【新刊速递】《冲突解决杂志》(JCR), Vol.68, No.6, July 2024 | 国政学人

题目：The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression

作者：Alexander Dukalskis, 都柏林大学政治与国际关系学院副教授；Saipira Furstenberg，意大利威尼斯卡福斯卡里大学哲学与文化遗产系研究员；Sebastian Hellmeier，WZB柏林社会研究院博士后研究员；Redmond Scales，都柏林大学政治与国际关系学院博士研究生。

摘要：有关跨国镇压的新兴文献已经确定了威权国家用来控制和胁迫其海外人口的几种策略。本文在现有研究的基础上，研究了跨国镇压的国内决定因素。本文认为，国内镇压的增加可能会导致随后的跨国镇压增加，因为国内的镇压会驱使国外的异见，并刺激国家将镇压的目光延伸到境外。为了评估本论点，本文利用了含有约1200 个案例的数据库，这些案例涉及 1991 年至 2019 年期间世界各地的威权国家在国外威胁、攻击、引渡、绑架或暗杀本国公民。本文使用多元回归分析首次定量测试了跨国镇压的国内驱动因素，发现随着国内镇压的加剧，该国随后升级跨国镇压的可能性也大幅增加。

The emerging literature dealing with transnational repression has identified several strategies used by authoritarian states to control and coerce their populations abroad. This article builds on existing research by investigating the domestic determinants of transnational repression. It argues that an increase in domestic repression is likely to lead to a subsequent increase in transnational repression because crackdowns at home drive dissent abroad and incentivize the state to extend its repressive gaze beyond its borders. To evaluate its arguments, the article draws on a database of approximately 1200 cases in which authoritarian states around the world threatened, attacked, extradited, abducted, or assassinated their own citizens abroad between 1991 and 2019. Offering a first quantitative test of domestic drivers of transnational repression, using multivariate regression analysis, the paper finds that as repression intensifies domestically, the likelihood of that state subsequently escalating its transnational repression also increases substantively.

题目：Faith-Based Discrimination and Violent Religious Hostilities: A Global Analysis

作者：Nilay Saiya，南洋理工大学人文与社会学院副教授；Stuti Manchanda， 南阳理工大学人文与社会学院博士研究生；Rahmat Wadidi，圣母大学政治学院研究生。

摘要：一些研究发现，对少数宗教社群的限制与暴力宗教敌对行动的发生有关。然而，这项研究没有考虑到这样一个事实，即少数宗教歧视可以采取不同的形式，因此可能会以不同的方式鼓励暴力。本文试图通过研究不同形式的少数宗教限制及其与宗教暴力的关系来填补这一空白。具体来说，我们分析了三种基本类型的宗教歧视——对少数宗教活动的限制、对少数宗教机构的限制以及对皈依和传教的限制——对宗教多数群体和宗教少数群体实施的暴力行为的比较强度。有趣的是，我们的分析表明，这三种形式的限制都鼓励宗教多数群体的暴力行为，但不会鼓励少数群体的暴力行为。我们用印度基于信仰的歧视和宗教暴力冲突的案例研究补充了统计分析。

Several studies have found restrictions on minority faith-based communities to be related to the onset of violent religious hostilities. Absent from this work, though, is a consideration of the fact that minority religious discrimination can take different forms, and, consequently, may encourage violence in different ways. This paper seeks to fill this void by examining different forms of minority religious restrictions and their relationship to religious violence. Specifically, we analyze the comparative strength of three basic types of religious discrimination—restrictions on minority religious practices, restrictions on minority religious institutions, and restrictions on conversion and proselytizing—on violence carried out by both religious majority groups and religious minority groups. Interestingly, our analysis shows all three forms of restrictions encourage violence from religious majorities, but not from minorities. We supplement the statistical analysis with a case study of faith-based discrimination and violent religious hostilities in India.

题目：Turning the Tables: Military Intervention and the Onset of Negotiations in Civil War

作者：Rebecca Dudley， 杨百翰大学政治专业助理教授。

摘要：内战中的谈判何时发生？军事干预如何改变这一过程？虽然现有文献提出了谈判开始的模型——包括调解和无协助的——但如果它们不考虑谈判前卷入冲突的第三方国家，它们就是不完整的。笔者认为军事干预通过三种途径调整谈判障碍，从而影响谈判的开始：军事胜利的可能性、示弱的风险以及存在其他否决方。笔者使用逻辑随机效应模型对非洲内战数据集进行了研究。该论点的延伸涉及干预预期如何影响冲突行为。支持叛军的干预、具有独立利益的干预和不对称干预导致谈判发生的可能性增加。控制干预预期的模型还表明，第三方可以通过预期和后续行动影响交战方的行为。

When do negotiations occur in civil war? How does military intervention alter this process? While the existing literature presents models of the onset of negotiations – both mediated and unassisted – they are incomplete if they do not consider third-party states involved in the conflict prior to negotiations. I argue that military intervention impacts negotiation onset by adjusting barriers to negotiation through three pathways: the likelihood of military victory, the risk of signaling weakness, and the presence of additional veto players. I examine these mechanisms using logistic random effects models on a dataset of African civil wars. An extension of the argument addresses how expectations of intervention shape conflict behavior. Rebel-supporting interventions, interventions with independent interests, and asymmetric interventions lead to an increase in the likelihood of negotiations occurring. Models controlling for expectations of intervention also suggest that third parties can impact belligerents’ behavior through both expectations and follow-through.

题目：Type of Violence and Ingroup Identity: Evidence From the Spanish Civil War

作者：Sergi Martínez，普林斯顿大学博士后研究员

摘要：战时暴力和专制镇压针对平民的形式多种多样。过去的研究探讨了暴力的原因和后果，但之前没有研究同时评估不同类型的暴力对政治认同的长期影响。本文认为，无差别攻击可以强化群体认同，而民间机构在选择性暴力中的作用可能会产生不利影响。本研究利用原始数据，记录了西班牙内战期间（1936-1939 年）比斯开（巴斯克地区）市政当局对选择性和无差别暴力的揭露情况，研究了其对投票行为的影响（1983-2015年）。结果表明，法西斯空袭增强了巴斯克民族主义，而选择性暴力则降低了巴斯克政党的受欢迎程度。个人和社区层面的证据表明，空袭促进了政治态度的代际传递。暴力可以增强民族认同，但也可能削弱民族认同：这取决于暴力类型。

Wartime violence and authoritarian repression against civilians take various forms. Past research has explored the causes and consequences of violence, but no previous work simultaneously assessed the long-term effects of different types of violence on political identities. This paper contends that indiscriminate attacks can reinforce ingroup identity, whereas the role of civilian agency in selective violence may have a detrimental impact. Equipped with original data capturing municipality-level exposure to both selective and indiscriminate violence during the Spanish civil war (1936–1939) in Biscay (Basque Country), this study examines its legacy on voting behavior (1983–2015). Results indicate that fascist airstrikes increased Basque nationalism while selective violence diminished the popularity of Basque parties. Individual and community-level evidence suggests that airstrikes fostered the intergenerational transmission of political attitudes. Violence can boost national identities, but it can also erode them: it depends on the type.

题目：Does Deplatforming Work?

作者：Danny Klinenberg，加州大学圣巴巴拉分校经济专业博士研究生

摘要：社交媒体已成为极端分子筹款和组织活动的渠道。在政府考虑如何监管的同时，一些社交媒体公司已经将攻击性内容的创作者移除——即平台下架。笔者通过两家视频流媒体公司——YouTube 及其极右翼竞争对手 Bitchute 移除平台的时间差异，估计了平台下架对收入和观看人数的影响。在 YouTube 上被下架会导致每周比特币收入增加 30%，Bitchute 上的观看人数增加 50%。Bitchute 活动的增幅低于 YouTube，这意味着平台下架会降低内容创作者的整体观看次数和收入。

Social media has become an outlet for extremists to fundraise and organize. While governments deliberate on how to regulate, some social media companies have removed creators of offensive content —deplatforming. I estimate the effects of deplatforming on revenue and viewership, using variation in the timing of removals across two video-streaming companies — YouTube, and its far-right competitor, Bitchute. Being deplatformed on Youtube results in a 30% increase in weekly Bitcoin revenue and a 50% increase in viewership on Bitchute. This increase in Bitchute activity is less than that on YouTube, meaning that deplatforming works in decreasing a content creator’s overall views and revenue.

题目：The Economic Coercion Trilemma

作者：Michael-David Mangini，耶鲁大学莱特纳比较与国际政治经济学项目博士后研究员

摘要：各国经常将市场准入作为国际政治中的讨价还价筹码。如果一个国家在给予市场准入之前要求其同时遵守多个问题领域，那么可以最大限度地提高遵守的动力，但也会使其变得脆弱——即任何无法在一个问题领域遵守的目标国家都没有遵守任何领域的激励。更一般地说，经济胁迫计划最多可以实现以下三个目标中的两个：1) 确保广泛的国内政治支持联盟，2) 将有意义的贸易价值与每项政策问题联系起来，3) 确保执行一项政治问题不会降低目标国家遵守其他政治问题的条件的动力。该计划的国内选民、问题本身和国际经济的特点是决定国家如何优先考虑这三个目标的关键因素。三难困境解释了可以与经济价值挂钩的问题的数量和类型。

States often use market access as a bargaining chip in international politics. A state that requires simultaneous compliance in multiple issue areas before granting market access maximizes incentives to comply but also makes them brittle – any targeted states that cannot comply in one issue area have no incentive to comply in any. More generally, programs of economic coercion can achieve at most two of the following three objectives: 1) secure a broad coalition of domestic political support, 2) the association of meaningful trade value with each policy issue, and 3) assurance that enforcing one political issue will not reduce the target’s incentives to comply with conditionality on others. Characteristics of the program’s domestic constituency, of the issues themselves, and of the international economy are key determinants of how the state prioritizes the three objectives. The trilemma explains the number and types of issues that can be linked to economic value.

题目：Changes in Perceptions of Border Security Influence Desired Levels of Immigration

作者：Ryan C. Briggs，圭尔夫大学政治系助理教授；Omer Solodoch，希伯来大学助理教授

摘要：人们对移民的安全担忧日益增加。许多国家通过加强边境来应对。然而，人们对边境安全措施对移民威胁的影响知之甚少。边境可能会促进群体认同并传播外来者的恐惧。相反，它们可能会增强公民的安全感和对移民的控制力。我们通过对 1000 多名美国人的配额样本进行的调查实验来测试这些说法。研究结果表明，将更多的政府资源用于边境安全会提高移民的期望水平。这种效应可能是由于边境安全措施引起的对移民的控制感，即使移民的数量或特征保持不变，从而产生这种效应。我们的研究结果表明，边境管制被广泛视为封闭和孤立的象征，它可以增加公众对移民的支持。

Security concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifying their borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat from immigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, they might enhance citizens’ sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using survey experiments run on a quota sample of over 1000 Americans. The findings show that allocating more government resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likely driven by a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widely considered as symbols of closure and isolation, can increase public support for immigration.