监管问询函、债权人风险感知与企业杠杆操纵
Comment Letters, Creditor Risk Perception, and Corporate Leverage Manipulation
《财经研究》2024年50卷第10期 页码：124-138 online：2024年10月3日
作者
中：王晓佳1 , 毛新述2 , 于芙2
英：Wang Xiaojia1, Mao Xinshu2, Yu Fu2
作者单位：1. 对外经济贸易大学 国际商学院, 北京 100029; 2. 北京工商大学 商学院, 北京 100048
摘要及关键词
摘要：虽然监管问询制度的初衷在于发挥治理作用，维护资本市场稳定，但它也会向市场传递企业存在潜在风险的信号，进而对企业产生不利影响。这是否会扭曲企业行为，最终违背监管初衷呢？文章从杠杆操纵视角，以我国2013—2021年A股非金融上市公司为研究样本，发现财报问询函会加剧企业的杠杆操纵行为。机制分析表明，财报问询函引发了债权人风险感知，进而迫使企业通过杠杆操纵来维持企业投融资需求。文章还从企业特征和问询函特征两个方面进行了补充验证。在企业特征方面，该效应在事前风险较高、信息环境较差以及投融资需求较高的样本中更显著；在问询函特征方面，该效应在问询程度较高、问询内容涉及债权人风险时更显著。拓展性分析表明，无论是中期报告问询函还是年度报告问询函，均会对企业杠杆操纵产生影响；而相对于财报问询函，一般问询函并不会对杠杆操纵产生影响。此外，内部控制有效性可以削弱财报问询函对杠杆操纵的影响。文章的结论不仅补充了财报问询函和杠杆操纵的相关研究，还有助于进一步优化和规范我国监管问询制度，对防范企业隐性债务风险以及推动我国资本市场发展具有重要意义。
关键词：监管问询函；杠杆操纵；债务融资；风险感知
Summary: While comment letters have played significant roles in governance, they also signal potential risks to the market. If market participants use these signals to judge a company’s quality, negative market reactions may follow. This raises the question of whether such adverse reactions could distort corporate behavior, contradict regulatory intentions, and even lead to systemic financial risks. This crucial issue has received limited attention in current research. Therefore, this paper intends to explore the economic consequences of comment letters from the perspective of corporate leverage manipulation, so as to supplement and extend this topic. Taking non-financial listed companies in China’s A-share market from 2013 to 2021 as the research sample, this paper finds that financial report comment letters will exacerbate corporate leverage manipulation. Mechanism analysis shows that financial report comment letters trigger creditor risk perception, thereby forcing companies to maintain their investment and financing needs through leverage manipulation. Furthermore, this paper provides supplementary verification from two aspects: corporate characteristics and comment letter characteristics. In terms of corporate characteristics, this effect is more significant in samples with higher ex-ante risks, poorer information environment, and higher investment and financing needs; in terms of comment letter characteristics, this effect is more significant when the degree of comment is higher and the comment content involves risks that creditors are concerned about. Expansion analysis shows that both mid-term report comment letters and annual report comment letters will have an impact on corporate leverage manipulation; compared to financial report comment letters, general comment letters do not have an impact on leverage manipulation; and the effectiveness of internal controls can weaken the impact of financial report comment letters on leverage manipulation. The inspiration of this paper is as follows: Regulatory authorities should balance their supervisory and guiding roles for enterprises, creditors, and minority shareholders, deepen their understanding of corporate leverage manipulation to ensure effective preventive supervision, and issue financial report comment letters cautiously to reduce its adverse impact. The conclusions not only enhance the research on comment letters and leverage manipulation, but also contribute to optimizing China’s regulation system, which has significant implications for preventing hidden corporate debt risks and promoting the development of China’s capital market.
Key words: comment letters; leverage manipulation; debt financing; risk perception
其他信息
DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20240511.201
收稿日期：2023-09-22
基金项目: 国家社会科学基金重大项目（22ZDA044）
点
这里“阅读原文”，查看更多
