01
原文：Jing C, Keasey K, Lim I, et al. Analyst Coverage and Corporate Environmental Policies[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024, 59(4): 1586-1619.
Analyst Coverageand Corporate Environmental Policies
ABSTRACT: Exploiting two quasi-natural experiments, we find that firms increase emissions of toxic pollution following decreases in analyst coverage. The effects are stronger for firms with low initial analyst coverage, poor corporate governance, and firms subject to less stringent monitoring by environmental regulators. Decreases in environmental-related questions raised in conference calls, an increased cost of monitoring to institutional shareholders reductions in pollution abatement investment, and the weakening of internal governance related to environmental performance are channels through which reduced analyst coverage contributes to increases in firm pollution. Our study highlights the monitoring role analysts play in shaping corporate environmental policies.
分析师关注与公司环境政策
摘要：这篇文章通过两个准自然实验，考察分析师关注与公司环境政策之间的关系。研究发现，在分析师关注减少后，公司有毒污染物的排放量会增加。这种影响在初始分析师关注较低、公司治理较差以及受到不太严格的环境监管的公司中更为显著。从作用机制来看，电话会议中环境相关问题的减少、机构股东监督成本的增加、污染治理投资的减少，以及与环境绩效相关的内部治理的弱化，都是分析师关注降低导致公司污染增加的作用渠道。该研究强调了分析师在塑造企业环境政策方面所发挥的监督作用。
亮点：（1）创新性地研究了金融分析师与企业环境政策之间的关系。文章提供了金融分析师在改善企业环境政策方面发挥积极作用的证据，补充了企业环境政策决定因素的有关文献。（2）独特的数据集和研究方法。文章使用了有毒废物排放量（TRI数据库）作为衡量企业环境表现的连续变量；在研究方法上，采用两个准自然试验——券商倒闭和券商合并事件能够较好地考察分析师关注对企业污染的影响。（3）从环境方面提供了分析师监督作用的证据。文章提供了有力的证据来证明分析师在改善企业环境政策方面的作用，支持了金融分析师是制约企业不当行为的关键外部监督者的观点。文章强调了分析师的监督功能在约束企业环境不当行为方面可以替代传统的公司治理机制和监管监督。
02
原文：Gomes A, Gopalan R, Leary M T, et al. Analyst Coverage Networks and Corporate Financial Policies[J]. Management Science, 2024, 70(8): 5016-5039.
Analyst Coverage Networks and Corporate Financial Policies
ABSTRACT：We use the setting of analyst coverage networks to shed light on the nature of peer effects in financial policies. First, we use the “friends-of-friends” approach and exploit the fact that analyst coverage networks partially overlap to identify endogenous peer effects, in which firms respond directly to the capital structure choices of their peers, separately from contextual effects, in which they respond to their peers’ characteristics. We further show evidence that analysts facilitate these peer effects through their role as informational intermediaries. Analyst network peer effects are distinct from industry peer effects and are more pronounced among peers connected by analysts that are more experienced and from more influential brokerage houses. Finally, the analyst peer effects become weaker after exogenous reductions in common coverage as a consequence of brokerage closures.
分析师覆盖网络和公司财务政策
摘要：文章使用分析师覆盖网络研究财务政策中同伴效应的本质。首先，使用“朋友的朋友”方法，并利用分析师覆盖网络部分重叠的事实来识别内生同伴效应，在这种效应中，公司直接对同行的资本结构选择做出反应。这与情境效应不同，后者指公司对其同行特征作出反应。进一步研究表明，分析师通过信息中介的角色促进了这些同伴效应。分析师网络的同伴效应不同于行业的同伴效应，且在经验更丰富、来自更有影响力的经纪公司的分析师所连接的同行中，这种效应更为明显。最后，随着券商倒闭导致的共同覆盖减少，分析师的同业效应变得减弱。
亮点：（1）扩展了关于公司政策中同伴效应的有关研究。文章使用“朋友的朋友”方法，能够将公司对其同业政策选择的回应与同业特征的影响区分开来，而这一区分在以往的方法中难以实现。该方法还可以用于记录部分重叠的其他网络中的内生同业效应，例如董事会网络和供应链网络。（2）展示了分析师在推动公司间财务政策传播方面可能发挥的重要作用。这种信息传递代表了一种尚未得到充分探索的渠道，可能引发同业效应。（3）丰富了共享分析师覆盖网络的效应的有关研究。文章强调了证券分析师在促进公司间（不仅仅是公司与投资者之间）信息流动中的一个未被充分重视的作用，即展示了它可以导致财务政策的共同性。
03
原文：Pittman J, Yang Z, Yu S, et al. Political Incentives and Analyst Bias: Evidence from China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2024.
Political incentives and analyst bias: Evidence from China
ABSTRACT：This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political-economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.
政治动机和分析师偏见：来自中国的证据
摘要： 这篇文章通过考察政治激励所起的作用，扩展了对金融分析师偏见决定因素的有关研究。利用中国一系列的省级政治事件，研究发现，在政治事件期间，分析师更有可能发布有利的建议或向上修正他们的建议，这种现象在与政治人物有联系的券商雇佣的分析师中更为显著。横截面证据表明，政治事件对分析师乐观情绪的影响集中在那些资本市场发展对政治家来说较为重要或现任政治人物面临晋升时更加明显。股票回报分析显示，从长远来看，在政治事件期间发布的有利建议明显不如其他时期的建议盈利，并且在投资者看来可信度较低。进一步研究还发现，金融分析师更有可能在政治事件期间发布乐观的盈利预测。总体而言，文章的研究结果表明，政治激励扭曲了分析师的观点，政治经济因素影响了中国的企业信息环境。
亮点：（1）扩展了关于政治经济因素如何通过信息提供者来影响企业信息环境的有关证据。文章基于中国各省每五年举行的省级党代会作为冲击事件，通过展示政治周期如何影响分析师行为，深化了读者对资本市场信息环境的理解。（2）拓宽了关于政治周期对经济和商业活动影响的研究。有研究表明，政客在选举前会操控宏观经济变量，文章揭示出政治人物会在重大政治事件前通过多种方式影响经济活动和市场行为，扩展了关于金融分析师偏差成因的研究。
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总编：游家兴
解析：苏三妹
审校：陈璐 孙倩
编辑：潘芳妍
