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原文：Chang W, Dambra M, Schonberger B, et al. Does sensationalism affect executive compensation? Evidence from pay ratio disclosure reform[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2023, 61(1): 187-242.
Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation?
Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform
ABSTRACT: Beginning in 2018, U.S. public firms were required to report the ratio of the chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation to their median employee’s compensation in the annual proxy statement. Exploiting the staggered reporting of pay ratios, we find little evidence that total CEO compensation changes in response to pay ratio disclosure reform. However, we do find that boards significantly adjust the mix of compensation awarded by reducing the sensitivity of CEO pay to equity price changes, particularly when the CEO is likely to garner media scrutiny, and by reducing reliance on stock-based and other compensation components that are most susceptible to media coverage surrounding the pay ratio disclosure. Firms ultimately disclosing higher pay ratios garner more media coverage around the filing of their proxy statement, and more negative-toned coverage in the subsequent month. Finally, we find evidence that greater pay disparity is associated with greater selling activity by retail investors and more negative say-on-pay votes following pay ratio reform, consistent with a broad set of investors responding to public scrutiny resulting from pay ratio disclosures.
轰动效应会影响高管薪酬吗?
来自薪酬比率披露改革的证据
摘要：从2018年开始，美国上市公司被要求在年度委托书中报告首席执行官（CEO）薪酬与员工薪酬中位数的比例。利用薪酬比率的交错报告，文章发现几乎没有证据表明，CEO总薪酬变化受到该薪酬比率披露改革的影响。然而，文章发现，董事会通过降低CEO薪酬对股价变化的敏感性（尤其是在CEO可能受到媒体监督的情况下）以及通过减少对股票薪酬和其他薪酬组成部分的依赖（因为这部分最容易受到媒体对薪酬比率披露的报道），显著调整了薪酬组合。此外，文章发现披露更高薪酬比率的公司会在提交代理委托书时收到更多媒体报道，并在随后的一个月里收到更多负面报道。最后，文章发现薪酬比例改革后，更大的薪酬差距与散户投资者更多的抛售活动和更多的负面薪酬话语权投票有关，这与广泛的投资者对薪酬比例披露改革导致的公众监督的反应一致。
亮点：（1）首先，对薪酬披露与高管薪酬关系的研究文献进行了补充。文章未发现证据表明首席执行官的薪酬水平会随着薪酬比例改革而增加。这与其他强制薪酬披露环境中的证据形成了鲜明的对比。此外，文章扩展了媒体报道对高管薪酬及其组成部分作用的研究。（2）其次，利用薪酬比率改革能使作者研究董事会如何修改薪酬合同以应对公司内部的薪酬差距，这在当前的文献中缺乏讨论。通过该方式，文章丰富了关于公司内部薪酬差距的文献。（3）最后，作者的发现与政策相关，提供了一些关于强制披露CEO薪酬比率经济后果的证据。
02
原文：Carline N F, Pryshchepa O, Wang B. CEO compensation incentives and playing it safe: evidence from FAS 123R[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2023, 58(7): 2993-3026.
CEO compensation incentives and playing it safe: evidence from FAS 123R
ABSTRACT: This article uses FAS 123R regulation to examine how reduction in CEO compensation incentives affects managerial “playing it safe” behavior. Using proxies reflecting deliberate managerial efforts to change firm risk, difference-in-difference tests show that affected firms drastically reduce both systematic and idiosyncratic risks, leading to an 8% decline in total firm risk. These reductions in risk are achieved by shifting to safer, but low-Qsegments while closing the riskier ones, without significant changes in investment levels. Our findings suggest that decrease in risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation, when not compensated for by alternative incentives or governance mechanisms, exacerbates risk-related agency problem.
CEO的薪酬激励与稳妥行事：来自FAS 123R的证据
摘要：本文使用FAS 123R法规来研究CEO薪酬激励的减少如何影响管理层的“安全行事”行为。通过使用代理来反映管理层刻意改变企业风险的努力，DID检验表明，受影响的企业大幅降低了系统性和特质性风险，导致企业总风险下降8%。这些风险的降低是通过转移到更安全，但Q值更低的部分，同时关闭风险更高的部分来实现的，投资水平没有显著变化。研究结果表明，在没有其他激励或治理机制补偿的情况下，期权补偿所提供的冒险激励减少加剧了风险相关的代理问题。
亮点：（1）文章有助于研究高管薪酬在激励管理者方面的作用，特别是股票期权对管理层冒险行为的影响。文章调和了目前文献中的不一致证据，表明对薪酬的负外生冲击导致管理者将其业务组合转移至风险较低的部门。（2）文章对管理“安全行事”行为和风险相关代理问题的文献也有广泛的贡献。过往文献证明了管理者在反收购法律后的收购行为降低了风险和公司价值，文章的研究结果进一步证明了这一点。（3）最后，文章深化了会计法规FAS 123R对公司政策影响的文献，研究发现了该法规意想不到且不那么受欢迎的经济后果，主要体现在其导致管理层风险承担能力下降，进而导致公司价值的下降。
03
原文：Albuquerque A, Bennett B, Custódio C, et al. CEO compensation and real estate prices: pay for luck or pay for action?[J]. Review of Accounting Studies, 2023, 28(4): 2401-2447.
CEO compensation and real estate prices: pay for luck or pay for action?
ABSTRACT: This paper uses variation in real estate prices to study Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay for luck. We distinguish between pay for luck and pay for responding to luck (action) by exploiting US GAAP accounting rules, which mandate that real estate used in the firm’s operations is not marked-to-market. This setting allows us to empirically disentangle pay for luck from pay for action, as a change in the value of real estate is only accounted for when the CEO responds to changes in property value. We show that CEO compensation is associated with the following two managerial responses to changes in real estate values: (i) real estate sales and (ii) debt issuance. Overall, we show that CEOs are rewarded for taking value-enhancing actions in response to luck.
CEO薪酬与房地产价格：运气薪酬还是业绩薪酬？
摘要：文章利用房地产价格的变化来研究首席执行官的运气薪酬。通过利用美国公认会计准则（GAAP）来区分运气付费和运气响应（行动）付费，因为美国公认会计准则要求公司运营中使用的房地产不按市值计价。这种设置使作者能够区分运气薪酬和业绩薪酬，因为只有当CEO对资产价值的变化做出反应时，才会考虑房地产价值的变化。文章表明，CEO薪酬与能够体现房地产价值变化（运气）的以下两种管理有关：房地产资产的销售和债务发行。总的来说，文章表明CEO为了响应运气而采取价值提升的行动时会获得一定的奖励。
亮点：（1）文章利用会计准则对房地产确认和计量采取历史成本而非公允价值的规定区分运气薪酬和业绩报酬，具有一定的新颖性。研究结果进一步提供了运气薪酬存在方面的证据。（2）文章为“运气薪酬”的争论提供了一个新的视角。作者利用文章的设置，较有效的识别了CEO运气薪酬做出的具体行为反应。文章发现CEO会因响应运气的行动下而获得奖励，因为从股东的视角来看，CEO响应运气的行动是最优的决策。
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总编：游家兴
解析：谭传兴
审校：林珉慧 陈沁圆
编辑：潘芳妍
