【保险学术前沿】NBER 2024年6月-8月保险精选文章目录与摘要

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

平台介绍：

“National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Papers Series” NBER（美国国家经济研究局）工作论文系列是一个广泛认可的经济学研究发布渠道。这些工作论文在同行评审前发布，以便更广泛地分发和讨论。NBER每年发布超过1200篇工作论文，这些论文由NBER的附属成员撰写，可能包含对政策影响的分析结果。

本期看点：

社会保险：

● 公共福利项目的参与通常会影响其他项目的参与情况。项目的保障范围可能会影响其他项目的使用，尤其是当这些项目覆盖的风险相关时。例如，当采用带薪病假法规要求时，工人赔偿福利的领取有所减少。

● 社会保险的扩张可以通过（去）工会化影响不平等性，不平等性可能会根据社会保险的目标受众而扩大或降低。补贴工会会降低整体社会福利，但会增加低技能工人的福利。

财产保险：

● 依赖于较粗略的野火风险测量的公司在高风险市场细分中收取相对较高价格——或者选择根本不服务于这些区域。实证结果与“赢家的诅咒”一致，即定价策略较不细致的公司面临更高的预期损失。

● 风险到保费梯度的增加主要是由再保险成本的传递效应导致的。

租金保证保险：

● 租金保证保险（RGI）可代替无法支付租金的投保租户向房东支付有限次数的租金，这些租户因收入或健康支出的负面冲击而无法支付租金。私人保险公司必须针对经济条件较好的租户才能实现盈亏平衡，而公共保险提供者则专注于最有可能无家可归的家庭。

长期护理保险：

● 如果父母符合公共长期护理保险福利的资格，他们的孩子成为他们主要照护者的可能性较小，而这反过来又会降低他们的孩子从他们那里获得遗产的感知可能性。

● 存在逆选择的市场中，补贴比风险调整有两个优势：它们在为不同买家定制保费方面提供了更大的灵活性，并且能够产生加价更低、参保率更高的均衡状态。

Boaz Abramson(哥伦比亚大学) , Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh(哥伦比亚大学)

摘要：A rent guarantee insurance (RGI) policy makes a limited number of rent payments to the landlord on behalf of an insured tenant unable to pay rent due to a negative income or health expenditure shock. We introduce RGI in a rich quantitative equilibrium model of housing insecurity and show it increases welfare by improving risk sharing across idiosyncratic and aggregate states of the world, reducing the need for a large security deposits, and reducing homelessness which imposes large costs on society. While unrestricted access is not financially viable with either private or public insurance providers due to moral hazard and adverse selection, restricting access can restore viability. Private insurers must target better off renters to break even, while public insurers focus on households most at-risk of homelessness.

租金保证保险（RGI）可代替无法支付租金的投保租户向房东支付有限次数的租金，这些租户因收入或健康支出的负面冲击而无法支付租金。我们在一个具有住房不确定性的丰富量化均衡模型中引入租金保证保险，并展示它通过改善个体和总体状态的风险分担、减少对大额押金的需求以及减少无家可归现象（这对社会造成了巨大的成本）来提升福祉。虽然无限制的投保由于道德风险和逆向选择而对私人或公共保险提供者来说在财务上是不可行的，但限制投保可以具有一定的可行性。私人保险公司必须针对经济条件较好的租户才能实现盈亏平衡，而公共保险提供者则专注于最有可能无家可归的家庭。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32582

Naoki Aizawa(威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校), Hanming Fang(宾夕法尼亚大学), Katsuhiro Komatsu(威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校)

摘要：The United States has experienced a significant decline in labor unions over the past half-century. We examine the aggregate labor market impact of labor unions, the causes of their decline, and their welfare and distributional consequences, accounting for unions’ effects on wages and employers’ insurance provisions. We first provide descriptive evidence that social insurance expansions contribute to the union’s decline. We then develop and estimate an equilibrium labor search model where unionization, wages, employers’ insurance provisions, and job security are endogenously determined. We find that, while skill-biased technological changes and Right-to-Work laws respectively explain 32% and 7% of the union decline from 1955 to 2019, social insurance expansions account for 15%. Our analysis also indicates that social insurance expansion can affect inequality through (de)unionization, and inequality may increase or decrease depending on how social insurance is targeted. Subsidizing unions lowers overall social welfare but increases the welfare of low-skilled workers.

过去半个世纪，美国的劳动联盟经历了显著的衰落。我们研究了劳动联盟对整体劳动力市场的影响、它们衰落的原因以及它们的福利和分配后果，同时考虑了联盟对工资和雇主保险提供的影响。首先，我们提供了描述性证据，表明社会保险的扩张会导致工会的衰落。然后，我们提出并估计了一个劳动力均衡搜寻模型，其中工会化、工资、雇主的保险提供和工作稳定性是内生决定的。我们发现，尽管技能导向的技术变革和工作权利法律能够分别解释1955年至2019年工会衰落的32%和7%，但是社会保险的发展占15%。我们的分析还表明，社会保险的扩张可以通过（去）工会化影响不平等性，不平等性可能会根据社会保险的目标受众而扩大或降低。补贴工会会降低整体社会福利，但会增加低技能工人的福利。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32793

Judson Boomhower(加州大学圣地亚哥分校), Meredith Fowlie(加州大学伯克利分校), Jacob Gellman(阿拉斯加安克雷奇大学), Andrew Plantinga(加州大学圣塔巴巴拉分校)

摘要：As climate risk escalates, property insurance is critical to reduce the risk exposure of households and firms and to aid recovery when disasters strike. To perform these functions efficiently, insurers need to access high quality information about disaster risk and set prices that accurately reflect the costs of insuring this risk. We use proprietary data on parcel-level wildfire risk, together with insurance premiums derived from insurers' regulatory filings, to investigate how insurance is priced and provided in a large market for homeowners insurance. We document striking variation in insurers' risk pricing strategies. Firms that rely on coarser measures of wildfire risk charge relatively high prices in high-risk market segments -- or choose not to serve these areas at all. Empirical results are consistent with a winner's curse, where firms with less granular pricing strategies face higher expected losses. A theoretical model of a market for natural hazard insurance that incorporates both price regulation and asymmetric information across insurers helps rationalize the empirical patterns we document. Our results highlight the underappreciated importance of the winner's curse as a driver of high prices and limited participation in insurance markets for large, hard-to-model risks.

随着气候风险的加剧，财产保险对于降低家庭和企业的风险暴露以及在灾害发生时帮助其恢复至关重要。为了有效地履行这些职能，保险公司需要获取关于灾害风险的高质量信息，并设定准确反映保险成本的价格。我们使用地块级别的野火风险专有数据，以及从保险公司监管申报中得出的保险费率，来调查房屋保险大市场中保险的定价和提供方式。我们记录了保险公司风险定价策略的显著变化。依赖于较粗略的野火风险测量的公司在高风险市场细分中收取相对较高价格——或者选择根本不服务于这些区域。实证结果与“赢家的诅咒”一致，即定价策略较不细致的公司面临更高的预期损失。结合价格监管和保险公司之间信息不对称的自然灾害保险市场的理论模型有助于解释我们记录的实证情况。我们的结果强调了“赢家的诅咒”作为大的、难以建模的风险保险市场中高价格和有限参与度的驱动因素的重要性，这一点被低估了。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32625

M. Kate Bundorf(杜克大学), Melissa McInerney(塔夫茨大学), Kosali I. Simon(印第安纳大学), Ruth Winecoff(罗格斯大学)

摘要：Enrollment in one public benefit program often affects enrollment in others. We study life-course spillovers by examining how access to publicly subsidized health insurance prior to age 65 affects public benefit choices at the age of Medicare eligibility. We use administrative data to examine several Medicare enrollment choices: the heavily under-subscribed Medicaid “dual” coverage as a supplement to Medicare; Medicare Part D; the Part D Low Income Subsidy (LIS); and Medicare Advantage. Focusing on people living in low-income zip codes, we find a large increase in dual Medicaid among new Medicare beneficiaries in Medicaid expansion states relative to non- expansion states, as well as corresponding increases in healthcare use and reductions in out-of-pocket spending. The dual Medicaid increase exerts a bonus effect: greater take-up of LIS and Part D programs, which we attribute to the accompanying automatic enrollment in these programs. Our results on Medicare Advantage enrollment are inconclusive. Overall, our results suggest that experience with Medicaid before age 65 causes meaningful behavioral responses among the lowest-income beneficiaries when they age into Medicare; this emphasizes the importance of longitudinal spillovers also present in other public programs with eligibility criteria that differ by applicant age (e.g., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)).

一个公共福利项目的参与通常会影响其他项目的参与情况。我们通过研究65岁之前能否获得社会医疗保险如何影响Medicare（美国老年和残障人士医疗保险计划）资格年龄时公共福利的选择，来研究终身的溢出效应。我们使用行政数据来探究几种Medicare参保选择：作为Medicare补充的参保人数严重不足的Medicaid“双重”覆盖；Medicare Part D；Part D低收入补贴（LIS）；和Medicare Advantage（医疗保险优势计划）。关注低收入区域的人们，我们发现，在Medicaid扩张州，相对于非扩张州，新的Medicare受益人中参与双重Medicaid的增加幅度较大，而且相应的医疗使用增加和自付支出减少。双重Medicaid的增加产生了额外效应：LIS和Part D计划的参与度更高，我们认为这是由于这些计划伴随的自动参保。我们关于Medicare Advantage参保结果尚无定论。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，65岁之前Medicaid的参保经历在最低收入受益人群体参与Medicare时存在有意义的行为反应；这强调了其他公共项目中也存在的纵向溢出效应的重要性，这些项目的资格标准因申请人年龄而异（例如，补充营养援助计划（SNAP）和补充保障收入（SSI））。

原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387822000505

Benjamin J. Keys(宾夕法尼亚大学), Philip Mulder(威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校)

摘要：We develop a new dataset to study homeowners insurance. Our data on over 47 million observations of households’ property insurance expenditures from 2014-2023 are inferred from mortgage escrow payments. First, we find a sharp 33% increase in average premiums from 2020 to 2023 (13% in real terms) that is highly uneven across geographies. This growth is associated with a stronger relationship between premiums and local disaster risk: A one standard-deviation increase in disaster risk is associated with $500 higher premiums in 2023, up from $300 in 2018. Second, using the rapid rise in reinsurance prices as a natural experiment, we show that the increase in the risk-to-premium gradient was largely caused by the pass-through of reinsurance costs. Third, we project that if the reinsurance shock persists, growing disaster risk will lead climate-exposed households to face $700 higher annual premiums by 2053. Our results highlight that prices in global reinsurance markets pass through to household budgets, and will ultimately drive the cost of rising climate risk.

我们创建了一个新的数据集来研究房屋保险。该数据集包含了2014年至2023年间超过4700万条家庭财产保险支出的记录，这些数据是根据抵押托管支付推断出来的。首先，我们发现从2020年到2023年，平均保费出现了33%的显著增长（按实际价值计算为13%），且这一增长在不同地区之间极不均衡。我们发现，保费增长与当地灾害风险之间的关系更加紧密：灾害风险每增加一个标准差，2023年的保费比2018年高出500美元，而2018年时这一增幅为300美元。其次，我们利用再保险价格的快速上升作为一个自然实验，展示了风险到保费梯度的增加主要是由再保险成本的传递效应导致的。第三，我们预测，如果再保险价格的上涨持续下去，到2053年，受气候风险影响的家庭将面临每年额外700美元的保费。我们的研究结果强调，全球再保险市场的价格波动会直接影响家庭预算，并最终推动气候风险成本的上升。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32579

Liran Einav(斯坦福大学), Amy Finkelstein(麻省理工学院), Pietro Tebaldi(哥伦比亚大学)

摘要：Health insurance is increasingly provided through managed competition, in which subsidies for consumers and risk adjustment for insurers are key market design instruments. We illustrate that subsidies offer two advantages over risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection. They provide greater flexibility in tailoring premiums to heterogeneous buyers, and they produce equilibria with lower markups and greater enrollment. We assess these effects using demand and cost estimates from the California Affordable Care Act marketplace. Holding government spending fixed, we estimate that subsidies can increase enrollment by 16 percentage points (76%) over risk adjustment, while all consumers are weakly better off.

医疗保险越来越多地通过受管理的竞争机制提供，在这种机制中，对消费者的补贴和对保险公司的风险调整是关键的市场设计工具。我们展示了在存在逆选择的市场中，补贴比风险调整有两个优势：它们在为不同买家定制保费方面提供了更大的灵活性，并且能够产生加价更低、参保率更高的均衡状态。我们使用加州《平价医疗法案》市场的需求量和成本估算来评估这些效应。在政府支出保持不变的情况下，我们估计补贴可以将参保率提高16个百分点（76%），同时所有消费者的状况至少不会比之前差。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32586

Xiuming Dong(约翰斯·霍普金斯大学), Johanna Catherine Maclean(乔治梅森大学), David Powell(兰德公司)

摘要：Social insurance programs shield individuals from specific risks, but these programs are not necessarily independent of each other. The existence and scope of one program can potentially influence the use of others, especially when the risks covered by the programs are related. This study investigates the relationship between two mandated benefit programs in the United States: state paid sick leave (PSL) mandates and workers’ compensation. Unlike most developed countries, the U.S. lacks a federal PSL mandate; however, 15 states have implemented such policies. PSL mandates require firms to provide compensated time off for employee health-related needs, while workers’ compensation offers benefits to help workers recover from workplace injuries or illnesses. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, the study explores the impact of state PSL mandates on the usage of workers’ compensation benefits. The findings reveal meaningful spillover effects: when states adopt PSL requirements, there is a decrease in workers’ compensation benefit receipt. While some evidence suggests possible improvements in health, there are no observed reductions in workplace injury rates specifically, indicating that workers may substitute PSL benefits directly for workers’ compensation.

社会保险项目旨在保护个人免受特定风险的影响，但这些项目并不一定是相互独立的。一个项目的存在和范围可能会影响其他项目的使用，尤其是当这些项目覆盖的风险相关时。本研究调查了美国两个强制性福利项目之间的关系：州级带薪病假（paid sick leave, PSL）法规和工人赔偿。与大多数发达国家不同，美国没有联邦PSL法规；然而，已有15个州实施了此类政策。PSL法规要求公司为员工的健康相关需求提供带薪休假，而工人赔偿则提供福利以帮助工人从工作场所的伤害或疾病中恢复。通过使用双重差分法，本研究探讨了州级PSL法规对工人赔偿福利使用情况的影响。研究结果揭示了有意义的溢出效应：当州采用PSL要求时，工人赔偿福利的领取有所减少。虽然一些证据表明可能对健康有所改善，但并没有观察到工作场所伤害率的降低，这表明工人可能直接将PSL福利替代为工人赔偿。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32751

Charles Yuji Horioka(神户大学), Emin Gahramanov(沙迦美国大学), Xueli Tang(迪肯大学）

摘要：The purpose of this paper is to conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of the nexus between long-term care insurance (LTCI), formal care, informal (family) care, and bequests. In our empirical analysis, we use micro data from the Japan Household Panel Survey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction (JHPS-CPS), formerly known as the Preference Parameter Study, conducted by Osaka University. Japan is an interesting case to analyze because a public LTCI system was introduced there in 2000. Our analysis shows that, in the case of Japan, if parents are eligible for public LTCI benefits, their children will be less likely to be their primary caregiver and that this, in turn, will reduce their children’s perceived likelihood of receiving a bequest from them. This result implies that bequests are selfishly or strategically motivated (i.e., that parents leave bequests to their children in order to elicit care from them) and that the introduction of a public LTCI system will reduce the likelihood of children providing care to their parents and through this channel reduce their perceived likelihood of receiving a bequest from them.

本文的目的是对长期护理保险（LTCI）、正式护理、非正式（家庭）护理和遗产之间的关系进行理论和实证分析。在我们的实证分析中，我们使用了大阪大学进行的日本家庭面板调查（JHPS-CPS），即消费者偏好和满意度调查的微观数据，该调查以前被称为偏好参数研究。日本是一个有趣的分析案例，因为2000年引入了公共LTCI系统。我们的分析表明，就日本的情况而言，如果父母符合公共LTCI福利的资格，他们的孩子成为他们主要照护者的可能性较小，而这反过来又会降低他们的孩子从他们那里获得遗产的感知可能性。这一结果意味着遗产是出于自私或战略动机的（即，父母给孩子留下遗产以换取他们的照护），而且引入公共LTCI系统将减少孩子为父母提供照护的可能性，并通过这一渠道降低他们从父母那里获得遗产的感知可能性。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32744