【新刊速递】《安全研究》(SS), Vol. 33, No. 3, 2024 | 国政学人

题目：Military Effectiveness and Naval Warfare

作者：Stephen Biddle,哥伦比亚大学国际与公共事务教授、外交关系委员会国防政策兼职高级研究员。John Severini,约翰-塞韦里尼目前是乔治敦大学政府学博士生。

摘要：军事效率促进了政治学文献的增长。然而，这些著作绝大多数侧重于大陆战争。中国的崛起凸显了海战。文献的核心结论是否适用于海战？我们通过一个关于 1649 年至 1988 年间国家间水面海战的新数据集来比较海战和陆战模式，从而探讨这一问题。我们发现，海上和陆地的军事环境截然不同，这使得海战结果对物资更加敏感，更加快速，也更加片面，因此两者存在本质区别。然而，在物质与非物质的相互作用方面也有重要的相似之处。这些特点对未来东亚反介入/区域拒止（A2/AD）战争的政策、海军资源分配中技能和物资投入的平衡以及军事效能研究都有重要影响。

Military effectiveness created a growth in political science literature. However, this work focused overwhelmingly on continental warfare. China’s rise highlights naval warfare. Do the central findings of the literature hold for war at sea? We explore this question by comparing naval and land combat patterns via a new dataset on interstate surface naval battles fought between 1649 and 1988. We find essential differences deriving from the contrasting nature of the sea and land as military environments, which have made naval outcomes more sensitive to materiel, quicker, and more one-sided. There are, however, also important similarities involving material–nonmaterial interactions. These features pose important implications for policy on future anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) warfare in East Asia, the balance of investment in skill and materiel in naval resource allocation, and research on military effectiveness.

题目：Testing as the Blindspot of Nuclear Nonuse

作者：Ruoyu Li, 约翰霍普金斯大学政治学系。

摘要：太平洋激进派宣称核试验就是核使用，这对国际关系（IR）学科中的核不使用概念提出了挑战。在应对这一挑战的同时，本文还揭示了有关核试验的学科盲点，即核试验与核使用不符。我认为，斯科特·萨根（Scott Sagan）和肯尼斯·华尔兹（Kenneth N. Waltz）关于核威慑的辩论以及妮娜·坦南瓦尔德（Nina Tannenwald）的核禁忌框架所体现的关于不使用核武器的国际关系讨论是殖民知识生产的一部分，这种知识生产否定了殖民地人民的政治能动性和人性。本文以美国在马绍尔群岛进行的核武器试验（1946-58 年）为例，对核试验进行了后殖民主义的重新诠释，从而论证了核试验是核使用的一种形式，特别是核武器的殖民使用。

Pacific activists’ proclamation that nuclear testing is nuclear use poses a challenge to the notion of nuclear nonuse in the discipline of International Relations (IR). While addressing such a challenge, this article reveals a disciplinary blind spot regarding nuclear testing that disqualifies testing from nuclear use. I argue that IR discussions of nuclear nonuse—exemplified by Scott Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz’s debates on nuclear deterrence and Nina Tannenwald’s nuclear taboo framework—are part of the colonial knowledge production that dismisses the political agency and humanity of colonized people. This article then argues that nuclear testing is a form of nuclear use, specifically, the colonial use of nuclear weapons, by developing a postcolonial reinterpretation of nuclear testing in the case of US nuclear weapon tests in the Marshall Islands (1946–58).

题目：Revolutionary Governments, Recklessness, and War: The Case of the Second Karabakh War

作者：Arman Grigoryan,利哈伊大学国际关系系副教授。

摘要：革命政治环境的特点是逆向选择的压力。它提升了最激进、最易发生冲突、最乐于冒险的类型，而这些人又教育程度低，缺乏执政经验。他们是庸俗的反唯物主义者，认为只要付出足够的努力和毅力，现实就可以按照他们的意愿来改变。革命者拥有宏大的理想和救世计划，通常不会容忍妥协和讨价还价。对他们来说，要实现这些想法，任何代价都不算太高。当革命者接管一个与其他国家发生冲突的国家时，这些倾向很可能也会影响他们对冲突的管理，并可能带来灾难性的后果。亚美尼亚革命政府的外交政策导致了 2020 年第二次卡拉巴赫战争和亚美尼亚方面的灾难性失败。

Revolutionary politics is an environment characterized by pressures for adverse selection. It elevates the most radical, conflict-prone, risk happy types, who in addition are poorly educated and inexperienced in government. They are vulgar anti-materialists who think reality can be bent to their will with sufficient effort and perseverance. Revolutionaries are possessed with grandiose ideas and salvation projects, which typically do not tolerate compromise and bargaining. Nor any cost seems too high to them for the realization of such ideas. When revolutionaries take over in a country that has a conflict with another state, these propensities are likely to affect their management of the conflict as well with potentially catastrophic consequences. The argument is illustrated with the diplomacy of Armenia’s revolutionary government, which led to the Second Karabakh War of 2020 and the Armenian side’s catastrophic defeat.

题目：Threat Construction and Coercive Credibility

作者：Danielle L. Lupton, 科尔盖特大学政治学副教授。

摘要：在国际危机中，行为体如何发出可信的威胁？传统的学术研究侧重于威胁的背景如何影响可信度，而本文则考虑威胁本身的构建如何影响可信度。更具体地说，本文引入了 "威胁理由 "这一概念，并从理论上分析了领导者在传达威胁时所选择的解释是如何影响其强制性可信度的。本研究采用了联合设计调查实验，以确定威胁的具体性和严重性、公开威胁与私人威胁以及威胁理由对可信度感知的影响。本文发现，更精确的威胁被认为更可信，而采用声誉理由的威胁可信度较低。有极少量证据表明，公开或私下发出威胁会影响可信度。本文还发现，受众是国内还是国际，以及危机诱因的严重程度都会影响人们对可信度的看法。本研究进一步加深了我们对塑造强制性可信度的因素以及决策者如何在国际危机中最有效地传达其承诺的理解。

How do actors issue credible threats during international crises? While scholarship has traditionally focused on how the context of threats influences credibility, this paper considers how the construction of the threat itself affects credibility. More specifically, this paper introduces the concept of threat justification and theorize how the choice of explanation a leader uses in communicating her threats can influence her coercive credibility. This study employs a conjoint design survey experiment to identify the influence of threat specificity and severity, public versus private threats, and threat justification on perceptions of credibility. This paper finds that more precise threats are perceived as more credible, while threats employing reputational justifications are less credible. There is a minimal amount of evidence that the public versus private delivery of a threat influences credibility. This paper also finds that perceptions of credibility are influenced by whether the audience is domestic versus international and by the severity of the instigating crisis trigger. This study furthers our understanding of the factors shaping coercive credibility and how policymakers can most effectively convey their commitments during international crises.

题目：Escaping Paralysis: Strategies for Countering Asymmetric Nuclear Escalation

作者：Even Hellan Larsen, 挪威奥斯陆大学政治学系的博士研究员。

摘要：拥有核武器的国家在与拥有核武器的对手进行低级别的冲突时往往犹豫不决，因为害怕引起核反击。本文将这种情况称为 "次战略瘫痪"。核武器国家试图摆脱这种瘫痪状态的选择进行了分类：反价值惩罚战略通过反价值核报复进行威慑；常规暂停战略通过常规反应将进一步升级的负担转嫁给对手，从而起到威慑作用；损害限制战略通过在核战争中限制损害的能力进行威慑；最后，针锋相对战略通过在所有冲突级别上的战争制胜能力来进行威慑。为了摆脱次战略瘫痪，苏联和印度在转向常规停顿战略之前，最初依赖于反价值惩罚。印度未能摆脱瘫痪状态，因此开始寻求损害限制战略。相比之下，美国则奉行针锋相对的战略，以消除次战略瘫痪。

States armed with nuclear weapons are often hesitant to engage in low levels of conflict against rivals armed with nuclear weapons for fear of provoking a nuclear response. I refer to this condition as “substrategic paralysis.” I provide a typology of the options for nuclear weapon states trying to escape this paralysis. A countervalue punishment strategy deters through countervalue nuclear retaliation. A conventional pause strategy deters by shifting the burden of further escalation back onto the adversary with a conventional response. A damage limitation strategy deters through the ability to limit damage in a nuclear war. Finally, a tit-for-tat strategy discourages through a war-winning capability at all conflict levels. To escape substrategic paralysis, the Soviet Union and India initially relied on countervalue punishment before moving toward a conventional pause strategy. India’s failure to escape paralysis triggered a search for a damage limitation strategy. In contrast, the United States pursues a tit-for-tat strategy to neutralize substrategic paralysis.

编译 | 柳博文

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 赵兴岳