编者按:美国全国经济研究所(NBER)是美国最大的经济学研究组织,其发布的工作论文代表着经济学研究最新的成果,每周一发布新论文。本周(9.9-9.15)共发布 35 篇新工作论文,本期将会推送中间 11 篇论文的题目与摘要,供读者学习。
学术财经研究团队翻译。
Failing Banks
银行倒闭
Sergio A. Correia, Stephan Luck, and Emil Verner #32907
Abstract: Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1865 through 2023 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive non-core funding. Commonalities across failing banks imply that failures are highly predictable using simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements. Predictability is high even in the absence of deposit insurance, when depositor runs were common. Bank-level fundamentals also forecast aggregate waves of bank failures during systemic banking crises. Altogether, our evidence suggests that the ultimate cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always and everywhere a deterioration of bank fundamentals. Bank runs can be rejected as a plausible cause of failure for most failures in the history of the U.S. and are most commonly a consequence of imminent failure. Depositors tend to be slow to react to an increased risk of bank failure, even in the absence of deposit insurance.
摘要:为什么银行会倒闭?我们通过覆盖1865年至2023年大部分商业银行的面板数据,研究了美国银行倒闭的历史。倒闭的银行通常表现出资产损失增加、偿付能力恶化,以及对高成本非核心资金的依赖加重。跨倒闭银行的共性表明,使用公开财务报表中的简单会计指标可以高度预测银行倒闭风险。即便在没有存款保险、存款人挤兑常见的情况下,预测准确度仍然很高。银行层面的基本面也可以预测系统性银行危机中的整体银行倒闭浪潮。总体而言,我们的证据表明,银行倒闭和银行危机的根本原因几乎总是银行基本面的恶化。银行挤兑作为倒闭的合理原因在美国历史上大多数银行倒闭案例中可以被否定,它们更常是即将倒闭的后果。即便在没有存款保险的情况下,存款人往往对银行倒闭风险的增加反应迟缓。
Gender Reveals in the Labor Market: Evidence on Gender Signaling and Statistical Discrimination in an Online Health Care Market
劳动市场中的性别揭示:在线医疗市场中性别信号与统计性别歧视的证据
Haoran He, David Neumark, and Qian Weng #32929
Abstract: A recent approach to testing for customer statistical discrimination involves studying price gaps between sellers from different gender, race, or ethnic groups and how they evolve as buyers obtain more information about seller quality. We consider a similar setting, testing for statistical discrimination against female doctors in an online health care market. But we show that this kind of analysis does not provide evidence on statistical discrimination in this setting because doctors have a choice about how strongly to signal gender. We develop a new approach to identifying statistical discrimination using doctors’ choices about signaling their gender. We find evidence of statistical discrimination against female doctors in male-dominated fields, and against male doctors in female-dominated fields. In particular, female doctors mask gender more strongly initially in male-dominated fields, and male doctors do the same in female-dominated fields. But in both female- and male- dominated fields the gender gap in signaling decreases with number of customer reviews of doctors. More generally, our evidence indicates how, in some markets, sellers may be able to reduce statistical discrimination by masking their group membership.
摘要:一种最近用于测试客户统计歧视的方法是研究来自不同性别、种族或民族群体的卖家的价格差距,以及随着买家获取更多关于卖家质量的信息,这些差距如何演变。我们在类似的环境中,测试在线医疗市场中针对女性医生的统计歧视。然而,我们表明,这种分析在该背景下无法提供统计歧视的证据,因为医生可以选择多大程度上对性别进行信号传递。我们开发了一种新方法,通过医生在性别信号传递上的选择来识别统计歧视。我们发现,在男性主导的领域存在对女性医生的统计歧视,而在女性主导的领域则存在对男性医生的统计歧视。具体而言,女性医生在男性主导的领域中更强烈地掩饰自己的性别,男性医生在女性主导的领域中也有类似行为。但在无论是女性还是男性主导的领域,随着医生获得的客户评价增多,性别信号的差距逐渐减少。更广泛地说,我们的证据表明,在某些市场中,卖家通过掩饰其群体身份,可能能够减少统计歧视。
Optimal Monetary Policy with Redistribution
带有再分配的最优货币政策
Jennifer La'O and Wendy A. Morrison #32921
Abstract: We study optimal monetary policy in a general equilibrium economy with heterogeneous agents and nominal rigidities. Households differ in type-specific, state-contingent labor productivity and initial firm ownership, yet markets are complete. The fiscal authority has access to a linear tax schedule with non-state-contingent tax rates and uniform, lump-sum taxes (or transfers). We derive sufficient conditions under which implementing flexible-price allocations is optimal. We then show that when there are fluctuations in relative labor productivity across households, it is optimal for monetary policy to abandon the flexible-price benchmark and target a state-contingent markup. The optimal markup covaries positively with a sufficient statistic for labor income inequality. In a calibrated version of the model, countercyclical earnings inequality implies countercyclical optimal markups.
摘要:我们研究了在具有异质性代理人和名义刚性的通用均衡经济中最优的货币政策。家庭在类型特定的、与状态相关的劳动生产率和初始企业所有权方面存在差异,然而市场是完备的。财政当局可以使用线性税收机制,设定不与状态相关的税率以及统一的、一次性税收(或转移支付)。我们推导出了使得实现灵活价格配置成为最优的充分条件。然后,我们展示了当家庭之间的相对劳动生产率波动时,最优货币政策应放弃灵活价格基准,转而瞄准与状态相关的加价率。最优的加价率与衡量劳动收入不平等的充分统计量呈正相关。在模型的校准版本中,反周期的收入不平等意味着反周期的最优加价率。
Equilibrium Evictions
均衡驱逐
Dean Corbae, Andrew Glover, and Michael Nattinger #32898
Abstract: We develop a simple equilibrium model of rental markets for housing in which eviction occurs endogenously. Both landlords and renters lack commitment; a landlord evicts a delinquent tenant if they do not expect total future rent payments to cover costs, while tenants cannot commit to paying more rent than they would be able or willing to pay given their outside option of searching for a new rental. Renters who are persistently delinquent are more likely to be evicted and pay more per quality-adjusted unit of housing than renters who are less likely to be delinquent. Evictions due to a tenant’s inability to pay are never socially efficient, and lead to lower quality investment in housing and too few vacancies relative to the socially optimal allocation. Government policies that restrict landlords’ ability to evict can improve welfare relative to laissez-faire, but a full moratorium on evictions only raises welfare when it is temporarily adopted in response to a large adverse shock. Finally, rent support can effectively eliminate evictions even without covering all missed rent and delivers significantly larger gains than eviction restrictions.
摘要:我们提出了一个关于住房租赁市场的简单均衡模型,其中驱逐是内生发生的。房东和租户都缺乏承诺能力:如果房东预期未来的租金收入无法覆盖成本,他们会驱逐拖欠租金的租户;而租户在租金超过他们能够或愿意支付的水平时,无法承诺继续支付,特别是在他们有寻找新租赁住房的外部选择时。持续拖欠租金的租户更有可能被驱逐,并且在质量调整后的租金上支付得更多,而较少拖欠的租户则支付得较少。由于租户无力支付导致的驱逐从来都不是社会有效的,它会导致对住房的质量投资减少,并且相对于社会最优配置,房屋空置率过低。政府限制房东驱逐能力的政策相对于放任自由(laissez-faire)可以改善社会福利,但全面的驱逐禁令只有在应对重大不利冲击时临时采用时,才会提升福利。最后,租金补贴即使没有覆盖所有未支付的租金,也能有效消除驱逐,并带来显著大于驱逐限制的收益。
Privacy Elasticity: A (Hopefully) Useful New Concept
隐私弹性:一个(希望)有用的新概念
Inbal Dekel, Rachel Cummings, Ori Heffetz, and Katrina Ligett #32903
Abstract: Privacy considerations and their effects on behavior are becoming increasingly important. Yet the extremes of full and no privacy are rarely an option. How much does behavior change with small changes in privacy? Dekel et al. (2023) introduce the concept of privacy elasticity, the responsiveness of economic variables to small changes in privacy protections. This concept combines elasticity—a key economic measure of responsiveness of one variable to changes in another—and differential privacy—a computer science theory emerging as the standard tool for protecting and quantifying privacy. Together, they create a measure of privacy elasticity that is portable and comparable across contexts. The applicability of this concept is demonstrated by reviewing how privacy elasticity can be estimated in a public-good lab experiment.
摘要:隐私考虑及其对行为的影响正变得越来越重要。然而,完全隐私或无隐私这两种极端情况很少是可行的。行为在隐私发生小幅变化时会发生多大变化?Dekel等人(2023)引入了隐私弹性的概念,即经济变量对隐私保护小幅变化的响应性。该概念结合了弹性(一个衡量一个变量对另一个变量变化的响应程度的关键经济指标)和差分隐私(一种计算机科学理论,已成为保护和量化隐私的标准工具)。两者结合创造了一个可在不同背景下使用和比较的隐私弹性衡量标准。通过回顾如何在公共物品实验中估算隐私弹性,展示了该概念的应用性。
How Do Holistic Wrap-Around Anti-Poverty Programs Affect Employment and Individualized Outcomes?
整体性全方位反贫困项目如何影响就业和个体化成果?
Javier Espinosa, William N. Evans, David C. Phillips, and Tim Spilde #32911
Abstract: A new wave of social service programs aims to build a pathway out of poverty by helping clients define their own goals and then supporting them flexibly and intensively over multiple years to meet those goals. We conduct a randomized controlled trial of one such program. Participants randomly assigned to intensive, holistic, wrap-around services have 10 percentage points higher employment rates after one year compared with a control group offered only help with an immediate need. Most of this effect appears to persist after programming ends. However, we find limited evidence that intensive, holistic services affect areas beyond employment, even when other areas of life are participants’ primary goals. We find some evidence that the program works by increasing hopefulness and agency among participants, which may be more useful in supporting labor force participation than in meeting other goals.
摘要:一波新的社会服务项目旨在通过帮助客户设定自己的目标,并在数年内提供灵活且深入的支持,帮助他们摆脱贫困。我们对其中一个项目进行了随机对照试验。分配到接受密集、整体、全方位服务的参与者,在一年后就业率比仅获得紧急需求帮助的对照组高出10个百分点。大部分这种效果在项目结束后仍然存在。然而,我们发现,尽管参与者的主要目标涉及生活的其他方面,密集、整体的服务对这些领域的影响有限。我们发现了一些证据表明,该项目通过增强参与者的希望感和自我掌控力来发挥作用,这可能对支持劳动参与更为有效,而在实现其他目标上效果较弱。
Incentives to Vaccinate
疫苗接种激励措施
Pol Campos-Mercade, Armando N. Meier, Stephan Meier, Devin G. Pope, Florian H. Schneider, and Erik Wengström #32899
Abstract: Whether monetary incentives to change behavior work and how they should be structured are fundamental economic questions. We overcome typical data limitations in a large-scale field experiment on vaccination (N = 5,324) with a unique combination of administrative and survey data. We find that guaranteed incentives of $20 increase uptake by 13 percentage points in the short run and 9 in the long run. Guaranteed incentives are more effective than lottery-based, prosocial, or individually-targeted incentives, though all boost vaccinations. There are no unintended consequences on future vaccination or heterogeneities based on vaccination attitudes and incentivized economic preferences. Further, administrative data on relatives shows substantial positive spillovers. Our findings demonstrate the great potential of incentives for improving public health and provide guidance on their design.
摘要:改变行为的货币激励是否有效以及如何设计是基本的经济问题。我们通过疫苗接种的大规模现场实验(N=5,324),结合行政和调查数据,克服了典型的数据限制。我们发现,保证提供20美元的激励在短期内使接种率提高了13个百分点,长期内提高了9个百分点。相比于基于彩票、亲社会或个性化的激励,保证激励更为有效,尽管所有激励措施都促进了疫苗接种。没有发现对未来疫苗接种的不良影响,也没有基于疫苗接种态度或经济偏好差异的异质性。此外,亲属的行政数据表明存在显著的正向溢出效应。我们的研究结果展示了激励措施在改善公共健康方面的巨大潜力,并为其设计提供了指导。
Racial Differences in the Total Rate of Return on Owner-Occupied Housing
自有住房总回报率的种族差异
Rebecca Diamond and William F. Diamond #32916
Abstract: We quantify racial differences in the total rate of return on housing in a nationally representative sample of homeowners from 1974-2021. We develop a new method to estimate the rental value of each owner-occupied house, using a house's resale value to proxy for unobservable quality. Black and Hispanic homeowners earn higher but more volatile rates of return than White homeowners, due in part to higher rental yields. These differences are largely explained by household income and education differences. Including returns on properties that do not transact in sample is crucial to accurately measure racial differences in total rates of return.
摘要:我们量化了1974年至2021年间全国代表性样本中自有住房总回报率的种族差异。我们开发了一种新方法来估算每个自有住房的租金价值,使用房屋的转售价值作为无法观测的质量的代理。研究发现,黑人和西班牙裔房主的回报率高于白人房主,但波动性更大,这部分归因于较高的租金收益。这些差异主要由家庭收入和教育差异解释。将未在样本中交易的房产的回报计算在内对于准确衡量种族间总回报率的差异至关重要。
Optimal Trade Policies and Labor Markets
最优贸易政策与劳动力市场
Yan Bai, Dan Lu, and Hanxi Wang #32919
Abstract: We provide a general formula for optimal unilateral policies in multi-sector, general-equilibrium Ricardian models with various widely adopted labor market specifications. Sector-specific tariffs are summarized by a matrix of partial supply elasticities and the share of Home’s import in foreign incomes, reflecting Home’s import market power. Sector-specific export taxes depend on trade elasticities and Home’s market share in foreign consumption, reflecting Home’s export market power. Home imposes higher tariffs or export taxes on sectors with larger market powers. We apply the general formula to specific cases: perfectly mobile labor, imperfectly mobile labor across sectors, Ricardian-Roy models, and inefficient labor markets.
摘要:我们为多部门、一般均衡Ricardian模型中的最优单边政策提供了一个通用公式,该模型采用了广泛应用的劳动力市场规范。部门特定的关税由部分供应弹性矩阵和本国进口在外国收入中的占比总结,反映了本国的进口市场力量。部门特定的出口税则依赖于贸易弹性和本国在外国消费中的市场份额,反映了本国的出口市场力量。对于市场力量较大的部门,本国会征收更高的关税或出口税。我们将这一通用公式应用于具体案例:完全流动的劳动力、部门间不完全流动的劳动力、Ricardian-Roy模型以及效率低下的劳动力市场。
The Complexities of Differential Privacy for Survey Data
调查数据差分隐私的复杂性
Jörg Drechsler and James Bailie #32905
Abstract: The concept of differential privacy (DP) has gained substantial attention in recent years, most notably since the U.S. Census Bureau announced the adoption of the concept for its 2020 Decennial Census. However, despite its attractive theoretical properties, implementing DP in practice remains challenging, especially when it comes to survey data. In this paper we present some results from an ongoing project funded by the U.S. Census Bureau that is exploring the possibilities and limitations of DP for survey data. Specifically, we identify five aspects that need to be considered when adopting DP in the survey context: the multi-staged nature of data production; the limited privacy amplification from complex sampling designs; the implications of survey-weighted estimates; the weighting adjustments for nonresponse and other data deficiencies, and the imputation of missing values. We summarize the project’s key findings with respect to each of these aspects and also discuss some of the challenges that still need to be addressed before DP could become the new data protection standard at statistical agencies.
摘要:近年来,差分隐私(DP)的概念受到了广泛关注,尤其是自美国人口普查局宣布在2020年十年人口普查中采用这一概念以来。尽管差分隐私具有吸引人的理论特性,但在实践中实施仍充满挑战,特别是在调查数据的应用中。本文展示了一个由美国人口普查局资助的正在进行的项目的部分成果,该项目正在探索差分隐私在调查数据中的可能性和局限性。具体来说,我们识别了在调查环境中采用差分隐私时需要考虑的五个方面:数据生成的多阶段性、复杂抽样设计带来的有限隐私放大效应、调查加权估计的影响、针对未回应及其他数据缺陷的加权调整,以及缺失值的插补。我们总结了项目在每个方面的关键发现,并讨论了在差分隐私成为统计机构新的数据保护标准之前需要解决的一些挑战。
Skills and Human Capital in the Labor Market
劳动力市场中的技能与人力资本
David J. Deming and Mikko I. Silliman #32908
Abstract: This paper synthesizes the economics literature on skills and human capital, with a particular focus on higher-order capacities like social and decision-making skills. We review the empirical evidence on returns to human capital from both a micro and macro perspective, as well as the evidence on returns to human capital investment over the life-cycle. We highlight two key limitations of human capital theory as currently implemented. First, prior work mostly assumes that human capital is one-dimensional and can be measured by education or test scores alone. Second, human capital is typically modeled as augmenting the marginal product of labor with workers being treated as factors of production, just like physical capital. We argue for a new approach that treats workers as agents who decide how to allocate their labor over job tasks. Traditional cognitive skills make workers more productive in any task, while higher-order skills govern workers’ choices of which tasks to perform and whether to work alone or in a team. We illustrate the value of this approach with stylized models that incorporate teamwork and decision-making skills and generate predictions about how returns to skills vary across contexts.
摘要:本文整合了关于技能和人力资本的经济学文献,特别关注社交能力和决策能力等高阶能力。我们从微观和宏观角度回顾了人力资本回报的实证证据,以及生命周期内人力资本投资回报的证据。我们强调了当前人力资本理论的两个关键局限性。首先,先前的研究大多假设人力资本是单一维度的,且仅通过教育或测试分数来衡量。其次,人力资本通常被建模为提升劳动的边际产出,工人被视为生产要素,类似于物质资本。我们提出了一种新的方法,将工人视为决策者,他们决定如何将劳动分配到工作任务中。传统的认知技能使工人在任何任务中都更高效,而高阶技能则决定工人选择执行哪些任务以及是单独工作还是团队合作。我们通过包含团队合作和决策技能的简化模型说明了这一方法的价值,并预测了技能回报在不同环境中的差异。
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