如果是比较易懂的书，我只是简单做一些标记和评注：
但是，我最喜欢的作者之一的杜威，文笔太晦涩，只用上面的方法，我很难领会他的思想。所以要多花一点功夫。
以杜威《伦理学》中的一节为例（我读他的书都是用这种方法），原书如下：
我对它怎么处理？手机现在都有提取图片中文字的功能（感谢科技），我把图中的文字提取出来，粘贴到手机中的笔记本里。
然后，把原文切分成一句一句，两句之前用空行隔开。如果句子太长（杜威经常使用特别长的句子），就把它分成两部分。
这样，就可以一句一句地研读。
在笔记本里，可以很方便地把重要的词语加粗，涂色，加下划线，以及加入评注（感谢科技）。
把原文拆成一句一句，还有一个好处，烧水的时候，等车的时候，睡前或早晨醒来，都可以打开笔记本，读上一句两句。好极了！
结果如下：
S 4. MOTIVE AND CONSEQUENCES
动机与后果
In reaching the conclusion that conduct and character are morally one and the same thing, first（指行为） taken as effect and then（指性格） as causal and productive factor, we have virtually disposed of one outstanding point of controversy in moral theory.
The issue in question is that between those who hold that motives are the only thing which count morally and those who hold that consequences are alone of moral import.
On one side stand those who, like Kant, say that results actually attained are of no importance morally speaking, because they do not depend upon the will alone; that only the will can be good or bad in the moral sense.我无法理解，康德怎么主张这么荒谬的观点。他若是在留言区留言，我很难忍住不反驳
On the other side, are those who, like Bentham, say that morality consists in producing consequences which contribute to the general welfare, and that motives do not count at all save as they happen to infuence the consequences one way or another.
One theory puts sole emphasis upon atlitude, upon how the chosen act is conceived and inspired激发，使产生; the other theory lays stress solely upon what is actually done, upon the objective content of the deed in the way of its effect upon others.
Our analysis shows that both views are one-sided.
At whichever end we begin we find ourselves intellectually（这个词是关键） compelled to consider the other end.
We are dealing not with two different things but with two poles of the same thing.
The school of Bentham, for example, does not hold that every consequence is of importance in judging an act morally.
It would not say that the act of a surgeon is necessarily to be condemned because an operation results in the death of a patient.
It limits the theory to foreseen and desired consequences.在这条件下，不用考虑动机
The intended consequence, the intention, of the surgeon was to save life; morally his act was beneficent, although unsuccessful from causes which he could not control.
They say if his intent was right, it makes no difference what his motive was;这里区分意图与动机。只看意图，不看动机
whether he was moved by kindly feeling, by desire for professional standing, by a wish to show his skill, or to gain a fee, is immaterial.
The only thing that counts morally is that he intended to effect certain consequences.
The protest contained in this position against locating morals in the conscious feeling which attends the doing of an act is valuable and valid.
Persons, children and grown-ups alike, often say in justification作为辩护 for some act that turned out badly that they meant well; they allege some innocent or amiable feeling as the “"motive” of the act.
我想起威廉詹姆斯的质问：你为什么没思考？你没有脑子吗？
The real fact in all probability was that they took next to no pains to think out the consequences of what they proposed to do. 对，这才是关键，才是真实
They kept their minds upon any favorable results that might be fancied to follow, and glossed over 掩饰忽略 or kept from view its undesirable consequences.
If“motive” signified the emotional state which happens to exist in consciousness at the time of acting, Bentham's position would be entirely sound.
Since that conception of motives is more or less prevalent, he was not setting up a man of straw to hit, but was attacking a doctrine which is morally dangerous. 生活中80%以上的人都抱这种错误和危险的看法
For it encourages （注意这个词，助长。许多观点和做法，都会助长很坏的倾向。生活中为什么有如此多巨婴？也是因为无数因素在助长）men to neglect（也就是不注意。注意什么，不注意什么，是大问题） the purpose and bearing of their actions, and to justify what they feel inclined to do on the ground that their feelings when doing it were innocent and amiable.
The underlying identifcation of motive with personal feeling is, however, erroneous.
What moves a man is not a feeling but the set disposition, of which a feeling is at best but a dubious可疑的靠不住的 indication. 我从未想到这一点
An emotion, as the word suggests, moves us, but an emotion is a good deal more than a bare “feeling”;
anger is not so much a state of conscious feeling as it is a tendency to act in a destructive way towards whatever arouses it.
It is doubtful if a miserly person is conscious of feelings of stinginess吝啬的; he rather prizes that which he hoards储备 and is moved to keep up and conserve that which he prizes.
Just as an angry person may deny, quite honestly, that he is angry, so an ambitious man is likely to be quite devoid of any feeling of ambition.
There are objects and ends which arouse his energy and into the attaining of which he throws himself with whole-heartedness.
If he were to interpret his own conduct he would say that he acts as he does not because of personal ambition, but because the objects in question are so important. 真是明辨秋毫
When it is recognized that "motive ” is but an abbreviated name for the attitude and predisposition toward ends which is embodied in action, all ground for making a sharp separation between motive and intention—foresight of consequences一falls away.
Mere foresight of resuIts may be coldly intellectual, like a prediction of an eclipse.
It moves to action only when it is accompanied with desire for that sort of result. 这两句：能预知而不动
On the other hand, a set and disposition of character Ieads to anticipation（注意这词，更多是情感而不是判断） of certain kinds of consequences and to passing over other effects of action without notice.
A careless man will not be aware of consequences that occur to a prudent man; if they（指后果） do present themselves to thought, he will not attach the force to them（这就是关键！即使知道，也忽略不管） which the careful man does.
A crafty狡猾的 灵巧的character will foresee consequences which will not occur to a frank and open （这里什么意思？）man;
if they should happen to come to the mind of the latter, he will be repelled by the very considerations that would attract the sly and intriguing person. 这种人多么没救。
Othello and Iago foresee different consequences because they have different kinds of characters.
Thus the formation of intention, of purpose, is a function of the forces of human nature which lead to action, and the foreseen consequences move to action only as they are also prized and desired.
The distinction between motive and intent is not found in the facts themselves, but is simply a result of our own analysis, according as we emphasize either the emotional or the intellectual aspect of an action.
The theoretical value of the utilitarian position consists in the fact that it warns us against overlooking the essential place of the intellectual factor, namely, foresight of consequences.
The practical value of the theory which lays stress on motive is that it calls attention to the part played by character, by personal disposition and attitude, in determining the direction which the intellectual factor takes.
But in its extreme form it suffers from the same one-sidedness as does the Benthamite theory of intention, although in the opposite direction.
It is possible to make good sense of the proposition that it is the "will” which counts morally, rather than consequences.
But only so, if we recognize that will signifes an active tendency to foresee consequences, to form resolute purposes, and to use all the efforts at command to produce the intended consequences in fact. 否则没有资格说“我也是好心”
The idea that consequences are morally irrelevant is true only in the sense that any act is always likely to have some consequences which could not have been foreseen, even with the best will in the world.
We always build better or worse than we know, and the best laid plans of men as of mice are more or less at the mercy of uncontrollable contingent circumstances when it comes to actual consequences.
But this fact of the limitation of intention cannot be converted into the doctrine that there is such a thing as motive and will apart from projection of consequences and from effort to bring them to pass.
“Will, ” in the sense of unity of impulse, desire, and thought which anticipates and plans, is central in morals just because by its very nature it is the most constant and effectual factor in control of consequences.
This emphasis upon character is not peculiar to any special type of moral theory.
Our dominating interest is the manifestation and interaction of personalities.
It is the same interest which shows itself in the drama where the colorful display of incidents is, save in the melodramatic and sentimental, a display of the outworking of character.
Political thought tends to be too much rather than too little concerned with personality at the expense of issues and principles.
What Hamlet, Macbeth, Nora, Tartuffe are to the theater, Roosevelt, Wilson, Lloyd George, Mussolini are to politics.
For practical reasons we must be concerned with character in our daily affairs.
Whether we buy or sell goods, lend money or invest in securities证券, call a physician or consult a lawyer, take or refuse advice from a friend, fall in love and marry, the ultimate outcome depends upon the characters which are involved.
