验什么呢？当然不是受分析者父母很多年以前的特质，因为科胡特对受分析者报告的父母的特质毫不怀疑;Kohut通过他自己的共情知道受分析者的父母并不共情。Kohut也不能检验他的自体客体理论，因为那样他就会进入一个恶性循环;他会回避这个问题。作者认为科胡特正在检验的是，他的病人的移情反应是否可以用病人父母作为有缺陷的自体客体在病人童年时的行为来解释。如果是这样，那么很明显，Kohut所检验的内容并不重要。受分析者不得不承认这个解释，因为这是他自己说过很多次的事情，而Kohut通过共情确认了受分析者所感受到的母亲是难以预测的、父亲是对受分析者不感兴趣的。这里是否有可能存在受分析者和分析师之间的共谋而把当前的冲突转变为过去的冲突，使得咨访双方得以逃避当前的冲突，这其中的复杂性很难讲清楚。这是自体心理学未曾预料和期望的，但应该被纳入到考虑之中。例如，有可能是受分析者对于很短的等待移置了更大的不满和怨恨在他的分析师身上，但这个不满和怨恨是他不敢承认的。(p277)
At any rate, when Kohut judges the parents of his sensitive patient soseverely and assertively, he leaves entirely out of consideration what could have been theextremely demanding attitude of this child which conditioned—at least inpart—the parents' response. This possibility remains completely outsideKohut's visual field..(p277)
无论如何，当科胡特如此严厉和果断地评判他敏感的病人的父母时，他完全没有考虑这个孩子可能对父母是非常极端的索取的难以满足的态度，而这种态度至少在一定程度上决定了父母对孩子的反应。这种可能性完全在科胡特的视野之外。(p277)
In his posthumous book (1984, chapter 9), Kohut affirms that through the psychology of the self, the analyst succeeds in empathizing withthe experience that the analysand has of himself as part of the analyst and ofthe analyst as part of him. In reality, Kohut thinks that the concept of empathy can be exactly graspedonly in the context of self psychology, and to a certain extent he is right, as empathy is redefined starting with the theory of self-objects, and in the same way, self-objects can be defined as thatwhich is achieved by empathy.(p.277)
在Kohut死后出版的书中(1984年，第9章)，Kohut宣称通过自体心理学，分析师成功地共情到了被分析者作为分析师的一部分，以及分析师作为被分析者的一部分。在现实中，Kohut认为，共情的概念只能在自体心理学语境下才能被完全掌握。在一定程度上Kohut当然是对的，因为共情的概念被自体客体理论重新定义，并且自体客体被定义为通过共情才能实现。 (p.277)
【译者注：读到了作者对Kohut理论略带讽刺的评论。似乎在说，既然自体心理学的各种概念都是你Kohut自己定义，那当然你的山头你做主】
In order to preserve the empathic bond, Kohut does not hesitate to avoidinterpretations that can "be felt" by the analysand as hostile or admonitory.The analyst will always tend to use tact in interpreting, as Ferenczi taught us; but he should never remain tied to whatthe analysand is going to feel, because the analysand is free to feel what he pleases, and the analyst's task consistsprecisely in analysing this experience, not in avoiding it. The care that Kohut takes on this point is inmy opinion contrary to the psychoanalytical method and also to the spirit ofthe search for truth that Freud taught us.（p278）
为了保持共情纽带，科胡特毫不犹豫地回避给出会被受分析者“感觉”有敌意或劝诫的解释。正如Ferenczi教给我们的那样，分析师解释时总是倾向于避免冒犯到对方；但是，分析师不应该永远被束缚在受分析者的感受上，因为受分析者可以自由地感受他想感受的东西，而分析师的任务恰恰在于分析这种体验，而不是避免它。科胡特在意的这一点在作者看来与精神分析方法相悖，也与弗洛伊德教我们的追求真理的精神相悖。 (p278)
At this point we should also explain Kohut's conceptual changefrom a theory of conflict to his theory of developmental arrest. Kohutmaintains that insofar as his doctrine considers the sexual impulses of objectrelations as secondary to the organization of the self, it remains under cover from guiltconnotations. While the interpretative approach centred on the conflict ofimpulse and defence lends itself to the analysand feeling it as censure, the interpretation of transferences withself-objects will be experienced as the acceptance of development in thenormal process of maturation. This decision to maintain the empathic climate aoutrance seems then to be one of the factors that have influenced Kohut'sthought and led him to abandon the theory of conflict and impulse.（p278）
在这一点上，我们也应该解释科胡特从冲突理论到发展停滞理论的概念转变。科胡特坚持认为，只要他的学说认为客体关系的性冲动继发于自体组织，那么它就仍然隐藏在内疚的内涵之下。虽然聚焦于冲动和防御冲突的解释方法会被受分析者感到被审查，但对自体客体移情的解释会被体验为对正常成熟过程中的发展的接受。想要保持一个极端的共情氛围的决定似乎是影响Kohut思想的因素之一，并使他抛弃了冲突和冲动理论。(p278)
At the end of this long discussion, I want to conclude by pointing out that empathy must beconsidered, asFerenczi insisted, as a valuable, but not infallible, guide to understanding what the analysand (and other people in general) feels, to understanding and sharing other people's suffering, to reducing it as far as possible, although it may not be in our power toavoid it. I think of empathy as a necessary factor of analytical work, since without it we could never be on thesame wavelength as our analysand; but it is never sufficient for our work, since empathy depends on very manyfactors that operate more in the context of analogue than digital communication; and in face of this multiplicity offactors and stimuli our own response is never univocal and infallible, since it depends on our own state of mind, our receptivity and our conflicts—inshort, on the processes of introjection andprojection that shape our countertransference in its widest sense.（p278）
在这些冗长的讨论最后，作者总结道，共情是必须要被考虑的，正像是Ferenczi也如此坚称。但对于指导我们对受分析者（以及其他一般人）的理解、理解和分享其他人的痛苦来说，共情虽有价值却并不可靠。共情并不能很有效地指导我们尽快减轻别人的痛苦，这些痛苦可能并不是我们所能避免的。作者认为共情是分析工作的一个必要因素，因为如果没有共情，我们就不可能与受分析者同频；但对我们的分析工作来说，只有共情是永远都不够的，因为共情取决于很多因素。在面对这些多样的因素和刺激时，我们自己的反应永远不可能只有单一的意义，也永远不可能是绝对可靠和正确的，因为我们的反应取决于我们自己的心理状态,我们的接受性和冲突——简言之，在最广泛的意义上，我们的反应取决于塑造了我们的反移情的内摄和投射过程。(p278)
Most psychoanalysts concerned with empathy tend to consider it asa complex phenomenon (or affect) connected with processes of identification—a special form ofidentification, which isgenerally transitory and preconscious, not regressive, and reversible by nature (Levy, 1985, p. 355; Yampey, 1985, p. 353).（p279）
大多数关注共情的精神分析师倾向于认为它是一种与认同过程相关的复杂现象(或影响)，是一种特殊的认同形式，通常是短暂的和前意识的，不是退行的，并且本质上是可逆的(Levy,1985, p. 355;Yampey, 1985,第353页)。(p279)
共情和反移情的关系
Annie Reich (1966), and in general all authors who tend to considercountertransference as an obstacle, prefer to separate it from empathy; others, like Racker, consider empathy as a mature or sublimated form ofcountertransference; but neither side recognizes it as an unequivocal method ofcollecting data. When Levy (1985) discusses empathy within self psychology, he points out the excessive range thatKohut gives to the term and the contradictory values he assigns to it:sometimes empathy is a reliable instrument for the collection of data, and sometimes it represents theanalyst's skill in making the analysand experience his interventions in accordwith his desires and needs (ibid., p. 368). Although Kohut does not appear to notice it, these are two very different concepts; and it is precisely the latter thatcauses many scholars to fear that psychoanalytical neutrality may becompromised in a sort of corrective emotional experience of the type of Alexander and French (1946).（p279）
Annie Reich (1966)及其他认为反移情是一种障碍的学者们，都倾向于将共情与反移情区分开;而另一些人，如Racker，则认为共情是反移情的成熟或升华的形式。但双方都不认为共情是唯一的数据收集方法。当Levy (1985)在自体心理学范畴中讨论共情时,他指出了科胡特给共情这个术语加诸了过大的范畴，并且科胡特也给共情赋予了矛盾的价值：有时共情是一个可靠的收集数据的工具,有时它却又代表了分析师根据受分析者的欲望和需要而让受分析者体验干预的技能。虽然科胡特似乎并没有注意到这一点，但这其实是两个非常不同的概念；正是后者使很多学者担心精神分析的中立性会被这样一种所谓的纠正性情绪体验所破坏。（p279）
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