这篇文章是我在寻找有关阿姆斯特朗调查时发现的，因为阿姆斯特朗调查时1906年发布的了，所以网上的原版文章，包括我在海外时搜索，也没有找到，但是确实找到了一些有关围绕阿姆斯特朗调查的解读。比如哈佛商学院的一篇文章，可惜，我在海外的时候没有随身携带信用卡，就没有付费，回国后想购买发现无法付款。
而这篇文章，发布于JSTOR，在国内还是可以访问的。我把中英文对照发出来，供大家参考。
所有的创新，都隐含着风险，风险被管理得当，就是造福社会，风险被漠视忽视，就会损害整个社会利益。这创新，不仅关乎于保险产品本身，渠道拓展、营销模式、客户开拓、客户服务，等等，都有创新的机遇。但是不变的是，以金融保险的本质规律去运行，才能持续持久的健康发展。
比如tontine保险，即唐提年金，并不是一无是处，它尤其适合养老场景，是否可以重新被设计呢？比如结合死亡责任，还能对冲客户长寿与客户早亡的两个极端风险。
以下是正文：
Tontine Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation:A Case of Stifed Innovation,1868-1905
唐提保险与阿姆斯特朗调查：一个抑制创新的案例 1868-1905
ROGER L. RANSOM AND RICHARD SUTCH
Tontine insurance, introduced in 1868, combined the features of life insurancewith an unusual old-age saving plan, A portion of the annual premium wasaccumulated in a fund that was divided among the surviving policyholders aftertwenty years. By 1905, two-thirds of all life insurance in force was of this type.Despite consumer appeal, sales of tontine policies were prohibited in 1906 afterthe Armstrong Investigation charged the tontine business with corruption andextravagance.We argue that tontine insurance was actuarially sound and anattractive life-cycle investment. Prohibition was probably unnecessary.
1868年推出的Tontine保险结合了人寿保险和一种非同寻常的养老储蓄计划的特点。每年保费的很大一部分会存入一个基金，这个基金在二十年之后会分给所有还健在的投保人。到1905年，在所有有效的人寿保险中，有三分之二是这种类型。尽管Tontine保险对消费者具有吸引力，但阿姆斯特朗调查后，1906年禁止了Tontine保险的销售，指控Tontine业务存在腐败和奢侈。我们认为，Tontine保险在精算上是合理的，是一种有吸引力的生命周期投资。禁止可能是不必要的。
It does seem probable that by allowing to assurants the choice among several dividendsystems, ... the assurants will, when assuring, choose the class which they instinctively feel will be most proftable to them, and that thus the assurant's self-interest mayeffect a classifcation beyond the wisdom of disinterested experts.
Sheppard Homans for the Equitable Life Assurance Society, 1868. 1
通过允许保险人在几种分红制度中做出选择，他们可能会本能地选择他们认为最有利于自己的类别，因此，保险人的自身利益可能会超出公正专家的智慧。
谢泼德·霍曼斯代表公平人寿保险公司，1868年。1
The sales pamphlet from which this quotation is taken annocnced the introduction of ‘tontine insurance’，an innovation which was to transform and propel the American life insurance industry over the next thirty-seven years. Tontine insurance was developed by SheppardHomans, creator of the American Standard life table and the most prominent actuary in the country, and was introduced in 1868 by theEquitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.2
引述这段话的小册子宣布了“Tontine保险”的推出，这是一项创新，将在接下来的三十七年间改变并推动美国寿险行业的发展。Tontine保险由谢泼德·霍曼斯（Sheppard Homans）开发，他是美国标准生命表的创造者，也是该国最杰出的精算师，并于1868年由美国公平人寿保险公司推出。2
2 vols. (New York, 1967), vol. l, p. 93. Sheppard Homans was the Actuary of the Mutual Life Insurance Company from 1855 to 1871. Despite the fact that he was in Mutual's employ, he consulted for other firms including, in this case, Equitable. George Phillips was Equitable's Actuary.
两卷本（纽约，1967年），之第一卷第93页。谢泼德·霍曼斯（Sheppard Homans）在1855年至1871年间担任共同人寿保险公司的精算师。尽管他受雇于共同人寿保险公司，但他也为其他公司提供咨询服务，包括本案中的公平人寿保险公司。乔治·菲利普斯（George Phillips）是公平人寿保险公司的精算师。
Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. XLVII, No.2 (June 1987). © The Economic HistoryAssociation.All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
Roger Ransom is Professor of History, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521; RichardSutch is Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.
This paper was researched and written while Richard Sutch was Visiting Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology. Data collected for this paper has been deposited in anarchive at the Laboratory for Historical Research at the University of California, RiversideCommunications and requests for data should be addressed to the authors in care ofthe University of California History of Saving Project, Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.
Lance Davis, John James, Martha Olney, B. Michael Pritchett, Richard Sylla, and SamuelWilliamson offered helpful suggestions. Financial support was provided by the National ScienceFoundation, the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the Division of Humanities and SocialSciences of the California Institute of Technology, and the Laboratory for Historical Research ofthe University of California, Riverside.
《经济史杂志》，第47卷，第2期（1987年6月）。©经济史协会版权所有。保留所有权利。ISSN 0022-0507。
罗杰·兰森是加利福尼亚大学河滨分校历史学教授，邮政编码92521；理查德·萨克是加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校经济学教授，邮政编码94720。
本文在理查德·萨克担任加州理工学院经济学访问教授期间进行研究和撰写。收集的本文数据已存放在加州大学河滨分校历史研究所的档案中。如需数据，请向作者本人（由加州大学历史储蓄项目、商业与经济研究所负责）提出请求。
兰斯·戴维斯、约翰·詹姆斯、玛莎·奥尔尼、B.迈克尔·普里切特、理查德·西拉、塞缪尔·威廉森提供了有益的建议。美国国家科学基金会、约翰·西蒙·古根海姆基金会、加州理工学院人文与社会科学部以及加州大学河滨分校历史研究所提供了资助。
The new type of policy was diferent from standard life insurance inthat the premiums paid had two distinct purposes. One portion of thepremium purchased insurance on the life of the policyholder. Theremaining portion was deposited in an investment fund managed by theinsurance company. This fund grew both from the continuing receipt ofpayments and from the earnings received on investments. After astipulated period had elapsed (usually twenty years), the entire amountaccumulated in the tontine fund was divided among the survivingpolicyholders.
这种新型政策与标准人寿保险不同，因为它支付的保险费有两个不同的用途。一部分保险费为投保人的生命购买了保险，另一部分则存入由保险公司管理的投资基金中。这个基金的增长既来自继续收到的款项，也来自投资收益。在规定的期限届满后（通常为20年），在基金中积累的全部资金将被分给未亡的保单持有人。
It is generally acknowledged that the phenomenal expansion of the U.S. life insurance business over the next thirty years was largelydriven by the popularity of tontine policies, helped along, perhaps, by the aggressive marketing techniques of the large firms.3 Despite its success, tontine insurance came under sharp attack in 1905. Tontine policies created enormous funds under the discretionary control of insurance companies. It was charged that these funds had been misusedto enhance the social status, political infuence, and personal wealth ofindustry leaders. In 1905 the New York State Legislature conducted aninvestigation into ''the business and affairs“ of the industry. The Joint Committee was chaired by State Senator William W. Armstrong and itswork became known as ‘the Armstrong Investigation.’, Far more prominent than Senator Armstrong in the proceedings, however, was Charles Evans Hughes, the committee's counsel. His role gave himnational prominence and launched his remarkable political career.4
一般认为，在接下来的三十年中，美国寿险业务的显著扩张在很大程度上是由Tontine政策的普及所驱动的，大型公司的积极营销手段可能也起到了推动作用3。尽管它取得了成功，但Tontine保险在1905年受到了猛烈的攻击。Tontine政策在保险公司的自由裁量控制下创造了巨大的资金。有人指责这些资金被滥用，以提高行业领导人的社会地位、政治影响力和个人财富。1905年，纽约州立法机构对该行业的“业务和事务”进行了调查。该联合委员会由州参议员威廉·W·阿姆斯特朗担任主席，其工作被称为“阿姆斯特朗调查”。然而，在诉讼中比阿姆斯特朗参议员更为突出的是查尔斯·埃文斯·休斯，该委员会的顾问。他的角色使他成为全国的知名人物，并开启了他非凡的政治生涯。4
After an exhaustive investigation, the New York State Legislatureacting on Hughes's recommendation prohibited further sale of tontine insurance .5 Other states followed suit. Ever since, tontine insurance hasfared poorly in the opinion of business and economic historians.6 Thereis certainly much about the insurance business in this era worthy ofcriticism. The industry seems to have indulged in more than its share ofunsound practices, questionable marketing techniques, and politicalmanipulation, and it attracted an extraordinary number of corruptindividuals.7 Despite this, it is our belief that tontine insurance deservesreassessment.Considered as a fnancial innovation, it was very success-ful. Considered as insurance, it was actuarially sound. Considered as a gamble, it was a ''fair bet’, in as much as there was no ''percentage for the house’, beyond a charge to cover administrative costs. Consideredas a life-cycle asset, it proved to be an excellent investment, earning arate of return substantially in excess of that generally available on otherassets. Tontine insurance was the victim, we argue, of an episode of regulatory excess.
经过详尽的调查，纽约州立法机构根据休斯的建议采取行动，禁止进一步销售tontine保险。其他州也效仿了这一做法。自那时以来，tontine保险在商业和经济史学家的眼中一直表现不佳。这个时代的保险业务无疑有很多值得批评的地方。该行业似乎沉迷于不健全的实践、可疑的营销技巧和政治操纵，吸引了大批腐败分子。尽管如此，我们认为tontine保险值得重新评估。从金融创新的角度来看，它是非常成功的。从保险的角度来看，它是精算合理的。从赌博的角度来看，它是一个“公平赌注”，因为除了用来支付管理费用的费用外，没有“房子的百分比”，也就是说，没有赌场从中抽取的佣金或抽成。。从生命周期资产的角度来看，它被证明是一项出色的投资，其回报率大大超过了其他资产的回报率。我们认为，tontine保险是我们所称的监管过度事件的受害者。
THE MECHANICS OF TONTINE INSURANCE
Tontine保险的机制
Consider the standard form of life insurance called ''level premiuminsurance,’, With a fxed premium, the insured is initially charged morethan is warranted by the risk assumed by the issuing company.However, as the insured grows older and the risk of death rises, thelevel premium eventually becomes less than adequate to cover the riskof death. The excess premiums paid by young policyholders create a'reserve’,which the company invests in income-producing assets untilthey are needed to pay death benefts to the policyholders’ benefciaries.For safety's sake, the fxed premium is set at a level substantially higherthan required to meet anticipated expenses and to generate an adequatereserve.In most years, this excessive charge accumulates a ''surplus’over and above the reserve. The company rebates this surplus to”policyholders periodically as ''dividends.’
考虑被称为“等额保费保险”的标准终身保险形式。在固定保费的情况下，被保险人最初支付的保费超出了保险公司在其承担风险时的合理金额。然而，随着被保险人年龄的增长和死亡风险的增加，等额保费最终不足以覆盖死亡风险。年轻保单持有人支付的额外保费将产生“储备金”，公司将该储备金投资于能产生收入的资产，直到需要向保单持有人受益人支付死亡抚恤金。为了安全起见，固定保费被设定在远高于预期费用和充足储备金所需的水平。在大多数年份，这种过高的费用会积累出“盈余”，超过储备金。公司定期将此盈余作为“股息”退还给保单持有人。
The tontine contract was an agreement by the policyholders to defer receipt of these dividends. The amount due would instead be pooled and invested by the company on behalf of the policyholders for a specifedperiod: five, ten, fifteen,or-most typically-twenty years. At the end of the period this fund, augmented by the investment earnings, would be divided proportionately among all of the surviving policyholders.8 The payment could be taken in cash or as a fully paid life annuity.Benefciaries of policyholders who died before the end of the tontineperiod would receive the specifed death beneft but neither they nor the deceased's estate would have a claim on the accumulated tontine fund.
tontine保险合同是保单持有人达成的一项协议，即延迟收取这些股息。相反，到期金额将由公司代保单持有人进行汇集和投资，投资期限为5年、10年、15年或最典型的20年。在投资期限结束时，该基金将通过投资收益增加，并按照比例分配给所有幸存的保单持有人。支付方式可以是现金或全额支付的人寿年金。在tontine保险期限结束前死亡的保单持有人的受益人将获得特定的死亡抚恤金，但他们或死者的遗产都不能对积累的tontine保险基金提出索赔。
8 The distinguishing feature of a tontine is that only survivors share in the distribution. The name“'tontine" recalled the scheme adopted in 1689 by Cardinal Mazarin to raise money for Louis XIVof France. Mazarin's plan had been suggested by Lorenzo Tonti a Neapolitan physician and bankeiliving in Paris. Shares were sold at 300 livres each. The principal earned interest but was nevelrepaid, The survivors inherited the interest of those who died, thus as time went on the wholeannuity fund was divided among fewer and fewer survivors, the last of whom drew an annualincome of 73,500 livres.
8 tontine保险的显著特点是只有生存者才能分享分配。名字“tontine”回忆了1689年马萨林红衣主教为法国路易十四筹集资金而采纳的计划。马萨林的计划是由居住在巴黎的那不勒斯医生和银行家洛伦佐·托蒂提出的。每股售价为300里弗。本金赚取利息，但永不偿还。生存者继承死亡者的利息，因此随着时间的推移，整个年金基金在越来越少的生存者之间分配，最后一名生存者每年收入73，500里弗。
In addition to securing conventional life insurance, the purchaser of a tontine policy was creating a retirement fund for old age. Moreover, therate of return earned by survivors on the investment of the deferreddividends could be expected to be unusually generous since they wouldshare in the accumulated dividends contributed by deceased policyhold-ers and all forfeitures of those who allowed policies to lapse. Theinsurance companies, of course, made much of these advantages in theirsales pitch for the new policy. Tontine insurance, they argued, was life insurance where the survivors won.
除了确保获得传统的人寿保险外，tontine保险的购买者还为老年人创建了退休基金。此外，由于幸存者将分享已故保单持有人和所有因保单失效而被没收的人所积累的股息，他们可以从延期股息的投资中获得异常丰厚的回报。当然，保险公司在推销新政策时充分利用了这些优势。他们认为，tontine保险是幸存者获胜的人寿保险。
A SHORT HISTORY OF TONTINE INSURANCE
Tontine保险的短暂历史
The frst ’Tontine Dividend Policy’, was sold by Equitable inNovember 1868.Sales were slow at frst, but after the policy was improved in 1871 and rechristened 'Tontine Savings Fund Assurance‘,it proved popular. New York Life also introduced tontine insurance in1871. Both New York Life and Equitable soon found that the bulk oftheir new business was being written on the plan and that sales wereexpanding rapidly.9 One by one, smaller companies introduced tontineplans of their own. Many of those that did not failed during thedepression that followed the Panic of 1873.10 In 1881 Northwestern Mutual introduced tontine insurance after a decade of sales decline andpromptly doubled its new business within two years.11 Most companies that had not already done so followed Northwestern immediately. But itwas not until 1885 that Mutual Life, the largest insurance company inthe country, finally introduced tontine insurance. Immediately thereafter, the new policy dominated Mutual's business.12 By 1905 only three companies, Connecticut Mutual, Mutual Beneft Life of New Jersey,and Provident Life and Trust of Pennsylvania, had held out against the trend.
第一份“Tontine红利保单”于1868年11月由Equitable公司销售。起初销售缓慢，但在1871年该保单得到改进并重新命名为“Tontine储蓄基金保险”后，它变得非常受欢迎。纽约人寿也在1871年推出了终身保险。纽约人寿和Equitable公司很快发现，他们的新业务大部分都是按照这个计划进行的，而且销售量正在迅速扩大。9 一家接一家的小公司推出了自己的终身保险计划。许多没有这样做的公司在1873年的大萧条之后纷纷倒闭。10 1881年，西北互惠保险公司在经历了十年的销售下滑后推出了tontine保险，并迅速在两年内使其新业务翻了一番。11 大多数尚未采取行动的公司立即效仿了西北互惠保险公司。但直到1885年，美国最大的保险公司Mutual Life才最终推出了tontine保险。此后不久，新政策主导了Mutual的业务。12 到1905年，只有三家公司——康涅狄格州互惠人寿保险公司、新泽西州互惠人寿保险公司和宾夕法尼亚州互惠人寿保险公司坚持反对这一趋势。
9 Buley, Equitable, vol. 1, pp.94,t26-28; and Buley, American Life Convention, vol. l, pp92-96. James M. Hudnut, Semi-Centennial History ofthe New York Life Insurance Company.1845-1895 (New York, 1895), pp, 150-51, 155-59. Equitable's share of the industry's sales rosefrom 7.6 percent to 11.0 percent between 1870/71 and 1872/73, meanwhile, New York Life saw itsshare of business increase from 4.8 to 5.6 percent; Spectator Year Book, 20 (1892), pp. 274-75298-99, and Frederick L. Hoffman, “Fifty Years of American Life Insurance Progress,” Journalofthe American Staisical Association, new series,95 (Sept. 1911), pp. 667-760, table XV, p. 727
9 布雷，公平人寿，第1卷，第94页，第26-28页；和布雷，美国生活公约，第1卷，第92-96页。詹姆斯·哈德纳特，《纽约人寿保险公司半世纪史。1845-1895》（纽约，1895年），第150-51页，第155-59页。公平在行业销售中所占的份额从1870/71年的7.6%上升到1872/73年的11.0%。与此同时，纽约人寿的份额从4.8%增加到5.6%；观众年鉴，20（1892），第274-75页，以及弗雷德里克·霍夫曼，“美国生命保险业五十年的进步”，美国统计协会新系列，95（1911年9月），第667-760页，表XV，第727页。
10 At least 55 companies out of an initial 128 disappeared between 1872 and 1878; Pritchett.Financing Growth, table l, p. 6. As far as we have been able to determine, none of the companiesthat failed had issued tontine policies. By contrast, the Equitable and New York Life passedthrough the crisis period unscathed, William Alexander, My HalfCentury in Life Insurance (NewYork,1935),p.46; and Hudnut, New York Life,chap.9.
10 在1872年至1878年间，最初的128家公司中至少有55家消失；普里切特，《融资增长》，表1，第6页。据我们所能确定的，没有一家倒闭的公司曾经发行过终身保险。相比之下，公平和纽约人寿顺利地度过了危机时期，威廉·亚历山大，《我的半个世纪的人寿保险生涯》（纽约，1935年），第46页；以及哈德纳特，《纽约人寿》，第9章。
11 Harold Williamson and Orange Smalley, Northwestern Mutual Life: A Century ofTrusteeship(Evanston,1957)，pp.101-2.
11 哈罗德·威廉森和奥兰治·斯莫利，《西北互助人寿：一个世纪的托管》（埃文斯顿，1957年），第101-2页。
12 Clough, Mutual Life, pp.14l, 144-147; Armstrong Committee, Testimony, vol. 2, p. 1724.
12 克劳夫，《互助人寿》，第141页，第144-147页；阿姆斯特朗委员会，《证词》，第2卷，第1724页。
THE VOLUME OF TONTINE INSURANCE ISSUED
Tontine保险的发行量
We have found no reliable way of estimating the total volume of tontine business for years before 1905. Not one of the state insurancecommissions required specifc reports on these policies and, of themajor companies, only Northwestern kept the tontine business distinctin its own books. The Armstrong Committee attempted to collectstatistics for 1905, but their effort was only partially successful and nofgures were provided to the committee by the three largest issuers of tontine policies: New York Life, Mutual, and Equitable. The committeedid obtain information from 21 other companies on the fraction of theiroutstanding insurance volume that was on the deferred-dividend plan.These percentages are reported in the second column of Table 1.
我们找不到可靠的方法来估计1905年前几年tontine保险的总发行量。没有一个州的保险委员会要求这些保单提供具体的报告，而且，在几家大公司中，只有西北人寿在自己的账目中保留了tontine保险业务的记录。阿姆斯特朗委员会试图收集1905年的统计数据，但他们的努力只取得了部分成功，没有向委员会提供数字的是三家最大的tontine保险发行商：纽约人寿、互助人寿和公平人寿。委员会从其他21家公司获得了关于其已发行保险中采用延期分红计划的百分比的信息。这些百分比在表1的第二列中报告。
aThis firm also sold industrial insurance, only the non-industrial business is presented here; seefn.15.
Sources: Total insurance in force: The Spectator Company, The Insurance Year Book, 1906-1907[Life, Casualty and Miscellaneous], 34th annual vol. (1906), Exhibit XXXV, pp. 568-69. Insurancein force is measured by the insured value of the policyholder's life.
Tontine insurance as percentage of the total according to Armstrong Testimony: New YorkState Legislature, Armstrong Committee, Testimony, Exhibits, Report and Index of the JointCommittee ofthe Senate and Assembly ofthe State ofNew York to Investigate and Examine intothe Business and Afairs of Life Insurance Companies Doing Business in the State of New York
有a标注的，表示这家公司也销售工业保险，但此处只列出了非工业业务；参见脚注15。
资料来源：总保额：Spectator公司，《保险年鉴》，1906-1907年[人寿、伤亡和杂项]，第34卷（1906年），附录XXXV，第568-69页。保额通过投保人的生命价值来衡量。
tontine保险在总保险中所占百分比根据阿姆斯特朗证词：纽约州立法机构，阿姆斯特朗委员会，证词，展品，报告和纽约州参议院和众议院联合委员会的索引，该委员会负责调查和审查在纽约州营业的人寿保险公司。
TABLE 1-continued
表1-续
(Albany,1906),vol.5,pp.4614-856;vol 7, pp.9-245.These percentages from the Armstrongtestimony probably refer to the end of 1904 or sometime in mid-1905.
Tontine insurance as a percentage of the total in 1905 as estimated from 1907 data: For the 13companies that reported data both for 1905 and for 1907, a regression equation was estimated inwhich the proportion of tontine insurance in 1905 was predicted from (1) the yolume of tontineinsurance in force in 1907 divided by the total insurance in force in 1905, and (2) the ratio of totalterminations during 1906/07 to insurance in force in 1905. The coefhcients were then used toestimate the 1905 proportion of tontine insurance for the 13 companies that lacked a 1905 estimateThe predicted values for all 26 companies are given.
Total tontine insurance in force: Estimated by applying the Armstrong percentage, if availableto the total insurance in force. When the Armstrong data is not available, the percentage estimatedfrom the 1907 data is used.
(奥尔巴尼，1906)，第5卷，第4614-856页；第7卷，第9-245页。阿姆斯特朗证词中提到的百分比可能指的是1904年底或1905年中期的某个时间。
根据1907年的数据估计的1905年tontine保险占总保险的比例：对于同时报告了1905年和1907年数据的13家公司，我们估计了一个回归方程，其中1905年的tontine保险比例是由以下两个因素预测的：（1）1907年生效的tontine保险数量除以1905年的总保险生效数量；（2）1906/07年度总终止数与1905年生效保险的比例。然后使用这些系数来估计缺少1905年估计值的13家公司在1905年的tontine保险比例。给出了所有26家公司的预测值。
生效的tontine保险总量：通过将阿姆斯特朗百分比（如果可用）应用于总保险生效量进行估算。当阿姆斯特朗数据不可用时，使用从1907年数据中估计的百分比。
Table 1 presents estimates of the volume of tontine insurance in forceat the end of 1905 for 34 large companies. For the 2l companies thatresponded to the Armstrong Committee this value was calculated bymultiplying the value of all insurance in force at the end of 1905 by thereported percentage of the company's business that was on a deferred-dividend basis. To extend the coverage to include other large companieswe extrapolated data for 1907 back to 1905.13 Of course, there wasconsiderably less tontine insurance in 1907 than in 1905 because furthersales of tontine policies had been prohibited early in 1906. For thecompanies with data in both years, the volume had fallen 22.6 percent.To extrapolate the 1907 fgures back to 1905 for the companies without1905 data, we assume that they issued no new tontine policies in 1906 or1907. If so, the entire change in the tontine insurance in force for these firms must have been the consequence of policy terminations through maturation, death, or surrender over the course of the two-year period.
表1提供了34家大型公司截至1905年底tontine保险发行量的估计值。对于向阿姆斯特朗委员会作出回应的21家公司，该值是通过将截至1905年底所有有效保险的价值乘以报告中该公司延期分红业务所占的百分比来计算的。为了将覆盖范围扩大到其他大型公司，我们将1907年的数据外推回1905年。13 当然，1907年的tontine保险发行量比1905年少得多，因为1906年初进一步销售tontine保险的政策被禁止了。对于在两年都有数据的公司，发行量下降了22.6%。对于没有1905年数据的公司，我们将1907年的数据外推回1905年，我们假设这些公司在1906年和1907年没有发行新的tontine保险。如果是这样的话，这些公司tontine保险的有效发行量的全部变化必然是两年期间到期、死亡或退保所造成的。
We estimate the terminations of tontine policies as a fraction of allterminations since data on the volume of terminations are available foreach company.A consistent relationship existed between the tontine fraction of all terminations and the tontine fraction of all insurance in force for the 13 companies that reported both 1905 and 1907 data.14 We use this relationship to estimate the terminations of tontine insuranceduring 1906 and 1907 for the companies that did not report in 1905. It isthen a simple matter to estimate the volume of tontine insurance at theend of 1905 by reinflating the 1907 data. These estimates are reported inthe last column of Table 1. The third column of Table 1 presents theseestimates as percentages of the total. To indicate the accuracy of theestimating technique we also present the estimated percentages for the13 companies for which we already had the 1905 percentage.
我们估计终止的tontine保险保单数量占所有终止保单数量的比例，因为每个公司都提供了终止保单数量的数据。13家同时报告了1905年和1907年数据的公司，其tontine保险保单终止比例与有效tontine保险保单比例之间存在一致的关系。14 我们利用这种关系来估计在1905年未报告数据的公司在1906年和1907年的tontine保险保单终止情况。然后，通过重新计算1907年的数据，就可以简单地估计出1905年底tontine保险的发行量。这些估计值在表1的最后一列中报告。表1的第三列将这些估计值作为总量的百分比进行报告。为了表明估计技术的准确性，我们还为已经拥有1905年百分比的13家公司提供了估计的百分比。
The value of tontine insurance outstanding at the end of 1905 for 34 companies totals more than 6 billion dollars. Based on these 34estimates, we suggest that about 64 percent of all insurance was on the deferred dividend plan at the time of the Armstrong Investigation.15 If so,the total volume of tontine insurance in force exceeded 7.5 percent of the total national wealth in 1905.16 As a rough guess, we estimatethere may have been as many as 9 million individual tontine policies in 1905 for a population of about 18 million households.17 Ownership must have been widespread.
34家公司在1905年底的tontine保险未偿余额总计超过60亿美元。基于这34家公司的估计，我们建议在阿姆斯特朗调查时，约64%的保险采用了延期分红计划。15 因此，1905年在生效的tontine保险发行量超过了全国总财富的7.5%。16 粗略估计，1905年有大约900万份个人tontine保险保单，而当时家庭数量约为1800万户。17 所有权一定很广泛。
THE APPEAL OF TONTINE INSURANCE
Tontine保险的吸引力
American life insurance companies were among the frst businesses toemploy widespread advertising and an organized sales effort in pursuitof business. The use of hypothetical examples promising high returnswas a common feature of their sales program. Yet it would be simplisticto suggest that high-pressure marketing or false expectations could havesold an inferior product to so many people over such a long period oftime. The popularity of tontine insurance also reflected its genuineadvantages over both ordinary insurance and conventional forms of saving.
美国的人寿保险公司是首批采用广泛广告和有组织的销售努力来开展业务的企业之一。他们销售计划的一个共同特点就是使用假设的例子来承诺高回报。然而，简单地将高压力销售或虚假期望归咎于销售劣质产品是不合理的，因为这种销售方式已经持续了很长一段时间。tontine保险的普及也反映了其相对于普通保险和传统储蓄形式的真正优势。
Purchasers of a tontine policy expected to receive-and actually didreceive, if they survived-a greater rate of return on their investmentthan was available on ordinary assets.In Table 2 we present thecalculated rate of return on an illustrative tontine-a twenty-year lifepolicy purchased at age 35 from Equitable in 1871 and held until paid in1891.18 For this policy, the company's prospectus had forecasted areturn of 10.4 percent: survivors actually received a nominal return of6.5 percent. However, prices in the United States fell steadily over theperiod between 1871 and 1891 so the amount disbursed in 1891 hadgreater purchasing power than the nominal sum would suggest. The realrate of return earned by survivors was 7.8 percent. Had the same moneybeen invested in a savings bank it would have earned a nominal returnof only 4.3 percent or a real rate of 6.1 percent. Purchasers may havebeen disappointed that the real returns were not as high as initiallyadvertised, but they were hardly swindled.19
tontine保险购买者预期——并实际获得，如果他们能存活的话——其投资回报率高于普通资产所能提供的回报率。在表2中，我们展示了购买者购买一份说明性的tontine保险（一份从1871年Equitable公司购买、有效期至1891年的20年寿命保险）的预期和实际计算回报率。对于这份保险，该公司的招股说明书预测的回报率为10.4%；而实际存活的投保人收到的名义回报率为6.5%。然而，从1871年至1891年期间，美国的价格稳步下跌，因此1891年支付的金额的实际购买力超过了名义金额所显示的购买力。实际存活的投保人获得的实际回报率为7.8%。如果这笔钱投资于储蓄银行，其名义回报率仅为4.3%，实际回报率为6.1%。投保人可能会对实际回报率没有最初广告中宣传的那么高而感到失望，但他们并没有被骗。
a Based on the consumer price index prepared by Paul A. David and Peter Solar, “A BicentenaryContribution to the History of the Cost of Living in America," Research in Economic History, 2ndannual vol.(1977),table 1,p. 16.
a 根据保罗·A·戴维和彼得·索罗尔编写的《美国生活成本指数研究》，第二年卷（1977年），表1，第16页。
b Based on the rate paid by the Bowery Savings Bank of New York reported in Sidney Homer, AHistory ofInterest Rates (2nd edn., New Brunswick, 1977), table 44, p. 319.
b 根据纽约的Bowery储蓄银行支付的利率报告，西德尼·霍默编写的《利率史》（第2版，新不伦瑞克，1977年），表44，第319页。
c Based on the gross earnings rate on total assets held by Equitable Life Assurance Societyreported in Lester W. Zartman, The Investments of Life Insurance Companies (New York, 1960)p. 74. From the gross fgures we deducted 0.3 percent for the expenses incurred in managing theportfolio on the authority of Zartman, pp. 116-17.
c 根据公平人寿保险公司持有的总资产的毛收益率报告，莱斯特·W·扎特曼编写的《人寿保险公司的投资》（纽约，1960年），第74页。从毛收益中我们扣除了0.3%的管理组合费用，这是基于扎特曼的权威，第116-17页。
Source: Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, “'Swindle or Security? A Reexamination of TontineInsurance, 1871-1905," Working Papers on the History of Saving, No. 6, (Berkeley, Nov. 1986).
来源：罗杰·L·兰森和理查德·S·兰森，《“诈骗还是安全保障？1871-1905年的终身保险再审视”，储蓄历史工作论文，第6号，（伯克利，1986年11月）》。
The superior performance of the tontine investment can be attributedto two distinct causes, First, the insurance companies were able toachieve a higher net rate of return on their portfolio of assets than thatpaid by banks. The Equitable's portfolio earned a return net of expensesof 5.3 percent. Second, the distinguishing feature of tontine funds wasthat they transferred to the survivors the accumulations that had beencontributed by those who died and by those who allowed their insurance to lapse. A simulation of the 1871 Equitable tontine fund reveals that 59percent of the survivor's dollar return was produced by the accumula-tion of his own deposits, 12 percent was transferred from those whodied, and 30 percent was contributed by those who lapsed.20
tontine保险投资表现优秀的原因有两个：首先，保险公司能够实现比银行更高的资产组合净回报率。Equitable公司的资产组合的净回报率为5.3%。其次，tontine保险基金的独特之处在于，它向幸存者转移了那些已经去世的人和允许保险失效的人所缴纳的积累。对1871年Equitable的tontine保险基金的模拟表明，幸存者获得的回报中，59%是由自己的存款产生的，12%是从那些去世的人那里转移过来的，30%是由那些允许保险失效的人贡献的。20
Tontine insurance with its promise of a high return for survivors oughtto have been particularly attractive to those whose saving was moti-vated by the desire to build a retirement fund. In the nineteenth centurythere were neither public nor private pension plans, so retirementsaving had to be individually managed.21 The problem for individualretirement savers is deciding how much income to save when one's lifespan is unknown. Too little saving when young may mean relativepoverty in old age, particularly if one lives “'too long”, too much savingmay produce an overly large and unintended bequest for one's heirs at the cost of relative privation.22 A life annuity is a perfect solution. Itpermits individuals to pool the risks of old age by providing a fixedstream of income for life. Annuity holders who live long will win at theexpense of those who die young. Tontine insurance allows the purchaseof an annuity on the installment plan, a feature that would have been particularly attractive to those primarily dependent on labor income. Since the tontine policy also included regular life insurance, eitherwhole life or term, it created a “fnancial straddle’, that would havebeen attractive to workers with families.23
tontine保险以其对幸存者的高回报承诺，对于那些希望建立退休基金的人来说应该是特别有吸引力的。在19世纪，既没有公共养老计划也没有私人养老计划，所以退休储蓄必须由个人管理。21 对于个人退休储蓄者来说，问题是决定在一个人不知道自己的寿命时应该储蓄多少收入。如果年轻时储蓄太少，可能意味着老年时相对贫穷，尤其是如果一个人“活得太久”；而如果储蓄太多，可能会产生过大的、意料之外的遗产，这会让继承人付出相对贫困的代价（意料之外的遗产可能导致继承人付出相对贫困的代价，因为这些遗产可能超过继承人的需要或管理能力。如果遗产金额过大，超出了继承人的投资和理财能力，他们可能会面临管理、投资或遗产纠纷等问题，导致不必要的经济压力和负担。此外，一些继承人可能会因为遗产的数额而失去动力或产生惰性，不再努力工作或积极追求自己的事业发展，导致经济状况逐渐恶化。因此，在处理遗产时，需要谨慎考虑和规划，以确保遗产的有效管理和合理分配，同时也要鼓励继承人积极面对生活和工作中的挑战，实现自己的潜力）。22 终身年金是一个完美的解决方案。它允许个人通过提供固定的人寿收入流来分散老年风险。长寿的年金持有人将以年轻时死亡的人的代价获胜。tontine保险允许按分期付款计划购买年金，这一特点对于主要依赖劳动收入的人来说特别有吸引力。由于tontine保险政策还包括定期人寿保险（要么是终身人寿保险，要么是定期人寿保险），因此它创造了一种“财务套利”，这对于有家庭的人来说是很有吸引力的。23
There is no doubt that insurance companies favored tontine policies,they typically paid their agents an additional commission if they could persuade an insurance buyer to defer annual dividends. The majorattraction of the tontine contract to the insurance companies lay in thefact that the accumulating dividends quickly built up enormous sur-pluses that were left entirely in the companies’ discretionary controlunder the lax insurance regulation of the time.24 The tontine funds werenot offset by a liability on the company books. They were neitherseparately reported nor accounted for during the tontine period, andthus they could be used (and misused) for many purposes.2s These funds financed the expansion of the existing insurance business at home aswell as the larger companies’new ventures abroad. Existence of thesurplus undoubtedly helped them sail through periods of businessdownturn. By the end of the century, surpluses were sutciently large toenable the insurance companies to manipulate the stock market, gaincontrol of banks, frms, and even industries, and, in general, to wield unprecedented economic power.
毫无疑问，保险公司青睐tontine保险政策，他们通常会向保险代理人支付额外的佣金，如果能够说服保险买家推迟年度股息。tontine保险合同对保险公司的主要吸引力在于，累积的股息迅速累积成巨大的盈余，这些盈余完全由公司在当时宽松的保险监管下自由控制。24 tontine保险基金不会抵消公司账簿上的负债。在tontine保险期间，这些基金既不单独报告也不核算，因此可以用于（和滥用）多种目的。25 这些资金用于资助国内现有保险业务的扩张以及大型公司国外的新业务。盈余的存在无疑帮助他们度过了业务下滑的时期。到世纪末，盈余已经足够大，使保险公司能够操纵股票市场，控制银行、公司和甚至行业，总的来说，他们拥有前所未有的经济实力。
THE PROHIBITION OF TONTINE INSURANCE
禁止tontine保险
The power of the insurance industry was brought to public attention when the Boston stockbroker, Thomas Lawson, broke ranks to join the muckraking crusade. Lawson's articles on the misdeeds of insuranceexecutives in Everybody's Magazine helped bring on the ArmstrongInvestigation.26 When the Armstrong Committee recommended thattontine insurance be prohibited the case was made with the followingarguments:
当波士顿的股票经纪人托马斯·劳森脱离行业，加入揭丑运动时，保险业的力量引起了公众的注意。劳森在《人人杂志》上发表的关于保险业高管不正当行为的文章，有助于开展阿姆斯特朗调查。26 当阿姆斯特朗委员会建议禁止tontine保险时，该委员会提出的理由如下：
(1) There would seem to be nothing in the supposed attractiveness of the opportunity toderive gain from the accumulations of other members which furnishes a sound argumentfor the continuation of this form of insurance. The feature of an additional beneft in thecase of survivorship appealed to the gambling instinct ...
（1）从其他成员的累积中获得收益的机会的所谓吸引力似乎没有提供继续这种形式的保险的合理理由。在生存者中获得的额外利益的特征吸引了赌博的本能……
(2)[T]he popularity [of tontine insurance] has been largely due to the representationswhich have accompanied it and to the fact that delusive statements have beenencouraged . . . through the payment of larger commissions than were allowed for otherforms of insurance. Estimates relied upon when the policies were issued have beenfalsifed by the event. . . . The disappointing returns upon these policies . . . has beenmore largely due to the wasteful methods of the companies . ..
(2) [T]ontine保险的流行在很大程度上是由于伴随其而来的陈述，以及由于虚假陈述得到了鼓励的事实，这是通过支付比其他形式的保险更高的佣金来实现的。在发行保单时所依赖的估计已被事件所证实是虚假的。这些保单的令人失望的回报在更大程度上是由于公司的浪费性方法。
(3) The deferred dividend policies had conspicuous advantages for the companies, asthey permitted the accumulation of profts for long periods without accounting. . .IT]he huge surpluses of the companies have .. . facilitated corruption. . . . [P]roper accountings have been refused. . . . [T]he companies should be compelled each year tostate the results of their management by annual accounting. . . . But if there is to be anannual accounting there is no reason why there should not be an annual distribution, onthe contrary, this is needed to make the remedy complete.27
(3) 延期股息政策对公司有明显的优势，因为它们允许长期不进行会计的利润积累。公司的巨额盈余已经助长了腐败。适当的会计被拒绝了。公司每年应被迫通过年度会计报告其管理结果。但是，如果存在年度会计，那么没有理由不进行年度分配。相反，为了使补救措施完善，这是必要的。27
Although these arguments proved to be sufcient reason for the NewYork Legislature and ultimately the other insurance states to requireannual dividends, they do not strike us as a compelling economic case.The only point which addresses the fnancial attractiveness of tontine insurance is the first, and the committee's argument seems to us to bemere gainsaying. The suggestion that the policy had a speculativeappeal is a moral rather than an economic argument. All forms ofinsurance are, in this same sense, a gamble, nevertheless, the commit-tee saw nothing morally wrong with ordinary life insurance. It is alsoimportant to note that insurance differs from parimutuel betting or astate lottery in that the insurance gamble is a fair one; the price of thepolicy is equal to its expected actuarial value plus the costs ofadministration. The purchaser of tontine insurance, moreover, acted toreduce the risk inherent in life rather than to increase it.
尽管这些论点证明是纽约立法机关以及最终其他保险州要求每年分红的充分理由，但它们并没有说服我们，成为经济上令人信服的案例。唯一涉及tontine保险的财务吸引力的观点是第一点，而且在我们看来，委员会的论点纯粹是反驳。认为保险单具有投机吸引力的建议是道德上的论点，而不是经济上的论点。从同样的意义上讲，所有形式的保险都是一种赌博，然而，委员会认为普通的人寿保险在道德上并没有错。另外值得注意的是，保险与彩票或国家彩票不同，因为保险赌博是公平的；保险单的价格等于其预期的精算价值加上管理成本。此外，tontine保险的购买者是为了减少生命中固有的风险，而不是增加风险。
The fact that tontine plans were advertised by prospectus does notstrike us as a fatal flaw. Misleading advertising could in principle havebeen dealt with directly through “'truth in advertising’,legislation. Noris it clear that misrepresentation was common. The position of thecommittee was supported by numerous tables of exhibits contrastingthe forecasted return on various tontine policies with their actual return.In every case the comparison was in dollars. Yet the major reason forthe disappointing results was not extravagance, as the committeecharged, but rather the general fall in the rate of interest over the lastthree decades of the nineteenth century. Much of the dollar lossproduced by the fall in the rate of return was restored in real terms bythe simultaneous fall in prices. In any case, disappointed investmentgoals seem hardly to be a reason to prohibit fnancial innovation.
tontine保险计划通过招股说明书进行宣传，这一事实在我们看来并不是致命的缺陷。误导性广告原则上可以通过“广告真实性”立法来解决。也不清楚误导是否普遍存在。委员会的立场得到了大量展品的支持，这些展品将各种tontine保险的预期回报与实际回报进行了对比。在所有情况下，比较都是以美元为单位的。然而，令人失望的结果的主要原因并不是委员会所指责的奢侈，而是19世纪最后三十年利率普遍下降。回报率下降导致的美元损失在很大程度上通过同时出现的价格下跌得到了实际上的弥补。无论如何，令人失望的投资目标似乎很难成为禁止金融创新的理由。
There is no doubt that the Armstrong Committee hit home with thethird argument. Their investigation revealed institutional and personalcorruption on a shocking scale. The tontine surpluses were apparently a temptation ditcult for some executives to resist. New York Statelegislators, newspaper editors, and insurance commissioners had alsobeen corrupted in the process and the fact that their bribes andsweetheart loans were fnanced with funds accumulated on behalf ofpolicyholders infuriated the public. It is also clear that much of thisabuse might have been avoided had accounting procedures been inplace that would have compelled full and timely reporting. What is notclear, however, is the last step of the committee's argument. There is noreason why annual accounting and annual audit control require annualdividends.We think the committee-unable to make the distinctionbetween the misdeeds of the insurance tycoons and the fnancialinstrument which enabled them to acquire sufcient power to makethose misdeeds politically signifcant-made the mistake of throwingout the baby with the bath water.
毫无疑问，阿姆斯特朗委员会的第三个论点是击中要害的。他们的调查揭示了令人震惊的制度和个人的腐败现象。tontine保险的盈余显然对一些高管来说难以抗拒。纽约州立法者、报纸编辑和保险专员也在这个过程中被腐败了，而他们收受的贿赂和甜心贷款是由保单持有人代表资金积累的，这一事实激怒了公众。同样明显的是，如果会计程序到位，迫使全面和及时报告，那么这种滥用行为可能就会被避免。然而，不清楚的是委员会论证的最后一步。没有理由要求年度会计和年度审计控制需要年度分红。我们认为，委员会无法区分保险业大亨的不当行为和使他们获得足够权力来使这些不当行为具有政治意义的金融工具，犯了把洗澡水和婴儿一起扔出去的错误。
Tontine insurance, we conclude, does not deserve the reputation it acquired as a consequence of the Armstrong Committee's investigation.During the late nineteenth century, this innovation helped many Amer.icans save for their old age by providing an efcient, high-yield, low-riskinvestment available on an installment plan. In a time before eitherpension funds or social insurance existed, such an asset fulflled an important economic function. Indeed, it may be that the prohibition oftontine insurance in 1906 hastened the introduction of both private pension plans and publicly funded social insurance programs.
总之，我们认为，tontine保险并不应该获得由于阿姆斯特朗委员会的调查而获得的声誉。在19世纪末，这种保险创新通过提供一种有效的、高回报、低风险的分期付款投资计划，帮助许多美国人积蓄了养老资金。在养老基金或社会保险出现之前，这种资产发挥了重要的经济作用。事实上，1906年禁止tontine保险可能会加速私人养老金计划和公共资助的社会保险计划的出台。
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