重要的是你在哪里:网络位置、设计网络与中央政府部门终结

文摘   2024-09-02 08:00   北京  

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今天为大家带来的是Liang Ma, Weixing Liu, Sicheng Chen, Tom Christensen的研究:《重要的是你在哪里:网络位置、设计网络与中央政府部门终结》。

摘要

       
本研究综合协作网络理论和机构终止理论的见解,探讨部委机构在设计合作网络中的位置如何影响其生存概率。通过使用2005年至2020年间中国中央部委机构变迁的数据,以及由国务院安排的1243个联合任务所衍生的设计网络,本文进行事件史分析以检验研究的假设。研究结果表明,若部委机构处于设计网络的中心位置能够显著降低机构被终止的概率,而处于设计网络边缘的机构在重大机构改革中生存的可能性较低。研究还发现,较强势的机构比如规模较大、具有经济职能或者由立法机构法定创建),更能从中心化的设计网络位置中受益。这些发现突显部委机构在设计网络中的位置对其生存前景的关键影响。因此,部委机构应战略性地改善它们在国务院任务安排中设计网络的位置,以降低其被终止的风险。

This study synthesizes insights from collaborative network and agency termination theories to investigate how agencies' positions in designed networks impact their survival probability Using longitudinal data for the central apparatus in China from 2005 to 2020, along with the designed networks derived from 1243 joint tasks arranged by the State Council, we conducted event history analyses to test our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that a centralized network position can significantly reduce an agency's likelihood of termination, while agencies in the periphery of designed networks may be less likely to survive significant restructuring. It is also discovered that stronger agencies. such as larger, economically functioning, or statutorily created ones, benefit more from centralized network positions. These findings underscore the pivotal role played by agencies' positions within designed networks in their survival prospects. As such agencies should strategically leverage their positions within collaborative networks to mitigate the risk of termination


引言

INTRODUCTION

       

在复杂的公共行政和治理领域中,网络在促进各机构之间的协作和资源共享方面发挥着关键作用。机构在这些网络中的战略位置至关重要。特别是在目标明确、自上而下管理和成员边界清晰的设计型网络中,理解节点的结构属性对于优化资源分配和实现预期的协作成果至关重要。与此同时,公共管理的动态环境突出了机构终止在实践和理论上的重要性。随着组织的发展或与当前需求不再匹配,机构终止成为一种关键机制,用于高效地重新分配资源,并使政府运作能够与其面临的当代挑战保持一致性。尽管关于机构终止驱动因素的文献广泛,但设计型网络中某机构位置对其终止可能性的影响仍然少有研究涉及。


In the intricate realm of public administration and governance, networks play a pivotal role in enabling collaboration and resource sharing among various agencies. The strategic positions of agencies within these networks are crucial. Particularly in designed networks, which are characterized by clear goals, top-down management, and well-defined membership boundaries, understanding the structural properties of nodes is essential for optimizing resource allocation and achieving desired collaborative outcomes. Simultaneously, the dynamic landscape of public management emphasizes the practical and theoretical importance of agency termination. As organizations evolve or become misaligned with current needs, agency termination emerges as a crucial mechanism for reallocating resources efficiently and aligning governmental operations with con- temporary challenges. Despite the extensive literature on the drivers of agency termination, the influence of an agency's position within a designed network on its likelihood of termination has been largely overlooked.

       


研究问题 

RESEARCH QUESTION

       

中央政府机构在设计型网络中的位置如何影响其存废?
典型的机构特征是否会调节这一网络效应?

How do central government agencies' positions in designed networks affect their termination?
Do typical agency characteristics moderate the network effects?
       

是的

研究假设

HYPOTHESES

      

假设 1:在设计型网络中,占据更中心位置的机构不太可能被终止。
假设 2a:机构规模会调节网络位置与机构终止之间的关系,对于规模较大的机构,这种关系更强。
假设 2b:机构的创建来源会调节网络位置与机构终止之间的关系,对于由立法机构法定创建的机构,这种关系更强。
假设 2c:机构职能会调节网络位置与机构终止之间的关系,对于具有经济职能的机构,这种关系更强。


Hypothesis 1. Agencies occupying more centralized positions in designed networks are less likely to be terminated.
Hypothesis 2a. Agency size moderates the relationship between network position and agency termination in designed networks, which is stronger for bigger agencies.
Hypothesis 2b. The source of creation of agency moderates the relationship between network position and agency termination in designed networks, which is stronger for agencies created by law.
Hypothesis 2c. Agency function moderates the relationship between network position and agency termination in designed networks, which is stronger for economic agencies.
       


研究方法

METHODS


1) 分析单位和数据来源
Unit of analysis and data sources      

分析单位是机构-年度。中央政府机构网络结构的数据来自中央政府工作报告。关于机构终止、层级结构、行政级别和职能的数据来自各机构的官方网站。

The unit of analysis was agency-year. The data on network structure of central government agencies are from the central government work reports. The data regarding termination, hierarchical structures, administrative levels, and functions of central government agencies were sourced from their official websites.


2) 模型设定
Model specifications      

考虑到研究使用了结合时间序列和横截面数据的数据库来分析机构终止问题,我们认为EHA(生存分析)是最合适的方法。为了减轻异方差性可能带来的影响,我们在回归模型中采用了稳健标准误,并考虑了在机构层面的聚类。此外,为了解决可能存在的时间依赖性问题,作者在分析中加入了持续时间变量,并使用了时间的三次样条曲线。


Considering that our research focused on examining agency termination using a dataset that combines time-series and cross-sectional data, we deemed the EHA (survival analysis) as the most suitable approach. To mitigate the potential concern of heteroscedasticity, we applied robust standard errors in our regression models, taking into account clustering at the agency level. Moreover, in order to address any potential time dependence, our analysis included the duration variable and utilized cubic splines of time.



研究结果

RESULTS


估计结果显示,机构终止与机构在设计网络中居中位置之间存在负相关关系,并且这一关联具有统计显著性。例如,当机构的度中心性增加 1% 时,机构终止的风险将减少 2.92%。这种关联在网络位置的各种度量中均得以体现,如接近中心性、中介中心性、特征向量中心性、核心位置和结构洞。因此,研究结果支持假设 1。

与假设2a一致,我们的分析表明,网络位置的影响在较大的机构中更为显著,这从机构规模的显著负向调节效应中可以看出。此外,研究结果还表明,网络位置对机构终止概率的影响因机构设立方式而异。相较于通过国务院指令设立的机构,立法机构法定创建的机构在网络位置与终止之间的关系更为密切(假设2b得到支持)。另外,我们发现,经济机构的网络位置与终止之间的相关性比非经济机构更强,表明经济机构在设计网络中对中心位置的依赖性更强,以维持其生存(假设2c得到支持)。


The results demonstrate a negative and statistically significant association between agency termination and the centralized positions of agencies within the designed network. For example, the degree centrality of agency increases 1%, the risk of agency termination would decrease by 2.92%. This association held across various measures of network position, such as closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality, core, and structural holes. As a result, our findings support H1.

Since degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality are the three most used network centrality indicator in previous studies, we first interact these three network position indicators with agencies attributes in Tables 3-5, respectively. Consistent with H2,our analysis reveals that the impact of network position is more pronounced for larger agencies, as indicated by the significantly negative moderating effect of agency size. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that the effect of network position on the odds of agency termination differs depending on the method of agency creation. Agencies established by the approval of the NPC exhibited a stronger relationship between network position and termination compared to those created through directives of the State Council. Additionally, we find that network position is more strongly correlated with termination among economic agencies than non-economic agencies, suggesting that economic agencies rely more heavily on a centralized network position within the designed network for survival.



结语

CONCLUSION


如前人研究所示,官僚机构并非长生不老。解释机构的终止或重组具有重要的理论意义。本研究在网络理论的复杂框架下,尤其是在中国中央政府的背景中,显著推进了我们对机构终止的理解。通过实证调查机构网络位置对其终止风险的影响,本文不仅记录了结构性因素的影响,还揭示了机构特征与网络中心性之间的战略互动。本文的研究发现将社会网络文献与机构终止的复杂过程联系起来,强调在政府任务合作网络中的中心位置如何显著增强中央机构的生存能力。这一新颖见解与 Kaufman 关于官僚结构内在稳定性和韧性的主张相一致,表明网络中的中心性可以作为增强这些属性的关键因素。

Bureaucracy, as demonstrated in previous studies, is not immortal. Explaining the termination or restructuring of agencies is of theoretical importance. This study significantly advances our understanding of agency termination within the complex framework of network theory, specifically in the context of the Chinese central government. By empirically investigating the impact of an agency's network position on its risk of termination, we not only document the structural influences but also illuminate the strategic interplay between agency characteristics and network centrality. Our findings interlink the literature on social networks with the intricate processes of agency termination, emphasizing how central positions within official government task cooperation networks significantly bolster the survival of central agencies. This novel insight aligns with Kaufman's assertions about the inherent stability and resilience within bureaucratic structures, suggesting that centrality in networks can serve as a critical factor in enhancing these attributes.     


文章来源:

Ma, L.,  Liu, W.,  Chen, S., &  Christensen, T. (2024).  Where you are matters: Network position, designed network, and central government agency termination. Public Administration,  1–24.

原文链接: 

https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.13026(或点击文末“阅读原文”查看)


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翻译|陈柳

编辑|陈柳

审核|Sarah E. Larson

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