01
原文：Zhuo Chen, Zhiguo He, and Chun Liu. The financing of local government in China: Stimulus loan wanes and shadow banking waxes. Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, 137: 42-71.
The Financing of Local Government in China: Stimulus Loan Wanes and Shadow Banking Waxes
ABSTRACT: The upsurge of shadow banking is typically driven by rising financing demand from certain real sectors. In China, the 4 trillion yuan stimulus package in 2009 was behind the rapid growth of shadow banking after 2012, expediting the development of Chinese corporate bond markets in the post stimulus period. Chinese local governments financed the stimulus through bank loans in 2009 and then resorted to nonbank debt financing after 2012 when faced with rollover pressure from bank debt coming due. Cross-sectionally, using a political-economy-based instrument, we show that provinces with greater bank loan growth in 2009 experienced more municipal corporate bond issuance during 2012–2015, together with more shadow banking activities including trustloans and wealth management products. China’s poststimulus experience exhibits similarities to financial market development during the US National Banking Era.
中国地方政府融资：刺激贷款减少，影子银行增多
摘要：影子银行的兴起通常是由某些实体部门不断上升的融资需求推动的。在中国2009年，4万亿的经济刺激计划是2012年后影子银行快速增长的幕后推手，加速了刺激后时期中国企业债券市场的发展。2009年，中国地方政府通过银行贷款为刺激计划融资，2012年后，当面临银行债务到期带来的展期压力时，又求助于非银行债务融资。横截面分析表明，2009年银行贷款增长较快的省份在2012-2015年发行了更多的市政公司债券，同时影子银行活动(包括信托贷款和理财产品)也更多。中国刺激后的经历与美国国民银行时代的金融市场发展有相似之处。
亮点：（1）文章与以往文献不同，侧重于地方政府的责任方面，研究影子银行的兴起，揭示了在市场经济不断发展的背景下，市场力量和政府干预相互作用，旨在刺激实体经济增长的财政冲击如何出人意料地影响金融市场的发展。（2）文章使用了政府融资平台发行的一种公司债券MCB进行实证研究，通过研究其数量和融资目的，发现地方政府融资从银行贷款到债券或其他非银行来源的演变，增加了中国地方政府债务的研究。（3）文章最后对比了美国历史、奥巴马的经济刺激计划和中国2009年的经济刺激计划，发现中国未来的市政预算会更接近国际标准做法
02
原文：Franklin Allen, Yiming Qian, Guoqian Tu, and Frank Yu. Entrusted loans: A close look at China’s shadow banking system. Journal of Financial Economics, 2019, 133: 18-41.
Entrusted Loans: A Close Look at China’s Shadow Banking System
ABSTRACT: We perform transaction-level analyses of entrusted loans, one of the largest components of shadow banking in China. Entrusted loans involve firms with privileged access to cheap capital channeling funds to less privileged firms, and the increase when credit is tight. Nonaffiliated loans have much higher interest rates than both affiliated loans and official bank loans, and they largely flow into real estate. The pricing of entrusted loans, especially of nonaffiliated loans, incorporates fundamental and informational risks. Stock market re-actions suggest that both affiliated and nonaffiliated loans are fairly compensated investments.
委托贷款：近距离观察中国影子银行体系
摘要：我们对委托贷款进行交易级分析，委托贷款是中国影子银行的最大组成部分之一。委托贷款是指有特权获得廉价资本的公司将资金输送给不那么有特权的公司，当信贷紧缩时，委托贷款就会增加。非关联贷款的利率比关联贷款和官方银行贷款都要高得多，而且这些贷款大部分流入了房地产。委托贷款的定价，特别是无关联贷款的定价，包含基本面风险和信息风险。股票市场的反应表明，关联贷款和非关联贷款都是合理补偿的投资。
亮点：（1）文章展示了中国官方银行体系高度扭曲的证据，即银行贷款利率远低于市场利率，委托贷款涉及特权企业，这些企业可以通过廉价渠道获得资本，将资金输送给不那么特权的企业。（2）文章提供了这些贷款资金的实际投资风险的证据。作者表明，非关联贷款比关联贷款风险更大，因为非关联贷款流入房地产行业的比例要大得多，而且它们事后更有可能出现问题。（3）文章发现委托贷款，特别是无关联贷款的定价与基本风险和信息风险相当，它们是一种合理的补偿投资。
03
原文：Lin William Cong, Haoyu Gao, Jacopo Ponticelli, and Xiaoguang Yang. Credit allocation under economic stimulus: Evidence from China. The Review of Financial Studies, 2019, 32(9): 3412-3460.
Credit Allocation Under Economic Stimulus: Evidence from China
ABSTRACT: We study credit allocation across firms and its real effects during China’s economic stimulus plan of 2009–2010. We match confidential loan-level data from the nineteen largest Chinese banks with firm-level data on manufacturing firms. We document that the stimulus-driven credit expansion disproportionately favored state-owned firms and firms with a lower average product of capital, reversing the process of capital reallocation toward private firms that characterized China’s high growth before 2008. We argue that implicit government guarantees for state-connected firms become more prominent during recessions and can explain this reversal.
经济刺激下的信贷配置：来自中国的证据
摘要：本文研究了2009-2010年中国经济刺激计划期间企业间信贷配置及其实际效果。我们将中国19家最大银行的机密贷款数据与制造业企业的数据进行比对。我们发现，刺激驱动的信贷扩张不成比例地有利于国有企业和平均资本产出较低的企业，逆转了2008年之前中国高增长的特征——资本向民营企业的再配置过程。我们认为，在经济衰退期间，政府对国有关联企业的隐性担保变得更加突出，这可以解释这种逆转。
亮点：（1）文章识别分离了企业借款的变化，即仅仅由信贷供应驱动而非信贷需求或投资机会驱动。（2）文章通过使用详细的微观数据记录金融摩擦如何影响企业在商业和信贷周期的不同阶段的信贷分配动态为这一领域增加了理论贡献。（3）文章的研究结果具有重要的政策意义。由于在经济衰退期间，企业难以生存，获得外部融资的渠道差异变得更加突出，在正常时期推动增长的低生产率企业向高生产率企业的资本有效再配置放缓，甚至可能出现逆转。文章发现，信贷扩张放大了这一效应，研究结果为政策驱动的信贷扩张提供了信息，这些扩张以政府关联企业优先获得融资为特征。
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总编：游家兴
解析：陈璐
审校：伟丽斯 黎俞宏
编辑：潘芳妍
