【新刊速递】《华盛顿季刊》(WQ), Vol. 47, No.3, 2024 | 国政学人

题目：China’s US-Driven Middle East Strategy

作者简介：Jared Oestman，美国战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）高级副总裁，同时担任兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基全球安全和地缘战略主席和中东项目主任。

摘要：自 2023 年 10 月 7 日哈马斯对以色列发动袭击以来的一系列外交活动中，中国常常远离行动的中心。美国、阿拉伯和欧洲的谈判者与以色列人、巴勒斯坦人和地区领导人进行了数百甚至数千小时闭门谈判，试图就停火、人质释放、安全和重建达成协议，而中国的谈判代表们度过的不眠之夜则少得多。中国在 7 月份促成了一项巴勒斯坦内部统一协议，该协议承诺很多，但较少提及任何实施策略。目前尚不清楚该协议是否会对巴勒斯坦人产生的任何影响，乃至解决他们与以色列的冲突。

In the flurry of diplomacy since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel, China has often been far from the action. American, Arab and European negotiators have spent hundreds--if not thousands--of hours locked in rooms with Israelis, Palestinians and regional leaders trying to hammer out agreements on a ceasefire, hostage release, security and reconstruction, Chinese negotiators have had far fewer sleepless nights. They worked through a Palestinian unity agreement in July that was long on pledges and short on any implementation strategy. It remains unclear whether the agreement will have any impact at all on Palestinians, let alone the resolution of their conflict with Israel.

题目：Preventing Mass Atrocities with a Divided UN Security Council

作者简介：Anjali Dayal，美国纽约福特汉姆大学政治学系国际政治学副教授，主要研究国际组织与和平进程、人权及安全之间的关系，特别关注联合国维和行动、联合国安理会的政治以及联合国对和平进程的参与。

摘要：在大国冲突加剧的时代，美国可用的预防和处理大规模暴行的多边策略和工具是什么？多边冲突管理工具（如维和行动）在大国合作时期蓬勃发展，但往往在联合国安全理事会五个常任理事国之间的紧张关系加剧时陷入停滞。联合国系统——负责管理冲突解决、人道主义救援和平民保护的关键多边机构——依赖于大国合作来管理复杂的人道灾难。但是，大国竞争的崛起意味着这些国家越来越难以在冲突中的关键拯救生命措施上达成一致，即使当涉及三个大国——美国、俄罗斯和中国——的关键危机导致广泛的平民痛苦时也是如此。

What multilateral strategies and tools are available to the United States for preventing and managing mass atrocities in an era of heightened great-power conflict? Multilateral conflict management tools like peacekeeping have flourished in times of great-power cooperation, but have often stalled when tensions spike among the UN Security Council's five permanent members. The UN system-the key set of multilateral institutions charged with managing conflict resolution, humanitarian relief, and civilian protection--depends on great-power cooperation to manage complex human disasters. But the rise of great-power competition has meant that increasingly these powers cannot easily agree on critical life-saving measures in conflicts, even as key crises involving three of these members-the US, Russia and China--produce widespread civilian pain.

题目：The Illusion of Germany’s Zeitenwende

作者简介：Rafał Ulatowski，波兰华沙大学政治学与国际关系学院助理教授，研究领域集中于全球能源市场、全球经济以及德国外交政策。

摘要：2022 年 2 月 27 日，就在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰三天后，德国总理奥拉夫・朔尔茨宣布，这对德国而言是一个 “时代转折”（Zeitenwende），德国很快将公布一项新的外交政策。他宣布改变德国与俄罗斯的关系（实施严厉制裁并结束德国对俄罗斯能源供应的依赖），以军事装备的形式支持乌克兰，最重要的是转变德国的国防政策。朔尔茨宣布设立 1000 亿欧元的特别基金，用于资助德国武装部队（联邦国防军）的现代化建设，将国防开支增加到每年国内生产总值的 2% 以上，并打造一支 “强大、超现代、进步的联邦国防军”，配备 “能飞的飞机、能出海的舰艇以及为执行任务做好最佳装备的士兵”。自 2022 年 2 月的演讲以来，朔尔茨总理对德国在欧洲的角色有了一个更加雄心勃勃的愿景 —— 成为 “欧洲安全的保障者”，为 “欧洲大陆的安全承担主要责任”，并成为 “欧洲常规防御的基石”。

On February 27, 2022, just three days after Russia invaded Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that this was a Zeitenwende (“turning point”) for Germany, which would soon unveil a new foreign policy. He announced changes in Germany’s relations with Russia (harsh sanctions and ending Germany’s dependence on Russian energy supplies), support for Ukraine in the form of military equipment, and most importantly a shift in German defense policy. Scholz announced the creation of a 100-billion euro special fund to finance the modernization of Germany’s armed forces (the Bundeswehr), an increase in defense spending up to more than 2 percent of GDP per year, and the creation of a “powerful, ultra-modern, progressive Bundeswehr” equipped with “airplanes that fly, ships that can set out to sea, and soldiers who are optimally equipped for their missions.” Since that speech in February 2022, Chancellor Scholz has developed an even more ambitious vision of Germany’s role in Europe—to be the “guarantor of European security,” taking “leading responsibility for the security of [the] continent,” and becoming “the cornerstone of conventional defense in Europe.

题目：Upsetting the Balance: Why Russia Chose Hamas over Israel

作者简介：Kimberly Marten，美国哥伦比亚大学巴纳德学院教授，研究国际关系、国际安全、俄罗斯以及气候变化的全球政治。

摘要：俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京长期以来一直试图在以色列、伊朗和主要阿拉伯国家之间玩一场平衡游戏。然而，在2023年10月7日哈马斯对以色列发起可怕的恐怖袭击之后，普京的俄罗斯似乎立即放弃了以色列，转而支持哈马斯，这一模式一直持续到现在。虽然莫斯科与耶路撒冷（注：指以色列）保持着官方外交关系，但其选择使俄以关系的基调降至冷战后的新低点，并损害了俄罗斯在该地区的一些重要安全利益。

Russian President Vladimir Putin has long attempted to play a balancing game between Israel, Iran, and leading Arab states in the Middle Fast. Yet immediately in the wake of the horrific Hamas terrorist onslaught against Israel on October 7, 2023, Putin's Russia seemed to abandon Israel in favor of Hamas, setting a pattern that has continued ever since, While Moscow has maintained official diplomatic relations with Jerusalem, its choices have brought the tenor of its relationship with Israel to a new post-Cold War low, and have harmed some of Russia's significant security interests in the region.

题目：Russian Nuclear Weapons in Belarus? Motivations and Consequences

作者简介：Liviu Horovitz，比利时布鲁塞尔治理学院（BSoG-VUB）安全、外交与战略中心（CSDS）高级研究员。Lydia Wachs，瑞典斯德哥尔摩大学国际关系专业博士生候选人，研究专注于苏联/俄罗斯在全球核秩序中的角色，特别是其核不扩散政策。

摘要：大约三十年前，苏联的核弹头和运载工具从白俄罗斯运往俄罗斯。这种归还既是大国压力的结果，也是试图增强明斯克从莫斯科新获得的独立性的尝试。到 2023 年夏天，核武器似乎又回到了这个国家。

Nearly three decades ago, Soviet nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles left Belarus for Russia. This return was as much the result of great power pressure as it was an attempt to bolster Minsk's newfound independence from Moscow. By summer 2023, nuclear weapons seemed to have returned to the country. 

题目：Starving Russia’s War Economy

作者简介：Noel Foster，美国海军战争学院助理教授，研究聚焦于修正主义大国如何利用新技术，如在线平台和微芯片生产的原材料，来重塑大国关系以使其对自己有利。

摘要：在弗拉基米尔·普京的俄罗斯，最有效率的将军是一位名叫埃尔维拉·萨希普扎多夫娜·纳比乌琳娜的矮小经济学家。当俄罗斯在2023年夏天前线崩溃时，参谋长瓦列里·格拉西莫夫将军和国防部长谢尔盖·绍伊古被叶夫根尼·普里戈津羞辱，随后普里戈津叛变并向莫斯科进军，纳比乌琳娜冷静地保持了卢布的稳定并反击了西方的制裁. 纳比乌琳娜出身于工人阶级的鞑靼族家庭，在苏联后期精英体制下努力突破极限。自2013年担任中央银行行长以来，尽管面临西方连续几轮的制裁和战争，她仍然保持了卢布的稳定，自普京在2014年2月接管克里米亚以来，情况便是如此。因此，当纳比乌琳娜告诉国家杜马，俄罗斯经济的主要威胁并非来自西方的制裁，而是来自俄罗斯的劳动力短缺时，人们应该认真听取她的警告。在一个过热的战争经济中，85%的俄罗斯公司报告了工人短缺的情况，半熟练工种的薪水增加了高达20%。这是不可持续的。

The most effective general in Vladimir Putin's Rusia is a diminutive economist by the name of Elvira Sakhipzadovna Nabiullina. When Russia's frontlines were collapsing in summer 2023-and Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu were shamed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who then proceeded to mutiny and march on Moscow-Nabiullina calmly kept the ruble afloat and counteracted Western sanctions. A product of a working-class ethnic Tatar family who pushed the limits of late Soviet meritocracy, Nabiullina has preserved the ruble since being named Central Bank governor in 2013, in the face of successive rounds of Western sanctions and war following Putin's February 2014 takeover of Crimea. One would do well to listen to Nabiullina's warnings, therefore, when she told the Duma that the main threat to the Russian economy comes not from the West's sanctions, but rather from Russia's labor shortages. In an overheated war economy, 85 percent of Russian companies reported worker shortages, and salaries for semi-skilled positions increased by up to 20 percent. That is untenable.

题目：Will Putin Stop at Ukraine? That’s the Wrong Question

作者简介：Samuel Charap，美国兰德公司俄罗斯和欧亚政策杰出主席以及高级政治学家，研究兴趣包括俄罗斯和前苏联国家的外交政策、欧洲和欧亚地区安全，以及美俄威慑、战略稳定和军备控制。Miranda Priebe，美国兰德公司美国大战略分析中心主任及高级政治学家。

摘要：2024年春，西方领导人开始就俄罗斯对北约盟友构成的威胁发出严重警告。在2024年国情咨文演讲中，总统乔·拜登对在座的议员表示：“如果这个房间里的任何人认为普京会在乌克兰停止，我向你保证，他不会。”拜登并不是唯一一个这么认为的人。丹麦国防部长特罗尔斯·伦德·鲍尔森也表示：“在三到五年内，俄罗斯可能会测试北约第五条款和北约的团结。” 德国国防部长鲍里斯·皮斯托里乌斯也呼应了这一评估：“我们必须考虑到弗拉基米尔·普京有一天可能会攻击一个北约国家。”他补充说，虽然俄罗斯的攻击 “目前” 不太可能，但“我们的专家预计在五到八年内这是有可能的。”波兰总理唐纳德·图斯克更进一步，称欧洲目前处于“战前时代”。

In the spring of 2024, Western leaders began issuing dire warnings about the threat posed by Russia to NATO allies.' During his 2024 State of the Union speech, President Joe Biden addressed the assembled lawmakers: “If anybody in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you, he will not." Biden was far from alone, “It cannot be ruled out that within a three- to five-year period, Russia will test Article 5 and NATO's solidarity,” said Denmark Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen.’ German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius echoed this assessment: "we have to take into account that Vladimir Putin might even attack a NATO country one day." While a Russian attack is not likely “for now," the minister added: "Our experts expect a period of five to eight years in which this could be possible." Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk went one step further, arguing Europe was in a “pre-war era.”

编译 | 常靖婧

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 顾博文