社会制度变迁与经济繁荣衰退：2024年诺贝尔经济学奖得主经典研究成果推荐

   Authors   

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson

American Economic Review, 2001, 91(05)

   Abstract   

We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes.

  摘要   

我们利用欧洲人死亡率的差异来估算制度对经济表现的影响。欧洲人在不同的殖民地采取了截然不同的殖民政策，并建立了不同的相关制度。在欧洲人面临高死亡率的地方，他们无法定居，更有可能建立采掘机构。这些制度一直延续至今。利用欧洲人死亡率的差异作为当前制度的工具，我们估计了制度对人均收入的巨大影响。一旦控制了制度的影响，非洲国家或更靠近赤道的国家的收入并不会更低。

   原文链接  

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles？id=10.1257/aer.91.5.1369

   Authors   

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson

American Economic Review, 2012, 102(06)

   Abstract   

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) established that economic institutions today are correlated with expected mortality of European colonialists. David Albouy argues this relationship is not robust. He drops all data from Latin America and much of the data from Africa, making up almost 60 percent of our sample, despite much information on the mortality of Europeans in those places during the colonial period. He also includes a "campaign" dummy that is coded inconsistently; even modest corrections undermine his claims. We also show that limiting the effect of outliers strengthens our results, making them robust to even extreme versions of Albouy's critiques.

  摘要   

Acemoglu、Johnson和Robinson（2001）认为，当今的经济体制与欧洲殖民者的预期死亡率相关。David Albouy认为这种关系并不稳健。他放弃了拉丁美洲的所有数据和非洲的大部分数据（占我们样本的近60%），尽管这些地方有很多关于殖民时期欧洲人死亡率的信息。他还加入了一个编码不一致的“运动”虚拟变量；即使是适度的修正也会削弱他的说法。我们还证明，限制异常值的影响会加强我们的结果，使其即使面对阿尔布伊的极端批评也能保持稳健。

   原文链接  

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.102.6.3077

   Authors   

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson

Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117(04)

   Abstract   

Among countries colonized by European powers during the past 500 years, those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor. We document this reversal using data on urbanization patterns and population density, which, we argue, proxy for economic prosperity. This reversal weighs against a view that links economic development to geographic factors. Instead, we argue that the reversal reflects changes in the institutions resulting from European colonialism. The European intervention appears to have created an “institutional reversal” among these societies, meaning that Europeans were more likely to introduce institutions encouraging investment in regions that were previously poor. This institutional reversal accounts for the reversal in relative incomes. We provide further support for this view by documenting that the reversal in relative incomes took place during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and resulted from societies with good institutions taking advantage of the opportunity to industrialize.

  摘要   

在过去500年间被欧洲列强殖民的国家中，那些在1500年还相对富裕的国家现在却相对贫穷。我们利用城市化模式和人口密度的数据记录了这一逆转，我们认为，城市化模式和人口密度代表了经济繁荣程度。这种逆转否定了将经济发展与地理因素联系起来的观点。相反，我们认为这种逆转反映了欧洲殖民主义导致的制度变化。欧洲的干预似乎在这些社会中造成了“制度逆转”，这意味着欧洲人更有可能在以前贫穷的地区引入鼓励投资的制度。这种制度逆转解释了相对收入的逆转。我们通过记录相对收入的逆转发生在18世纪末和19世纪初，是制度良好的社会利用机会实现工业化的结果，从而为这一观点提供了进一步的支持。

   原文链接  

https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/117/4/1231/1875948

   Authors   

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A, Robinson

American Economic Review, 2005, 95(03)

   Abstract   

The rise of Western Europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean and with substantial trade with the New World, Africa, and Asia via the Atlantic. This trade and the associated colonialism affected Europe not only directly, but also indirectly by inducing institutional change. Where "initial" political institutions (those established before 1500) placed significant checks on the monarchy, the growth of Atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy, and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights. These changes were central to subsequent economic growth.

  摘要   

1500年后，西欧的崛起主要归功于那些能够通往大西洋并通过大西洋与新大陆、非洲和亚洲进行大量贸易的国家的发展。这种贸易和与之相关的殖民主义不仅直接影响了欧洲，还通过引发制度变革间接影响了欧洲。在“初始”政治体制（1500年前建立的政治体制）对君主政体形成重大制约的情况下，大西洋贸易的增长通过限制君主政体的权力而加强了商人群体，并帮助商人获得了保护财产权的体制变革。这些变革对后来的经济增长至关重要。

   原文链接  

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0002828054201305

   Authors   

Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson

American Economic Review, 2008, 98(01)

   Abstract   

We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions themselves will persist over time.

  摘要   

我们构建了一个模型来研究政治体制变革对经济体制的影响。政治体制的变化会改变法律上政治权力的分配，但也会刺激对事实上政治权力的投资，从而部分甚至完全抵消法律上权力的变化。该模型可能意味着一种被俘获的民主模式，即民主政权可能会存活下来，但会选择有利于精英阶层的经济体制。该模型提供了一些条件，在这些条件下，经济或政策结果将不受政治体制变化的影响，而经济体制本身也将长期存在。

   原文链接  

https://benny.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.98.1.267

   Author   

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, Pierre Yared

 American Economic Review, 2008, 98(03)

   Abstract   

Existing studies establish a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables. We show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and various measures of democracy. We present instrumental-variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy. The cross-country correlation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years. This pattern is consistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political-economic development paths at certain critical junctures.

  摘要   

现有研究在收入与民主之间建立了很强的跨国相关性，但没有控制同时影响这两个变量的因素。我们的研究表明，通过加入国家固定效应来控制这些因素，可以消除人均收入与各种民主指标之间的统计关联。我们提出的工具变量估计值也表明收入对民主没有因果影响。收入与民主之间的跨国相关性反映了过去500年中收入变化与民主之间的正相关性。这种模式与社会在某些关键时刻走上不同的政治经济发展道路的观点是一致的。

   原文链接  

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.98.3.808

   Author   

Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson

American Economic Review, 2011, 101(07)

   Abstract   

The French Revolution had a momentous impact on neighboring countries. It removed the legal and economic barriers protecting oligarchies, established the principle of equality before the law, and prepared economies for the new industrial opportunities of the second half of the 19th century. We present within-Germany evidence on the long-run implications of these institutional reforms. Occupied areas appear to have experienced more rapid urbanization growth, especially after 1850. A two-stage least squares strategy provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the reforms instigated by the French had a positive impact on growth.

  摘要   

法国大革命对周边国家产生了重大影响。它消除了保护寡头的法律和经济壁垒，确立了法律面前人人平等的原则，并为19世纪下半叶新的工业机遇做好了经济准备。我们提供了德国国内关于这些制度改革长期影响的证据。占领区似乎经历了更快速的城市化增长，尤其是在1850年之后。两阶段最小二乘法策略提供的证据与法国人发起的改革对经济增长产生积极影响的假设一致。

   原文链接  

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.7.3286

   Author   

Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, Eric Friedman

Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58(1–2).

   Abstract   

The “Asian Crisis” of 1997–98 affected all the “emerging markets” open to capital flows. Measures of corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline better than do standard macroeconomic measures. A possible explanation is that in countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers and thus a larger fall in asset prices.

  摘要   

1997-1998年的“亚洲危机”影响了所有向资本流动开放的“新兴市场”。公司治理措施，特别是对小股东保护的有效性，比标准的宏观经济措施更能解释汇率贬值和股市下跌的程度。一种可能的解释是，在公司治理薄弱的国家，较差的经济前景导致管理者更多的征用，从而使资产价格下跌更多。

   原文链接  

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X00000696

   Author   

Simon Johnson, John McMillan, Christopher Woodruff

American Economic Review, 2002, 92(05)

   Abstract   

Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

  摘要   

薄弱的产权和有限的外部融资渠道哪个对私营部门投资的制约更大？通过对后共产主义国家新成立企业的调查，我们发现，产权薄弱阻碍了企业对利润进行再投资，即使在可以获得银行贷款的情况下也是如此。在产权相对较强的地方，企业会对利润进行再投资；在产权相对较弱的地方，企业家不愿用留存收益进行投资。

   原文链接  

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282802762024539

   Author   

James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, Thierry Verdier

Journal of Development Economics, 2006, 79, 2

   Abstract   

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.

  摘要   

在本文中，我们认为资源禀赋所产生的政治激励是理解资源禀赋是否是一种诅咒的关键。我们的研究表明：(1)相对于有效的开采路径，政治家倾向于过度开采自然资源，因为他们对未来打了太多折扣；(2)资源繁荣提高了开采路径的效率。然而，(3)资源繁荣提高了掌权者的价值，为政治家提供了更多的资源，他们可以利用这些资源来影响选举结果，从而增加了经济其他部分的资源错配。(4)资源繁荣对经济的总体影响主要取决于体制，因为体制决定了政治激励在多大程度上体现为政策结果。拥有促进问责制和国家能力的体制的国家往往会从资源繁荣中获益，因为这些体制可以改善这种繁荣所产生的不正常的政治激励。然而，没有这种体制的国家可能会受到资源诅咒的影响。

   原文链接  

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387806000137

   Author   

James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, Thierry Verdier

 Journal of Public Economics, 2017, 145

   Abstract   

 In recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets, be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in Greece, or to unstable oil prices in Venezuela. We study the political consequences of such public income volatility. As is standard, in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re-election probabilities, but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy, such as patronage public employment, less costly. Our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth. In the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction, jointly interacting with increased patronage employment.

  摘要   

近年来，许多国家的公共预算都出现了很大的波动，无论是希腊获得外国贷款的波动，还是委内瑞拉不稳定的石油价格。我们研究了这种公共收入波动的政治后果。按照惯例，在我们的模型中，政治激励会产生低效政策以提高连任概率，但我们的研究表明，公共收入的不确定性会产生特定的新影响。未来的不确定性会降低执政的收益，从而使政策更有效率。但与此同时，它也降低了在位者的连任概率，而且由于一些政策的低效集中在未来，这就使得低效政策（如赞助性公共就业）的成本降低。我们的模型强调了公共预算波动与经济增长之间新的政治经济学联系。在波动来自自然资源价格（这是许多发展中国家的特点）的情况下，我们表明，波动本身可能是低效资源开采的一个来源，并与赞助性就业的增加共同作用。

   原文链接  

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272716302006

（选文、整理：陆森）