【保险学术前沿】International Economic Review 2021-2024年保险精选文章目录与摘要

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

期刊介绍：

《International Economic Review》（国际经济评论）是一本自1960年起发行的经济学领域的季刊，由宾夕法尼亚大学和大阪大学的经济学系出版，旨在为现代定量经济学提供一个讨论平台。该刊每年发行4期，每期发表文章15篇左右，2023年影响因子为1.4。

本期看点：

●社会保障残疾保险：

将配偶护理所造成的时间损失考虑在内，社会保障残疾保险的保险价值相对于其成本而言会增加。补贴护理成本的预算中性政策（预算中性政策是指一种政策改革或调整，它不会增加或减少政府的总体预算）改革可以提高社会福利。

●失业保险：

当工人没有完全保险来对抗失业的风险时，当保险水平低于某个阈值时，劳动力增长的广度边际（是否购买）的正面效应会超过家庭财富减少而产生的深度边际（购买何种产品）的负面效应。

●汽车保险：

汽车保险投保人在保险期限的最后一个月比在其他任何月份都更容易遇到事故，这种现象是由投保人持有的沉没成本误解导致的，这加剧了他们的道德风险。

●医疗保险：

“健康溢价”：有医疗保险的个体更有可能保持良好健康或从不良健康状况中恢复。个人保险状态对健康有着显著且持久的影响。提供全民医疗覆盖将缩小健康和预期寿命的差距。

Chaoran Chen（约克大学），Zhigang Feng（内布拉斯加大学奥马哈分校），Jiaying Gu（多伦多大学）

摘要：This article identifies a “health premium” of insurance coverage: insured individuals are more likely to maintain good health or recover from poor health. We introduce this feature into a prototypical macrohealth model and estimate the baseline economy by matching the observed joint distribution of health insurance, health, and income over the life cycle. Quantitative analysis reveals that an individual's insurance status has a substantial and persistent impact on health. Providing universal health coverage would narrow health and life expectancy gaps, with a mixed effect on the income distribution in the absence of any additional redistribution of income or wealth.

本文识别了保险覆盖的“健康溢价”：有保险的个体更有可能保持良好健康或从不良健康状况中恢复。我们将这一特征引入一个典型的宏观健康模型中，并通过匹配生命周期中观察到的医疗保险、健康和收入的联合分布来估算基准经济情况。定量分析显示，个人的保险状态对健康有着显著且持久的影响。提供全民健康覆盖将缩小健康和预期寿命的差距，在没有额外收入或财富再分配措施的情况下，将对收入分配产生混合效应。

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12722

Husnu C. Dalgic（曼海姆大学）

摘要：Households in emerging markets hold significant amounts of dollar deposits whereas firms have significant amount of dollar debt. Motivated by perceived dangers, policymakers consider regulations to limit dollarization. I draw attention to an important benefit of dollarization: it serves as an insurance arrangement in which firms provide income insurance. Emerging market exchange rates tend to depreciate in recessions so that households prefer holding deposits denominated in dollars. They effectively starve local financial markets of local currency; raising local interest rates over USD rates and causing entrepreneurs to borrow in dollars. This premium is the price paid by households for insurance.

在新兴市场中，家庭持有大量美元存款，而企业则有大量美元债务。出于对潜在风险的考量，政策制定者考虑实施法规以限制美元化。本文指出美元化的一个重要好处：它充当了一种保险安排，其中企业提供收入保险。新兴市场的汇率在经济衰退时往往会贬值，因此家庭更愿意持有以美元计价的存款。这实际上使得当地金融市场缺乏本地货币；使得本地利率高于美元利率，并促使企业家以美元借款。这种溢价是家庭为保险支付的价格。

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12686

Siha Lee（麦克马斯特大学）

摘要：This article evaluates the insurance value of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program among married households when wives face a trade-off between market hours and spousal care following their husbands' disability. Event study analyses show that wives' labor supply responses to their husbands' disability are small, and instead, a considerable amount of time is spent in spousal care. Using a dynamic structural model, I find that incorporating time loss due to spousal care increases the insurance value of SSDI relative to its costs. Finally, budget-neutral policy reforms that subsidize the cost of care can improve social welfare.

本文评估了已婚家庭中，当妻子在丈夫残疾后面临工作时间和配偶护理之间的权衡时，社会保障残疾保险（SSDI）计划的保险价值。事件研究分析表明，妻子面对丈夫残疾时，劳动力供给反应很小，相反，大量的时间花在了配偶护理上。通过使用动态结构模型，本文发现将配偶护理所造成的时间损失考虑在内，SSDI的保险价值相对于其成本而言会增加。最后，补贴护理成本的预算中性政策改革可以提高社会福利。

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12712

Youngsoo Jang（昆士兰大学）

摘要：I study how credit and default affect optimal health insurance, constructing a life-cycle model of health investment with a strategic default option on emergency room bills and financial debts. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and used to compare the optimal policy for Medicaid by the availability of the default option and credit. I find that strategic default induces the optimal policy to be more redistributive. With (Without) the option, the optimal income threshold for Medicaid eligibility is 44% (25%) of the average income. In these findings, the interaction between strategic default and preventative medical spending is important.

本文研究了信贷和违约如何影响最优医疗保险，构建了一个健康投资的生命周期模型，其中包含对急诊室账单和金融债务的战略性违约选择。该模型与美国经济进行了校准，并根据违约选项和信贷的可用性对Medicaid的最优政策进行了比较。本文发现战略违约会使最优政策更具再分配性。有（无）该选项时，Medicaid资格的最优收入门槛为平均收入的44%（25%）。在这些研究结果中，战略性违约与预防性医疗支出之间的相互作用非常重要。

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12617

Kym Pram（内华达大学里诺分校）

摘要：I analyze a model of monopoly insurance contracting where the consumer has access to endogenous, costly evidence of his risk type. I characterize when the consumer is worse off if the insurer is allowed to condition contracts on evidence and when the ability to contract on evidence leads to a Pareto improvement. I compare the results to an analogous setting with perfect competition: Under perfect competition, when evidence acquisition costs are low, the ability to contract on evidence is always Pareto improving. For intermediate costs, I uncover a new source of unraveling.

本文分析了一个垄断保险合同模型，在这个模型中，消费者可以获取到内生性的、成本高昂的关于其风险类型的证据。本文描述了如果允许保险公司以证据作为签订合同的条件，消费者何时会处于更糟的状况，以及何时根据证据签订合同的能力会带来帕累托改进。本文将结果与完全竞争的类似情况进行了比较：在完全竞争条件下，当证据获取成本较低时，根据证据签订合同的能力总是帕累托改进。对于中间成本，本文发现了一种新的解套来源。

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12646

Gregory E. Givens（阿拉巴马大学）

摘要：I interpret evidence on government spending multipliers using a model in which workers are not fully insured against job loss. Government consumption affects aggregate spending along two margins : (i) an intensive margin owing to a fall in household wealth and (ii) an extensive margin that accounts for growth in the workforce. At insurance levels below a certain threshold, the positive effects of (ii) dominate the negative effects of (i), leading to multipliers for private consumption and output that exceed zero and one. Similar results appear in a quantitative model scaled to match microestimates on the consumption cost of unemployment.

本文使用一个模型来解释政府支出乘数的证据，在此模型中，工人没有完全保险来对抗失业的风险。政府消费通过两个边际影响总支出：(i)由于家庭财富减少而产生的深度边际（intensive margin）；(ii)考虑到劳动力增长的广度边际（extensive margin）。当保险水平低于某个阈值时，（ii）的正面效应会超过（i）的负面效应，从而导致私人部门消费和产出的乘数超过0和1。在调整以匹配失业消费成本的微观估计的定量模型中，也出现了类似的结果。

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12560

Andrea Attar（法国图卢兹经济学院；罗马第二大学；经济研究中心和经济信息及工业组织研究所）, Thomas Mariotti（法国图卢兹经济学院；欧洲经济政策研究中心；经济研究中心和经济信息及工业组织研究所）, François Salanié（法国图卢兹经济学院）

摘要：This article studies an insurance market on which privately informed consumers can simultaneously trade with several firms operating under a regulation that prohibits cross-subsidies between contracts. The regulated game supports a single equilibrium allocation in which each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This competitive allocation cannot be Pareto-improved by a social planner who observes neither consumers' types nor their trades with firms. Public intervention under multiple contracting and adverse selection should thus arguably target firms' pricing strategies, leaving consumers free to choose their preferred amount of coverage.

本文研究了一个保险市场，在此市场中，拥有私人信息的消费者可以同时与几家保险公司进行交易，这些保险公司受禁止保险合同间交叉补贴的法规监管。这种受监管的竞争性博弈支持一种单一的均衡分配，其中每一层保险保障都根据购买它的消费者类型合理定价。当政策规划者既无法观察消费者的类型也无法观察他们与公司的交易时，这种竞争性分配不是帕累托改进的。因此，在多重合同和逆选择的情况下，公共干预应该关注公司的定价策略，同时让消费者自由选择他们偏好的保险保障。

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12570

Chao Ma（厦门大学）

摘要：Investigating a unique large data set, we find that automobile insurance policyholders are more likely to encounter accidents during the last month of the insurance policy term than during any other month. Our interpretation is that this effect is driven by the sunk cost fallacy held by policyholders, which exacerbates their moral hazard. The explanation is that in the last month, policyholders may become concerned that they may “waste” the premiums paid upfront if they have not encountered an accident before the policy expires; thus, they will reduce their accident-prevention efforts, although the premiums are sunk costs and cannot be reversed.

通过对一个独特的大型数据集进行调查，我们发现汽车保险的投保人在保险期限的最后一个月比在其他任何月份都更容易遇到事故。我们认为，这种效应是由投保人持有的沉没成本误解所驱动的，这加剧了他们的道德风险。对此的解释是：在最后一个月，投保人可能会担心如果他们在保险到期之前没有遇到过事故，他们可能会“浪费”预先支付的保费；因此，他们会减少事故预防努力，尽管保费是沉没成本，无法逆转。

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12512