【新刊速递】《外交政策分析》(FPA), Vol. 20, No. 4, October 2024 | 国政学人

题目：Securitization, Deterrence, and Extended Deterrence by Denial: The War in Ukraine

作者：Amir Lupovici，特拉维夫大学政治科学学院副教授。

摘要：乌克兰战争创造了一种多种行为体提出与回应存在层面的威胁的情况。这些侵略性词藻的事件引发了一场关于威胁行动安全化的学界争论。进一步说，笔者我界定了五种相互关联的安全化行动——每种回应对应一种行动——与威慑威胁被插入：这让我们能追踪俄罗斯的发言如何对来自西方和乌克兰的威胁安全化和对采取这一侵略的特别步骤正当化。这引致乌克兰创造了一个与接收国际军事援助有关的对手——安全化行动。此外，俄罗斯为了威慑它，对一个这场战争中潜在的北约直接加入国安全化。北约成员被俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的这些安全化行动牢牢锁定，最终选择通过提供武器的特殊手段来推进延伸威慑的拒止战略。通过传递承诺支持乌克兰的信息，他们意在使俄罗斯确信分配资源打击乌克兰是徒劳无功的。因此检验这一案例为威慑与安全化理论提供了有趣的结论。

The war in Ukraine created a situation in which various actors issued and responded to existential threats. These incidents of aggressive rhetoric invite a scholarly discussion about the securitizing moves of deterrence. More specifically, I identify five interrelated securitizing moves—each responding to the other moves—within which deterrent threats are embedded: It allows us to trace how Russian enunciators securitized the threat from the West and Ukraine and justified taking the exceptional measures of an invasion. This resulted in Ukraine making a counter-securitizing move, with the aim to receive international military assistance. In addition, the Russians securitized a potential direct involvement of NATO in the war in order to deter it. Locked between these securitizing moves of Russia on the one hand and Ukraine on the other, NATO members eventually chose to advance an extended deterrence by denial strategy through the unique means of providing weapons. By delivering the message that they are committed to support Ukraine, they aim to convince the Russians that allocating resources to fight in Ukraine is a worthless endeavor. Examining this case thus offers interesting implications for both deterrence and securitization theories.

题目：The Party Politics of Military Intervention in Australia and Executive Prerogatives: Ideology Meets Strategy and Culture

作者：Falk Ostermann，基尔大学政治学系社会科学研究所高级讲师。

摘要：作为为了在外交、安全与国防政策上灵活行动而拥有大量行政空间的改良的威斯敏斯特式的体制，尽管澳大利亚不断进行军事部署，但澳大利亚国会在海外输送军队上没有一个官方的说法，即和他的主要盟友美国站在一起。因为工党-自由党两党共同反对，民主党与绿党过去推动给予国会事先投票权的努力被阻挠。然而，由于不断增长的政治分裂和军事部署的政治化，后冷战政治证明了对武力使用与决策以及两党监督范围的抗议。本文联系澳大利亚的案例与安全与国防政策的政党政治的当代学术研究，证明了澳大利亚的政党竞争与其他国家的相似之处。不过，澳大利亚政党更加强调在不安全战略环境中的决策能力，这也凸显出辩论和能动性在澳大利亚仅仅某种程度上沿袭了其他威斯敏斯特体系。

As an adjusted Westminster-style system with large executive room for maneuver in matters of foreign, security, and defense policies, Australia's parliament does not have a formal say in sending troops abroad despite the continental nation's constant military deployments, i.e., alongside its major ally, the United States. Past efforts from Democrats and Greens to push legislation giving parliament ex ante voting rights have been stymied by Labor-Liberal bipartisanism opposing it. However, given increasing political fragmentation and the politicization of military deployments, post-Cold War politics gives testament to dissent on the use of force, decision-making on it, and the reach of oversight between political parties. Linking the Australian case to contemporary scholarship on the party politics of security and defense policy, this article focuses on the party-political component of contestation and explores patterns of dissent and consensus on the use of force, decision-making, and oversight. Using voting, debate, interview data, and taking stock of the most recent parliamentary inquiry into war powers, the article demonstrates Australian parallels with party-political contestation in other countries. However, it also highlights that debate and agency in Australia do only follow those in other Westminster systems to some extent, while Australian parties put an even higher emphasis on decision-making efficiency in an insecure strategic environment.

题目：Entrepreneurial Frame Alignment: Framing Foreign Policy Change under a Veil of Continuity

作者：Lars Wikman ，瑞典国防大学战争研究系军事教师。

摘要：倡导者如何框定外交政策变革，从而迫使政治对手默许？在本文中，我说明了外交政策倡导者如何运用六种框架对齐战略，将政策置于主流话语的范围内，从而获取政治支持、利用机会窗口以及管理联盟。这有助于我们了解倡导者可获得的框架工具和深化外交政策变革与连续之间关系的理解。在实证分析上，主要基于23次深度访谈，笔者展示了瑞典外交政策的一次新尝试——在阿富汗部署特别军事力量，是如何成功被牢牢框定在外交政策大方向的范围之内，并与先前的外交政策保持一致。这一分析证明了如何通过在敏感和矛盾层面被外交政策连续性遮盖时对齐战略的运用，预先阻止潜在对手。

How can entrepreneurs frame foreign policy change so it forces political opposition into acquiescence? In this article, I show how foreign policy entrepreneurs use six frame alignment strategies to situate policy within the confines of the dominating discourse in ways that generate political support, exploit windows of opportunity, and manage coalitions. This contributes to our knowledge of the available framing tools for entrepreneurs and advances our understanding of the relationship between change and continuity in foreign policy. In the empirical analysis, based predominantly on twenty-three in-depth interviews, I show how a new venture of Swedish foreign policy, the deployment of Special Forces to Afghanistan, was successfully framed firmly within the confines of the foreign policy orientation and in line with previous policies. The analysis demonstrates how potential opposition was forestalled through the use of alignment strategies as sensitive and controversial aspects were masked as foreign policy continuity.

题目：The Currency Constraint: Explaining the Selective Enforcement of US Financial Sanctions 

作者：Navin R Bapat, 北卡罗来纳大学教堂山国际关系学教授；Bryan R Early, 奥尔巴尼大学政治学教授兼研究副院长；Julia Grauvogel, 德国全球与地区研究所高级研究员；Katja B Kleinberg，纽约州立大学宾汉姆顿大学政治学副教授。

摘要：经济制裁仍然是最广泛使用的外交政策工具之一。同时，它们的强制力经常是不完全的和有选择的。如果发起国关注制裁的有效性，制裁措施的变化会造成反效果。我们认为发起国面临一个当下有效胁迫与未来胁迫能力之间的取舍。我们开发了一个探索发起国的混合动机的正式模型，例如美国对银行强制执行金融制裁。通过运用2003到2014年间美国发起强制行动以支持对伊朗的制裁的数据以及三个解释性的案例，我们评估了这一假说，即当美元地位与可选择的结算体系强相关时，制裁强制力更强。我们的发现支持了这一假说。

Economic sanctions remain one of the most widely used foreign policy tools. At the same time, their enforcement is often incomplete and selective. If sender states are concerned about sanctions effectiveness, variation in enforcement is counterproductive. We argue that sender states face a trade-off between effective coercion in the present and the ability to use coercion in the future. We develop a formal model to explore the mixed incentives of senders such as the United States in enforcing their financial sanctions against banks. Using data on US enforcement actions taken in support of the Iranian sanctions regime from 2003 to 2014 and three illustrative case examples, we evaluate the hypothesis that sanctions enforcement should be greater when the position of the US dollar is strong relative to alternative settlement mechanisms. Our findings support this contention.

题目：US Diplomatic Visits and Allies' Military Spending

作者：James D Kim，华盛顿大学政治学助理教授。

摘要：本文发展并检验了两个关于同盟保护国的外交访问是怎样影响被保护者军事开支的竞争性解释。其一认为，同盟保护国的访问会让盟国产生安全感，从而减少盟国的防务开支。（安全感假说）。其二认为，这样的访问将加强与盟国的伙伴关系，促使同盟国增加负担分享。（伙伴关系假说）。笔者通过分析1950到2007年美国总统对盟友的访问和盟友军事开支的年度百分比变化，检验了这些假说。笔者发现了支持安全感假说的证据，表明美国总统外交访问与盟友接下来几年更低的军事开支联系在一起。而且，笔者发现当访问在总统任期的头三年完成时，消极效应是首要的，就算访问是在总统任期的最后一年也不会导致盟友负担分享的显著变化。这一发现凸显了同盟保护国的旅行外交在为军事盟国提供安全感方面的角色，以及它对盟国外交政策产生的非预期的后果：减少对联盟的贡献。

This article develops and tests two competing arguments regarding how a patron's diplomatic visits influence the military spending of protégés. One argument posits that a patron's visits will decrease allies' defense spending by producing reassurance (reassurance hypothesis). Another perspective contends that such visits will increase allies' burden sharing by fostering allied partnerships (partnership hypothesis). I test these hypotheses by analyzing US presidential visits to allies and the annual percentage changes in allies' military spending from 1950 to 2007. I find evidence supporting the reassurance hypothesis, indicating that diplomatic visits by US presidents are associated with lower military expenditures by allies the following year. Furthermore, I find that the negative effect is primarily observed when visits are made in the first 3 years of a presidential term, while visits in the final year of a presidency do not result in significant changes in allied burden sharing. The findings highlight the role of a patron's travel diplomacy in providing reassurance in military alliances, as well as its unintended consequence for protégés' foreign policy: reduced alliance contribution.

题目：A New “Cult of the Offensive?” Elite Perceptions of Artificial Intelligence in Military Affairs in the United States and the People's Republic of China

作者：Zachary Selden，佛罗里达大学政治学副教授。

摘要：人工智能（AI）的军事应用目前极大地受限于物流、运输、侦查和其他支持部门。不过，美国和中国在发展自主战斗装置和其他AI的进攻应用上，取得了重大进步。AI在军事事务中的多方面应用和应用的模糊性，可以被视作增加或削减了进攻性军事行动的相对成本。因此，至关重要的问题并非对AI新兴使用倾向于进攻还是防御的技术确定，而在于一个关于AI如何被决策者理解的看法。与一战时代的进攻狂热相类似，当对抗的期望上升时，模糊不清的新兴科技可能导致掌权者关注这一技术的进攻优势。本文考察了2014到2022年中美围绕AI军事应用的政策精英话语。本文发现在这一时期，围绕AI军事应用的精英讨论在两国都更关注AI的进攻应用而非防御。虽然这绝不是决定性的，但它表明人们对进攻和防御的理解平衡可能正朝着不稳定的方向发展。

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in military affairs is largely limited to logistics, transport, reconnaissance, and other support functions at present. Yet, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are also making significant progress in developing autonomous combat vehicles and other offensive applications of AI. The ambiguous nature and multifaceted applications of AI in military affairs could be seen as either increasing or decreasing the relative cost of offensive military action. The critical question, therefore, is not a technical determination of whether the emerging uses of AI favor the offensive or defensive force, but rather an assessment of how AI is perceived by policymakers. Similar to the World War I era cult of the offensive, ambiguous emerging technology may drive leaders to focus on the offensive advantages of that technology when expectations of conflict are rising. This paper examines the policy elite discourse surrounding the military applications of AI in both the United States and the PRC between 2014 and 2022. It finds that over this period, elite discussion of the use of AI in military affairs has shifted in both states in ways that indicate more focus on the offensive rather than defensive applications of this emerging technology. While by no means determinative, it is an indicator that perceptions of the offense–defense balance may be moving in a destabilizing direction.

题目：Interest, Need, or Reputation? Determinants of Qatar's Foreign Aid 

作者：Bulent Aras, 萨班哲大学艺术与社会科学学院的教授；Burcu Fazlioglu, 托比经济技术大学经济学教授；Majed Al Ansari，卡塔尔外交大臣兼副首相顾问。

摘要：除了对中国、印度、巴西和土耳其等大国的研究外，有关新兴捐助国的对外援助贡献的文献缺乏原始数据和实证分析。本文通过提供2014到2021年间，卡塔尔这一有韧性的且相对较小的新兴捐助国的对外援助配给的新颖、详尽的数据集，从而填补了既有文献的这一空白。笔者称之为卡塔尔援助数据库，数据库的内容概括了卡塔尔国际援助的特点。为了说明数据集的有效性，笔者调查了卡塔尔对外援助是否旨在满足捐助国利益、接受国需要以及别的因素。笔者的实证发现确认，尽管卡塔尔的援助配给决定优先考虑接受国的需要，但它的援助条件更多的取决于卡塔尔在目标国的对外政策利益。

The literature on the motivations behind emerging donors' foreign aid contributions—with the exception of larger countries such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey—lacks original data and empirical analyses. This article addresses this gap by providing a novel, detailed dataset of the foreign aid allocations of one resilient, relatively small emerging donor, Qatar, for the period from 2014 to 2021. The contents of our database, which we dub Qatar Aid Database, encapsulate the features of Qatar's international aid. To illustrate our dataset's efficacy, we investigate whether Qatar's foreign aid operations aim to satisfy donor interests, recipient needs, or something else. Our empirical findings affirm that although Qatar's aid allocation decisions prioritize recipient needs, its aid provision depends more on Qatar's foreign policy interests in the targeted countries.