Wall Street consiglieri are readying for a rush of new business. Bankers who advise on capital raisings or mergers and acquisitions expect a deluge of fees as Donald Trump returns to the presidency. But some clients are suddenly more valuable than others. 

华尔街的顾问们正准备迎接新业务的涌入。为融资或并购提供建议的银行家们预计，随着唐纳德•特朗普重返总统宝座，他们将获得大量的费用。但有些客户突然变得比其他客户更有价值。

The potential snapback in deals is enormous. Global mergers are traditionally equivalent to around 20 per cent of US GDP in any given year, but in 2024 are around half that. If M&A volumes bounced to 25 per cent, as in 2021, that’s $4tn of additional activity. Fees range anywhere from 1 to 5 per cent for banks that win hearts, minds and mandates.

交易的潜在反弹是巨大的。传统上，任何一年的全球并购额都相当于美国国内生产总值的20%左右，但2024年的并购额约为这一数字的一半。如果并购交易量反弹到2021年的25%，那么将增加4万亿美元的交易量。对于赢得客户青睐和委托的银行来说，服务费率从1% 到5%不等。

First in line is Goldman Sachs. A fifth of its revenue typically comes from M&A and underwriting, versus less than 10 per cent at Bank of America, which also runs a huge retail bank. Goldman generally tops the merger advisory ranks, with rival Morgan Stanley second or third. Goldman boss David Solomon has been positioning to pick off artificial intelligence-related deals too, assembling a special council for the purpose.

排在第一位的是高盛。高盛五分之一的收入通常来自并购和承销业务，而美国银行则不到10%，后者还经营着一家大型零售银行。在并购咨询领域，高盛通常位居榜首，竞争对手摩根士丹利位居第二或第三。高盛的老板苏德巍(David Solomon)也一直在寻找与人工智能相关的交易，并为此成立了一个特别委员会。

——本文2024年11月8日发布于FT中文网，英文原题为 Elon Musk might be Wall Street’s great white whale

Donald Trump will go down in history as a truly historic president. That is not a moral judgment. It is simply an acknowledgment of the scale of his achievement in completely remaking American politics.

唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)将作为一位真正具有历史意义的总统载入史册。这不是一个道德评判，而只是承认他在彻底重塑美国政治方面取得的重大成就。

Like Franklin Roosevelt or Ronald Reagan, Trump has not merely won re-election. He has also brought about fundamental shifts in policy, ideology and the political landscape. Unfortunately, he has also brought about a profound change in political norms, by embracing conspiracy theories and refusing to accept that he lost the 2020 presidential election.

就像富兰克林•罗斯福(Franklin Roosevelt)或罗纳德•里根(Ronald Reagan)一样，特朗普不仅赢得第二个任期，还带来了政策、意识形态和政治格局上的根本转变。不幸的是，拥抱阴谋论并拒绝接受自己在2020年败选意味着，他还带来了政治规范上的深远变化。

The accusation that Trump is a threat to democracy turned out not to be the clinching argument that the Democrats imagined. That could be because Americans simply did not buy the argument. But there is also evidence that there is an appetite for strongman leadership in the US.

有关特朗普对民主制度构成威胁的指控，到头来并没有成为民主党人想象中的决定性论点。这也许是因为美国人对这个论点根本不买账。但也有证据表明，相当多的美国人恰恰盼着出现一位强人领袖。

——本文2024年11月8日发布于FT中文网，英文原题为 Trump and the lure of strongman leadership

With Donald Trump headed back to the White House, we’re about to stress-test the question: just how dependent is the world trading system on the US?

随着唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)重返白宫，我们将迎来一场压力测试，看看世界贸易体系究竟有多依赖美国？

The distortive threat that the tariffs from his first term posed to the production networks that had been built up since the end of the cold war are obvious, but the impact of what he is contemplating now will go way beyond his previous actions.

他第一任期实施的关税对世界在冷战以后逐步形成的生产网络明显有扭曲之势，但他现在考虑要做的事情的影响之大，将远超他以前采取的行动。

High tariffs on Chinese imports (and duties on steel and aluminium from other trading partners) in Trump’s first term as president caused disruption to bilateral trade. But it’s now well-established that companies responded to the China tariffs by routing goods into the US via so-called “connector countries” such as Vietnam and Mexico. Governments including Mexico, Canada and Australia also managed to negotiate deals to ameliorate the impact of the steel and aluminium duties. The US’s trade deficit with China shrank: its overall deficit did not.

特朗普在第一个总统任期内对中国进口商品征收的高额关税（以及对其他贸易伙伴国征收的钢铝关税）干扰了双边贸易。但现在一种习以为常的做法是，企业会取道越南和墨西哥等国把商品运往美国。墨西哥、加拿大和澳大利亚等国的政府还谈成贸易协定，减轻了钢铝关税的影响。美国对华贸易逆差有所缩小：但总体逆差并没有缩小。

——本文2024年11月8日发布于FT中文网，英文原题为 Trump’s tariff obsession is worse than before

Within a few hours of Donald Trump securing his victory in the US, Japanese media was using the term matatora — the third Trump-related entry in Japan’s dictionary of escalating disquiet at his possible return.

唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在美国取得胜利后几小时内，日本媒体就开始使用“matatora”一词，这是日本对于特朗普可能再次当选而日益加剧的不安所相关的词典中，与之有关的第三个词条。

The first word in the sequence, moshitora (“what if Trump”), was current in the latter months of 2023 and set a tone of background nervousness in government, corporate and market circles. The second, hobotora (“most likely Trump”), has been in widespread use this year, demanding more serious fretting around geopolitics, inflation and trade risk. Matatora (“Trump is back”) grants a general licence to gasp. 

这个序列中的第一个词moshitora，“如果特朗普获胜会怎么样”，是2023年最后几个月出现的，为政府、企业和市场界的紧张情绪定下了基调。第二个词“hobotora”，“很可能是特朗普”，在今年被广泛使用，要求人们加大对地缘政治、通货膨胀和贸易风险的担忧。Matatora，“特朗普回来了”，则为人们发放了倒吸一口气许可证。

For some, though, the word has unleashed a bullish snort and an argument that — absent embroilment in regional conflict or some other unforeseen calamity — Japan may be better placed than almost any other developed market outside the US to flourish over the next few years. 

不过，对于一些人来说，这个词会让他们发出满意的声音，他们认为，如果没有卷入地区冲突或其他不可预见的灾难，日本可能比美国以外的几乎任何其他发达市场都更有条件在未来几年蓬勃发展。

——本文2024年11月8日发布于FT中文网，英文原题为 Japan is having a moment but will it survive Trump?