蓝色的天，冰冷的心：环境规制的政治成本

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环境问题对公民的福祉构成挑战，过高的污染物浓度可能会产生相当大的健康成本。迫于民众的压力，政府有动力制定和执行环境规制。由于环境规制可能会带来意想不到的负面经济后果，因此有越来越多的文献对其经济成本进行了描述。然而，我们目前对环境规制的政治后果了解有限，其作用也是喜忧参半。一方面，环境规制可能会产生积极的政治后果。严重的污染会引起公众的广泛关注，降低对政府的满意度，甚至引发社会动荡。公民通常会要求改善环境质量，而环境质量的改善可能会满足公民的要求并增加他们的政治支持。但另一方面，环境规制可能会带来意想不到的负面影响。严格的环境规制通常依赖于强制手段来实现强制遵守，但其执行效果可能适得其反，公民会指责政府过于严格。基于此，我们通过调查中国环境规制的政治成本来填补这一空白。为了减少严重的空气污染，近年来，中国政府重新下放了环境治理的控制权，并启动了自上而下的严格执法，以激励地方官员。地方政府倾向于积极执行环境法规，以应对来自上层的巨大政治压力。

Environmental issues pose challenges to the well-being of citizens; in fact, exceedingly high pollutant concentration could engender considerable health costs. In response to popular pressure, governments are incentivized to enact and enforce environmental regulations. Since the unintended negative economic consequences may result from environmental regulations, a rising literature depicts their economic cost. However, we currently have a limited understanding of the political consequences of environmental regulations, and their role remaining mixed. On the one hand, environmental regulations may have positive political consequences. Severe pollution incites wide public concern and undermines satisfaction with governments, even fueling social unrest. Citizens typically demand better environmental quality, the improvement of which may meet their demands and increase their political support. On the other hand, environmental regulations may incur unintended negative consequences. Stringent environmental regulations are more likely to rely on coercive tools to enforce compliance, yet their enforcement can be counterproductive, with citizens blaming governments for excessive stringency. In this study, we address the gap by investigating the political cost of environmental regulations in China. To reduce serious air pollution, the Chinese central government has recentralized control of environmental governance and initiated tight top-down enforcements to incentivize local bureaucrats in recent years. Local governments tend to aggressively implement environmental regulations in response to severe political pressure from above.

为了估算环境规制的效果，我们以清洁取暖改造政策为例。清洁取暖改造政策是中国华北地区控制空气污染的一项重要环境法规。长期以来，煤炭一直是华北地区的主要能源。与针对企业的普通法规不同，该政策旨在用清洁能源替代煤炭，用于家庭冬季取暖。从2017年开始，中央政府选择了三轮试点城市强制实施这一政策。到2019年，在中国北方66个城市中，实施该政策的试点城市达到37个。清洁取暖改造政策是严格环境监管的典型案例。为了执行这项雄心勃勃的政策，地方政府采取了一系列强有力的措施。一些地方政府取消了煤炭市场，并限制空气污染严重地区使用煤炭。这种严格的政策措施为我们提供了一个估算其后果的独特机会。

我们编制了全面的城市级和个人级数据集并结合应用多种方法以识别研究问题所目标探索的因果效应和机制。我们首先构建了2012-2019年的城市层面数据集，并采用差分估计法（DID）来识别环境规制的环境效应。然后，我们使用2012-2020年的五轮中国家庭面板研究（CFPS）数据来估计环境规制的政治效应。最后，我们设计并开展了一项针对338个村庄2658名居民的原创调查，以探讨可能的机制。

We compiled comprehensive city-level and individual-level datasets and combined multiple methods to identify the causal effects and mechanisms targeted by the research question. We first constructed a city-level dataset for 2012–2019 and employed a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation to identify the environmental effect of the environmental regulation. Then, we used five rounds of China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) data for 2012–2020 to estimate the political effect of environmental regulation. Finally, we designed and conducted an original survey of 2,658 residents in 338 villages to explore possible mechanisms.

估算过程：为了评估环境法规对空气质量的影响，我们构建了2012年至2019年的城市级数据集。为了使估算结果具有可比性，我们的分析重点关注中国北方的66个地级市，不包括北京和天津。关键自变量是清洁供暖改造政策的采用情况。为了确定是否采用该政策，我们使用城市在t年及之后是否被选为试点城市。我们的因变量是空气污染，由两种主要空气污染物确定：PM2.5和SO2。我们通过在ArcMap中将PM2.5和SO2网格覆盖到中国城市级行政边界上，并计算每个城市多边形内所有网格的平均浓度，获得了城市-年份的年平均浓度数据。为了捕捉混杂因素，我们控制了人均GDP、人均财政收入、人口密度、城市建成区面积和年平均风速。在方法上，我们利用了基于环境法规采用情况的空间和时间变化的双重差分法（DID）。

主要结果：清洁供暖改造政策显著减少了包括PM2.5和SO2在内的污染物。该政策对环境有效，实现了预期目标。

Estimation process: To evaluate the impact of environmental regulations on air quality, we construct a city-level dataset between 2012 and 2019. To make the estimation comparable, our analysis focuses on 66 cities at the prefecture level in Northern China, thus excluding provincial-level cities, including Beijing and Tianjin. The key independent variable is the adoption of the clean heating renovation policy. To identify the adoption of this policy, we use whether a city was selected as a pilot city in year t and afterward. Our outcome variable is air pollution, identified by two major air pollutants: PM2.5 and SO2. We obtained city-year annual average concentration data by overlaying the PM2.5 and SO2 grids on Chinese city-level administrative boundaries in ArcMap and calculating the average concentration amounts of all grids within each city polygon. To capture confounding factors, we control GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, population density, urban build-up area, and annual average wind speed. We employ a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis reliant on the spatial and temporal variation of adopting the environmental regulation.

Main findings: The clean heating renovation policy significantly reduces pollutants, including PM2.5 and SO2. This policy is environmentally effective and achieves its intended aims.

估算过程：为了评估环境规制的政治后果，我们使用了2012、2014、2016、2018和2020年的五波中国家庭调查（CFPS）数据。CFPS包含两个关于政治态度的问题：对当地干部的信任和对当地政府的支持。前者衡量了对当地官员的信任程度，后者反映了公民对地方政府表现的评估。我们使用这两个变量来衡量个人对地方政府和官员的政治态度。我们使用双向固定效应线性模型来估计结果。个体固定效应使我们能够控制时间不变的个体特征，而年度固定效应则捕捉特定年份的宏观政策冲击。清洁供暖改造政策在城市层面实施，因此我们还控制了城市固定效应，以捕捉时间不变的城市特征。

主要结果：清洁供暖改造政策大大降低了公民对地方官员的信任和对地方政府的支持。虽然这项政策明显改善了空气质量，但它降低了当地居民对地方政府和官员的评估。清洁供暖改造政策的实施以牺牲地方政治合法性为代价改善了空气质量。

Estimation process: To evaluate the political consequences of environmental regulation, we employ five waves of China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) data from 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020. CFPS contains two questions on political attitudes: trust in local cadres and support of local governments. The former measures the level of trust in local officials, the latter captures how citizens evaluate local governments’ performance. We use two variables to measure individuals’ political attitudes toward local governments and officials. We use the two-way fixed effect linear model to estimate our results. Individual fixed effect allows us to control time-invariant individual characteristics, and year-fixed effect captures year-specific macro policy shocks. The clean heating renovation policy was implemented at the city level, so we also control the city-fixed effect to capture time-invariant city characteristics.

Main findings: The clean heating renovation policy significantly lowers citizens’ trust in local officials and support of local governments. Although this policy evidently improves air quality, it reduces local residents' evaluation of local governments and officials. The adoption of the clean heating renovation policy improves air quality at the cost of local political legitimacy.

估算过程：为进一步探究严格的环境规制如何以政治合法性为代价来改善环境质量的背后机制，我们设计并开展了一项原创调查。我们在华北地区选择了一个试点城市展开调查，在全市人口较多的乡镇中随机选取了一些村庄，然后在每个村庄随机抽取8户家庭。我们在调查中纳入了一系列问题，主要从政策成本和政策参与两个方面来探讨机制，例如要求受访者评估他们对政策成本的接受程度，并回答村庄中是哪个实体决定了清洁供暖改造政策的采用（村委会还是村民大会/代表大会）。

主要结果：1）清洁供暖改造政策的实施给当地居民带来了高昂的成本。当环境规制给当地居民带来沉重的经济负担时，环境规制会大大降低当地居民对政府的信任度。2）大多数村庄在环境规制的实施过程中政策参与度较低。在实施清洁取暖改造政策的村庄中，大多数受访者表示采用清洁取暖改造政策的决定由村委会做出；而仅有一小部分受访者表示，决策由村民大会或代表大会做出。总之，当严格的环境规制给当地居民带来沉重的政策负担，且政策参与度较低时，更有可能削弱当地的政治支持。

Estimation process: To further explore underlying mechanisms of why stringent environmental regulation improves environmental quality at the cost of political legitimacy, we designed and conducted an original survey. We selected one pilot city in Northern China to conduct our survey, by randomly selecting villages among populous towns in the city and then randomly selecting eight households in each village. We included a series of questions in the survey to mostly explore the mechanism from two aspects, both policy cost and policy partcipation, such as asking respondents to rate their acceptance of policy cost, and answer what entity had made the decision to adopt the clean heating renovation policy in their villiages (villagers’ committees or villagers’assembly/representative assembly) .

Main findings: 1）The adoption of the clean heating renovation policy entails high costs for local residents. Environmental regulation significantly reduces local political trust when it entailed high financial burdens for local residents. 2）Most villages had weak policy participation in the implementation of environmental regulation. Among villages implementing clean heating renovation policy, most of the respondents reported that villagers’committees made the decision of adoption, while only a small proportion of respondents claimed that decisions were made by villagers’assembly or representative assembly. In sum, stringent environmental regulations are more likely to reduce local political support when entailing high policy burdens for local residents and having weak policy participation.