【保险学术前沿】Journal of Development Economics 2021-2024年保险精选文章目录与摘要

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

期刊介绍：

《Journal of Development Economics》（《发展经济学杂志》）以其严格的审稿标准和高质量的学术文章，在经济学领域内享有很高的声誉，是一本专注于经济发展各个领域的学术期刊，它涵盖了从紧迫的政策问题到不发达的结构性问题的所有方面，特别强调发表定量或分析性的研究工作。该刊每年出版六期，每期20篇左右，2023年的影响因子是5.1。

本期看点：

● 公共医疗保险：

中国农村儿童早期（0-5岁）接触公共医疗保险对其青少年时期的健康、认知和教育结果有显著积极影响。

在城镇医疗保费相对于收入较低的城市，信息（对社会保险的理解程度）会促使人们参与医疗保险，而在保费相对较高的城市，则会出现下降的情况。

通过向发展中国家的低收入个人提供公共医疗保险，政府可以激励制药公司开发新的医疗技术。

● 指数保险：基差风险通常被认为是指数保险普及率低的主要原因之一。即使下行基差风险增加，风险厌恶的农民也会选择触发赔付水平来保护自己免受灾难性后果的影响。

● 失业保险储蓄账户：在发展中国家引入失业保险储蓄账户（UISA）制度可以减少失业率，提高正规部门就业比例，使产出增加，提高个人消费水平。

● 保险需求：利他主义网络的存在增加了低损失主体的保险需求，而减少高损失主体的保险需求，其总体影响取决于需求同质化、零下限和保额上限之间的相互作用。

Tizié Bene（艾克斯-马赛大学，法国国家科学研究中心CNRS）, Yann Bramoullé（艾克斯-马赛大学，法国国家科学研究中心CNRS）, Frédéric Deroïan（艾克斯-马赛大学，法国国家科学研究中心CNRS）

摘要：We study how altruism networks affect the demand for formal insurance. Agents with CARA utilities are connected through a network of altruistic relationships. Incomes are subject to a common shock and to a large individual shock, generating heterogeneous damages. Agents can buy formal insurance to cover the common shock, up to a coverage cap. We find that ex-post altruistic transfers induce interdependence in ex-ante formal insurance decisions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the insurance game and show that agents act as if they are trying to maximize the expected utility of a representative agent with average damages. Altruism thus tends to increase demand of low-damage agents and to decrease demand of high-damage agents. Its aggregate impact depends on the interplay between demand homogenization, the zero lower bound and the coverage cap. We find that aggregate demand is higher with altruism than without altruism at low prices and lower at high prices. Nash equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient.

我们研究了利他主义网络如何影响对正式保险的需求。具有CARA效用函数的主体通过利他关系网络相互连接。收入会受到共同冲击和大规模个体冲击的影响，导致不同的损失。主体可以购买正式保险来覆盖共同冲击，直到保额上限。我们发现，事后的利他转移导致事前正式保险决策的相互依赖。我们描述了保险博弈的纳什均衡，并表明主体似乎在试图最大化具有平均损失的代表性主体的预期效用。因此，利他主义倾向于增加低损失主体的保险需求，减少高损失主体的保险需求。其总体影响取决于需求同质化、零下限和保额上限之间的相互作用。我们发现，在低价格下，利他主义下的总保险需求高于没有利他主义的情况，而在高价格下则相反。纳什均衡受到帕累托效率的约束。

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387824000841

Davide Pietrobon（隆德大学）

摘要：Insurance can encourage the use of risk-increasing inputs, but it can also decrease people’s incentives to exert effort when the latter is difficult to monitor. This effort reduction can be associated with a decrease in the use of effort-complementary inputs. I study a model of risk-sharing that allows for both effects of insurance on input use and use the latest ICRISAT panel to structurally estimate it. Median fertilizer use is almost three times higher under no sharing than under full insurance for reasonable levels of risk aversion. A subsidy that halves fertilizer prices increases farmers’ welfare by 37% in consumption-equivalent terms.

保险可以鼓励人们使用增加风险的投入品，但在其难以监测的情况下，保险也会降低人们付出努力的积极性。这种努力的减少可能跟与努力互补的投入品使用减少有关。我研究了一个风险分担模型，该模型考虑到了保险对投入品使用的两种影响，并使用最新的 ICRISAT 面板对其进行了结构性估算。在合理的风险规避水平下，不分担风险的化肥使用量中位数比完全保险的化肥使用量中位数高出近三倍。按消费当量计算，化肥价格减半的补贴使农民的福利增加了37%。

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387823001591

Xin Geng（SAS研究所）, Wendy Janssens（阿姆斯特丹自由大学）, Berber Kramer（国际粮食政策研究所）

摘要：Limited access to reliable financial instruments makes it difficult for rural households to manage daily cash flows. Selling goods through cooperatives can improve savings, but cooperative income is not easily accessible when facing an emergency. Cash-constrained households may therefore side-sell in local markets that pay on the spot, while insurance could reduce the need to side-sell. We test these hypotheses using panel data for farmers from two Kenyan dairy cooperatives. Both cooperatives pay only once a month, with local market vendors paying a lower price but upon delivery. We find that farmers sell less milk to the cooperatives when facing uninsured health emergencies or when cash on hand is low. Health insurance reduces side-selling. These findings highlight that selling, saving and risk-coping decisions are intertwined, with side-selling providing a strategy to manage temporary cash constraints. This suggests that linking agricultural and insurance contracts can enhance cooperatives’ financial sustainability.

有限的可靠金融工具使得农村家庭在管理日常现金流方面面临困难。通过合作社销售商品可以改善储蓄，但在紧急情况下，合作社的收入并不容易获得。因此，受现金约束的家庭可能会在当地市场旁销，因为当地市场可以即时支付货款，而保险可以减少旁销的需求。我们使用来自两家肯尼亚乳制品合作社农民的面板数据来检验这些假设。这两家合作社每月只支付一次，而当地市场商贩在交货时支付的价格较低。我们发现，当面临未投保的健康紧急情况或手头现金不足时，农民向合作社销售的牛奶减少。健康保险减少了旁售。这些发现突显了销售、储蓄和风险应对决策之间的相互关联，旁销提供了一种应对暂时现金约束的策略。因此，将农业和保险合同联系起来可以增强合作社的财务可持续性。

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387823000974

Wei  Huang (北京大学), Hong Liu (中国人民大学)

摘要：This paper examines the impact of exposure to public health insurance in early life on outcomes in adolescence in rural China. Exploiting the variation in the county-by-county rollout of the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) between 2003 and 2008, we find that exposure to the NCMS during ages 0–5 significantly improves health, cognitive, and educational outcomes during adolescence. In contrast, exposure after age five has no significant effects. Our further investigation provides evidence for several underlying mechanisms, such as improved prenatal care and birth outcomes, better preventive medical protection against childhood diseases, and lower risk in medical expenditure.

本文研究了中国农村儿童早期接触公共医疗保险对其青少年时期健康结果的影响。利用2003年至2008年间县与县之间新合作医疗计划(NCMS)推出的差异，本文发现0-5岁期间接触新合作医疗计划显著改善了青少年时期的健康、认知和教育结果。相比之下，5岁以后的接触没有显著的影响。本文进一步调查提供了一些潜在机制的证据，如对产前护理和分娩结果的改善，儿童疾病的更好预防，以及医疗支出的风险降低。

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304387822000815

Erik Lichtenberg（马里兰大学帕克分校）, Eva Iglesias（马德里理工大学）

摘要：Index insurance has been seen as an important tool for managing the risks faced by farmers in developing countries but uptake has been disappointingly low. Basis risk is often cited as one of the main reasons for the lack of uptake. We investigate the role of basis risk in greater depth by considering contracts that allow farmers to choose the level of the index that triggers an indemnity in addition to coverage. We show that risk averse farmers will select trigger levels to protect against catastrophic outcomes, even if downside basis risk increases. A numerical simulation model bears out our theoretical results.

指数保险一直被视为管理发展中国家农民所面临风险的重要工具，但其普及率却低得令人失望。基差风险通常被认为是普及率低的主要原因之一。我们通过考虑允许农民选择触发除保险覆盖范围之外还有赔付的指数水平的合同，更深入地研究了基差风险的作用。结果表明，即使下行基差风险增加，风险厌恶的农民也会选择触发赔付水平来保护自己免受灾难性后果的影响。数值模拟模型证实了我们的理论结果。

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387822000505

John Giles （发展经济学研究小组，世界银行与劳动经济研究所(IZA)），Xin Meng （澳大利亚国立大学），Sen Xue （暨南大学），Guochang Zhao （西南财经大学）

摘要：

This paper uses a randomized information intervention to shed light on whether poor understanding of social insurance, both the process of enrolling and costs and benefits, drives the relatively low rates of participation in urban health insurance and pension programs among China's rural-urban migrants. Among workers without a contract, the information intervention has a strong positive effect on participation in health insurance and, among younger age groups, in pension programs. Migrants are responsive to price: in cities where the premia are low relative to earnings, information induces health insurance participation, while declines are observed in cities with high relative premia.

本文使用随机信息干预来阐明，对社会保险的理解不足（包括参保过程和成本效益）是否会导致中国城乡流动人口参与城镇医疗保险和养老金计划的比例相对较低。在没有合同的工人中，信息干预对医疗保险的参与有很强的积极影响，在年轻群体中，对养老金计划的参与也有很大的积极影响。流动人口对价格有以下反应：在保费相对于收入较低的城市，信息会促使人们参与医疗保险，而在保费相对较高的城市，则会出现下降的情况。

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304387821000249

Xuan Zhang（新加坡管理大学）, Huihua Nie（中国人民大学）

摘要：Developing countries are characterized by low levels of pharmaceutical innovation. A likely reason is their small market size, which is not because of the population size but because of low levels of income and lack of health insurance coverage. This study exploits a natural experiment from the implementation of a public health insurance program for rural residents in China (New Cooperative Medical Scheme [NCMS]) to examine whether the pharmaceutical industry increases innovation regarding diseases covered by the NCMS that are prevalent in rural areas. We examine the 1993–2009 patent data to gauge pharmaceutical innovation in China. Diseases with a 10% higher rural patient share saw a 12.4% increase in relevant domestic pharmaceutical patent applications and a modest increase in patent quality after the NCMS implementation. By providing public health insurance to low-income individuals in developing countries, governments can create incentives for pharmaceutical firms to develop new medical technologies.

发展中国家的特点是医药创新水平低。一个可能的原因是他们的市场规模小，这不是因为人口规模，而是因为收入水平低和缺乏医疗保险。本研究利用了中国农村居民公共健康保险计划（新合作医疗计划 [NCMS]）实施的自然实验，以检验制药行业是否提高了关于农村地区普遍存在的 NCMS 所涵盖疾病的创新。我们研究了 1993-2009 年的专利数据，以衡量中国的医药创新。农村患者比例高出 10% 的疾病，实施 NCMS 后相关国内药品专利申请增长 12.4%，专利质量略有提高。通过向发展中国家的低收入个人提供公共医疗保险，政府可以激励制药公司开发新的医疗技术。

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S030438782030153X

Fernando Cirelli （纽约大学），Emilio Espino（托尔夸托迪特利亚大学），Juan M. Sánchez（圣路易斯联邦储备银行）

摘要：The high incidence of informality in the labor markets of middle-income economies challenges the provision of unemployment protection. We show that, despite informational frictions, the introduction of an unemployment insurance savings account (UISA) system may provide substantial benefits. This system improves welfare by providing insurance to the unemployed and creating incentives to work in the formal sector. The optimal scheme generates a reduction in unemployment (from 4 to 3 percent), an increase in formality (from 68 to 72 percent) and a rise in total output (by 4 percent). Overall, individuals obtain welfare gains equivalent to a 2.4 percent increase in consumption in every period.

中等收入经济体劳动力市场的高度非正规化给失业保障的提供带来了挑战。我们研究发现，尽管存在信息摩擦的现象，引入失业保险储蓄账户（UISA）制度仍可能会带来许多的益处。该制度通过为失业者提供保险，并为在正规部门工作的人创造激励的方式改善大众福利。最理想的实施方案可使得失业率从4%降至3%，正规部门就业比例从68%升至72%，总产出增加4%。总的来说，个人通过这一制度在每个时期获得的福利收益相当于消费水平增加2.4%。

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304387820301401

入驻平台：雪球、头条号、微博、百家号、知乎

邮箱：thirteenactuary@163.com

小编微信号：xxjss13