顶级期刊目录 | The Review of Economic Studies 2024.11

1.A Model of Online Misinformation

2.Decomposing Duration Dependence in a Stopping Time Model

3.Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations

4.Motives and Consequences of Libor Strategic Reporting: How Much Can We Learn from Banks’ Self-Reported Borrowing Rates?

5.Revisiting Event-Study Designs: Robust and Efficient Estimation

6.Outside Options in the Labour Market

7.Marriage Market and Labour Market Sorting

8.The Work-From-Home Technology Boon and its Consequences

9.Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests

10.Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence 

11.Measuring Diffusion Over a Large Network

12.Designing Interrogations

13.Stability in Large Markets

14.Granular Search, Market Structure, and Wages

15.A Dynamic Model of Input–Output Networks

16.Credit Allocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations

17.Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labour Courts

   Authors  

Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar, James Siderius

   Abstract   

We present a model of online content sharing where agents sequentially observe an article and decide whether to share it with others. This content may or may not contain misinformation. Each agent starts with an ideological bias and gains utility from positive social media interactions but does not want to be called out for propagating misinformation. We characterize the (Bayesian–Nash) equilibria of this social media game and establish that it exhibits strategic complementarities. Under this framework, we study how a platform interested in maximizing engagement would design its algorithm. Our main result establishes that when the relevant articles have low-reliability and are thus likely to contain misinformation, the engagement-maximizing algorithm takes the form of a “filter bubble”—creating an echo chamber of like-minded users. Moreover, filter bubbles become more likely when there is greater polarization in society and content is more divisive. Finally, we discuss various regulatory solutions to such platform-manufactured misinformation.

Authors  

Fernando Alvarez, Katarína Borovičková, Robert Shimer 

   Abstract   

We develop an economic model of transitions in and out of employment. Heterogeneous workers switch employment status when the net benefit from working, a Brownian motion with drift, hits optimally chosen barriers. This implies that the duration of jobless spells for each worker has an inverse Gaussian distribution. We allow for arbitrary heterogeneity across workers and prove that the distribution of inverse Gaussian distributions is partially identified from the duration of two non-employment spells for each worker. We estimate the model using Austrian social security data and find that dynamic selection is a critical source of duration dependence.

   Authors  

Paulo Barelli, Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

   Abstract   

We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. Market mechanisms in a class that includes auctions yield the same outcome as the Walrasian rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the efficient allocation has a monotonicity property. Examples illustrate cases where they differ. Monotonicity restricts the heterogeneity among traders’ types.

   Authors  

Pietro Bonaldi

   Abstract   

Libor is an estimate of interbank borrowing costs computed daily from rates reported by a fixed panel of banks. Evidence suggests that banks have manipulated Libor in recent years by misreporting their borrowing costs. I estimate a strategic reporting model that identifies banks’ borrowing costs as well as their motives for misreporting. The estimation places a lower bound on the value that Libor would have had if banks had truthfully reported their borrowing costs. The model is identified even when unobserved heterogeneity exists in the form of a common cost component that is known by all banks but unobservable to the econometrician and is allowed to follow a non-stationary process. The only data used for identification are banks’ Libor quotes. Overall, I find that the estimated lower bound for the unmanipulated Libor is always above the published Libor, with an average deviation of 25 basis points at the worst of the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The estimated bound displays a pattern similar to two other measures of interbank borrowing costs that have been used previously to assess the extent of manipulation. The model is also used to determine the extent to which misreporting was motivated by signalling or banks’ net exposure to Libor. The estimation results indicate that sending creditworthiness signals was the main driver of systematic misreporting from 2007 to 2010.

   Authors  

Kirill Borusyak, Xavier Jaravel, Jann Spiess

   Abstract   

We develop a framework for difference-in-differences designs with staggered treatment adoption and heterogeneous causal effects. We show that conventional regression-based estimators fail to provide unbiased estimates of relevant estimands absent strong restrictions on treatment-effect homogeneity. We then derive the efficient estimator addressing this challenge, which takes an intuitive “imputation” form when treatment-effect heterogeneity is unrestricted. We characterize the asymptotic behaviour of the estimator, propose tools for inference, and develop tests for identifying assumptions. Our method applies with time-varying controls, in triple-difference designs, and with certain non-binary treatments. We show the practical relevance of our results in a simulation study and an application. Studying the consumption response to tax rebates in the U.S., we find that the notional marginal propensity to consume is between 8 and 11% in the first quarter—about half as large as benchmark estimates used to calibrate macroeconomic models—and predominantly occurs in the first month after the rebate.

   Authors  

Sydnee Caldwell, Oren Danieli

   Abstract   

This paper develops a method to estimate workers’ outside employment opportunities. We outline a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity, from which we derive a sufficient statistic, the “outside options index” (OOI), for the effect of outside options on earnings, holding worker productivity constant. The OOI uses the cross-sectional concentration of similar workers across job types to quantify workers’ outside options as a function of workers’ commuting costs, preferences, and skills. Using German micro-data, we find that differences in options explain 20% of the gender earnings gap, and that gender gaps in options are mostly due to differences in the implicit costs of commuting and moving.

   Authors  

Paula Calvo, Ilse Lindenlaub, Ana Reynoso

   Abstract   

We develop a new equilibrium model in which households’ labour supply choices form the link between sorting on the marriage market and sorting on the labour market. We first show that in theory, the nature of home production—whether partners’ hours are complements or substitutes—shapes equilibrium labour supply as well as marriage and labour market sorting. We then estimate our model using German data to empirically assess the nature of home production, and find that spouses’ home hours are complements. We investigate to what extent complementarity in home hours drives sorting and inequality. We find that home production complementarity strengthens positive marriage sorting and reduces the gender gap in hours and in labour sorting. This puts significant downward pressure on the gender wage gap and on within-household income inequality, but fuels between-household inequality. Our estimated model sheds new light on the sources of inequality in today’s Germany, and—by identifying important shifts in home production technology toward more complementarity—on the evolution of inequality over time.

   Authors  

Morris A Davis, Andra C Ghent, Jesse Gregory 

   Abstract   

We study the impact of widespread adoption of work-from-home (WFH) technology using an equilibrium model where people choose where to live, how to allocate their time between working at home and at the office, and how much space to use in production. Motivated by cross-sectional evidence on WFH, we model WFH as a complement to work at the office. Simulations of the model indicate that the pandemic induced a large change to the relative productivity of WFH that substantially increased home prices and will permanently affect incomes, income inequality, and city structure.

   Authors  

Christian Ewerhart, Julia Lareida 

   Abstract   

This article studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favourite, while the strongest type of the favourite tries to discourage the underdog—so that the contest unravels. This strong-form disclosure principle is robust with respect to correlation, partitional evidence, randomized disclosures, sequential moves, and continuous type spaces. Moreover, the assumption of uniform asymmetry is not needed when incomplete information is one-sided. However, the principle may break down when type distributions are too similar, contestants possess commitment power, or information is unverifiable. In fact, cheap talk will always be ignored, even if mediated by a trustworthy third party.

   Authors  

Spyros Galanis, Christos A Ioannou, Stelios Kotronis 

   Abstract   

We study information aggregation in a dynamic trading model. We show theoretically that separable securities, introduced by Ostrovsky in the context of Expected Utility, no longer aggregate information if some traders have imprecise beliefs and are ambiguity averse. Moreover, these securities are prone to manipulation as the degree of information aggregation can be influenced by the initial price set by the uninformed market maker. These observations are also confirmed in our laboratory experiment using prediction markets. We define a new class of strongly separable securities, which are robust to the above considerations and show that they characterize information aggregation in both strategic and non-strategic environments. We derive several testable predictions, which we are able to confirm in the laboratory. Finally, we show theoretically that strongly separable securities are both sufficient and necessary for information aggregation but, strikingly, there does not exist a security that is strongly separable for all information structures.

   Authors  

Xiaoqi He, Kyungchul Song

   Abstract   

This article introduces a measure of the diffusion of binary outcomes over a large, sparse network, when the diffusion is observed in two time periods. The measure captures the aggregated spillover effect of the state-switches in the initial period on their neighbours’ outcomes in the second period. This article introduces a causal network that captures the causal connections among the cross-sectional units over the two periods. It shows that when the researcher’s observed network contains the causal network as a subgraph, the measure of diffusion is identified as a simple, spatio-temporal dependence measure of observed outcomes. When the observed network does not satisfy this condition, but the spillover effect is non-negative, the spatio-temporal dependence measure serves as a lower bound for diffusion. Using this, a lower confidence bound for diffusion is proposed, and its asymptotic validity is established. The Monte Carlo simulation studies demonstrate the finite sample stability of the inference across a range of network configurations. The article applies the method to data on Indian villages to measure the diffusion of microfinancing decisions over households’ social networks.

   Authors 

Alessandro Ispano, Péter Vida

  Abstract  

We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer’s evidence, which is informative about the suspect’s status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in equilibrium without any commitment.

   Authors 

Ravi Jagadeesan, Karolina Vocke

  Abstract  

In matching models, pairwise-stable outcomes do not generally exist without substantial restrictions on both preferences and the topology of the network of contracts. We address the foundations of matching markets by developing a matching model with a continuum of agents that allows for arbitrary preferences and network structures. We show that pairwise-stable outcomes are guaranteed to exist. When agents can interact with multiple other counterparties, pairwise stability is too weak of a solution concept, and we argue that a refinement of it called tree stability is the most appropriate solution concept in this setting. Our main results show that tree-stable outcomes exist for arbitrary preferences and network topologies.

   Authors  

Gregor Jarosch, Jan Sebastian Nimczik, Isaac Sorkin 

  Abstract 

We develop a model of size-based market power in a frictional labour market. In the canonical search environment, competition for workers is encoded in outside options. In our granular setting, large employers remove their own job postings from their workers’ outside option. Thus, size gives market power and a more concentrated market structure depresses wages because it reduces competition for workers. We calibrate the model to Austrian data and find that such size-based market power depresses wages by about 2.6% or 1,500 euros annually per worker.

   Authors 

Ernest Liu, Aleh Tsyvinski 

  Abstract  

We develop a dynamic model of input–output networks that incorporates adjustment costs of changing inputs. Our closed-form solution for the dynamics of the economy shows that temporary shocks to upstream sectors, whose output travels through long supply chains, have disproportionately significant welfare impact compared to affected sectors’ Domar weights. We conduct a spectral analysis of the U.S. production network and reveal that the welfare impact of temporary sectoral shocks can be represented by a low-dimensional, 3-factor structure.

   Authors  

Karsten Müller, Emil Verner

  Abstract  

We study the relationship between credit expansions, macroeconomic fluctuations, and financial crises using a novel database on the sectoral distribution of private credit for 117 countries since 1940. We document that, during credit booms, credit flows disproportionately to the non-tradable sector. Credit expansions to the non-tradable sector, in turn, systematically predict subsequent growth slowdowns and financial crises. In contrast, credit expansions to the tradable sector are associated with sustained output and productivity growth without a higher risk of a financial crisis. To understand these patterns, we show that firms in the non-tradable sector tend to be smaller, more reliant on loans secured by real estate, and more likely to default during crises. Our findings are consistent with models in which credit booms to the non-tradable sector are driven by easy financing conditions and amplified by collateral feedbacks, contributing to increased financial fragility and a boom–bust cycle.

   Authors 

Joyce Sadka, Enrique Seira, Christopher Woodruff

  Abstract  

Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyse sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labour court. We provide parties with personalized predictions for case outcomes and show that this information nearly doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration. The experiment generates the first experimental evidence in live court cases that reducing information asymmetries results in a decrease in delay, an outcome predicted by many theories of bargaining. We also find that the information treatment is effective only when the plaintiff is present to receive it directly, suggesting agency issues between plaintiffs and their private lawyers. For most workers, the treatment appears to improve welfare, as measured by discounted payouts and ability to pay bills.

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