01
原文：Kong D, Lin C, Liu S, Xuan Y. Politically Affiliated Analysts[J]. Management Science, 2024.
Politically Affiliated Analysts
ABSTRACT: Government ownership of financial intermediaries is pervasive around the world. In this study, we examine the impact of common government ownership between the brokerage and listed firms on the information production role of brokerage firms. We show that affiliated analysts tend to issue more optimistic recommendations for stocks of firms controlled by the same government entity that controls their brokerage firms. This optimistic bias is particularly pronounced during periods of economic shocks. Our study demonstrates this by utilizing additional tariff impositions and tariff exemptions during the U.S.–China trade war as exogenous negative and positive shocks, respectively. Additionally, our study indicates that stocks recommended by politically affiliated analysts tend to underperform those recommended by independent analysts, implying that the optimism stems from conflicts of interest rather than superior information. Furthermore, our research highlights that sophisticated investors perceive the potential bias and incorporate it into their trading. Consistent with an exchange of favors story, politically affiliated brokerage firms receive a larger allocation during the issuance of local government debt, whereas governments subscribe for more shares during seasoned equity offerings by these affiliated brokerage firms.
政治关联分析师
摘要：政府对金融中介机构拥有所有权这一现象在全球范围内广泛存在。这篇文章探讨了当券商公司与上市公司之间存在共同政府所有权时，券商公司信息生产角色会受到怎样的影响？文章发现，政治关联分析师倾向于对由控制其券商的同一政府实体控制的公司股票发布更为乐观的推荐评级。同时，这种乐观偏向在经济冲击期间尤为显著。作者利用中美贸易战期间的关税加征和关税豁免作为负面外生冲击和正面外生冲击来证明这一点。此外，研究结果表明，政治关联分析师推荐的股票表现不如独立分析师推荐的股票，这意味着乐观偏见源于利益而非信息优势。进一步地，研究还发现，机构投资者能够察觉到这种潜在的偏差并将其纳入交易决策中。此外，与利益交换理论一致，具有政治关联的券商在地方政府债券发行时获得了更多的分配，并且政府在这些关联券商增发股票时认购了更多股份。
亮点：（1）本文从券商公司的视角，丰富了政府所有权和政治压力经济后果的相关研究。先前大量文献讨论了政府所有权对银行的影响，本文则是讨论了政府所有权对券商公司这一重要信息生产者的影响，弥补了现有文献的空白。（2）本文拓展了关于政治联系的研究边界，已有研究主要关注政治联系对企业绩效和融资的作用，而本文创造性地讨论了券商公司和公司的政治联系对分析师行为的影响。同时，这种政治联系也属于关系网络的一种，补充了关系网络对资本市场影响的有关文献。（3）本文从利益冲突的视角拓展了有关分析师预测偏差的文献范围，有助于深化对阻碍分析师客观预测影响因素的理论认识。
02
原文：Chen S, Ma H, Wu Q, Zhang H. Common Institutional Ownership and Stock Price Crash Risk[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2024, 41(1): 679-711.
Common Institutional Ownership and Stock Price Crash Risk
ABSTRACT: This paper presents new evidence on the economic benefits arising from common institutional ownership. We find a negative and significant effect of common institutional ownership on stock price crash risk. This effect is robust to a battery of robustness checks and is causal according to some identification tests, including difference-in-differences analyses on financial institution mergers. We find evidence that the negative effect is attributable to the monitoring role of common institutional owners—a role that is enabled by common owners' lower information processing cost and greater monitoring incentives owing to governance externalities. We also find that common owners negatively influence crash risk through constraining bad news hoarding and that common owners are more likely to force CEO turnover when a firm has higher crash risk. Overall, our results suggest that common institutional shareholders play a unique and effective monitoring role that fends off stock price crashes.
共同机构所有权与股价崩盘风险
摘要：这篇文章提供了关于共同机构所有权带来的经济效益的新证据。研究发现，共同机构所有权对股价崩盘风险具有显著的负面影响，且该效应在经过一系列稳健性检验后依然显著。作者还利用金融机构合并事件进行双重差分检验，支持了二者间的因果关系。进一步的结果表明，上述效应源于共同机构所有者的监督作用，这得益于共同机构所有者拥有更低的信息处理成本以及治理外部性的激励。机制分析表明，共同机构所有者通过限制不良消息的囤积来降低股价崩盘风险。此外，当公司面临更高的股价崩盘风险时，共同所有者更可能促使CEO更替。总体而言，本文发现，共同机构股东发挥了独特且有效的监督作用，降低了股价崩盘风险。
亮点：（1）本文从资本市场的角度探讨了共同机构所有权的经济后果，扩展了关于共同机构所有权的研究。现有研究主要集中在共同机构所有权对产品市场结果和公司政策的影响，本文从股市的视角探讨了共同机构所有权的另一项经济效益，对现有文献进行了补充和扩展。（2）本研究将共同机构所有权引入到股价崩盘风险影响因素的分析框架，为相关文献领域做出了重要贡献。与现有研究通常割裂地考虑机构投资者的持股不同，本研究引入了共同机构所有权这一概念，重点不仅在于分析机构所有权的持有水平，而是探讨同时持有同行企业股票的机构投资者交叉持股的影响。（3）本研究的发现为监管机构和投资者提供了重要的启示。本研究提供了证据，证实共同机构所有者在监督公司行为及减少不良信息积累方面确实发挥了独特而重要的作用。
03
原文：Cheng X, Wang H H, Wang X. Common Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2022, 136: 106218.
Common Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility
ABSTRACT: We examine relationship between common institutional ownership and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that common institutional ownership is negatively associated with the level of CSR, which supports an anti-competitive view. We conduct a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis and a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis based on a quasi-natural experiment of financial institution mergers. The results alleviate concerns about endogeneity. Using the DiD setting, we find further support for the anti-competitive view, and can rule out alternative explanations. Additional analyses on investor characteristics show that our results come mainly from common owners with long-term investment horizons or lower social inclination. Moreover, we find that the anti-competitive effect is more pronounced for mature firms, and for firms in industries with lower labor intensity and lower customer sensitivity.
共同机构所有权与企业社会责任
摘要：这篇文章研究了共同机构所有权与企业社会责任（CSR）之间的关系。研究发现，共同机构所有权与CSR水平呈负相关，支持了反竞争观点。作者采用倾向得分匹配（PSM）分析和基于金融机构合并这一准自然实验的双重差分（DiD）分析缓解了对内生性问题的担忧。在双重差分检验中，本文进一步发现了对反竞争观点的支持，并排除了其他解释。对投资者特征的进一步分析显示，上述结果主要来自于具有长期投资视野或社会倾向较低的共同所有者。此外，本文发现反竞争效应在成熟公司以及劳动密集度较低和客户敏感度较低的行业中更加明显。
亮点：（1）本文丰富了有关机构所有权和企业社会责任的文献。以往研究记录了机构所有权对企业社会责任的积极影响，隐含的假设是投资组合公司及其企业社会责任政策彼此完全独立。本文则表明机构共同所有权会对投资组合公司的企业社会责任产生负面影响。（2）本文拓展了共同所有权的文献。现有研究集中于共同所有权对公司经营和股东的经济影响。本文通过研究其对广泛利益相关者的影响，扩展了这一系列文献。（3）本文推动了关于是否以及如何限制机构共同所有权的争论。本文研究结果支持了共同机构所有权对企业社会责任的反竞争影响，为这场持续的争论做出了贡献。
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总编：游家兴
解析：刘乾
审校：林珉慧 陈沁圆
编辑：潘芳妍
