01
原文：Hassan, T. A., Hollander, S., Van Lent, L., & Tahoun, A. (2019). Firm-level political risk: Measurement and effects. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(4), 2135-2202.
Firm-level political risk: Measurement and effects
ABSTRACT: We adapt simple tools from computational linguistics to construct a new measure of political risk faced by individual US firms: the share of their quarterly earnings conference calls that they devote to political risks. We validate our measure by showing it correctly identifies calls containing extensive conversations on risks that are political in nature, that it varies intuitively over time and across sectors, and that it correlates with the firm’s actions and stock market volatility in a manner that is highly indicative of political risk. Firms exposed to political risk retrench hiring and investment and actively lobby and donate to politicians. These results continue to hold after controlling for news about the mean (as opposed to the variance) of political shocks. Interestingly, the vast majority of the variation in our measure is at the firm level rather than at the aggregate or sector level, in the sense that it is neither captured by the interaction of sector and time fixed effects, nor by heterogeneous exposure of individual firms to aggregate political risk. The dispersion of this firm-level political risk increases significantly at times with high aggregate political risk. Decomposing our measure of political risk by topic, we find that firms that devote more time to discussing risks associated with a given political topic tend to increase lobbying on that topic, but not on other topics, in the following quarter.
企业层面的政治风险：度量与影响
摘要：我们采用了计算语言学中的简单工具，构建了一种衡量美国企业所面临政治风险的新指标：企业在季度收益电话会议上讨论政治风险的比例。我们通过显示它正确识别包含大量政治性风险对话的电话来验证我们的测量，它随时间和跨部门直观地变化，并且它以高度指示政治风险的方式与公司的行为和股票市场波动相关。面临政治风险的公司会缩减招聘和投资，并积极游说和向政客捐款。在控制了政治冲击的均值（而不是方差）之后，这些结果仍然成立。有趣的是，我们测量的绝大多数变化是在公司层面，而不是在总体或部门层面，因为它既没有被部门和时间固定效应的相互作用所捕获，也没有被单个公司对总体政治风险的异质暴露所捕获。在总体政治风险较高的时期，这种企业层面政治风险的分散性显著增加。按主题分解我们的政治风险衡量标准，我们发现，在接下来的季度里，那些花更多时间讨论与特定政治主题相关的风险的公司倾向于增加对该主题的游说，而不是其他主题。
亮点：（1）文章通过分析公司季度收益电话会议记录，采用了简单的计算语言学工具，构建了一种新的政治风险测量方法，即通过识别和计算会议中涉及政治风险的对话比例来量化公司层面的政治风险；（2）在提出理论模型的基础上，作者通过实证分析验证了模型的有效性。结果表明，政治风险测量值与公司的投资、雇佣、游说活动等行为显著相关，证明了该测量方法在实际应用中的可靠性；（3）文章在理解和量化公司层面的政治风险方面提供了新的视角和横向方法，对后续该领域的研究发展提供了良好的基础。
02
原文：Huang, G. Y., Shen, C. H. H., & Wu, Z. X. (2023). Firm-level political risk and debt choice. Journal of Corporate Finance, 78, 102332.
Firm-level political risk and debt choice
ABSTRACT: We examine the effect of firm-level political risk on debt choices and find: (i) firms with higher political risk display a preference for private debt over public debt; (ii) the magnitude of this preference varies with the aggregate policy uncertainty; (iii) politically risky firms indeed receive less favorable terms in the bond market. To explain such findings, we show that private lenders have several advantages in serving politically risky borrowers. First, to the extent that lenders cannot perfectly foresee the adoption of new government policies, private lenders’ expertise in implementing the reorganization process is important to limit their potential loss. Second, politically risky borrowers must undertake significant operation adjustments facing rising policy uncertainty. Private lenders can gather accurate information and closely monitor these adjustments. Last, as the severity of political risk varies with aggregate policy uncertainty, there exists an implicit contract between a borrower and its relationship bank, whereby a borrower accepts less favorable terms during normal times in exchange for the bank’s support during difficult times. Taken together, this study advances our understanding of how cross-sectionally heterogeneous political risk influences corporate debt choice.
企业层面的政治风险与债务选择
摘要：本文考察了企业层面的政治风险对债务选择的影响并发现：（一）政治风险较高的企业对私人债务的偏好高于公共债务；（二）这种偏好的程度随总体政策的不确定性而变化；（三）具有政治风险的公司确实在债券市场上获得较少的优惠条件。为了解释这些发现，文章表明私人贷款机构在为具有政治风险的借款人提供服务方面具有若干优势。首先，在某种程度上，贷款人不能完全预见政府新政策的实施，私人贷款人在实施重组过程中的专业知识对于限制其潜在损失非常重要。其次，面对不断上升的政策不确定性，具有政治风险的借款人必须进行重大的经营调整。私人贷款机构可以收集准确的信息并密切监控这些调整。最后，由于政治风险的严重程度随总体政策不确定性的变化而变化，借款人与其关系银行之间存在一种隐性契约，即借款人在正常时期接受不太有利的条款，以换取银行在困难时期的支持。综上所述，本研究促进了对跨部门异质政治风险如何影响公司债务选择问题的理解。
亮点：（1）首次研究了企业层面的政治风险如何影响债务融资选择。通过使用企业层面测度对政策不确定性的研究进行了区分并提供了新见解；（2）在不同颗粒度上进行了横截面分析。文章研究了高、低政治风险企业的融资选择差异如何随总体政策不确定性而变化，这只能通过使用企业层面的测量来实现。
03
原文：Mahmoud Gad, Valeri Nikolaev, Ahmed Tahoun, Laurence van Lent. (2024). Firm-level political risk and credit markets[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 77(2-3):101642.
Firm-level political risk and credit markets
ABSTRACT: We take advantage of a new composite measure of political risk (Hassan et al., 2019) to study the effects of firm-level political risk on private debt markets. First, we use panel data tests and exploit the redrawing of US congressional districts to uncover plausibly exogenous variation in firm-level political risk. We show that borrowers’ political risk is linked to interest rates set by lenders. Second, we test for the transmission of political risk from lenders to borrowers. We predict and find that lender-level political risk propagates to borrowers through lending relationships. Our analysis allows for endogenous matching between lenders and borrowers and indicates the presence of network effects in diffusing political risk throughout the economy. Finally, we introduce new text-based methods to analyze the distinct sources of political risk to lenders and borrowers and provide textual evidence of the transmission of political risk from lenders to borrowers.
公司层面的政治风险和信贷市场
摘要：本文利用一种新的政治风险综合衡量标准（Hassan et al., 2019）来研究企业层面的政治风险对私人债务市场的影响。首先，文章使用面板数据测试并利用美国国会选区的重新划分来揭示公司层面政治风险的似是而非的外源性变化。结果表明，借款人的政治风险与贷款人设定的利率有关。其次，文章测试了政治风险从贷款人到借款人的传递。文章预测并发现贷款人层面的政治风险通过借贷关系向借款人传播。文章的分析考虑了贷款人和借款人之间的内生匹配，并表明网络效应在整个经济中扩散政治风险的存在。最后，文章引入了新的基于文本的方法来分析贷款人和借款人的不同政治风险来源，并提供了政治风险从贷款人到借款人传递的文本证据。
亮点：（1）使用企业特定的政治风险度量提供了政治风险和信贷市场结果之间的因果关系证据。（2）证明了公司层面的政治风险是通过商业关系在公司之间传递的。在存在贷款关系的情况下，银行政治风险的增加会导致借款人的利率增加。（3）引入新的、基于文本的方法为理解贷款人和借款人政治风险的不同来源提供了新的见解。
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总编：游家兴
解析：刘晗
审校：林珉慧 陈沁圆
编辑：潘芳妍
