MIT商学院博士生个人书单｜集体行动：奥尔森之后？
文摘
社会
2024-10-07 06:40
美国
Hello，我是MIT商学院经济社会学项目的博士生，主要从模型角度研究集体行动的机制以及共识、权力、规范是如何产生的。跟国内的朋友和老师们交流的时候，我的一个很深的感觉是国内外学界在这个方向上关注的重点以及做出的理论假设区别很大。鉴于我本身就是研究共识的，我也希望能创造更多的共识。因此，我在这里分享一下一个比较独特的，结合了社会学、组织学、心理学、复杂系统等多种视角的书单，供同好们参考交流。因为这是个跨领域的书单，我会简短地介绍每个部分与集体行动的关系，但我希望尽量避免自己给出过多的对文献本身及这个领域的总结，毕竟跨领域研究的创新力本就来自每个学者对同样的研究成果不同的理解。集体行动的研究领域受到经济学影响很深，最著名的是奥尔森1965年《集体行动的逻辑》。奥尔森假设所有人都是理性人，他认为当参与集体行动需要代价，而其一旦成功，成果会惠及所有人的时候，每个人都有动机“搭便车”。从这个角度，理解集体行动的逻辑在于理解理性人什么时候会认为参与集体行动是理性的：比如当存在制度性或者社会性惩罚的时候，搭便车就没那么容易了。但是这个逻辑至少在三个层面受到新的研究挑战：首先，人类并不是完全理性的。事实上，在信息不完备的时候，通过“有限理性”快速做出决策，甚至是比试图达到“完全理性”（而浪费时间在获取信息上）更“理性”的策略。其次，一个集体或者组织并不总是能意识到其面临的问题是什么、首先需要解决的危机是什么，组织本身需要在一个不确定的环境下“学习”。最后，权力、规范、制度等这些协助或者阻碍集体行动的要素，不一定是外界施加的，也可能是从组织内部涌现的。这个书单展现了一些有意思的可能性，比如：解决方案有时先于问题的产生便已经出现（Cohen et al., 1972）；集体行动存在临界点——星星之火，在没有预兆的情况下，有一天突然燎原（比如Kuran, 1991）；就仿佛“皇帝的新衣“讲的那样，组织成员有时候会集体强化一个几乎没人支持的社会规范，甚至积极踊跃地惩罚不遵守这个规范的成员（Centola et al., 2005）等等。这些可能性说明，理解集体行动，我们需要理解人和组织的非理性部分，以及观念和权力在一个社群中的演化和传播，是如何被社会结构所影响的。
一、有限理性(bounded rationality)和组织学习(organizational learning)·Gigerenzer, G. (2020). What is bounded rationality? In Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality (pp. 55-69). Routledge.·Goldstein, D. (2011) "Heuristics" The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology·March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. Organization Science, 2(1), 71-87.·Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic management journal, 14(S2), 95-112.·Hilgartner, S., & Bosk, C. L. (1988). The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model. American Journal of Sociology, 94(1), 53-78.·Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), 1-25. 以Schelling (1978) 和Granovetter (1978)为代表，美国社会学开始意识到集体行动并不是个人行为和倾向的简单加总，而是受到人与人之间的关系纽带、交流的方式和空间结构等等的影响。这种复杂的互动关系，把仿真建模（Agent Based Model, ABM）引入了对集体行动的机制探讨。同时，实验和案例研究也帮助完善了这些新机制的理论。·Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of Sociology, 83(6), 1420-1443.·Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior. Norton.·Macy, M. W., & Willer, R. (2002). From factors to actors: Computational sociology and agent-based modeling. Annual Review of Sociology, 28(1), 143-166. （这一篇不完全是关于集体行动，但是是很好的一篇面向社会学的ABM介绍）·Baldassarri, D. (2011). "Collective Action" The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology·Macy, M. (1991). Chains of cooperation: Threshold effects in collective action. American Sociological Review, 56(6), 730-747.·Marwell, G., & Oliver, P. (1993). The Critical Mass in Collective Action (Studies in Rationality and Social Change). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.·Centola, D. (2013). A Simple Model of Stability in Critical Mass Dynamics. Journal of Statistical Physics, 151, 238-253.·【实验】Willer, R. (2009). Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem. American Sociological Review·【案例】Lohmann, S. (1994). The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91. World Politics, 47(1), 42-101.·【案例】Kuran, T. (1991). Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. World Politics, 44(1), 7–48.人们参与集体行动或者服从一个集体规范，其实有个很简单的理由：人天性里是有利他性的，而且尤其愿意为了自己认同的集体做出贡献。这一部分主要探讨，这种集体感与集体行动的关系，以及当组织成员有多种身份的时候，组织边界的复杂性。·Gould, R. V. (1995). Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.·Gould, R. V. (1993). Collective Action and Network Structure. American Sociological Review, 58(2), 182-196.·Halevy, N., Bornstein, G., & Sagiv, L. (2008). “In-Group Love” and “Out-Group Hate” as Motives for Individual Participation in Intergroup Conflict: A New Game Paradigm. Psychological Science, 19(4), 405–411.·Laumann, E., Galaskiewicz, J., & Marsden, P. (1978). Community Structure as Interorganizational Linkages. Annual Review of Sociology, 4, 455-484.·Breiger, R. L. 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Between Monoculture and Cultural Polarization: Agent-based Models of the Interplay of Social Influence and Cultural Diversity. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory, 25, 996-1023.·DellaPosta, D., Shi, Y., & Macy, M. (2015). Why do liberals drink lattes? American Journal of Sociology, 120, 1473-1511.·Centola, D., González-Avella, J. C., Eguíluz, V. M., & San Miguel, M. (2007). Homophily, Cultural Drift, and the Co-Evolution of Cultural Groups. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6), 905-929.·Baldassarri, D., & Bearman, P. (2007). Dynamics of political polarization. American Sociological Review, 72, 784-811.·Goldberg, A., & Stein, S. K. (2018). Beyond Social Contagion: Associative Diffusion and the Emergence of Cultural Variation. American Sociological Review, 83(5), 897–932.·Phillips, D. J., & Zuckerman, E. W. (2001). Middle-Status Conformity: Theoretical Restatement and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets. 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American Journal of Sociology, 99, 1455-1491.·Reagans, R. E., & Zuckerman, E. W. (2008). Why knowledge does not equal power: The network redundancy trade-off. Industrial and Corporate Change, 17, 903-944.·Centola, D., & Macy, M. (2007). Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 113(3), 702-734.
