【新刊速递】《世界政治》(WP), Vol. 76.4, October 2024 | 国政学人

题目：Global Governance under Populism: The Challenge of Information Suppression

作者简介：Allison Carnegie, 美国哥伦比亚大学政治学教授，研究专注于全球治理和国际机构，尤其是民粹主义、贸易、外援和新兴技术。Richard Clark, 美国圣母大学政治学助理教授，圣母国际安全中心（NDISC）教职研究员，研究兴趣包括国际合作和国际政治经济学，重点关注全球化、国际金融和气候变化。Noah Zucker，英国伦敦政治经济学院国际关系系助理教授，主要研究气候变化和脱碳的政治经济。

摘要：民粹主义者对全球治理的意识形态反对是众所周知的，然而这些行为者是否以及如何系统地破坏国际组织仍然不明确。本文认为，民粹主义者扭曲全球治理的一个关键手段是通过歪曲科学信息，这对于应对许多公共卫生和环境问题所需的全球响应至关重要。由于民粹主义者持有反精英、维护主权的观点，他们有动机扣留或误报科学信息。通过对提供给国际组织（IOs）的信息来源和质量的新数据进行分析，本文发现民粹主义领导人向国际组织提供科学信息的可能性显著低于其他类型的领导人。当他们确实提供此类数据时，其准确性低于其他来源提供的信息。本文的研究结果表明，民粹主义可能会阻碍国际机构在紧迫的国际关注领域进行治理的能力。

Populists’ ideological opposition to global governance is well recognized, yet whether and how these actors systematically undermine international organizations remain unclear. The authors argue that a key means by which populists warp global governance is by distorting scientific information, which is necessary for global responses to many public health and environmental issues. Populists are motivated to withhold or misreport scientific information due to their anti-elite, prostate sovereignty views. Using new data on the source and quality of information provided to international organizations (ios), the authors find that populist leaders are significantly less likely to provide scientific information to ios than are other types of leaders. When they do offer such data, they are less accurate than the information that other sources supply. The authors’ findings suggest that populism may stymie international institutions’ ability to govern in areas of pressing international concern.

题目：The Importance of Un Peacekeeping Mission Orientation and Personnel for Environmental Protection

作者简介：Tobias Böhmelt，英国埃塞克斯大学政府学院教授，研究兴趣为国际关系和比较政治学。

摘要：联合国维和行动越来越与提供安全或和平之外的社会和经济成果相关联。维和人员也可能有助于环境保护的改善。这里讨论的研究推进了关于维和人员导向和人员构成的的理论论点，以阐明维和人员与环境之间关系的潜在机制。通过任务授权或地面直接行动，维和任务可以具有绿色导向，这可能会加强他们对环境保护的承诺。此外，文职人员可以帮助发展实施和执行环境法规所需的国家能力。本文分析了冷战后非洲的维和部署，使用了固定效应模型和匹配法。实证分析表明，环境任务导向和更多的文职人员（相较于军职人员）与更好的当地水质相关。这项研究丰富了我们对维和行动的认知，也为环境政治和安全研究文献提供了补充。

UN peacekeeping is increasingly linked to social and economic outcomes other than the provision of security or peace. Peacekeepers can also be associated with improvements in environmental protection. The research discussed here advances theoretical arguments on peacekeepers’ orientation and personnel composition to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of the relationship between peacekeepers and the environment. Through mandates or direct action on the ground, peacekeeping missions can have a green orientation that likely strengthens their commitment to environmental protection. Moreover, civilian personnel can help to develop the state capacity that is necessary to implement and enforce environmental regulations. The author analyzes peacekeeping deployments in post–Cold War Africa and uses fixed effects models and matching. The empirical analysis provides evidence that environmental mission orientation and more civilian personnel, than uniformed personnel, correlate with better local water quality. This research contributes to our knowledge on peacekeeping operations, and it adds to the literature on environmental politics and security studies.

题目：Informal, Legal, or Illegal? Varieties of Artisanal Mining in the Global South

作者简介：Zaraí Toledo Orozco，美国杜兰大学美洲政策与研究中心（CIPR）博士后研究员，研究在高度不平等的社会中，被排除群体如何参与政治。Moisés Arce，美国杜兰大学政治科学系教授，研究专注于环境政治、冲突过程、民主治理和比较政治经济。

摘要：在 2002 年至 2014 年的大宗商品繁荣期间，全球南方的手工采矿活动有所增加，但矿工非正式地位的变化仍未得到充分研究。本文根据对规则的遵守程度以及国家行为体行这种遵守的意愿来定义手工采矿的地位：当矿工拥有正式的经营许可证并遵守国家采矿规则进行采矿时为合法；而当采矿发生在受限的自然保护区，且对国家采矿规则的违背广泛存在时为非法。本文通过考察采矿对当地经济的重要性以及该行业内的组织不对称性——即一个地区内手工采矿的联合强度差异——来解释手工矿工非正式地位的变化。在手工采矿对当地经济至关重要的地方，低不对称性有助于矿工过渡到合法地位，而相比之下，高不对称性则将他们推向非法和犯罪。本文对秘鲁重要黄金产区的这些转变进行了过程追踪。研究结果对其他以非正式性著称的小规模生产者和商人有广泛影响。

Artisanal mining in the Global South increased during the 2002–14 commodity boom, yet variation in the informal status of miners remains understudied. The authors define the status of artisanal mining based on the degree of rule compliance and the willingness of state actors to enforce such compliance: it is legal when the miners have formal permits to operate and follow state rules to mine, but it is illegal when the mining takes places in restricted natural reserves and noncompliance with state mining rules is extensive. The article explains transitions in the informal status of artisanal miners by examining the importance of mining to the local economy and the organizational asymmetries within the sector—that is, the differences in the associative strength of artisanal mining within a region. Where artisanal mining is central to the local economy, low asymmetries help miners transition to legality while high asymmetries, by contrast, push them toward illegality and criminality. The authors process trace these transitions in Peru’s most important gold-producing regions. The findings have broad implications for other small-scale producers and merchants whose activities are also known for widespread informality.

题目：Agrarian Elites, Wealth Inequality, and State Capacity: Evidence from Early Twentieth-Century Brazil

作者简介：Giuliana Pardelli，纽约大学阿布扎比分校政治学助理教授，研究领域为政治经济学、税收、国家能力、公共产品供给与不平等。

摘要：传统的农业精英常常被描绘为国家扩张的障碍。由于土地所有者尤其容易受到税收的影响，不平等的出现预期会加剧他们对财政能力发展的抵制。本文认为，当有产者在政治上占据主导地位，并且从公共支出中获得与其资本禀赋成比例的利益时，财富不平等与精英对能力投资的更大支持相关联。利用二十世纪初巴西的数据，本文展示了在土地精英面临较少政治威胁的地区，土地持有集中度较高与增加财政和行政能力相关。对机制的检验证实了这种关系源于精英对特定类型公共支出存在需求的观点。这些发现提供了关于经济利益与政治主导性在塑造国家影响范围的地方层面差异之相互作用的新见解，为关于国家建设的更广泛文献做出了贡献。

Traditional agrarian elites have often been portrayed as obstacles to the expansion of the state. Because landed actors are particularly exposed to taxation, inequality is expected to exacerbate their resistance to the development of fiscal capacity. This article argues that when propertied actors are politically dominant and obtain benefits from public spending that are proportional to their capital endowments, wealth inequality is associated with greater elite support for capacity investments. Using early twentieth-century Brazilian data, the author shows that where landed elites faced fewer political threats, higher levels of landholding concentration were associated with increased fiscal and administrative capacity. Tests of mechanisms corroborate the idea that this relationship results from elite demands for specific types of public spending. These findings contribute to the broader literature on state-building by providing new insights into the interaction between economic interests and political dominance in shaping subnational variation in the reach of the state.

题目：Electoral Systems and the Autocrat’s Trade-Off: Evidence from the Russian Duma

作者简介：Anders Woller，丹麦哥本哈根大学政治学系研究人员。

摘要：立法选举支撑着权威主导政权，但不同的选举制度对这些政权的政治前景同时有利又有弊。本文在理论上探讨了在能够获取地方精英偏好信息的选举制度与维持立法控制的制度之间的权衡。一个选举制度可以实现其中之一，但无法同时做到。本文对俄联邦议员进行了实证研究，其中一半议员在单席位选区中当选，另一半则在全国范围内通过封闭政党名单选举产生。候选人可以同时在两个名单上登记（样本量N = 515），选区结果决定了最终的名单归属。对于那些在选区内勉强胜出或失败的议员来说，选举激励会突然发生变化。本文利用这一事实来识别地方代表对支持或反对政体的议会行为的影响。研究结果支持了这一权衡：选区名单的议员在演讲中传达地方偏好信息更多，但更频繁地反对法案提案。独裁者如何权衡这种取舍决定了选举制度的选择，并阐明此类国家中的选举改革。

Legislative elections sustain authoritarian regimes, but distinct electoral systems simultaneously benefit and hurt the political prospects of those regimes. The author theorizes about a trade-off between electoral systems that facilitate information on local elite preferences, and systems that maintain legislative control. An electoral system can achieve either, but not at the same time. The author undertakes an empirical study of Russian federal deputies, half of whom are elected in single-member districts, the other half on a nationwide closed-party list. Candidates can register on both lists (N = 515), and district results determine final list affiliation. Electoral incentives change abruptly for deputies who are barely winning or losing their district, a fact that the author exploits to identify the effects of local representation on pro- and antiregime parliamentary behavior. The results support a trade-off: district-list deputies convey more information on local preferences in their speeches than party-list deputies do, but they oppose law proposals more frequently. How autocrats weigh this trade-off determines the electoral system and illuminates electoral reform in autocracies.

编译 | 常靖婧

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 胡庭晨