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原文：Allen F, Gu X, Li C W, et al. Implicit guarantees and the rise of shadow banking: The case of trust products[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2023, 149(2): 115-141.
Implicit Guarantees and the Rise of Shadow Banking: The Case of Trust Products
ABSTRACT：Implicit guarantees provided by financial intermediaries are a key component of China's shadow banking sector. We show theoretically that project screening by intermediaries, accompanied by their implicit guarantees to investors, can be the second-best arrangement and mitigate capital misallocation that favors state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Using a dataset of trusts’ investment products, we find, consistent with our model, that ex ante expected yields reflect borrower risks and implicit guarantee strength, and risk sensitivity is reduced by strong guarantees. Regulations in 2018 restricting implicit guarantees lead to a weaker relationship between yield spread and guarantee strength, and more credit rationing of non-SOEs.
隐性担保与影子银行的扩张：以信托产品为例
摘要：金融中介机构提供的隐性担保构成了中国影子银行的重要组成部分。研究结果表明，金融中介对被投项目进行筛选，并为投资者提供隐性担保是一个“次优解”，有助于减轻资本错配。使用信托投资产品的数据集，文章获得了与模型一致的结果，事前预期收益率反映借款人风险和隐性担保强度两方面内容，并且强有利的隐性担保降低了风险敏感性。2018年限制隐性担保的法规导致收益率利差与担保强度之间的关系减弱，致使民营企业的信贷配给加剧。
亮点：（1）文章从理论上证明了金融中介机构所提供的隐性担保的次优性，以及隐性担保在为民营企业提供资金、减轻资本错配方面发挥的重要作用。（2）文章以信托业为切入点，探讨隐形担保在中国影子银行扩张过程的关键作用，并深度分析“资管新规”对影子银行的抑制作用，丰富了中国影子银行的相关研究。
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原文：Huang J, Huang Z, Shao X. The risk of implicit guarantees: Evidence from shadow banks in China[J]. Review of Finance, 2022, 27(4): 1521-1544.
The Risk of Implicit Guarantees: Evidence from Shadow Banks in China
ABSTRACT：We study how risks spill over from shadow banking activities to traditional banks through implicit guarantees. Using data on wealth management products (WMPs), China’s largest shadow banking component, we find that banks with higher interbank borrowing rates strategically provide stronger implicit guarantees to their issued WMPs. Extending implicit guarantees builds bank reputations and reduces rollover costs while exposing banks to losses from shadow banking activities. Our findings thus suggest a bank-specific approach to assessing the risk of implicit guarantees based on transparent and real-time interbank rates.
隐性担保的风险——来自中国影子银行的证据
摘要：文章研究了风险如何通过隐性担保从影子银行活动溢出到传统银行。利用中国最大的影子银行组成部分——理财产品（WMP）的数据，文章发现银行间拆借利率较高的银行会策略性地为其发行的理财产品提供更有力的隐性担保。扩大隐性担保有助于建立银行声誉，降低延期成本，同时使得银行面临影子银行活动带来的损失。因此，文章的研究结果表明，应根据透明和实时的银行同业拆借利率来评估隐性担保的风险。
亮点：（1）文章发现银行在战略上提供隐性担保，即面临更高借贷利率的银行会提供更强的担保，以建立声誉并降低延期成本，而影子银行与传统银行的紧密联系，可能会加剧金融风险传递，破坏银行系统稳定性。（2）文章揭示了隐性担保的战略性提供以及从理财产品到银行系统的风险溢出效应，丰富了影子银行的研究文献。
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原文：Tian X, Tu G, Wang Y. The real effects of shadow banking: Evidence from China[J]. Management Science, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00953
The Real Effects of Shadow Banking: Evidence from China
ABSTRACT：We provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of shadow banking in terms of technological innovation. Firm-to-firm entrusted loans, the largest part of the shadow banking sector in China, enhance the borrowers’ innovation output. The effects are more prominent when the borrowers are subject to severer financial constraints, information asymmetry, and takeover exposures. A plausible underlying channel is capital reallocations from less productive but easily financed lender firms to more innovative but financially less privileged borrower firms. Our paper suggests that shadow banking helps correct bank credit misallocations and thus, serves as a second-best market design in financing the real economy.
影子银行的真正影响：来自中国的证据
摘要：文章从企业层面上研究了影子银行对于技术创新的实际影响。作为中国影子银行的最大组成部分，企业间的委托贷款有助于提高借款企业的创新产出。上述影响在借款企业面临更严重的财务约束、信息不对称和收购风险时更为突出。文章的关键潜在机制在于影子银行使得资本从生产率较低但容易获得融资的贷款企业重新分配到更具创新性但在财务受限的借款企业。文章认为，影子银行作为替代性的市场化融资方式，有助于缓解银行信贷错配。
亮点：（1）文章认为中国的影子银行部门可以将资本从生产率较低但易于融资的企业中引导至更具创新性但在财务受限的企业，从而提高资本配置的效率，有助于缓解资金错配。（2）既往研究主要聚焦于影子银行崛起的影响因素、影子银行的定价和相关风险特征。文章通过提供直接的微观证据证实了影子银行的积极影响，即其在促进借款企业增强技术创新能力方面的积极作用。
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总编：游家兴
解析：王智源
审校：林慧 司淑玉
编辑：潘芳妍
