丹尼尔·米勒 | 福音派特朗普支持的奥秘？

3 THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIO-POLITICAL IDENTITY: FROM COALITION TO EQUIVALENCE
3 社会政治身份的构成：从联盟到对等

My thesis regarding majority evangelical support for Trump is simpler than those outlined above insofar as it is essentially tautological: overwhelming numbers of evangelicals voted for Trump because they are evangelicals, which is to say, because conservative political identification is a constitutive feature of their religious identity as evangelicals. Because Republican identification is a constitutive feature of majority evangelical identity, widespread evangelical support for Trump was virtually a foregone conclusion. The complexity of the thesis lies in the demonstration that this tautological formulation has explanatory value and is not simply question-begging. This demonstration requires a foray into the realm of political ontology, with particular attention to the constitution of socio-political identity as such, with an eye to the affective dimension of that identity.10 Such an account will allow us to make sense of majority evangelical support for Trump.
我关于大多数福音派对特朗普的支持的论点比上面概述的要简单，因为它本质上是重复的：压倒性的福音派投票给特朗普，因为他们是福音派，也就是说，因为保守的政治认同是他们作为福音派宗教身份的一个构成特征。因为共和党的身份认同是多数福音派身份的一个构成特征，所以福音派对特朗普的广泛支持几乎已成定局。论文的复杂性在于证明这种同义词的表述具有解释价值，而不仅仅是乞求问题。这种论证需要涉足政治本体论的领域，特别关注社会政治身份本身的构成，并着眼于该身份的情感维度。10 这样的叙述将使我们能够理解大多数福音派对特朗普的支持。

The positions surveyed above presuppose a coalitional understanding of socio-political identity. That is, they understand the relation between evangelicalism and the Republican Party as a strategic alliance between two socio-political groups defined by well-established identities. A relation of coalition is strategic insofar as the relevant parties enter into it because it serves their particular political ends to do so, and these ends reflect the discreet identities of the parties. The greatest significance here is that a relation of coalition preserves the discreet identities of its parties: their identities are fully constituted and complete vis-à-vis one another. In this sense, the identities of the parties to the coalition are external to the relation that forms the coalition. Using a coalitional model, an examination of widespread evangelical support for Trump seeks the reason why evangelicals have chosen to enter into a strategic alliance with the Republican Party, and what their interests are in doing so.
上述调查的立场以对社会政治身份的联盟理解为前提。也就是说，他们理解福音派和共和党之间的关系是两个由既定身份定义的社会政治团体之间的战略联盟。只要相关政党参与联盟关系，联盟关系就具有战略意义，因为这样做符合他们特定的政治目的，而这些目标反映了政党的谨慎身份。这里最大的意义在于，联盟关系保留了其政党的谨慎身份：他们的身份是完全构成的，并且彼此之间是完整的。从这个意义上说，联盟各方的身份是构成联盟的关系之外的。使用联盟模式，对福音派对特朗普的广泛支持的考察，寻求福音派选择与共和党建立战略联盟的原因，以及他们这样做的利益是什么。

In contrast to a relation of coalition, a relation of equivalence is one in which a new social identity takes shape, which cannot be reduced to the pre-existing identities of the actors constitutive of the relation (D. Miller, 2016, pp. 186–215). The identities of the social actors in a relation of equivalence are no longer external to one another, but are importantly co-constitutive of a new identity. I am suggesting that, at present, a majority of evangelicals stand in a relation of equivalence to Republicans and political conservatism, so that, understood from the side of majority evangelicalism, they do not represent two discreet social identities. On the contrary, support for the contemporary GOP, in the form of both its party platform and its presidential candidates, is a constitutive dimension of what it means to be an evangelical, as understood by a majority of evangelicals.11
与联合关系相反，等价关系是新的社会身份形成的关系，它不能被简化为构成关系的行动者预先存在的身份（D. Miller，2016 年，第 186-215 页）。在等价关系中，社会行为者的身份不再是彼此的外部身份，而是重要的是新身份的共同构成。我是在说，目前，大多数福音派人士与共和党人和政治保守主义处于等同的关系中，因此，从多数福音派的立场来理解，他们并不代表两种谨慎的社会身份。相反，对当代共和党的支持，无论是以党纲还是总统候选人的形式，都是大多数福音派所理解的福音派的一个构成性层面。11

Identities of equivalence are effects of political construction. Two political-ontological features are integral to this construction: the proliferation of diverse and competing socio-political actors, and the constitutive incompletion of their identities. The first point is straightforward enough: our contemporary political terrain is marked by a diverse array of socio-political actors, who level contrasting, often conflicting political demands. This diversity undermines any notion of what may be termed substantive universality. That is, there exists no social agent or class around which a broader social identity might coalesce naturally or of necessity.
等价的身份是政治建构的效果。这种建构有两个政治本体论特征是不可或缺的：多样化和相互竞争的社会政治行为者的扩散，以及他们身份的构成性不完整。第一点很简单：我们当代的政治版图以各种各样的社会政治行为者为标志，他们提出了截然相反、往往相互冲突的政治诉求。这种多样性破坏了任何可以称为实质性普遍性的概念。也就是说，不存在更广泛的社会主体或阶级，更广泛的社会身份可以自然地或必然地围绕它凝聚起来。

The second point is more complex. Political demands are demands for something that is lacking, demands for what ought to be the case but presently is not. In this sense, they highlight the missing fullness of those who level them (Laclau, 1996, p. 28). Political demands highlight the incomplete identities of those leveling them, rather than reflecting an understanding of social agents or groups as simply sovereign, autonomous, or self-determining (Markell, 2003, p. 11). They highlight what Charon R. Krause describes as the socially distributed nature of political agency, bringing into view the fact that the social is not populated by self-enclosed, fully constituted loci of action (Krause, 2015, p. 21). Undertaking social action, including the leveling of political demands, therefore requires an appreciation of the incompletion of socio-political identity (Markell, 2003, p. 24).
第二点更复杂。政治诉求是对所缺乏之物的要求，是对本应如此但目前并非如此的要求。从这个意义上说，他们突出了那些平分他们的人所缺失的充实（Laclau，1996 年，第 28 页）。政治要求突出了那些平分他们的人的不完整身份，而不是反映出对社会代理人或群体的理解，即简单的主权、自治或自我决定（Markell，2003 年，第 11 页）。他们强调了 Charon R. Krause 所描述的政治代理的社会分布性质，并指出社会并非由自我封闭、完全构成的行动场所构成的事实（Krause，2015 年，第 21 页）。因此，采取社会行动，包括平衡政治要求，需要认识到社会政治身份的不完整（Markell，2003 年，第 24 页）。

Within a political terrain populated by diverse socio-political groups, all of whose identity is necessarily incomplete, the central task is the formation of political groups with sufficient critical mass to effect social change. If agency involves efficacy, that is, following Krause, the ability to “have an impact on the world,” then it necessarily extends beyond the purported boundaries of an individual or small group (Krause, 2015, pp. 23, 28). The constitution of political groups with this requisite critical mass is achieved through the articulation of equivalences, a modification of the Gramscian notion of the collective will, between the fragmented elements of the political terrain, the result of which is the constitution of a new political identity with a shared “common sense” (Gramsci, 2000, pp. 239–242, 343–349; see also Critchley, 2007, pp. 101–102; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 67).
在一个由不同的社会政治群体组成的政治领域中，所有这些群体的身份都必然是不完整的，中心任务是形成具有足够临界人数的政治群体，以实现社会变革。如果能动性涉及功效，即遵循克劳斯，“对世界产生影响”的能力，那么它必然会超越个人或小团体的所谓界限（克劳斯，2015 年，第 23、28 页）。具有这种必要临界质量的政治团体的构成是通过对等性的表达来实现的，这是对葛兰西集体意志概念的修改，在政治地形的碎片化元素之间，其结果是构成具有共同“常识”的新政治身份（葛兰西，2000 年，第 239-242 页， 343–349;另见 Critchley，2007 年，第 101-102 页;Laclau & Mouffe，2001 年，第 67 页）。

As I suggested above, the constitutively incomplete nature of socio-political identity is such that there is no substantive universality around which these new socio-political actors can be constituted. There is, however, another form of universality within the political, which we might term a “contingent universality,” involving appeal to universal signifiers, to the names given to that which is lacking within the experience of those levelling political demands. A number of these signifiers will be immediately familiar to anyone acquainted with the US political scene: freedom, democracy, equality, rights, etc. These signifiers are universal in the sense that that virtually all political actors appeal to them. Indeed, political discourse in the USA would be virtually unintelligible without appealing to them. What renders these signifiers contingently universal, however, is the fact that they have no universal meaning, significance, or social referents. That is, while divergent political actors and groups will appeal universally to these signifiers, what they signify is not the same for all these actors or groups. These signifiers operate universally only because the divergent political groups fill them in different ways (e.g., diverse groups can appeal to rights precisely because they do not understand them in the same way).
正如我上面所指出的，社会政治身份的构成性不完全性是这样的，以至于没有实质性的普遍性可以围绕这些新的社会政治行为者来构成。然而，在政治中还有另一种形式的普遍性，我们可以称之为“偶然的普遍性”，涉及诉诸普遍的能指，诉诸于那些平等的政治要求的经验中所缺乏的东西所赋予的名称。任何熟悉美国政治舞台的人都会立即熟悉其中的一些符号：自由、民主、平等、权利等。这些能指是普遍的，因为几乎所有的政治行为者都对他们有吸引力。事实上，如果不吸引他们，美国的政治话语几乎是难以理解的。然而，使这些能指具有必然普遍性的是，它们没有普遍的意义、意义或社会指涉。也就是说，虽然不同的政治行为者和团体会普遍吸引这些能指，但它们所代表的意义对于所有这些行为者或团体来说并不相同。这些能指之所以普遍存在，只是因为不同的政治团体以不同的方式填充它们（例如，不同的团体之所以能够诉诸权利，正是因为他们以不同的方式理解权利）。

Appealing to common signifiers is not, then, evidence of consensus or shared meaning. On the contrary, these signifiers serve as the universally available means by which divergent actors are enabled to act politically.12 This occurs as political actors fill these universal signifiers with their particular demands, which express what is experienced as missing in their identities as they are presently constituted. Large-scale socio-political groups take shape around these signifiers as political actors seek to extend the meaning or sense with which they invest these signifiers to cover an increasing breadth of other socio-political actors. When these efforts are successful, the result is the constitution of the political demands, and indeed the signification of the missing fullness, of divergent socio-political agents as equivalent to one another (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xiii). Successful equivalential articulation results in the formation of large-scale social and political identities through the extension and fixation of universal signifiers, which come to serve as nodal points or knots of meaning through which other elements of the political are fixed and toward which they are oriented (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. xi, 67; Sayyid, 2003, p. 44; see also Žižek, 1989, pp. 98–105).
因此，诉诸共同的能指并不是共识或共同意义的证据。相反，这些能指是使不同行为者能够采取政治行动的普遍可用的手段。12 当政治行为者用他们的特定要求填充这些普遍的能指时，就会发生这种情况，这些要求表达了他们目前构成的身份中所经历的缺失。随着政治行为者寻求扩展他们赋予这些能指的意义或意义，以涵盖越来越多的其他社会政治行为者，大规模的社会政治团体围绕这些能指形成。当这些努力取得成功时，结果就是政治要求的构成，实际上是不同的社会政治主体彼此等同的缺失充实的象征（Laclau & Mouffe，2001，第xiii页）。成功的等同表达导致通过普遍能指的延伸和固定形成大规模的社会和政治身份，这些能指成为意义的节点或结，通过这些节点或意义结，政治的其他元素被固定并指向（Laclau & Mouffe，2001 年，第 习，67 页;赛义德，2003 年，第 44 页;另见 Žižek，1989 年，第 98-105 页）。

Successful equivalential articulation results in the emergence of new political identities that are not reducible to the identities of the actors that pre-exist the process of articulation (Laclau, 1990, p. 234; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 84). It therefore institutes a new common sense that binds the constitutive elements of equivalential chains and modifies their identity (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 183–184). Applying this analysis to the issue of majority evangelical support for Trump, we find that, if we consider the initial alignment of white evangelicals with the GOP in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is appropriate to view this as a strategic alliance entered into by a socio-political movement with an identity that was discreet from that of the Republican Party.13 However, the situation has shifted dramatically since that time. Marking that shift, “evangelical Christian,” at least as this identity is experienced by millions of US evangelicals, is now equivalent to “Republican” or “political conservative.” That is, Republican or politically conservative political identity has come to be a constitutive feature of the common sense, of the experienced meaning, of the religious identity of a majority of US evangelicals.
成功的等价表达导致了新的政治身份的出现，这些政治身份不能简化为在表达过程之前存在的行为者的身份（Laclau，1990 年，第 234 页;Laclau & Mouffe，2001 年，第 84 页）。因此，它建立了一种新的常识，该常识将等价链的构成元素结合并修改它们的身份（Laclau & Mouffe，2001年，第183-184页）。将这一分析应用于多数福音派对特朗普的支持问题，我们发现，如果我们考虑白人福音派在1970年代末和1980年代初与共和党的最初结盟，那么将其视为一个社会政治运动建立的战略联盟是合适的，其身份与共和党的身份不同。13 然而，从那时起，情况发生了巨大变化。标志着这种转变，“福音派基督徒”，至少在数百万美国福音派信徒所经历的身份上，现在等同于 “共和党 ”或 “政治保守派”。也就是说，共和党或政治上保守的政治身份已经成为大多数美国福音派信徒的常识、经验意义和宗教身份的构成特征。

This understanding of socio-political identity differentiates my analysis from those surveyed above. In discussing majority evangelical support for Trump, we are discussing one socio-political identity, not two. Identification with the Republican Party is a constitutive feature of majority evangelical identity as such. Accounting for evangelical support for Trump is not a matter of articulating a relation between a religious group and a political group; it is a matter of understanding a single social group for whom conservative political identification is a constitutive feature of its religious identity. The point at which analyses such as those surveyed above misfire is not at the level of empirical considerations about contemporary religion and politics; rather, their problem is that they proceed from an underdeveloped conception of socio-political identity itself.
这种对社会政治身份的理解使我的分析与上述调查的分析不同。在讨论大多数福音派对特朗普的支持时，我们讨论的是一个社会政治身份，而不是两个。对共和党的认同是多数福音派身份本身的一个构成特征。解释福音派对特朗普的支持并不是阐明宗教团体和政治团体之间的关系的问题;这是一个理解一个单一社会群体的问题，对他们来说，保守的政治认同是其宗教认同的构成特征。诸如上述调查的分析失误的点并不是在对当代宗教和政治的实证考虑层面上;相反，他们的问题在于他们从不成熟的社会政治身份本身的概念出发。

This is even the case with William Connolly's account of evangelicals’ relation to political conservatism, despite the many compelling points he raises (Connolly, 2005).14 At points, Connolly seems to advance a notion that a single, novel socio-political identity was formed between evangelicalism and conservative politics. He writes, for example, that the causality involved in social processes “morphs into energized complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore unconnected or loosely associated elements fold, bend, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, forging a qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation” (Connolly, 2005, p. 870, emphasis in original). At the same time, however, he writes of an alliance between evangelicalism and cowboy capitalism, implicitly maintaining an emphasis on a coalition between two discreet socio-political movements (Connolly, 2005, p. 869). Or, again, he ascribes the assemblage of these movements to “affinities of identity” and “sensibility,” suggesting that what is at issue is not the emergence of a single new socio-political entity, but a relation between two discreet entities (Connolly, 2005, pp. 871, 875, emphasis in original). There is a sense, then, that Connolly does not press his notion of interinvolvement as far as the present argument would require.
威廉·康诺利（William Connolly）对福音派与政治保守主义关系的描述也是如此，尽管他提出了许多令人信服的观点（Connolly， 2005）。14 在某些时候，康诺利似乎提出了一种观念，即在福音派和保守派政治之间形成了一个单一的、新颖的社会政治身份。例如，他写道，社会过程中涉及的因果关系“演变成相互交融和相互参与的充满活力的复杂性，其中迄今为止不相连或松散关联的元素相互折叠、弯曲、混合、乳化和溶解，形成一种抵抗经典解释模型的定性集合”（Connolly，2005 年 ，第 870 页，强调为原文所加）。然而，与此同时，他写到福音派和牛仔资本主义之间的联盟，隐含地强调两个谨慎的社会政治运动之间的联盟（Connolly，2005，第 869 页）。或者，他再次将这些运动的集合归因于“身份的亲和力”和“情感”，这表明问题不是一个单一的新社会政治实体的出现，而是两个谨慎的实体之间的关系（Connolly，2005 年，第 871、875 页，强调为原文所加）。因此，有一种感觉是，康诺利并没有按照目前的论点所要求来推动他的相互参与的概念。

Relations of equivalence are historically constituted, developing over time. This holds for the relation of equivalence between majority evangelicalism and the GOP as well. While a full account of the transition from a relation of coalition to one of equivalence is obviously impossible here, a brief consideration of some of the moments in the evolving relationship between US evangelicals and the GOP illustrate this shift. The issue of opposition to abortion serves as an instructive example. There is arguably no social or political issue more central to contemporary evangelical political identity than opposition to abortion, an issue Lindsay describes as “the most contentious political issue of the last thirty years” (Lindsay, 2007, p. 39). As Jo Renée Formicola suggests, the issue of “life,” often a cipher for the unborn fetus in evangelical discourse, has served as a focal point propelling religious conservatives into US political life (Formicola, 2008, pp. 10–11).
等价关系是历史上构成的，随着时间的推移而发展。这也适用于多数派福音派和共和党之间的等价关系。虽然在这里完整地描述从联盟关系到对等关系的转变显然是不可能的，但对美国福音派和共和党之间不断发展的关系中的一些时刻的简要考虑就说明了这种转变。反对堕胎的问题就是一个有启发性的例子。可以说，对于当代福音派政治身份来说，没有比反对堕胎更核心的社会或政治问题了，林赛将这个问题描述为 “过去三十年中最具争议的政治问题”（林赛，2007 年，第 39 页）。正如 Jo Renée Formicola 所说，“生命”问题，通常是福音派话语中未出生胎儿的密码，已成为推动宗教保守派进入美国政治生活的焦点（Formicola，2008 年，第 10-11 页）。

Indeed, opposition to abortion is so constitutive a feature of majority evangelical identity that it is difficult to imagine evangelical identity otherwise. It is particularly informative, then, to note that evangelicals’ vehement opposition to abortion on moral and religious grounds is relatively recent, marking a distinct shift. Evangelical religious leaders avoided wading into the legal battle surrounding the Supreme Court's landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade decision (Formicola, 2008, pp. 10–11). In fact, William Martin notes that in the years leading up to this decision “evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants, many of whom now consider abortion a litmus test of extraordinary importance, had little to say about it one way or another” (Martin, 1996, p. 193). Evangelical leaders demonstrated a marked reticence toward the adoption of unambiguously pro-life positions, in part because opposition to abortion was a significant position among Roman Catholics (Lindsay, 2007, pp. 39–40. Going even further, many social and intellectual evangelical leaders even argued that abortion was not a moral issue to be opposed on distinctly Christian grounds (Dudley, 2011, pp. 40–44).
事实上，反对堕胎是多数福音派身份的一个构成性特征，以至于很难想象福音派身份是其他的。因此，特别有信息量的是，福音派人士以道德和宗教理由强烈反对堕胎是相对较新的，这标志着一个明显的转变。福音派宗教领袖避免卷入围绕最高法院 1973 年具有里程碑意义的 Roe v.Wade 裁决（福米科拉，2008 年，第 10-11 页）。事实上，威廉·马丁 （William Martin） 指出，在做出这一决定之前的几年里，“福音派和原教旨主义新教徒，他们中的许多人现在认为堕胎是极其重要的试金石，但无论如何都没有什么可说的”（马丁，1996 年，第 193 页）。福音派领袖对采取明确的支持生命的立场表现出明显的沉默，部分原因是反对堕胎是罗马天主教徒的一个重要立场（Lindsay，2007 年，第 39-40 页。更进一步，许多社会和知识分子福音派领袖甚至认为，堕胎不是一个可以基于明显基督教理由反对的道德问题（Dudley，2011 年，第 40-44 页）。

Indeed, the early motivation for political mobilization among evangelicals was not opposition to abortion, but opposition to the federal government's intervention against evangelical schools engaged in racial discrimination (Balmer, 2007, pp. 13–17). As Duane Oldfield notes, “the most far-reaching federal intervention in local affairs during the 1960s and 1970s was its effort on behalf of desegregation… . The civil rights revolution was a challenge to the beliefs of many evangelicals” (Oldfield, 1996, p. 61).15 Summing up the issue, Jonathan Dudley writes that “the evangelical Right, therefore, was not as concerned about abortion initially as it was with defending racially segregated schools” (Dudley, 2011, p. 46).
事实上，福音派政治动员的早期动机不是反对堕胎，而是反对联邦政府干预从事种族歧视的福音派学校（Balmer，2007 年，第 13-17 页）。正如杜安·奥德菲尔德 （Duane Oldfield） 所指出的，“1960 年代和 1970 年代联邦政府对地方事务影响最深远的干预是它为废除种族隔离所做的努力......民权革命是对许多福音派信徒信仰的挑战“（Oldfield， 1996， 第61页）。15 乔纳森·达德利 （Jonathan Dudley） 在总结这个问题时写道，“因此，福音派右翼最初对堕胎的关注不如捍卫种族隔离的学校”（达德利，2011 年，第 46 页）。

This position began to change in the 1970s, with opposition to abortion becoming a defining features of the morality and politics of the US Religious Right in the 1980s (Dudley, 2011, pp. 44–58.)16 The significant point here is that opposition to abortion has moved from being, at most, an issue of questionable political importance among evangelicals to being a normative feature of majority evangelical identity.
这一立场在 1970 年代开始发生变化，反对堕胎成为 1980 年代美国宗教右翼道德和政治的决定性特征（Dudley，2011 年，第 44-58 页）。16 这里重要的一点是，反对堕胎已经从福音派中最多是一个政治重要性值得怀疑的问题，变成了大多数福音派身份的规范性特征。

The issue of opposition to abortion illustrates the changing nature of majority evangelical identity and its increasing identification with Republican politics over time. Survey data of religion and politics in the US provide additional evidence of the shifting majority sense of what it means to be an evangelical vis-à-vis conservative politics, highlighting the intensifying equivalence between evangelicals and conservative political positions that has defined the past decade. For example, between 2007 and 2014, the percentage of evangelical Christians who would rather have “smaller government, fewer services” increased from 48 to 64%, while the percentage who favored “bigger government, more services” decreased from 41 to 30%. On government regulation of the environment, the percentage of evangelicals who responded that “stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy” increased from 35 to 48%, and 56% of evangelicals hold that government aid to the poor “does more harm than good,” while only 38% respond that it “does more good than harm.” Even the percentage of evangelicals responding that abortion should be “illegal in all/most cases” rose from 61 to 63% over this period (Pew Research Center, 2014b).
反对堕胎的问题说明了多数福音派身份的性质发生了变化，以及随着时间的推移，它对共和党政治的认同感越来越高。美国宗教和政治的调查数据提供了额外的证据，表明大多数人对福音派与保守派政治的理解发生了转变，凸显了过去十年中福音派和保守派政治立场之间日益增强的对等性。例如，在2007年至2014年期间，宁愿 “更小的政府，更少的服务 ”的福音派基督徒的比例从48%上升到64%，而 “更大的政府，更多的服务 ”的比例从41%下降到30%。在政府对环境的监管方面，回答 “更严格的环境法律和法规使太多工作岗位流失 并损害经济 ”的福音派信徒比例从35%上升到48%，56%的福音派信徒认为政府对穷人的援助 “弊大于利”，而只有38%的人回答说 “利大于弊”。在此期间，甚至回答堕胎应该是 “在所有/大多数情况下都是非法的” 的福音派信徒的百分比也从 61% 上升到 63%（皮尤研究中心，2014b）。

Whereas support for opposition to abortion may be cast as a quintessentially religious and moral issue, it's not clear that these other positions that have gained increased evangelical support over the past decade are distinctly religious in nature. That is, if one presumes some sort of conceptual distinction between religious issues and political issues, increasing evangelical support for these typical Republican Party positions may seem surprising, particularly insofar as religious reasons could equally be mounted for opposing these typically Republican positions (C. Smith, 1998, pp. 196–198n5). On the other hand, increasing levels of identification with politically conservative issues are exactly what we should expect to see in a shift from a relation of coalition to a relation of equivalence.
虽然支持反对堕胎可能被塑造成一个典型的宗教和道德问题，但目前尚不清楚这些在过去十年中获得更多福音派支持的其他立场是否具有明显的宗教性质。也就是说，如果假设宗教问题和政治问题之间存在某种概念上的区别，那么福音派对这些典型共和党立场的支持增加似乎令人惊讶，特别是当宗教原因同样可以反对这些典型的共和党立场时（C. Smith， 1998，第 196-198n5 页）。另一方面，对政治保守问题的认同程度不断提高，正是我们应该期望看到的从联合关系到对等关系的转变。

This point illustrates why another recent analysis of majority evangelical support for Trump misses the mark. Jones suggests that the central question “is not why evangelicals supported Trump, but how white evangelicals’ early and steadfast support for Trump has changed them” (Jones, 2016b, emphasis original). He is right, of course, that evangelical support expresses a change in evangelical identity. But he is wrong to suggest that this change is either sudden or recent. What evangelical support for Trump illustrates is the equivalence of evangelicalism and Republican politics that has developed over the course of decades. Majority evangelical support for Trump is significant insofar as it brings this shift into clear relief, but to consider it a shift somehow initiated by support for Trump misconstrues the central political question at hand.
这一点说明了为什么最近对多数福音派对特朗普支持的另一次分析没有抓住重点。琼斯认为，核心问题 “不是福音派为什么支持特朗普，而是白人福音派早期对特朗普的坚定支持如何改变了他们”（Jones， 2016b， 强调原文）。当然，他是对的，福音派的支持表达了福音派身份的变化。但他认为这种变化要么是突然的，要么是最近的，那就错了。福音派对特朗普的支持表明，福音派和共和党政治是几十年来发展起来的等同的。大多数福音派对特朗普的支持是重要的，因为它清楚地缓解了这种转变，但认为这是由支持特朗普引发的某种转变，就误解了手头的核心政治问题。

4 PARTISANSHIP AND IDENTITY
4 党派关系和身份

I am suggesting that for a majority of US evangelicals conservative political identification is a constitutive feature of what it means to be an evangelical. Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels's group theory of political behavior vividly illustrates the significance of this identification. Drawing on studies of voter behavior, historical case studies, and their own original research, they suggest that partisan identity, and therefore voting behavior, does not follow from voters’ ideological beliefs, their proximity to politicians on politically significant positions, or their deeply held values. In contrast to such folk theories of democracy, they argue that partisan identification comes first, and determines these other issues (which we can refer to as belief, in a kind of shorthand) after the fact (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 1).
我的意思是，对于大多数美国福音派信徒来说，保守的政治认同是成为福音派教徒的一个构成特征。Christopher H. Achen 和 Larry M. Bartels 的政治行为群体理论生动地说明了这种识别的重要性。借鉴对选民行为的研究、历史案例研究和他们自己的原始研究，他们认为党派身份以及投票行为并不取决于选民的意识形态信仰、他们与政治上重要职位上的政治家的接近程度或他们根深蒂固的价值观。与这种民间民主理论相反，他们认为党派认同是第一位的，并在事后决定这些其他问题（我们可以将其称为信仰，以一种速记的方式）（Achen & Bartels，2016，第1页）。

Achen and Bartels point out that the assumptions of the folk theory are not borne out in the political belief systems of ordinary people, suggesting that “‘genuine ideological identification—an abiding dispositional commitment to an ideological point of view—turns out to be rare’” (Kinder & Kalmoe, cited in Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 34). Rather than supporting the intuitive view that partisan identity follows from ideology (i.e., beliefs, preferences, or the like), they suggest that ideology is “a byproduct of more basic partisan and group loyalties” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, pp. 34, 234). They also counter the notion that voter preferences are determined by a candidate's proximity to voters on particular issue of interest, arguing that issue proximity reflects, rather than determines, voter preference. Accordingly, “prospective voters convince … themselves that the candidate or party they favor has issue positions similar to their own … whether or not this is in fact the case” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 42). With regard to the argument that political identity reflects a range of core values, if not a well-defined political ideology, they counter that, while core values do tend to be more stable, “they are a good deal less stable than the phrase ‘core values’ would seem to imply, being significantly colored by party identification and even by short-term vote intentions” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 35). Partisan affiliation, then, comes first, with the articulation of ideological or core-value preferences as an effect of that prior affiliation (Achen & Bartels, 2016, pp. 34, 36, 234).
Achen和Bartels指出，民间理论的假设并未在普通人的政治信仰体系中得到证实，这表明“'真正的意识形态认同——对意识形态观点的持久性格承诺——被证明是罕见的”（Kinder & Kalmoe，引自Achen & Bartels，2016年，第34页）。他们没有支持党派身份源于意识形态（即信仰、偏好等）的直觉观点，而是认为意识形态是“更基本的党派和群体忠诚的副产品”（Achen & Bartels，2016，第34、234页）。他们还反驳了选民偏好取决于候选人在特定利益问题上与选民的接近程度的观点，认为问题的接近程度反映了选民的偏好，而不是决定选民的偏好。因此，“潜在选民说服......他们自己认为他们支持的候选人或政党的立场与他们自己的立场相似......无论事实是否如此“（Achen & Bartels，2016 年，第 42 页）。关于政治身份反映了一系列核心价值观的论点，如果不是明确的政治意识形态的话，他们反驳说，虽然核心价值观确实更稳定，但“它们比'核心价值观'这个短语似乎暗示的要稳定得多，受到党派认同甚至短期投票意图的影响”（Achen & Bartels， 2016 年，第 35 页）。因此，党派归属是第一位的，意识形态或核心价值偏好的表达是先前隶属关系的结果（Achen & Bartels，2016年，第34、36、234页）。

Achen and Bartels's account highlights the significance of majority evangelicalism's identification with Republican politics. On the group theory of political behavior, given the politically conservative identity of majority evangelicalism, widespread evangelical support for Trump is simply part of the larger phenomenon of Republican voters “coming home” to Trump in the 2016 election (Bump, 2016). As the relation between majority evangelicalism and Republican politics has progressively shifted from one of coalition to that of equivalence, the group theory of political identity alerts us to the fact that a majority of evangelicals was always going to support Trump.
阿琛和巴特尔斯的叙述强调了多数福音派认同共和党政治的重要性。在政治行为的群体理论上，鉴于多数福音派的政治保守身份，福音派对特朗普的广泛支持只是共和党选民在 2016 年选举中 “回家” 支持特朗普的更大现象的一部分（Bump， 2016）。随着多数福音派和共和党政治之间的关系逐渐从联盟转变为对等的关系，政治身份的群体理论提醒我们，大多数福音派总是会支持特朗普。

The recent research findings of Paul A. Djupe, Jacob R. Neiheisel, and Anand Edward Sokhey lend additional credence to this point (Djupe, Neiheisel, & Sokhey, 2017). Reflecting on the aftermath of the 2016 election, they write, “people may reevaluate their religious membership when they sense political (or other) disagreement, leaving their houses of worship more homogeneous organizations.” Based on survey data, they found that 14% of respondents reported leaving their churches by mid-November. Ten percent of self-identified white evangelicals in the survey sample were among these leavers. As their research demonstrates, the most significant factor determining whether adherents stayed in their congregations was the perceived fit between their level of support (or opposition) to Trump and that of their clergy. Given the high levels of evangelical support for Trump, a reasonable inference is that the bulk of evangelicals who left their churches did so because they did not support Trump; as Djupe et al. suggest, this would be consistent with a pattern of politically liberal and moderate evangelicals leaving their churches over the past two decades, as evangelicals have increasingly aligned with conservative Republican politics. The result, as noted above, is the increasing political homogenization of evangelical congregations, which is exactly what we would expect, given the equivalence between majority evangelicalism and Republicans and the group theory of political identity. What these data suggest is that it is increasingly difficult to maintain evangelical religious identity without also maintaining a conservative political identity.17
Paul A. Djupe， Jacob R. Neiheisel和Anand Edward Sokhey最近的研究结果为这一点提供了额外的可信度（Djupe， Neiheisel和Sokhey， 2017）。在回顾 2016 年大选的后果时，他们写道，“当人们感觉到政治（或其他）分歧时，他们可能会重新评估他们的宗教成员身份，让他们的礼拜场所组织更加同质化。根据调查数据，他们发现14%的受访者报告说在11月中旬之前离开了他们的教会。在调查样本中，有10%的自我认同的白人福音派教徒属于这些离开者。正如他们的研究表明，决定信徒是否留在他们的教会中的最重要因素是他们对特朗普的支持（或反对）水平与神职人员的支持（或反对）程度之间的契合度。鉴于福音派对特朗普的高度支持，一个合理的推论是，大多数离开教会的福音派信徒之所以离开，是因为他们不支持特朗普;作为 Djupe 等 人。这表明，这将与过去二十年政治上自由派和温和派福音派离开教会的模式一致，因为福音派教徒越来越与保守的共和党政治保持一致。如上所述，其结果是福音派教会的政治同质化日益加剧，这正是我们所期望的，因为多数福音派和共和党人之间的对等性以及政治身份的群体理论。这些数据表明，在不保持保守派政治身份的情况下，保持福音派的宗教身份越来越困难。17

It may be objected that there are obvious exceptions to these general trends among white US evangelicals. Well-known figures such as Ronald Sider, Jim Wallis, Tony Campolo, and others have long represented a wing within evangelicalism that charts a more liberal or moderate political course. But these figures (and others like them) do not mitigate the force of the argument I am advancing, for at least two related reasons.
有人可能会反对说，在美国白人福音派信徒中，这些普遍趋势显然是例外的。罗纳德·西德（Ronald Sider）、吉姆·沃利斯（Jim Wallis）、托尼·坎波罗（Tony Campolo）等知名人物长期以来一直代表着福音派内部的一个派别，他们制定了更自由或温和的政治路线。但这些数字（以及其他类似的数字）并没有减轻我所提出的论点的说服力，至少有两个相关原因。

First, as I suggested previously, social trends are not deterministic certainties, and reference to majority evangelical identity necessarily implies a minority that breaks with the trend. The existence of figures like Sider, Wallis, Campolo, and others is already presupposed in the focus on majority evangelical identity. Second, and following from this, while these figures and those evangelicals who affiliate with them are significant minorities within broader US evangelicalism, gaining in social visibility and acceptance, it nevertheless remains the case that, as Black notes, “the size, scope, and influence of these groups is quite small when compared with the Christian right” (Black, 2016, p. 145).
首先，正如我之前所建议的，社会趋势不是确定性的，提到多数的福音派身份必然意味着少数人与趋势决裂。像西德、沃利斯、坎波罗和其他人这样的人物的存在，已经被预设在对多数福音派身份的关注中。其次，从此来看，虽然这些人物和那些与他们有联系的福音派人士是更广泛的美国福音派中的重要少数群体，在社会知名度和接受度方面有所提高，但正如布莱克所指出的，“与基督教右翼相比，这些团体的规模、范围和影响力相当小”（Black， 2016， 第 145 页）。

Jim Wallis, whom Black correctly notes is likely the most widely known of these figures at present, serves as an effective illustration of this point. On the one hand, “the number of self-identified evangelicals who subscribe to the flagship publication Sojourners has grown significantly,” from five percent of the readership in 2002 to 18% in 2011 (Black, 2016, p. 144). Despite this increase, however, evangelicals continue represent only a minority presence in Wallis's organization (Black, 2016, p. 144). Black also notes that, as with many organizations in the Christian Right, organizations in the “evangelical Left” tend to center around “a magnetic and captivating personality,” and therefor face difficulties maintaining their identity and social momentum as their charismatic founders age and retire (Black, 2016, p.143). While such leaders and movements, and the resulting evangelical Left, are not insignificant in their social impact, their existence does not mitigate the overall force of my argument concerning the nature of majority evangelical identity.
布莱克正确地指出，吉姆·沃利斯 （Jim Wallis） 可能是目前这些人物中最广为人知的，他就是这一点的有效例证。一方面，“订阅旗舰出版物《旅居者》的自我认同的福音派信徒的数量显著增长”，从 2002 年的 5% 增加到 2011 年的 18%（Black，2016 年，第 144 页）。 然而，尽管有这种增长，福音派在沃利斯的组织中仍然只代表少数群体（Black，2016 年，第 144 页）。布莱克还指出，与基督教右翼的许多组织一样，“福音派左翼”的组织往往以“有吸引力和迷人的个性”为中心，因此，随着其有魅力的创始人年龄的增长和退休，他们难以维持自己的身份和社会势头（布莱克，2016 年，第 143 页）。虽然这些领袖和运动，以及由此产生的福音派左翼，在他们的社会影响上并非微不足道，但他们的存在并没有削弱我关于多数福音派身份性质的论点的整体力量。

5 THE VISCERAL NATURE OF POLITICAL IDENTITY: THE EVANGELICAL HOMEWORLD
5 政治身份的本质：福音派的家园

The group theory of political identity departs significantly from the individualism presupposed in the folk theory. But it also departs from the rationalism of the folk theory. Within the group theory, political ideology and reasoning remain significant, but their role changes dramatically. No longer serving as the basis of political identity, they serve as second-order legitimations employed to rationalize pre-established political identity and the behavior that follows from it in an act of “cognitive balancing” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 269). So, for example, “the more information the voter has, often the better able she is to bolster her identities with rational-sounding reasons,” supporting “emotional or cognitive commitments whose real basis lies elsewhere” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, pp. 268, 269, emphasis added). This “elsewhere” is crucial for understanding the nature of socio-political identity as it applies to evangelicals and brings us to a consideration of the deeply affective nature of political identity noted at the outset. Highlighting both this affective dimension and the shift away from a rationalistic understanding of political identity, Achen and Bartels note that political identity has to do with “emotional attachments that transcend thinking” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 228).
政治身份的群体理论与民间理论中预设的个人主义大相径庭。但它也背离了民间理论的理性主义。在群体论中，政治意识形态和推理仍然很重要，但它们的作用发生了巨大变化。它们不再作为政治身份的基础，而是作为二阶合法性，用于以“认知平衡”的行为合理化预先建立的政治身份和由此产生的行为（Achen & Bartels，2016 年，第 269 页）。因此，例如，“选民拥有的信息越多，她通常就越能用听起来合理的理由来支持她的身份”，支持“真正基于其他地方的情感或认知承诺”（Achen & Bartels，2016 年，第 268、269 页，强调为作者所加）。这个 “别处 ”对于理解社会政治身份的本质至关重要，因为它适用于福音派，并让我们思考政治身份在一开始就注意到的深刻情感本质。Achen 和 Bartels 强调了这种情感维度和对政治身份的理性主义理解的转变，指出政治身份与“超越思考的情感依恋”有关（Achen & Bartels，2016 年，第 228 页）。

While Achen and Bartels do not elaborate on the emotional nature of political identity, I am arguing that it is deeply affective in nature, constituted on what Connolly usefully refers to as the visceral register, understood as a “register of subjectivity and intersubjectivity” of “preconscious modes of intensity and thought-imbued feelings built into the stomach” (Connolly, 1999, pp. 3, 176). While the visceral register is “indispensable to more conceptually refined thinking,” it is nevertheless pre-reflective in nature (Connolly, 1999, p. 3). The affective anchoring of political identity is significant because it provides voters with a “reliably coherent universe” that “constructs a conceptual viewpoint by which voters can make sense of the political world (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 268). The majority identification of evangelicals with Republican politics is therefore not a matter of rational deliberation.
虽然阿琛和巴特尔斯没有详细说明政治身份的情感本质，但我认为它在本质上是深刻的情感性的，由康诺利有用的称为本能的记录构成，被理解为“主观性和主体间性的记录”，是“内置在胃中的前意识强度模式和充满思想的情感”（康诺利， 1999 年，第 3、176 页）。虽然本能的语域“对于更概念化的思考是必不可少的”，但它在本质上仍然是前反思的（Connolly，1999 年，第 3 页）。政治身份的情感锚定非常重要，因为它为选民提供了一个“可靠连贯的宇宙”，该宇宙“构建了一个概念性的观点，选民可以通过它来理解政治世界（Achen & Bartels，2016年，第268页）。因此，福音派的多数人认同共和党政治不是一个理性考虑的问题。

The conceptual mediation of partisan identity goes beyond explicit political ideology and values, shaping people's worldviews “in a deep way, right down to ‘their own facts’” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 284). Voters demonstrate a consistent tendency not only to adjust their ideology to fit that of their pre-existing partisan identity, but to adopt interpretive strategies over social facts to overcome any cognitive dissonance with their party identity (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 278). The result is that “people's factual judgments are often cobbled together from various more or less pertinent or trustworthy sources, including news accounts, water-cooler conversations, campaign propaganda, and folk wisdom about the way the world works,” so that an increase in political knowledge actually enhances political bias (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 279). Partisan identity therefore inculcates a tendency in voters to “figure out what ought to be true, but not to learn what [is] in fact true,” a tendency which is even more pronounced with regard to issues of increased complexity (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 283).
党派身份的概念中介超越了明确的政治意识形态和价值观，“以一种深刻的方式，一直到'他们自己的事实'”塑造了人们的世界观（Achen & Bartels，2016 年，第 284 页）。选民表现出一种一致的倾向，不仅要调整他们的意识形态以适应他们先前存在的党派身份，而且会采取对社会事实的解释策略来克服与他们的政党身份的任何认知失调（Achen & Bartels，2016，第278页）。结果是“人们的事实判断通常是从各种或多或少相关或可信的来源拼凑而成的，包括新闻报道、饮水机对话、竞选宣传和关于世界运作方式的民间智慧”，因此政治知识的增加实际上增强了政治偏见（Achen & Bartels，2016，第 279 页）。因此，党派身份在选民中灌输了一种倾向，即“弄清楚什么是真实的，而不是了解什么是真实的”，这种倾向在日益复杂的问题上更为明显（Achen & Bartels，2016 年，第 283 页）。

To account more fully for the affective nature of evangelical political identity, for its “felt sense,” we must further develop this notion of a conceptual universe. Attending to this experiential dimension is also important insofar as the notions of meaning and common sense elaborated above can give too ideational an impression of the process of equivalential identity formation. I suggested above that a majority of evangelicals came home to Trump, and this theme of home is a useful place to start. Drawing on the generative phenomenology developed by Anthony Steinbock, I am arguing that identification with the Republican Party is a constitutive feature of the “homeworld” of a majority of evangelicals.18
为了更充分地解释福音派政治身份的情感本质，解释它的 “感觉”，我们必须进一步发展这个概念宇宙的概念。关注这个经验维度也很重要，因为上面阐述的意义和常识的概念可能会给人一种对等同身份形成过程的过于概念化的印象。我在上面建议，大多数福音派信徒都回到了特朗普的家乡，而家这个主题是一个有用的起点。借鉴安东尼·斯坦博克（Anthony Steinbock）发展的生成现象学，我论证了对共和党的认同是大多数福音派人士的 “家园 ”的一个构成特征。18

The phenomenological concept of the homeworld adds a decidedly more concrete, visceral, and affective dimension to the broader concept of the lifeworld, introduced in the later work of Edmund Husserl (1970). Representing neither an object that could be thematized directly nor the totality of objects we ordinarily think of as comprising the world (Steinbock, 1995, pp. 105–107), the lifeworld names the horizon from which the totality of objectivity and subjective experience is generated, the “fundamental structures, rules, or conditions for the possibility of sense-emergence” (Steinbock, 1995, p. 14). In contrast with the abstract notion of the lifeworld, the homeworld is “that concrete lifeworld wherein we are typically familiar, normal, or ‘at home.’ … Our world is the world constituted for us in which we are homey or familiar—heimisch—in the widest sense” (Steinbock, 1995, p. 188).19 The homeworld is a “possessive world” in the dual sense that we belong to it and that it is our world (Steinbock, 1996, pp. 65–82; Steinbock, 1995, pp. 122, 220, 222); it is, so to speak, the experientially privileged lifeworld, the privilege of which owes to the fact that “experiences coalesce as our own and in such a way that our world structures experience itself” (Steinbock, 1995, p. 184,).
家园的现象学概念为更广泛的生活世界概念增加了一个明显更加具体、发自内心和情感的维度，这在埃德蒙·胡塞尔（Edmund Husserl，1970）的后期著作中被引入。生活世界既不代表一个可以直接主题化的物体，也不代表我们通常认为构成世界的物体的整体（Steinbock， 1995， pp. 105-107），它命名了产生客观性和主观经验整体的视野，即“感官涌现可能性的基本结构、规则或条件”（Steinbock， 1995，第 14 页）。与生命世界的抽象概念相反，家乡世界是“我们通常熟悉的、正常的或'在家'的具体生活世界。我们的世界是为我们构成的世界，我们在其中是家或熟悉的——最广义的 heimisch“（斯坦博克，1995 年，第 188 页）。19 家乡世界是一个“占有欲世界”，从双重意义上讲，我们属于它，它是我们的世界（Steinbock，1996 年，第 65-82 页;Steinbock，1995 年，第 122、220、222 页）;可以说，它是经验特权的生活世界，其特权归功于这样一个事实，即“经验作为我们自己的经验融合在一起，并以这样一种方式，我们的世界结构体验自己”（Steinbock，1995 年，第 184 页）。

The role of the homeworld in structuring experience, the affective dimension of identity, interests us here. As both possessing and possessed, the homeworld is defined by a normative significance. Norms are the a priori structures that function in a “guiding manner,” “stylizing” both “our way of ‘seeing’” and “the very reality seen” (Steinbock, 2004, pp. 171–172). Social actors are not, as the folk theory presupposes, subjects who stand apart from a world of objects, including political ideologies and beliefs, rationally choosing from among them. On the contrary, objectivity and subjectivity are both constituted within the homeworld in such a manner that they correlate with each other. Thus, phenomena given to experience within the homeworld are not given neutrally, as mere objects, but with a certain priority, presenting themselves with an alluring, enticing, affective sense (D. Miller, 2016, p. 166; Steinbock, 1995, p. 155). Likewise, the alluring or enticing character of phenomena constitutes the affective affinities of the subjects who encounter them. The homeworld is therefore marked with a distinctly modal significance, structuring the way in which that which is given is experienced, felt, and known.
家乡世界在构建体验中的作用，即身份的情感维度，在这里我们很感兴趣。作为拥有和被附身，家园是由规范意义定义的。规范是先验的结构，它以“指导方式”运作，“风格化”“我们'看到'的方式”和“看到的现实”（斯坦博克，2004 年，第 171-172 页）。社会行动者并不像民间理论所假设的那样，是独立于包括政治意识形态和信仰在内的客体世界，理性地从中做出选择的主体。相反，客观性和主观性都是以彼此关联的方式在母星中构成的。因此，在家乡世界内被赋予经验的现象并不是中立的，仅仅是作为对象，而是具有一定的优先权，以一种诱人的、诱人的、情感的感觉呈现自己（D. Miller，2016 年，第 166 页;Steinbock，1995 年，第 155 页）。同样，现象的诱人或诱人特征构成了遇到它们的主体的情感亲和力。因此，母星被标记为明显的模态意义，构建了被给予的事物被体验、感受和被认识的方式。

The homeworld is not fixed or static, nor does it reduce to an account of transcendental subjectivity.20 On the contrary, it is historically and socially generated (hence a generative phenomenology), representing a form of “intersubjective historicity” (Steinbock, 1995, pp. 172, 193). The modal dimension of the homeworld is the driving force behind its ongoing generation and relative stability. Phenomena that are given as alluring or enticing, that exert an affective pull, are experienced as concordant with the homeworld, thereby taking on a normative significance; they reinforce the sense in which the homeworld is, in fact, home. This leads to a complex process of constitutive repetition that grants the homeworld a “genetic density,” sedimentation, or stabilization. Affectively alluring phenomena condition experience and are appropriated, reinforcing their normative status, which in turn further conditions experience, and so on (Steinbock, 1995, p. 158). In this way, the coalescence of sense within the homeworld takes on a teleological modality, not in the sense that the norms of the homeworld rigidly determine experience, but in the sense that “the comportment of the subject, while open, is not arbitrary, but guided or oriented by its milieu” (Steinbock, 1995, p. 158). This “inner teleological sense” is therefore such that social agents are moved to participate in the ongoing generation and preservation of the homeworld itself (Steinbock, 1995, p.161, 2003, pp. 293, 296).
家园不是固定的或静态的，它也不会简化为对先验主观性的解释。20 相反，它是历史和社会产生的（因此是一种生成现象学），代表了一种“主体间历史性”的形式（Steinbock，1995 年，第 172、193 页）。 母星的模态维度是其持续生成和相对稳定的驱动力。那些被赋予诱人或诱惑的现象，那些产生情感吸引力的现象，被体验为与母星相一致，从而具有规范意义;它们强化了 Homeworld 实际上是家的意义。这导致了一个复杂的构成性重复过程，赋予母星“遗传密度”、沉淀或稳定。情感上诱人的现象制约着经验并被挪用，加强了它们的规范地位，这反过来又进一步制约了经验，依此类推（Steinbock，1995 年，第 158 页）。通过这种方式，母星内部的意义融合呈现出一种目的论的模式，不是在母星的规范严格决定经验的意义上，而是在“主体的举止虽然开放，但不是任意的，而是由其环境引导或导向的”（Steinbock，1995 年，第 158 页）。因此，这种“内在目的论意义”使得社会主体被推动参与家园本身的持续生成和保护（Steinbock，1995年，第 161 页，2003 年，第 293、296 页）。

The correlation of the homeworld's constitution of affect among social agents and social agents’ reciprocal generation of the homeworld helps illuminate two points of particular relevance to our discussion. First, it highlights the historical and social dynamics by which a relation of coalition evolves into a relation of equivalence. Relations of equivalence are constituted via the sedimentation of homeworld norms, to the point that they become features defining the identities of those within them, rather than features that are, in a sense, external to them. In his discussion of the resonance machine reinforcing the ties between evangelicals, the GOP, and capitalism, Connolly provides an illustrative concrete example of the reciprocal movement of processes of re-appropriation:
母星在社会主体之间的情感构成和社会主体对母星的相互生成之间的相关性有助于阐明与我们的讨论特别相关的两个点。首先，它强调了联盟关系演变为等价关系的历史和社会动态。等价关系是通过母星规范的沉淀构成的，以至于它们成为定义其中之人身份的特征，而不是在某种意义上对它们来说外部的特征。在他讨论加强福音派、共和党和资本主义之间联系的共鸣机器时，康诺利提供了一个说明性的具体例子，说明重新挪用过程的相互运动：

It finds expression in the market apologism and scandal mongering of the electronic news media, mobilization drives by the Republican Party and Fox News, administrative edicts to overturn environmentalism and weaken labor, attacks on Social Security, curtailment of minority rights in the name of religious morality, pressure for right-wing appointments to the Supreme Court, support for preemptive wars, tolerance or worse of state practices of torture that flout the Geneva Conventions, and propagation of a climate of fear and loathing against the Islamic world and large parts of Europe. (Connolly, 2005, pp. 870–871)
它表现在电子新闻媒体的市场道歉和丑闻散布、共和党和福克斯新闻的动员活动、推翻环保主义和削弱劳工的行政法令、对社会保障的攻击、以宗教道德的名义限制少数群体权利、对最高法院右翼任命的压力、对先发制人的战争的支持。 容忍或更糟地容忍国家藐视日内瓦公约的酷刑做法，以及传播对伊斯兰世界和欧洲大部分地区的恐惧和厌恶气氛。（康诺利，2005 年，第 870-871 页）

Decades of identification with Republican policies and political positions has fed into these appropriative repetitions and reinforcement mechanisms which, in turn reinforce and further sediment majority evangelical identification with Republican Party politics, to the point that such identification represents a constitutive feature of their very identity.
几十年来对共和党政策和政治立场的认同已经助长了这些挪用性的重复和强化机制，这反过来又加强并进一步沉淀了大多数福音派对共和党政治的认同，以至于这种认同代表了他们身份本身的一个构成特征。

Second, it highlights a mechanism through which socio-political agents deploy rational arguments and interpretations in a way that supports their pre-existing partisan identity. Socio-political agents select the rationales and interpretations they do because they are alluring to them, precisely insofar as they reinforce the homeworld norms that have already constituted them as the socio-political agents they are. As noted above, then, reflective and deliberative rationality continue to play a significant role in relation to socio-political identities, but that role shifts. As Connolly suggests, the affective register, while preconscious or pre-reflective, is nevertheless an instrumental precondition for political reflection or deliberation. Brian Massumi illustrates the same point when he refers to a thinking-feeling that is not a mode of reflection, but an anterior condition for, an “immediate understanding” that informs reflective or deliberative thought (Massumi, 2015, p. 94). Echoing Steinbock's emphasis on the affective, teleological lure of phenomena as given within the horizon of the homeworld, Massumi sums up this process, writing that “we already understand, in the very fibre of our being, what is at stake, and where things might be tending” (Massumi, 2015, pp. 93–94).
其次，它强调了一种机制，通过这种机制，社会政治主体以支持他们先前存在的党派身份的方式部署理性的论点和解释。社会政治主体选择他们所做的理由和解释，因为它们对他们有吸引力，恰恰是因为它们强化了已经构成他们作为社会政治主体的母星规范。因此，如上所述，反思和审慎理性在社会政治身份方面继续发挥着重要作用，但这种作用发生了变化。正如康诺利所说，情感记录虽然是前意识或前反思的，但它仍然是政治反思或深思熟虑的工具性前提。布赖恩·马苏米 （Brian Massumi） 在提到一种思维感觉时说明了同样的观点，这种感觉不是一种反思模式，而是为反思或深思熟虑的思想提供信息的“即时理解”的前提条件（Massumi，2015 年，第 94 页）。与斯坦博克强调的在母星视野内赋予的现象的情感、目的论诱惑相呼应，Massumi 总结了这一过程，写道：“我们已经了解，在我们存在的纤维中，什么是利害攸关的，以及事情可能走向何方”（Massumi，2015 年，第 93-94 页）。

While socio-political agents can and do offer reasons and rationales for the positions they hold and the political actions they undertake, then, these are second-order, post factolegitimations of affective identities constituted within the horizon of the homeworld. Thus, when they do elaborate ostensible reasons for their political decisions, voters “sound like they're thinking,” but “their consistency is often driven by group loyalties and partisan biases, even when it comes to straightforward matters of fact” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 296). Of course, precisely insofar as the norms of the homeworld are the pre-reflexive horizon constitutive of this visceral common sense of a majority of US evangelicals, they are not themselves objects of conscious rationality or deliberation. As Achen and Bartels sum up the issue with regard to the individual social actor, “the fact that none of the opinions propping up her party loyalty are really hers will be quite invisible to her. (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 268).
虽然社会政治主体能够而且确实为他们所担任的职位和他们所采取的政治行动提供了理由和理由，但这些是在母星视野内构成的情感身份的二阶、事后合法化。因此，当他们为他们的政治决定详细阐述表面上的理由时，选民“听起来像是在思考”，但“他们的一致性往往是由群体忠诚和党派偏见驱动的，即使涉及到直接的事实问题”（Achen & Bartels，2016年，第296页）。当然，恰恰是就母星的规范是大多数美国福音派信徒的这种本能常识的前反身视野构成的而言，它们本身并不是有意识的理性或深思熟虑的对象。正如 Achen 和 Bartels 总结关于个人社会行为者的问题时，“支持她对政党忠诚的观点没有一个是真正属于她的观点，这一事实对她来说是完全不可见的。（Achen & Bartels，2016 年，第 268 页）。

6 CONCLUSION 6 总结

Drawing together the threads from the preceding discussion, two central and related points emerge. First, support for conservative politics is a constitutive dimension of the religious identity of a majority of US evangelicals; it is a structural feature of their homeworld.21 From within this evangelical homeworld there is no question of a distinction between religious and political identity for such evangelicals: rather, support for the Republican Party is an expression of their Christian identity. In the experience of millions, such support is simply part of the felt sense of what it means to be an evangelical (indeed, to be Christian at all) and, conversely, failure to support Republican Party politics and policies is nothing less than failure to be a real or authentic Christian.22 This is consistent with Djupe et al.’s analysis: evangelicals who do not identify with the Republican Party find it difficult to maintain their evangelical identity. Indeed, the identification of evangelicalism with conservative politics is so thoroughgoing that many people who identify as religiously unaffiliated (i.e., “nones”) so identify because, at least in large measure, they identify participation in organized religion as such with conservative politics (Hout & Fischer, 2002; Zuckerman, 2014, pp. 67–68; Mercadante, 2014, p. 27).
将前面讨论的线索放在一起，出现了两个中心和相关的观点。首先，对保守派政治的支持是大多数美国福音派信徒宗教身份的一个构成维度;这是他们家乡的一个结构特征。21 在这个福音派的家园中，这些福音派信徒的宗教和政治身份之间没有区别的问题：相反，对共和党的支持是他们基督教身份的表现。根据数百万人的经历，这种支持只是对成为福音派（事实上，根本不是基督徒）意味着什么的感受的一部分，相反，不支持共和党的政治和政策，就等于没有成为一个真正的或真实的基督徒。22 这与 Djupe 等 人一致。的分析：不认同共和党的福音派人士发现很难维持他们的福音派身份。事实上，将福音派与保守政治的认同如此彻底，以至于许多自认为无宗教信仰的人（即“无宗教信仰者”）如此认同，因为至少在很大程度上，他们将参与有组织的宗教与保守政治等同起来（Hout & Fischer，2002年;Zuckerman，2014 年，第 67-68 页;Mercadante，2014 年，第 27 页）。

On this analysis, to view the issue of overwhelming evangelical support for Trump as a question concerning the relation of religion and politics, understood as discreet social realms, is a mistake. This support is not a matter of religious support for a political party. It is not a matter of evangelical supporters deliberating about the degree to which their religious beliefs coincide with the political ideology of the Republican Party. What is at issue is the identity of a religious group, which identity includes a constitutively political dimension.
根据这种分析，将福音派对特朗普的压倒性支持问题视为一个关于宗教和政治关系的问题，被理解为谨慎的社会领域，是一个错误。这种支持不是对政党的宗教支持问题。这不是福音派支持者考虑他们的宗教信仰与共和党的政治意识形态在多大程度上一致的问题。争论的焦点是一个宗教团体的身份，这个身份包括一个构成性的政治维度。

Following from this, the second major point emerging from the discussion is that majority evangelical political identity is a deeply affective, visceral matter. In arguing that GOP affiliation is a constitutive dimension of majority evangelical identity, a structuring feature of the evangelical homeworld, I am not simply claiming that evangelicals “believe in” the GOP platform, that in political deliberation they will tend to support GOP principles because they accord with their own, or the like, but that evangelicals’ majority identification with the GOP is pre-deliberative and pre-reflective, occurring at the “gut level.” Breaking with the rationalism of the folk theory of political identity, majority evangelical identification with the GOP should not be considered an effect of political deliberation or rationality, but the origin of such deliberation. When confronted, for example, with whether or not to support the GOP candidate for president, or, certainly, whether to support his opponent, a majority of US evangelical voters do not experience this as a question or matter of debate at all. It is simply a given that the GOP candidate is preferable. Once again drawing on Massumi's discussion, majority evangelical support for Trump and the GOP does not represent an effect of reflection, but a pre-reflective affective knowledge given in evangelicals’ “fibre of being” (Massumi, 2015, pp. 93–94).
接着，讨论中出现的第二个主要观点是，多数福音派的政治身份是一个深刻的情感、发自内心的问题。在论证共和党的隶属关系是多数福音派身份的一个构成维度，是福音派母相的一个结构性特征时，我并不是简单地声称福音派 “相信 ”共和党的纲领，在政治审议中，他们会倾向于支持共和党的原则，因为它们符合他们自己的原则，或类似的原则，而是福音派人士对共和党的多数认同是经过深思熟虑和预先反思的。 发生在 “肠道水平”。打破民间政治身份理论的理性主义，多数福音派对共和党的认同不应被视为政治审议或理性的结果，而应被视为这种审议的起源。例如，当面临是否支持共和党总统候选人，或者当然是否支持他的对手时，大多数美国福音派选民根本不认为这是一个问题或辩论问题。共和党候选人更可取是理所当然的。再次借鉴 Massumi 的讨论，大多数福音派对特朗普和共和党的支持并不代表反思的效果，而是福音派的 “存在纤维” 中给出的反思前情感知识（Massumi，2015 年，第 93-94 页）。

Analyses of evangelical support of Donald Trump, such as those surveyed above, miss the mark because they overlook these points. Developing an adequate understanding of majority evangelical support for Trump requires an account of how socio-political identities are constituted and an application of this account to the specific case of evangelicals supporting Trump. As I suggested at the outset, this approach reveals majority evangelical Trump support to be essentially tautological: a majority of evangelicals supported Trump, as the GOP nominee for president, because they are evangelicals. As the intervening discussion has made clear, however, this tautology nevertheless possesses significant explanatory force, demystifying the relation between Trump and the majority of US evangelicals.
对福音派对唐纳德·特朗普支持的分析，比如上面调查的那些，没有达到目标，因为他们忽视了这些点。要充分理解大多数福音派对特朗普的支持，需要说明社会政治身份是如何构成的，并将这一解释应用于福音派支持特朗普的具体案例。正如我在一开始所建议的，这种方法揭示了大多数福音派对特朗普的支持本质上是重复的：大多数福音派支持特朗普作为共和党总统提名人，因为他们是福音派。然而，正如中间的讨论所表明的那样，这种同义词仍然具有重要的解释力，揭开了特朗普和大多数美国福音派之间关系的神秘面纱。