为印尼能源转型融资,JETP之外还能如何优化?

文摘   2024-10-09 16:27   北京  


印度尼西亚松巴岛的太阳能电池板

专家们表示,重新分配补贴和优化可再生能源招标程序可以帮助印尼减少对煤炭和其他化石燃料的依赖。


“公正能源转型伙伴关系”(JETP)机制下,与印尼达成的数十亿美元协议在大张旗鼓地启动近两年后,富裕国家承诺提供的216亿美元能源转型融资仍未转化为新的清洁能源项目或燃煤电厂的提前退役


据印尼JETP秘书处的说法,截至2024年6月底,有19个总额为1.446亿美元的项目已于近期启动或正在讨论之中。然而,Eco-Business的调查显示,这些由美国、加拿大和德国等国提供的资助主要是用于可行性研究或技术援助的赠款。


与JETP和印尼能源转型有关的一份重要规划文件是JETP秘书处于2023年发布的《综合投资与政策计划(CIPP)。虽然这份文件因未排除工业区的燃煤综合电厂,并忽视以社区为基础的清洁能源项目而受到批评,但它为印尼到2050年可再生能源在能源结构中的占比制定了最雄心勃勃的目标(见图 1)。


JETP秘书处技术专家Putu Indy Gardian表示,这些雄心勃勃的目标旨在激励政府各部门,甚至是印尼国有电力公司Pusahaan Listrik Negara(PLN),将其可再生能源目标与国家的脱碳目标相匹配。印尼最新国家自主贡献目标(National Determined Contribution)承诺,到2030年在没有国际援助的情况下减排32%,在有国际援助的情况下减排43%

图 1:印尼能源转型情景下的可再生能源比例

JETP情景为印尼2030年和2050年可再生能源在能源结构中的占比设定了最雄心勃勃的目标,超过印尼国家电力总体规划(RUKN)和PLN情景下的目标水平。

能源经济与金融分析研究所(IEEFA)亚洲能源金融战略顾问Grant Hauber表示,CIPP更为雄心勃勃的情景能否转化为国家政策和机制,将由政府决定。10月20日,目前的《可再生能源法案》将交由新一任政府通过成为法律,但批评人士认为该法案不尽如人意。“印尼即将颁布的《可再生能源法案》相当不乐观,因为它将新能源归类为可能来自化石燃料的能源。”独立智库Ember的高级电力政策分析师 Dinita Setyawati 说:“对太阳能和风能等可再生能源,没有给予足够重视。


然而,CIPP的一个关键部分是太阳能光伏发电装机容量的指数式增长,从2022年的100MW增至2025年的4.1GW,增幅超过40倍。预计到2030年,可再生能源装机容量将增加7倍,达到29.3GW,到2050年达到264.6GW。(见图 2)


印尼将如何实现这一目标?依靠怎样的政策和程序机制?


解决方案 1:需要“投标工厂”

CIPP的可再生能源目标,需要“像工厂流水线一样生产出数十个项目”,Hauber说。例如,每个太阳能项目的成功都需要多方面的因素——从合适的场地和输电互联等实际需求,到确保有严格的合同、定价机制和通常需要数月甚至数年的竞标过程。


他说,JETP目前缺少这种“投标工厂”,即一个专门负责识别、规划和执行项目的部门。


然而,对于必须进行招标设计以及与包括律师、银行家和工程师在内的利益相关者进行磋商的工作,“绝对没有捷径可走”,他说。“多年来,这一直是亚洲所有基础设施发展的通病——雄心勃勃、政策目标高,但执行能力低。


不过,印尼并不需要重新发明轮子——国内和区域都有政府机构成功监管公私合作(PPP)项目的范例,Hauber说。其中一个是PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (Persero, 或 PT SMI),它是印尼财政部下属的特殊任务机构。成立15 年以来,PT SMI已为400多个基础设施项目提供资金,但直到最近才在印尼能源转型机制下承担支持能源转型项目的任务。


另一个成功运营的例子是菲律宾公私合作中心(Philippines’ PPP Center),该中心从2000年的只有两个人和一个项目,发展到今天拥有200多名员工和近100个在运营项目。

图 2:印尼太阳能项目装机容量(JETP 情景)

JETP情景预计,印尼2022年至2050年间太阳能光伏装机容量将急剧增加。


解决方案 2:开放市场

然而,PT SMI启动更多可再生能源项目的能力受到现有燃煤电厂合同的限制,这些合同由PLN管理,PLN垄断了印尼的电力供应。国家层面正在采取措施解决这一问题。印尼政府于8月宣布,计划关闭或退役13家燃煤发电厂,这些电厂的总装机容量为4.8GW,产生的二氧化碳当量为660万吨。印尼能源和矿产资源部总干事Eniya Listiani Dewi说,其中一些是计划自然退役的老电厂。


与此同时,PLN在9月宣布将在2060年前将800家燃煤发电厂转为燃气发电厂。


Hauber说,加快转型的一个方法是印尼放松PLN对电力市场的垄断,允许第三方买卖可再生能源。其他东南亚国家已经开始这样做——PLN在越南的同行——越南电力公司(EVN)也对发电和输电实行类似的垄断,直到越南政府在7月宣布允许直接购电协议(DPPA)。马来西亚最近也允许希望直接从生产商处购买可再生能源的大型公司通过第三方接入电网,但业内人士表示还有更多工作要做。


Ember的Setyawati说,与此同时,PLN无需等待JETP资金来加速其能源转型。


在亚洲开发银行能源转型机制(Energy Transition Mechanism)的支持下,PLN已在开展一个试点项目,以关闭燃煤发电厂Cirebon 1。该机制与JETP的启动是分开安排的。


事实上,Setyawati认为,JETP目前只对印尼更广泛的能源转型计划起到补充作用。“我认为JETP融资在脱碳情景初期有帮助,提高可再生能源的优先级,并为电力部门提供数据。”不过,其他类型的融资也应该“与JETP并行”,以避免资金使用效率低下。


解决方案 3:重新分配补贴

印尼JETP的另一个障碍是缺乏有利的融资条件。IEEFA可持续金融和气候风险研究负责人Shantanu Srivastava表示,多边开发银行的优惠贷款的利率通常比商业贷款更优惠,因此可以吸引更多的私人资本。


然而,他说,目前印尼的JETP计划并未安排和提供此类贷款。


“这就是为什么整个JETP计划受到质疑的原因。”Srivastava说:“如果七国集团(G7)以商业条款提供贷款,这并不能解决资金的问题。”


但独立智库国际可持续发展研究所(IISD)能源政策助理Anissa Suharsono表示,另一个对印尼能源转型更有促进作用的资金来源是公共财政。她说,这包括补贴、国有企业的投资以及国有银行等公共金融机构的贷款。


“这些基金都在政府控制之下,应首先行动,因为这表明政府在向清洁能源转型方面的承诺。”Suharsono说,“这样的信号在降低清洁能源投资风险并最终吸引更多私人投资方面发挥着重要作用。”


印尼人已经从这种“补贴互换”(subsidy swap)中受益,即把目前用于补贴化石燃料的资金转用于开发可再生能源。Suharsono指出,2015年,政府通过改革化石燃料补贴节省了约276万亿卢比(约合204亿美元)。IISD的一项研究发现,这使得更多资金投入到社会保护和基础设施建设中,包括教育、医疗保险、住房和清洁水等项目。


依靠政府

Ember公司亚洲项目总监Aditya Lolla说,最终,JETP必须为印尼能源转型铺平道路,“JETP 的协议都是自上而下的——与亚洲的其他决策类似。”他补充说,这迫使公务员、私营部门和投资者等“整个机制”争相实现国家设定的最高目标。


强有力的政府领导对于推动私人资本至关重要。“大多数东南亚国家面临的挑战是,除非私营部门知道资金会流动起来,否则他们不会采取行动,” Hauber说。“如果企业正在等待政府的许可或合同的谈判,这就存在延迟风险。延迟会增加成本和不确定性。而政府能做的最重要的事就是消除不确定性——创建可预测的标准、可复制的模板。这正是印尼所缺乏的。”


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Financing Indonesia’s energy transition can happen beyond sluggish JETP deals – here’s how


Experts say that rerouting subsidies and implementing a better tender process for renewables can help Indonesia reduce its dependence on coal and other fossil fuels.


Nearly two years after Indonesia’s multibillion-dollar Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) mechanism was launched to much fanfare, none of the pledged US$21.6 billion in energy transition financing from rich countries has translated into new clean energy projects or the early retirement of coal-fired power plants.


According to the country’s JETP Secretariat, 19 programmes totalling US$144.6 million were recently launched or are undergoing discussion as of end-June 2024. A check by Eco-Business, however, showed that these programmes, funded by countries including the United States, Canada and Germany, are largely grants for feasibility studies or technical assistance.


“Indonesia has these investment plans that list a bunch of projects, [but those] projects don’t necessarily mean investments [are happening],” said Grant Hauber, strategic energy finance advisor for Asia at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).


One key planning document in relation to JETP and Indonesia’s energy transition is the Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP), published in 2023 by the JETP Secretariat. While the plan has been criticised for not excluding coal-fired integrated power plants in industrial areas and for ignoring community-based clean energy projects over large scale ones, it also lays out the country’s most ambitious targets for the renewables in Indonesia’s energy mix by 2050 [see Figure 1].


Putu Indy Gardian, the JETP Secretariat’s technical specialist, said that these ambitious targets were set to spur various government ministries and even Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), Indonesia’s state-owned power utility, in aligning their renewable energy targets, which have historically been mismatched, with Indonesia’s decarbonisation targets. The country’s recently updated Nationally Determined Contribution targets a 32 per cent reduction in emissions by 2030 without international aid, and 43 per cent with international aid.


However, it is up to the government to decide whether the CIPP’s more ambitious scenario will translate into national policy changes and mechanisms, said Gardian. Indonesia will see Prabowo Subianto take over the country’s presidency from Joko Widodo later this month, on 20 October, and the current Renewable Energy Bill will be passed on to his administration to pass into law. Critics consider the bill underwhelming.


“Looking at Indonesia’s renewable energy bill that will be enacted later this year, it is quite bleak because it categorises new energy as possibly fossil fuel-derived energy” said Dinita Setyawati, senior electricity policy analyst at independent think tank Ember. “There’s not much emphasis placed on renewables [such as] solar and wind.”


And yet, a crucial part of CIPP is an exponential rise in solar photovoltaic capacity from 100 megawatts in 2022 to 4.1 gigawatts (GW) in 2025 – an increase of more than 40 times. The rate of renewables capacity addition is expected to increase seven times by 2030, to 29.3GW, and will reach 264.6GW by 2050. [see Figure 2]


“How [is Indonesia going to achieve that]? What policies and process mechanisms will make that happen?” Hauber asked at IEEFA’s recent Energy Finance 2024 conference, where Gardian also spoke. Several experts at the event shared their thoughts with Eco-Business on practical steps Indonesia can take to finance its energy transition.


Solution 1: ‘Tender factory’ needed


When it comes to the CIPP’s renewables targets, what is needed is for “dozens of projects to be cranked out almost like a factory process,” said Hauber. Each solar project, for instance, requires multiple factors to succeed – from physical needs like an appropriate site and transmission interconnections, to ensuring there are rigorous contracts, pricing mechanisms and a bidding process that often takes months, if not years.


This “tender factory”, a specialised unit that would identify, plan and execute projects, is currently missing from JETP, he said. “This kind of work is boring – that’s the reason [for the sluggishness].”


However there is “absolutely no shortcut” for having to do tender designs and consulting with stakeholders including lawyers, bankers and engineers, he said. “This has been the bugbear of all infrastructure development in Asia for years – [there] is high ambition and high policy targets but low implementation capability.”


However, Indonesia does not need to reinvent the wheel – there are domestic and regional examples of government agencies which oversee public-private partnership (PPP) projects that have worked well in the past, said Hauber. One example is PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (Persero, or PT SMI), which is a special mission vehicle under Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance. Persero has financed more than 400 infrastructure projects since its inception 15 years ago, but has only recently been tasked with supporting energy transition projects under the country’s energy transition mechanism.


Another example of a successful operation is the Philippines’ PPP Center, which has gone from having just two people and no projects in 2000 to over 200 staff and nearly 100 operating projects today, said Hauber.


Solution 2: Liberalising the market


PT SMI’s ability to get more renewable energy projects off the ground, however, is limited by existing contracts for coal-fired power plants, managed by PLN, which monopolises Indonesia’s electricity supply. Coal is Indonesia’s primary source of energy, making up 36.4 per cent of the energy mix in 2030, according to International Energy Agency data. Energy-related emissions stood at 652 million tonnes of carbon dioxide and its equivalents (MtCO2e) in 2022, or 1.91 per cent of global emissions.


Steps are being made at a national level to address this. Indonesia’s government announced in August that it is planning to shut down or decommission 13 of its coal-fired power plants, which have a total capacity of 4.8 GW and generate 66 MtCO2e. Some of these are old plants that are scheduled to retire naturally, said the director general of Indonesia’s Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry, Eniya Listiani Dewi.


Meanwhile, PLN announced last month that it would be switching 800 of its coal-fired power plants to gas by 2060. It has yet to announce details of which plants would be closed and when.


One way to speed up the transition is for Indonesia to loosen PLN’s monopoly on the electricity market by allowing for third parties to buy and sell renewables, said Hauber. Other Southeast Asian countries have already begun doing this – PLN’s counterpart in Vietnam, EVN, also held a similar monopoly over electricity generation and transmission until the government announced in July that direct power purchase agreements (DPPA) would be allowed. Malaysia also recently granted third-party access to the electricity grid by large companies looking to buy renewable energy directly from producers, although industry players say more needs to be done.


“What I’m hopeful for is that Vietnam’s DPPA is going to show the way [for an energy market] that can almost be fully private,” said Hauber.


In the meantime, PLN does not have to wait on JETP funds to accelerate its energy transition, said Ember’s Setyawati. “Bolder commitment from PLN can happen parallel to JETP developments,” she said.


The state utility is already in the process of a pilot project to decommission coal-fired power plant Cirebon 1 with the support of the Asia Development Bank’s Energy Transition Mechanism, which had been arranged separate from the launch of JETP.


In fact, Setyawati believes that JETP currently plays only a complementary role to Indonesia’s broader energy transition plans. “I think JETP financing helps initially with decarbonisation scenarios, prioritisation of renewables and making data available for the electricity sector,” she told Eco-Business. However, other types of financing can and should be disbursed “parallel with JETP” to avoid an inefficient use of funds.


“For instance, we don’t need multiple feasibility studies on one project,” she said. “The phase out [of coal-fired power plants] will happen gradually, but the great thing is that discussions and awareness of the energy transition is now everywhere.”


Solution 3: Rerouting subsidies


Another stumbling block for Indonesia’s JETP has been the lack of favourable financing terms. Concessional loans from multilateral development banks typically offer more favourable interest rates than commercial loans, and can therefore attract much larger amounts of private capital, said Shantanu Srivastava, research lead for sustainable finance and climate risk at IEEFA.


However, these kinds of loans are not currently being structured and offered as part of Indonesia’s JETP programme, he said.


“That is why the whole JETP programme has been questioned. If [the G7 countries] are providing loans with commercial terms, that does not solve the problem [of inaccessible finance],” said Srivastava.


But another source of funding which could be more catalytic in financing Indonesia’s energy transition is public finance, said Anissa Suharsono, energy policy associate at the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), an independent think tank. This includes subsidies, investments from state-owned enterprises, as well as loans from public financial institutions such as state-owned banks, she said.


“These funds are all under government control and should have been the first to move because it would signal the government’s commitment in transitioning [towards cleaner energy],” said Suharsono. “[Such a signal] plays a crucial role in derisking clean energy investments and eventually attracting a larger volume of private investments.”


Indonesians have already benefited from such a “subsidy swap”, which involves taking funds that are currently used to subsidise fossil fuels and using them to subsidise renewable energy development instead. Suharsono pointed at how in 2015, the government reaped about 276 trillion rupiah (US$20.4 billion) in savings from reforming fossil fuel subsidies. A study by IISD found that this led to more finance being committed to social protection and infrastructure development, including programmes for education, health insurance, housing and clean water.


Banking on the government


Ultimately, JETP must pave the way for a more coordinated response to Indonesia’s energy transition, said Aditya Lolla, Asia programme director at Ember. “If you look at deals like JETP, they are very top down – similar to the rest of policymaking in Asia,” he said.


This forces the “entire machinery” of civil service, the private sectors and investors scramble to deliver on top line targets set by politicians, he added. “It can be a good or bad thing, but when you’re talking about the urgency [of climate action], mechanisms need to become more holistic and coordinated.”


Strong government leadership will also be crucial in driving private capital. “The challenge in most Southeast Asian countries is that the private sector won’t move unless they know the money will flow,” said Hauber. “If companies are waiting for permission from the government or some contract to be negotiated, that’s a delay risk. Delays add cost and uncertainty,” he said.


“The biggest thing [governments] can do is to remove uncertainty – create standard, replicable templates that are predictable. That is what Indonesia is lacking,” said Hauber.


本文 2024 年 10 月 1 日发布于Eco Business。文章仅代表作者观点,不代表本公众号立场。

封面图源:Flickr/Asian Development Bank

翻译 审校/韩迪 汪燕辉      编辑/包林洁

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