宪法学期刊《Constitutional Political Economy》2024年第1期摘要中译
期刊简介:
Constitutional Political Economy《宪法政治经济学》是致力于宪法学分析广泛领域的评论杂志。其基础学科是经济学,但众多制度的研究要求对经济、政治、法律、哲学动机、规则和效果的多重考察。因此,这是一种包含多种不同观点的跨学科期刊。宪法学分析是该期刊的主要重点,但同时也包括对公共政策、法律制度、规范和方法论问题等。该期刊是由Springer Verlag出版社出版的季刊,每期通常包含5或6篇关于宪法政治经济学、公共选择、政治理论以及法与经济学的高质量文章。2024年第1期刊载了七篇文章。
期刊网址:
https://www.springer.com/journal/10602
2024年第1期
Volume 35, Issue 1,March 2024
01#
Natural amenities and Neo-Hobbesian local public finance
自然设施与新霍布斯地方财政理论
Abstract:A revenue maximizing local government must obey a migration constraint when levying taxes. Using this insight, I develop a simple theory of taxation that suggests natural amenities are a key factor influencing local tax rates. Natural amenities confer rents to residents which governments and interest groups compete to extract. Revenue maximizing local tax rates are increasing in the level of natural amenities, increasing in moving costs, and decreasing in households’ reservation utility. Using data on natural amenities and taxation for US counties, I find that local tax rates are in-fact increasing the level of natural amenities. Finally, I suggest an alternative interpretation of the “tax revolts” of the late 1970s. Rather than an attempt to constrain Leviathan, local property tax reform (such as California’s Proposition 13)and restrictions on housing supply are the outcome of competition over amenity rents in which property owners successfully capture a monopoly position at the expense of other social groups including renters and local government.
收入最大化的地方政府在征税时必须遵守移民限制政策。基于此视角,我提出了一个简易税收理论,该理论认为自然设施是影响地方税率的关键因素。自然设施为居民提供租金,而政府和利益集团也竞相榨取这些租金。追求收入最大化的地方税率提高了自然设施水平和迁移成本,减少了家庭保留效用。通过美国各县的自然设施和税收数据,我发现地方税率实际上正在提高自然设施的水平。最后,我建议对1970年代后期的“税务反抗”运动进行另一种解释。地方财产税改革(如加州第13号税收法案)和对住房供应的限制不是因为试图限制利维坦,而是对自然设施租金竞争的结果,在此竞争中,业主成功地以牺牲其他社会群体(包括租房者和地方政府)为代价获得垄断地位。
Luke Petach,Belmont University, Nashville, USA
译者注:California’s Proposition 13,即美国加州第13号税收法案,由公共选择学派的创始人和代表人物之一布坎南于1978年在加州提出。该法案在加州的全民公决中,以二比一的优势获得通过。根据该法案,物业税税率不得超过市场价的1%;物业税税基以加州市政府1975年评估出的公开市场价值为基准,此后的评估价值每年不得超过2%。
02#
The different facets of the proportionality principle as applied by the supreme court in India
印度最高法院适用比例原则的不同面向
Abstract:The evolution of the proportionality principle in India has, at best been an experiment of sorts. Its incorporation as a review tool was initially confined to the deciding the legality of the administrative decision-making. At this stage, it was used more as an alternative to the Wednesbury standard of reasonableness rather than an independent review procedure. Over the years, however, as the principle found more and more utility as rights reviewing mechanism, its has made a major impact in review jurisprudence in India. Today the principle is consistently used to deal to review the constitutionality of legislations limiting fundamental rights. Proportionality has featured extensively on issues concerning privacy rights, individual autonomy and boundaries of free speech and expression. The present article is a study of the different facets of the proportionality principle as has been applied by the Supreme Court of India. The article takes a critical look on the interrelationship between the proportionality principle and the pre-existing review procedures in India and the justification—often historical—that has been used by the Supreme Court to give a proportionality a place in review jurisprudence in India.
比例原则在印度的演变至多只是一种实验。它作为一种审查工具,最初仅限于确定行政决策的合法性。在这个阶段,它更多地被用作“温斯伯里不合理性标准”的替代方案,而非一个独立的审查程序。然而,近些年来,该原则作为权利审查机制的功能越来越大,对印度的审查判例产生了重大影响。如今,比例原则连续被用来审查限制基本权利立法的合宪性。比例原则在涉及隐私权、个人自主权以及言论和表达自由的界限等问题上得到了广泛的适用。本文是对印度最高法院适用比例原则的不同面向进行研究。文章批判性地审视了比例原则与印度先前存在的审查程序之间的相互关系,以及印度最高法院在审查判例中赋予比例原则一席之地的正当理由(通常是历史角度的)。
Navin Sinha,Present address: Symbiosis Law School, Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune, India;Gujarat National Law University, Gandhi Nagar, India
Fakkiresh S. Sakkarnaikar,Gujarat National Law University, Gandhi Nagar, India
译者注:Wednesbury standard of reasonableness,这里译为温斯伯里不合理性标准,是英国法合理原则的别称。英国合理原则至少在16世纪就已确立。1598年的“卢克案”被视为其源头。此后,这一原则一直得到坚持。尽管英国人长期坚持合理原则,对其内涵的表述却一直比较笼统。直到1948年的“温斯伯里案”,这一原则才得到经典阐述。该案中,格林法官指出:不合理“通常是指不应当做的事。例如,一个被授予裁量权的个人必须正确地指示其自己依法办事,他必须让自己注意他应当考虑的因素,他必须拒绝考虑与他必须考虑事情无关的因素。如果他没有遵从这些规则,那么他将被认为或经常被认为是不合理的行为。同样,有些事情如此荒谬,以致具有一般理智的人都不认为行政机关在正当地行使权力”。由于这一阐述具有经典性,得到普通法系国家的普遍认可,英国法上的合理原则也被称为“温斯伯里原则”“温斯伯里不合理性”或“温斯伯里理由”。
03#
Fake marriages, asylum, and gas station robberies: institutional determinants of migrants' strategies
假结婚、庇护和加油站抢劫:移民战略的制度决定因素
Abstract:I study institutional and political determinants of migrants’ immigration strategies using the United States’ immigration system as a case study. Drawing from work that theoretically connects decisions to immigrate legally vs. illegally as well as theoretical insights from literature on the economics of crime, I show how relative probabilities of successful migration using different strategies and relative utility gained using different strategies weigh heavily in immigrants’ calculus. To do so, I use qualitative evidence of migrant strategies in the face of migration policy constraints. These various policy constraints lead to a variety of different tactics revolving around decisions regarding whether to immigrate legally, to commit visa fraud, or to choose one type of visa over another. In the process, I also build on a rich body of Public Choice literature to demonstrate how complicated regulatory systems, in this case regulatory systems that quantitatively restrict migration, encourage rent-seeking by both migrants and nonmigrants.
我以美国的移民制度为案例研究,研究移民移居策略的制度性和政治性的决定因素。文章从理论上将移居决定分别与合法移民和非法移民联系起来,同时借鉴犯罪经济学文献的理论观点,展示了使用不同策略成功移民的相对概率以及使用不同策略获得的相对效用在移民的计算中如何占有重要地位。为此,我使用了应对移民政策限制的移民策略的不同案例。这些不同的政策限制导致了各种围绕决策的策略循坏,即是否合法移民、进行签证欺诈或选择一种签证而不是另一种签证的决定。在这个过程中,我还以丰富的公共选择理论文献为基础,展示了美国复杂的监管体系以及数量上限制移民的监管政策如何鼓励移民和非移民的寻租行为。
Joshua Bedi,Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark
04#
U.S. Antitrust Policy in the Age of Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Netflix and Facebook
美国的反垄断政策:在亚马逊、谷歌、微软、苹果、奈飞、脸书的时代
Abstract:Sweeping changes have disrupted society courtesy of the Information Revolution, presenting great opportunities in radically transformed economic markets but also great challenges in adapting to new and different forms of organization. Antitrust laws and other elements of competition policy are being re-examined. Specifically, the House Judiciary Committee conducted hearings in 2020 in which it asked key questions about the pattern of development in U.S. markets and options for policy reform. This paper, answering such queries, finds strong evidence for the view that, relative to practical alternatives that include E.U.-style regulation, digital markets in the U.S. appear robust, generating considerable innovation that produces pro-consumer outcomes. The global Internet is dominated by U.S.-developed technologies and business models discovered and deployed in a process of competitive rivalry. Even given imperfect rules and regulations, U.S. markets have contributed strongly to economic advances embraced around the world.
信息革命给社交礼仪带来了彻底的变化,为经济市场的彻底转变带来了巨大机遇,但也意味着市场要适应新的和不同形式的组织这一重大挑战。反垄断法及其他市场竞争政策正重新面临审查。具体而言,众议院司法委员会在2020年举行了听证会,在听证会上提出了有关美国市场发展模式和政策改革方案选择的关键问题。本文回答了这些问题,找到了强有力的证据证明,与包括欧盟式监管在内的实际替代方案相比,美国的数字市场似乎很强大,具备相当大的创新能力,从而产生了有利于消费者的结果。全球互联网由美国开发的技术和商业模式主导的,是在竞争过程中发展的。即使存在不完善的规则和法规,美国市场也为世界各地的经济发展做出了巨大贡献。
Thomas W. Hazlett,John E. Walker Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA,Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
05#
The profit system: how (and why) to deflect the radical critique
利润机制:转移激进批判的方式与理由
Abstract:What we may call the Normative Representativeness Requirement (NRR) is a necessary condition on any successful objection to a political-economic system that is decentralized and profit-oriented. This article applies the NRR to what I call “The Radical Critique” of the profit system. I argue that this critique, which is not only historically important (as reported by Marx (Capital: a critique of political economy, C.H. Kerr and Company, Chicago, 1867)) but also continues to circulate (e.g., as reported by Cohen (Why not socialism?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009), as reported by Piketty (Capital in the twenty-first century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2014), does not meet the NRR. The Radical Critique of diverse forms of the profit system (e.g., laissez-faire or a welfare-state) suffers from a fatal flaw that renders its logical force at best undiscernible.
我们可能称规范代表性需求理论(NRR)是成功反对以利润为导向和分散的政治经济体系的必要条件。本文将NRR应用于我所说的对利润机制的“激进批判”。我认为,这种批判不仅具有重要的历史意义,而且还将继续流传,皮凯蒂也持此说。但这些批评不符合 NRR。对各种形式的利润体制(例如,自由放任或福利国家)的激进批判存在一个致命的缺陷,使其逻辑力无法被辨别。
译者注:托马斯・皮凯蒂(Thomas Piketty)是法国著名经济学家,巴黎经济学院教授,法国社会科学高等研究院研究主任,主要研究财富与收入不平等,主要著作有:《不平等经济学》《21世纪资本论》。
06#
Deeds, not words? Speech and re-election of Japan’s local legislators
要行动而非逞口舌?演讲与日本地方议员连任
Abstract:This study is an empirical inquiry into the re-election of elected assembly members and investigates whether incumbents' general participation in legislative sessions is a determinant of the outcome of their re-election efforts. This study measures legislative participation based on the amount of speech on the plenary session floor during the immediately preceding term, which is tabulated from published local assembly transcripts.The data for the analysis come from 41 prefecture assemblies in Japan that held elections on the same day in April 2015. This sample enables us to test whether legislative participation has a positive electoral impact across different localities. The empirical analysis of the re-election outcomes of elected officials suggests that floor speech is a factor contributing to electoral success for assembly members. In addition, this speech effect diminishes as incumbents accumulate terms, and it is the first term legislators who benefit most from the positive re-election effect of speech.
本研究是对当选议员连任的实证调查,旨在调查现任议员对立法会议的普遍参与是否是其连任结果的决定因素。本研究根据上一任期届满前全体会议上的演讲量来衡量立法参与情况,该样本来源于已公布的地方议会记录表格,数据来自2015年4月同一天举行选举的日本41个地方议会。这个样本使我们能够衡量立法参与是否对不同地区的选举产生积极影响。连任结果的实证分析表明,发言是议员选举成功的一个因素。此外,随着现任议员任期的积累,这种演讲产生的效果会减弱,而从演讲的积极连任效应中获益最多的是第一届立法会议员。
Akihiko Kawaura,Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha University, Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan
Yasutomo Kimura,Faculty of Commerce, Otaru University of Commerce, Midori, Otaru, 047-8501, Japan
Yuzu Uchida,Faculty of Engineering, Hokkai-Gakuen University, Chuo-ku, Sapporo, 064-0926, Japan
07#
Ricardo and the farmers
李嘉图定律与农民
Abstract:It is investigated under what conditions rents can be won through interference in the market through price subsidies. It is shown that owners of factors of production have an interest in price subsidies in the product market (which they can motivate with reference to “consumer interests”) only if the factor supply is not perfectly price elastic, the incentive for rent-seeking increasing as the price elasticity of supply decreases. It is further demonstrated that this can occur in the case of differential rents. Since differential rents are found primarily in the use of land, land owners, i.e. farmers, should have especially high incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities.
本文旨在研究在什么条件下可以通过价格补贴干预市场来赢得租金。结果表明,只有当要素供给不完全具有价格弹性时,生产要素所有者才对产品市场的价格补贴感兴趣(他们可以参照“消费者利益”获得激励),此时,寻租的动机随着供给价格弹性的降低而增加。我们进一步发现,前述情形在租金差异化的情况下也可能会发生。由于租金差异化主要体现在土地的使用上,土地所有者即农民应该有特别高的动机从事寻租活动。
Bengt-Arne Wickström,Andrássy-Universität, Budapest, Hungary
清湖宪法研习社
翻译|张伟
排版|曹世卓