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摘要
引言
INTRODUCTION
公众问责与政治权力密不可分。“对权力说真话”的需要已成为老生常谈，而问责制往往被框定为“让权力承担责任”的必要。然而，希望行使问责权的人也需要获得适当的资源和平台，以便行使问责权。因此，显然，治理网络中的权力和资源分配在问责过程中发挥着关键作用。然而，这些相关概念很少被放在一起详细考虑，也很少在不同治理模式或范式的背景下进行探讨。在本文中,我们建议在不同的治理背景下仔细研究这些概念，以加深我们对这两个概念的理解。我们将关于治理范式、问责制、资源相互依赖和权力的文献结合在一起，提出将问责制和权力作为治理网络中行动者之间关系中密不可分（但并不总是成反比）的概念。我们的目标是展示不同治理范式（传统公共管理TPA、新公共管理NPA和新公共治理NPG）中，行为者之间的资源分配如何影响权力和问责制的行使，以及最终如何与不同的民主概念相对应。为此，我们借鉴了资源相互依赖理论；控制权、行动权和权利共享等概念；以及对责任的委托代理、多向、追溯和前瞻性理解。具体来说，我们采用演绎法，借鉴了有针对性的文献综述和我们自身对这些概念的既有认识，概述了支撑这些范式的民主理念，并由此讨论了不同治理背景下问责制的原理和操作。然后，我们重点讨论了这些问责关系如何取决于治理参与者之间的资源分配，以及这与公共管理中如何行使权力（管控、行动和合作）有何对应关系。最后，我们提出一个框架和一系列假设，以指导未来将这些不同概念联系起来的研究。
Public accountability is inextricably linked with political power. The need to “speak truth to power” has become something of a cliché, and accountability is often framed as the need to “hold power to account”. However, those who wish to exercise accountability also need access to the appropriate resources and arenas that enable them to do so. Clearly, therefore, the distribution of power and resources within governance networks plays a key role in accountability processes. Yet, these related concepts are rarely considered together in detail or explored in the context of different governance models or paradigms. In this paper, we suggest that a closer examination of them in different governance contexts can improve our understanding of both concepts. We bring the literatures on governance paradigms, accountability, resource interdependence, and power together, presenting accountability and power as concepts that are inextricably connected (but not always inversely proportionate) in relationships between actors in governance networks. We aim to show how the distribution of resources between actors shapes how power and accountability are exercised within different governance paradigms (Traditional Public Administration [TPA], New Public Management [NPM], and New Public Governance [NPG]), and—ultimately—correspond to different conceptualizations of democracy. To that end, we draw on theories of resource interdependence; the concepts of power over, power to and power with; and principal-agent, multidirectional, retrospective, and prospective understandings of accountability. To be specific, Taking a deductive approach and drawing on a purposive literature review and our own prior knowledge of these concepts, we outline the key understandings of democracy that underpin these paradigms, which leads into a discussion of the rationale for and operationalization of accountability within different governance contexts. We then highlight how these accountability relationships are a function of how resources are distributed between governance actors, and how this corresponds to how power (over, to, and with) can be exercised within public administration. Finally, we present a framework and a set of hypotheses to direct future studies that seek to connect these different concepts.
公共行政中的治理范式
GOVERNANCE PARADIGMS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
直到20世纪70年代末，韦伯式的官僚制在工业化民主国家中占据主导地位，这构成了传统公共行政（TPA）的范式。TPA的基础思想是，政治和公共行政是是政府内部的不同职能，而官僚机构在政策制定和实施中扮演着核心角色。民选政治家指导政府各部门实现政策目标，并承担部门活动的总体责任。基于代议制民主的原则，官僚机构代表民选代表和最终的公民，以公共利益的名义行事，公民则通过投票箱表达对政府的批准。公共组织内的专业人才被赋予高度的尊重和自由裁量权，这是基于他们按照促进或保护公共利益的公共服务逻辑行事的假设。国家与社会的关系以家长式主义为特征，并相信政府官僚机构最能解决公共问题。
The TPA paradigm of Weberian bureaucracy was dominant in industrialized democracies until the late 1970s. Underpinning TPA is the idea that politics and public administration are separate functions within government, and that bureaucracies assume a central role in policy-making and implementation. Elected politicians direct government ministries to achieve policy objectives, and assume overall responsibility for departmental activities. Based on the principle of representative democracy, bureaucracies act in the public interest on behalf of elected representatives and ultimately citizens, who express their approval of the government at the ballot box. Professionals within public organizations are granted a high degree of respect and discretion, on the assumption that they operate according to a logic of public service that promotes or protects the public interest. State–societal relations are characterized by paternalism, and the belief that government bureaucracies are best placed to address public problems.
2）新公共管理 New public management
从20世纪70年代开始，许多西方政府对公共服务的治理采取了市场化改革，这成为了众所周知的新公共管理（NPM）范式的一部分。除了认为传统民主制度变得“负担过重”，无法有效解决社会问题，批评传统公共行政（TPA）的人还认为，公民应在公共服务中拥有更多的选择权，且认为接触市场或准市场条件将有助于提高服务交付的经济性、效率和效果。因此，在NPM下，政府将之前直接由部长和官员控制的多种职能外包、私有化和“机构化”。在此之下，民主不仅仅被理解为定期选举中对政党或候选人的投票。相反，它扩展到使公民能够日常选择哪些组织提供公共服务，并使用市场或准市场条件来要求服务提供者负责，基于如果“客户”不满意，他们可以从其他组织获取服务的原则。因此，公民与政府之间的关系更加交易化，重点在于公共服务在多大程度上展现了“物有所值”。然而，NPM几乎从诞生之初就招致批评——部分是因为问责制的原因，因为私营服务提供商最终向股东而非选民汇报，并且可能被政府聘用，在选举周期内代表政府行事。此外，私有化、外包和机构化导致了公共服务景观的碎片化，这使得政策制定者更难解决那些跨越传统部门界限的、明显的难以处理的长期社会、经济和环境“顽疾”问题。
Beginning in the 1970s, many Western governments adopted market-orientated reforms to the governance of public services, which formed part of what became known as the NPM paradigm. Alongside a perception that traditional democracies were becoming “overloaded” and unable to address societal problems effectively, critics of the TPA model argued that citizens should be able to exercise greater choice in public services, and that exposure to market or quasi-market conditions would facilitate greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness in how they are delivered. Under NPM, therefore, governments outsourced, privatized, and “agencified” various functions that were previously under the direct control of ministers and officials. Subsequently, democracy is not understood solely in terms of voting for a party or candidate at periodical elections. Instead, it extends to enabling citizens to choose which organizations deliver their public services on a daily basis, and using market or quasi-market conditions to hold the providers of services accountable, on the basis that “customers” could access services from other organizations if they were dissatisfied. The relationship between citizens and government is therefore more transactional, with a focus on the extent to which public services provide “value for money.”However, NPM attracted criticism almost from its inception—partly on accountability grounds, because private service providers ultimately report to shareholders rather than voters and may be contracted to act on a government's behalf for a period that spans election cycles. In addition, privatization, outsourcing, and agencification, which had led to the fragmentation of the public service landscape, made it more difficult for policymakers to address apparently intractable long-term social, economic, and environmental “wicked” issues that cut across traditional departmental boundaries.
3）新公共治理 New public governance
作为回应，西方各国政府试图鼓励公共组织之间建立跨机构伙伴关系，并与公民开展更紧密的合作。这构成了“后新公共管理”方法的重要组成部分，该方法强调网络和社会参与对于协调公共服务活动以及共同设计、创造和提供公共服务的重要性。虽然学者们可能用不同的术语来描述这种模式（例如“新公共服务”或“协同治理”），但他们都强调国家行为者与公民更紧密合作的重要性，以“在利益相关者之间就设计和实施一系列旨在创造公共价值的正式政策达成共识”。NPG强调参与式和审议式民主，其理念是让公民更密切地参与决策和实施过程，以此解决NPM和TPA中存在的民主问责问题。在NPG背景下，国家与公民的关系更像是相互支持、兄弟般的关系，而不是TPA和NPM分别具有的家长式或交易式关系。
关于NPG是否与NPM有足够的区别，以代表真正的范式转变，存在一些争论。事实上，NPG也受到了与NPM类似的批评，即让更多的行为者参与决策会损害问责制，因为没有人能完全确定谁对什么负责。此外，由于公民与服务提供者之间的关系倾向于变得更加横向和非正式，决策者所受到的控制、监督和强制程度与其他范式下的决策者不同。此外，许多人质疑参与式治理是否具有真正的代表性或合法性，因为弱势公民往往被边缘化，在决策过程中比其更富有的邻居发挥更少的影响力。因此，与TPA和NPM一样，我们可以看到对公共服务问责制的担忧也困扰着NPG模式。
In response, Western governments sought to encourage interagency partnership collaborations across public organizations and closer working with citizens. This formed a key part of the “post-NPM” approach, which stresses the importance of networks and societal engagement to coordinate public service activity and codesign, cocreate, and coproduce public services. Although scholars may have adopted different terms to describe this paradigm (e.g., “the new public service”, or “collaborative governance”), they all stress the importance of state actors working more closely with citizens to build “consensus among stakeholders on a formal set of policies designed and implemented to generate public value”. NPG emphasizes participative and deliberative democracy, based on the idea that involving citizens more closely in policy-making and implementation can address concerns around democratic accountability that exist in both NPM and TPA. In NPG contexts, the state has a more mutually supportive, fraternal relationship with citizens, instead of the paternal or transactional association that characterizes TPA and NPM, respectively.
There is some debate as to whether NPG is sufficiently distinguishable from NPM to represent a genuine paradigmatic change. Indeed, NPG has come in for similar criticisms to NPM, namely, that involving a greater number of actors in decision-making harms accountability, because nobody is entirely sure who is responsible for what. Additionally, since relationships between citizens and service providers tend to be more horizontal and informal, decision-makers are not subject to the same level of control, oversight, and coercion as in other paradigms. Moreover, many have questioned whether participative governance can be genuinely representative or legitimate, since more disadvantaged residents are often marginalized and exert less influence than their wealthier neighbors in decision-making processes. As with TPA and NPM, therefore, we can see how concerns about the accountability of public services also bedevil the NPG model.
问责制
ACCOUNTABILITY
如上所述，不同的治理模式引发了人们对公共服务问责制的不同担忧，各种改革试图解决这些问题。与此同时，问责制的概念在政策和学术文献中越来越流行。我们追溯了公共问责理论的演变，以及它如何反映流行的治理模式。
As the above discussion suggests, different governance paradigms have raised different concerns around the accountability of public services, and various reforms have sought to address these concerns. In parallel, the idea of accountability has become more popular in both policy and academic literature. We trace the evolution of public accountability theory and how it reflects prevailing governance paradigms.
1）垂直问责制和传统公共行政 Vertical accountability and TPA
在典型的等级制TPA环境中，问责制的定义围绕委托代理关系展开，委托人有权根据收到的信息采取行动，并可以要求代理人对其行为负责。在传统的官僚机构中，政策由高层制定,并通过一系列办公室（局）执行，每个负责人和员工都按等级向上级汇报工作，并由上级负责。因此，委托人和代理人处于不同的层级，在与不同行为者的互动中往往扮演不同的角色。因此，在现实中，问责制并非基于单一的委托代理关系，而是基于一系列授权和问责关系。这使得问责制概念更具挑战性，问责过程也更加复杂。此外，在议会制中，民主国家由选民与立法机构之间以及立法机构与政府之间的一系列问责关系构成。在政府内部，政府首脑与其内阁（根据行政权力的运作模式而有所不同）、内阁部长与副部长之间以及他们与公务员（以及执行机构）之间都存在关系。因此，多种不同的关系构成了问责制的网络，而不是单一的委托关系——尽管这个网络是由多种委托代理关系构成的。
In classically hierarchical TPA contexts, definitions of accountability center around the presence of a principal–agent relationship, in which principals have the power to act on the information they receive and can hold agents to account for their actions. In traditional bureaucracies, policy is established at the top and carried out through a series of offices (bureaux), with each manager and worker reporting hierarchically to a superior and held to account by that person. As such, principals and agents operate at various levels, often performing different roles in their interactions with different actors. In reality, therefore, accountability is not based on a single principle–agent relationship but rather on a series of relationships of both delegation and accountability. This makes the concept more challenging and the process of holding people to account more complex. Furthermore, in parliamentary systems, the democratic state is made up of a series of accountability relationships between voters and legislatures, and between legislatures and government. Within government, there is a relationship between the Head of Government and their Cabinets (which varies depending on the model of executive power in operation), between Cabinet Ministers and junior ministers, and between each of those and a cohort of civil servants (as well as executive agencies). As such, multiple different strands form a web of accountability rather than a single line of delegation—although this web is nonetheless made up of multiple principal–agent relationships.
2）多方位问责制和新公共管理 Multidirectional accountability and NPM
从表面上看，NPM通过市场机制、专业化、权力下放、目标设定和衡量，提高了对运营绩效问责制的重视程度，而TPA则依赖于官僚等级制度和部长负责制。然而，由于NPM鼓励推广不同的公共服务提供模式，导致治理格局更加分散。这加剧了公共服务问责制的不确定性、复杂性和混乱性，特别是在绩效衡量和管理方面。因此，人们的注意力从议会分级控制转向了日益重视管理问责制，这在某些情况下产生了适得其反和/或意想不到的后果，即对服务绩效造成问责“过度”，而在另一些情况下则造成问责“不足”。此外，外包和私有化举措可能会使选民和当选代表更难追究外部供应商对业绩不佳或财务管理不善的责任，因为公职人员不再直接控制运营。
NPM对绩效报告和检查的依赖，通常由与部长保持一定距离的外部检查机构或审计机构进行监督，这进一步扩展了公共机构问责的方式。这些机构通常被描述为与公共机构之间存在“对角”问责关系，因为它们没有正式的制裁权力，但它们的评估却可能产生重大影响。它们的存在加剧了问责制领域分散凌乱的特点，意味着公共管理者必须管理组织内外多种不同、不断变化且经常相互冲突的期望。对此，学者们认为，我们应该以“横向”问责制来补充基于委托代理理论的等级制度安排。但是在这种情况下，确定谁应该对谁负责以及负责什么变得越来越困难，因为决策是由多个参与者共同做出的，而他们之间并不总是存在等级关系。因此，总体而言，尽管新公共管理改革声称要改善问责制，但实际上却使情况更加混乱，因为这意味着公共机构必须依赖纵向、横向和对角线机制，而这些机制往往并不适合其需求。
Ostensibly, NPM increased the focus on accountability for operational performance through market mechanisms, professionalization, decentralization, target-setting and measurement, as opposed to TPA's reliance on bureaucratic hierarchy and ministerial responsibility. However, because NPM encourages the proliferation of different public service delivery models, it results in a more fragmented governance landscape. This contributes to greater uncertainty, complexity, and confusion in public services accountability, particularly in terms of performance measurement and management. As a result, attention shifted from hierarchical parliamentary control toward an increased focus on managerial accountability which resulted, in some instances, in the counterproductive and/or unintended effect of creating accountability “overloads” on service's performance and in others, the creation of accountability “deficits”. In addition, outsourcing and privatization initiatives can make it much more difficult for voters and elected representatives to hold external providers to account for poor performance or financial mismanagement, because public officials no longer exercise direct control over operations.
NPM's reliance on performance reporting and inspections, often overseen by external inspectorates or audit institutions that operate at arms-length from ministers, further expanded the ways in which public bodies are held accountable. Such bodies are often characterized as having a “diagonal” accountability relationship with public bodies, because they have no formal powers of sanction but their assessments can nonetheless have significant implications. Their presence exacerbates the fragmented and cluttered nature of the accountability landscape and means that public administrators have to manage combinations of multiple, different, changing, and often conflicting expectations within and outside their organizations. In response, scholars argued that we should supplement hierarchical arrangements based on the principal–agent theory with “horizontal” forms of accountability. However, in these contexts, it becomes increasingly challenging to establish who should be accountable to whom and for what, because decision-making is shared among multiple actors who are not always in hierarchical relationships with each other. Overall, therefore, despite its stated intention to improve accountability, NPM reforms have muddied the waters substantially, because they mean public bodies have to rely on vertical, horizontal, and diagonal mechanisms, when often none are appropriately tailored to their requirements.
3）横向问责制和新公共治理 Horizontal accountability and NPG
鉴于NPG中治理参与者之间更加依赖合作，我们可以看到横向问责制在这些情况下也是相关的。然而,由于NPG范式的理论基础表明，社会应该参与创造公共价值的共同努力（通过与公民的对话和合作达成共识）,它试图回避不同治理参与者追求相互冲突的目标的问题。相反，其重点在于动员集体合作并追求共同目标，无需对涉及公民、国家和公共服务提供者的权力或准合同关系进行明确的等级定义。这些原则降低了纵向和横向正式问责机制的重要性，也降低了通过监察员进行斜向问责的必要性。通过寻求确保公共机构与公民更紧密地合作，它还试图解决公众对政策实施和服务交付的担忧。
问责制文献与这些治理发展同步演变。具体而言，学者和从业者已从单纯从回顾和控制的角度理解问责制（即关注调查错误、不遵守标准或滥用权力）转向认为问责制还应促进学习。这些研究强调，问责程序（如外部检查）应更具反思性、建设性和前瞻性，强调自我评价和从过往经验中学习的重要性，而不仅仅是强调错误和不足。在许多情况下，问责关系甚至可能没有任何形式，而是依靠治理参与者之间的个人关系、友好讨论、辩论和反馈，所有参与者都表面上寻求改善公众的结果。然而，与TPA和NPM一样，这种问责制的概念也受到了批评，因为对公职人员和公共服务进行独立监督和评估（换句话说，就是更加等级化和追溯性的问责机制）仍然很重要；此外，协同治理涉及决策中的更多参与者和关系，可能会带来过多要求，并增加不同问责机制之间出现紧张或冲突的风险。考虑如上，我们可以看到，在NPG范式中，对更大公众问责制的追求仍在继续。
Given the greater reliance on collaboration between governance actors within NPG, we can see how horizontal accountability is also relevant in these contexts. However, because the theoretical underpinnings of the NPG paradigm suggest that society should be involved in a common endeavor to create public value (as agreed through dialogue and collaboration with citizens), it tries to sidestep the problem of different governance actors pursuing conflicting objectives. Instead, the focus is on mobilizing the collective to cooperate and pursue shared goals, without the need for a clear hierarchical definition of authority or quasi-contractual relationships involving citizens, the state, and public service providers. These principles reduce the importance of formal accountability mechanisms along both vertical and horizontal dimensions, and also the need for diagonal accountability through inspectorates. By seeking to ensure that public bodies work more closely with citizens, it also seeks to address concerns about public control over policy implementation and service delivery.
The accountability literature has evolved in parallel with these governance developments. Specifically, scholars and practitioners have moved on from understanding accountability purely in retrospective and controlling terms (where it focuses on investigating mistakes, nonadherence to standards, or abuses of power) to argue that it should also facilitate learning.. These studies have emphasized that accountability processes such as external inspections ought to be more reflective, constructive, and forward-looking, emphasizing the importance of self-evaluation and learning from previous experiences rather than merely highlighting mistakes and inadequacies. In many cases, accountability relationships may not even be formalized in any way, and instead rely on personal connections, friendly discussions, debates, and feedback between governance actors, all of whom are ostensibly seeking to improve outcomes for the public. As with TPA and NPM, however, this conceptualization of accountability has come in for criticism, on the basis that independent oversight and evaluation of public officials and public services—in other words, more hierarchical and retrospective mechanisms of holding to account—remain important. Additionally, collaborative governance involves a greater number of actors and relationships in decision-making, it could introduce excessive demands and increase the risk of tensions or clashes between different accountability mechanisms. With this in mind, we can see how the quest for greater public accountability continues within the NPG paradigm.
治理范式中的资源相互依存、权力和问责制
RESOURCE INTERDEPENDENCE, POWER, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE PARADIGMS
Previous studies have stressed that actors who possess important resources are better placed to exercise it. These resources may be financial, but they could equally be associated with specific knowledge, personnel, political or leadership qualities, or legal or constitutional rights and obligations. Governance theory is based on the idea that individual actors within networks would struggle to develop and implement policy alone, and therefore they pool their resources and rely on each other to help achieve objectives collectively. In his analysis of central–local relations in the UK, Rhodes (1981) argued that the distribution of resources within these networks, along with the importance that individual actors attach to them, shapes the nature of these interdependent relationships. Following this logic, actors who possess scarce and/or crucial resources can exercise more power than other members of the network. Therefore, if we can identify the resources that each actor seeks to acquire, and which other organizations might be able to provide those resources, we can arrive at a better understanding of how power may be distributed between different governance actors. In a further development, Eckersley (2017) expanded Rhodes' conceptualization to cover horizontal relationships between actors in local governance. Based on their resource requirements, and the availability of these resources within the network, he suggested that municipalities can operate on a spectrum in which they range from acting independently of, through operating interdependently with and toward being dependent on other organizations when seeking to achieve their objectives. By implication, if important resources are distributed asymmetrically within the network, some actors are able to exercise more power than others.
1）权力“至上”、垂直问责制和TPA
Power “over”, vertical accountability and TPA
资源依赖的视角使得纵向问责关系中的权力至上的观念具有相关性。事实上，我们甚至可以说，只有当委托人能够对代理人行使权力时，他们才能有效地履行问责职能。我们主要从TPA背景下的权力至上角度来描述委托人和代理人之间的关系。即通过等级官僚结构、审查机制和民主选举，,委托人拥有与问责制有关的大部分资源。因此，代理人很大程度上依赖于委托人，两者之间的关系极不对称——后者处于对前者行使权力的有利地位。虽然现实情况未必如此，但这符合理想的TPA范式中的垂直问责制。
The resource dependence perspective makes the idea of power over relevant in vertical accountability relationships. Indeed, we would go as far as saying that principals are only able to undertake their accountability functions effectively if they can exercise power over agents. We characterize the relationship between principal and agent primarily in terms of power over in TPA contexts. Through hierarchical bureaucratic structures, scrutiny mechanisms, and democratic elections, principals possess most of the resources that pertain to accountability. As a result, agents are largely dependent on principals and the relations between these actors are highly asymmetric; the latter is well-placed to exercise power over the former. Although this may not necessarily be the case in reality, it nonetheless fits within the ideal TPA paradigm of vertical accountability.
2）权力“至下”、多方位问责制与新公共管理
Power to, multidirectional accountability, and NPM
然而，我们无需单纯从胁迫或支配的角度来理解权力和责任。权力不是一个有限的概念，行为者可以纯粹出于自身目的获得和行使权力，而不会影响他人。这种权力至下的概念是指一个组织或个人拥有实现其目标和“完成工作”的资源。我们可以看到，在治理安排更加分散和横向的情况下，权力至下如何具有更大的相关性。具体来说，当问责关系更为复杂，而主体通过层级机制对代理人行使权力的能力较弱时，治理网络中的行动者就有更大的权力根据自己的利益行事。当资源分散在整个网络中（例如，在政府机构、代理机构和承包商之间），并且参与者有更大的相互独立操作的自由时，情况尤其如此。在NPM背景下，这与国家应专注于其“核心活动”，而外部行为者执行“非核心”功能并（在私人提供者的情况下）寻求创造利润的观点相吻合。NPM理念强调个人能动性的重要性，并“解放”管理者和服务提供者，以便使其在约定的预算范围内实现绩效目标，再加上支撑这种理想的逻辑，我们可以看到，在这种治理背景下，权力至下如何变得更有影响力。
However, we need not understand power and accountability purely in terms of coercion or domination. Power is not a finite concept, and actors can obtain and exercise it purely for their own purposes, without affecting others. This idea of power to refers to an organization or individual having the resources to achieve their objectives and “get things done”. We can see how power to has greater relevance in situations where governance arrangements are more fragmented and horizontal. Specifically, where accountability relationships are more complex and principals are less able to exercise power over agents through hierarchical mechanisms, actors within governance networks have more power to operate according to their own interests. This is particularly the case where resources are diffused across the network (e.g., between government bodies, agencies, and contractors), and where actors have greater freedom to operate independently of each other. In NPM contexts, this chimes with the idea that the state should focus on its “core activities” , while external actors perform “noncore” functions and (in the case of private providers) seek to generate profit. Coupled with the logic that underpins the NPM ideal, which stresses the importance of individual agency and “freeing up” managers and service providers to achieve performance objectives within agreed budgetary parameters, we can see how power to becomes more influential within such governance contexts.
3）权力“共享”、横向问责制和新公共治理
Power “with”, horizontal accountability, and NPG
治理行为者之间的这种相互依存关系是NPG环境中的一个关键因素，并与权力的第三个概念联系在一起：权力“共享”的概念。就像权力至下一样，这一概念并非零和博弈，也不是社会控制、统治或胁迫的机制。然而，它与权力至下的不同之处在于，它注重集体行动和追求共同目标，而不是赋予个人权力。没有“赢家”和“输家”之分，权力只是帮助实现共同目标的推动力。因此，在人类世这个充满邪恶问题、多重危机和社会分散机构的时代，这种权力概念可能变得越来越重要。这些挑战要求行动者合作、分享知识并相互学习，因为人们认为在努力实现共同目标时调动整体的力量比依赖各部分的总和更有效。权力和责任在这些横向安排中的分散使得引入纵向问责机制变得非常困难。然而，在治理参与者强调“权力共享”而不是“权力至下”的地方，我们可以看到问责制如何更具前瞻性和预见性。通过共同合作，参与者可以提高从经验中学习的集体能力，实现围绕公共服务成果的共同目标。这些概念与关于NPG和公共价值创造的辩论有关，而不是关注TPA和NPM背景下有关评估和控制的典型特征。
This interdependence between governance actors is a key element in NPG contexts and connects to a third conceptualization of power: the idea of power with. As with power to, the concept is not viewed in zero-sum terms, nor as a mechanism for social control, domination, or coercion. However, it differs from power to in focusing on collective action and the pursuit of shared goals rather than the empowerment of individuals. There are no “winners” and “losers”, but rather power is an enabler than can help to achieve a common objective. It is, therefore, perhaps increasingly important in the Anthropocene era of wicked issues, polycrises, and dispersed agency across society. Such challenges require actors to cooperate, share knowledge, and learn from each other on the assumption that mobilizing the whole can be more effective than relying on the sum of its parts in trying to achieve mutual objectives. The diffusion of power and responsibilities across these more horizontal arrangements makes it very difficult to introduce vertical accountability mechanisms. However, where governance actors emphasize power with rather than power to, we can see how accountability may be much more prospective and forward-looking. By working together, actors can increase their collective ability to learn from experience and achieve shared objectives around public service outcomes. Such conceptualizations are relevant to debates about NPG and the creation of public value rather than the focus on assessment and control that characterizes TPA and NPM contexts.
讨论与结论
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
当委托人拥有大部分可用资源时，代理人就依赖于委托人的合法性、资金和法律框架来开展活动。这使得委托人能够对代理人行使实质性权力，并通过事后监督、审查和制裁机制来逐级问责。这些机制旨在确保代理人按照委托人的目标行事，而委托人的目标是通过代议制民主机构动员起来的，并以公共组织为公众服务的宗旨为基础。在上述条件占主导地位的情况下，它们更符合TPA治理模式的特点。 当资源分配给一小部分治理参与者时，这些参与者相对独立地运作，并拥有追求自身目标（如服务公众或创造利润）的实质性权力。问责关系在多个方向上发挥作用，例如通过分级监测和报告、对角检查以及横向合同安排和市场动态。这些安排旨在赋予公民更大的“选择”和“发言权”，从而将民主原则扩展到公共服务提供方式中。在这种情况占主导地位的地方，它们与NPM治理模式联系更紧密。 在全社会共享资源的情况下，治理参与者认识到有必要相互合作、相互依存，以便相互产生有助于实现共同目标的权力。这会导致更多的事前横向和非正式的问责关系，其重点是知识共享以及组织和个人如何学习和改进。通过让社会参与者以这种方式参与确定和创造公共价值，民主更具参与性，也更符合NPG的原则。 我们欢迎未来开展实证研究，尝试应用这些观点及其之间的联系，以研究权力、问责制和治理之间的理论联系在实践中如何发挥作用。实证研究表明，TPA、NPM和NPG的要素存在于大多数西方治理体系中，我们既不主张任何国家代表任何单一模式，也不提出关于哪种模式最合适或最有效的规范性论点。尽管如此，我们建议，我们对每种不同背景下主要权力和问责制类型的概念化,可以为未来研究如何将这些概念运用于治理安排提供框架。 In recent decades, industrialized democracies have introduced a seemingly endless stream of public management reforms in a quest for greater public accountability, enhanced public value, and more empowered citizens. Yet, given that power is necessary to exercise accountability, and accountability is viewed as a key mechanism to restrain excessive power, it is surprising that these concepts are rarely examined together in the academic literature. We have sought to make sense of this landscape by setting out how accountability is a function of power and the distribution of resources within networks, and also how both concepts are conceptualized and exercised in various ways that are often characteristic of different governance paradigms. On that basis, we suggest the following propositions to direct future research into these concepts: Where principals possess most of the available resources, agents depend on them for legitimacy, funding, and the legal framework that underpins their activity. This enables principals to exercise substantial power over agents and hold them to account hierarchically through ex post monitoring, scrutiny, and sanctioning mechanisms. These mechanisms seek to ensure that agents are acting in line with the principal's objectives, which are mobilized through representative democratic institutions and implemented on the basis that public organizations exist to serve the public. Where such conditions predominate, they are more characteristic of the TPA model of governance. Where resources are distributed among a select group of governance actors, these actors operate relatively independently of each other and possess substantial power to pursue their own objectives (such as serving the public or generating profit). Accountability relationships operate in multiple directions, for example, through hierarchical monitoring and reporting, diagonal inspections, and horizontal contractual arrangements and market dynamics. These arrangements aim to give citizens greater “choice” and “voice,” thereby extending democratic principles into the way in which public services are provided. Where such conditions predominate, they are more associated with the NPM model of governance. Where resources are shared across society, governance actors recognize the need to collaborate and work interdependently, in order to generate power with each other that can help achieve common goals. This leads to more ex-ante horizontal and informal accountability relationships, which focus on knowledge sharing and how organizations and individuals can learn and improve. By involving societal actors in identifying and creating public value in this way, democracy is more participative and in line with the principles of NPG. We would welcome future empirical studies that seek to apply these ideas, and the connections between them, to examine how these theoretical links between power, accountability, and governance play out in practice. Empirical studies have shown how elements of TPA, NPM and NPG exist in most Western governance systems, and we neither seek to claim that any country is representative of any single paradigm nor advance a normative argument as to which is most appropriate or effective. Nonetheless, we suggest that our conceptualization of the predominant types of power and accountability that characterize each different context can frame future studies of how these ideas may be operationalized in governance arrangements.
文章来源：
Eckersley, P., Lakoma, K., Murphy, P., Caygill, T., & Pell, C. (2024). Accountability as a function of power relationships in public governance networks. Public Administration.
原文链接：
https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.13032（或点击文末“阅读原文”查看）
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