【新刊速递】《国际研究季刊》(ISQ), Vol. 68, No. 3, September 2024 | 国政学人

题目：“If Foreign, Then Cleaner”: Individual Corruption Perceptions and Support for Free Trade in Developing Nations

作者：Dihan Shi，圣路易斯华盛顿大学政治学系博士生，研究兴趣是使用空间统计、调查实验和计算机视觉来研究比较政治经济学和公众舆论；Guillermo Rosas，圣路易斯华盛顿大学政治学教授，研究兴趣包括比较政治经济学和拉丁美洲立法政治。

摘要：现有关于国际政治经济舆论的文献记录了国内腐败观念在大众对一系列与一体化相关的外交政策的态度形成中所发挥的作用。基于这个先例，本文推测腐败观念也会影响对自由贸易的看法。本文建立了一种启发式的态度形成方法，其中政治精英对腐败的个人看法引发了对外国、公司和产品的积极态度，将其称为“外来线索”。这一暗示促使对腐败有较高认识的个人更加支持自由贸易。基于18个拉美国家的调查数据，本文证明，国内腐败程度越高，对自由贸易的支持越大。因果中介分析提供了额外的证据，表明对外国和企业的积极态度是腐败认知效应发挥作用的渠道。文章还通过分析对一组不同的欠发达国家和较发达国家的其他调查，提供了主效应的外部有效性的证据。本文基于启发式的自由贸易支持模型补充以物质自身利益作为贸易政策领域态度形成基础的理论。

Extant literature on public opinion in international political economy documents the role that domestic corruption perceptions play in the formation of mass attitudes toward a range of integration-related foreign policies. Based on this precedent, we conjecture that corruption perceptions also affect opinions toward free trade. We build on a heuristic approach to attitude formation where individual perceptions of corruption among the political elite trigger positive attitudes toward foreign countries, firms, and products, what we refer to as a “foreignness cue.” This cue drives individuals with high perceptions of corruption to be more supportive of free trade. Based on survey data from eighteen Latin American countries, we demonstrate that higher levels of perceived domestic corruption are associated with greater support for free trade. Causal mediation analysis provides additional evidence that positive attitudes toward foreign countries and firms are a conduit through which the corruption perceptions effect operates. We also offer evidence of external validity of the main effect by analyzing additional surveys on a distinct set of less and more developed countries. Our heuristic-based model of support for free trade complements theories based on material self-interest as a basis for attitude formation in the realm of trade policy.

题目：Judicialization and Public Support for Compliance with International Commitments

作者：Harlan Cohen，福特汉姆法学院法学教授，研究兴趣是国际法、国际贸易、国际法理论、全球治理和美国外交关系法；Ryan Powers，佐治亚大学公共与国际事务学院国际事务系助理教授，研究兴趣是使用调查和实验来了解公众和政策精英如何看待全球经济和外交政策。

摘要：将国际承诺司法化对遵守国际法的激励有何影响？本文利用一项美国公众调查中的实验来研究这个问题。作者发现，国际法院发出的不遵守信号正如不遵守理论所预期的那样，相对于来自外国当事方（即特定争端中的“受害者”）的不遵守信号，它提高了人们对法律义务的认知，并支持恢复遵守。同时，本文发现，法院发出的信号在激发公众对恢复遵守的支持方面，并不比国际组织或国内政治精英发出的相同不遵守信号更有效（也不更无效）。这些结果表明，法院并不是唯一能够影响遵守政治的机构，而且关于机构设计的经常激烈的争论可能不仅关乎机构形式或标签的冲突，也关乎机构控制的冲突。

What effect does judicializing international commitments have on incentives to comply with international law? We study this question using experiments embedded in a survey of the American public. We find that non-compliance signals from an international court work precisely as theories of non-compliance anticipate, raising perceptions of legal obligation and support for returning to compliance relative to non-compliance signals from foreign state parties (i.e., the “victims” in a given dispute). At the same time, we find that signals from courts are no more (and no less) effective in generating public support for returning to compliance than identical non-compliance signals sent by international organizations or domestic political elites. These results suggest that courts are not uniquely positioned to shape the politics of compliance and that the often-rancorous debates over institutional design may be just as much about conflicts over institutional control as they are about conflicts over institutional forms or labels.

题目：Whitewashing American Exceptionalism: Racialized Subject-Positioning and US Foreign Policy

作者：Richard W Maass，欧道明大学政治与地理学副教授，研究兴趣包括美国学术政策、国际安全、国际法、大战略、种族与学术政策以及学术史。

摘要：在研究外交政策叙事的新方法以及对美国政策制定者将如何管理单极程度较低的国际体系感到不安的背景下，美国例外论正在重新引起学术界的兴趣。这种复兴在时间上与国际关系中对种族化动态和欧洲中心主义的日益关注同时发生，尽管尚未实质上发生。本文探讨了美国例外论的核心——美国外交政策的主流叙事框架——如何反映了对美国外交政策的粉饰理解，这种理解被认为是渗透到其历史发展中的种族化主体定位的产物。在概念化美国例外论之后，它开发了一个理论框架来捕捉种族化的主体定位如何对一个国家在世界上的角色理解进行分层。继续调查这一过程如何根据内在性、无知和无辜的认识论塑造了美国例外论的发展，产生了例外主义叙事，这些叙事忽视了非白人人口在美国国家认同构建中作为有意义的其他人的地位，并否定了美国与白人的互动。这些群体作为可能削弱其例外论的相关证据。即使公开的种族主义言论变得不合法，这些粉饰效应仍然根深蒂固，为当今的美国外交构成了持久的障碍。

American exceptionalism is enjoying a revival of scholarly interest amid new approaches to studying foreign policy narratives and unease regarding how US policymakers will manage a less unipolar international system. That revival coincides temporally, though not yet substantively, with growing attention to racialized dynamics and Eurocentrism within international relations. This article examines how core strands of American exceptionalism—the prevailing narrative framing of US foreign policy—reflect a whitewashed understanding of US foreign policy that can best be understood as the product of racialized subject-positioning that saturated its historical development. After conceptualizing American exceptionalism, it develops a theoretical framework to capture how racialized subject-positioning stratifies understandings of a nation’s role in the world. It proceeds to investigate how this process shaped the development of American exceptionalism in line with epistemologies of immanence, ignorance, and innocence, producing exceptionalist narratives that neglect non-white populations as meaningful others in the construction of US national identity and that negate US interactions with those groups as relevant evidence that might undercut its exceptionalism. These whitewashing effects remained embedded even as overtly racist discourse became delegitimized, posing enduring obstacles for US diplomacy today.

题目：Russia’s Leadership in Eurasia: Holding Together or Falling Apart?

作者：Sean Roberts，温彻斯特大学政治和国际关系高级讲师，研究领域是俄罗斯的外交和安全政策、俄罗斯国内政治、威权政权动态、后苏联地区的区域一体化；Ulrike Ziemer，温彻斯特大学社会科学系社会学高级讲师，研究兴趣在于性别、移民和侨民社会学，尤其关注俄罗斯和南高加索地区的跨国主义和世界主义。

摘要：俄乌战争提出了有关“俄罗斯主导的欧亚大陆”地区领导权和追随者动态的重要问题。这些问题，尤其是俄罗斯在该地区领导地位的强弱，因现有文献的模糊性以及俄罗斯与长期盟友（尤其是亚美尼亚、白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦）关系的相互矛盾的形象而变得复杂。这些盟友通常被描述为“命运共同体”或注定要更紧密融合的伙伴，但也被描述为“机运共同体”或临时的情境伙伴，大致以俄罗斯为中心。本文利用英国国际关系学院和区域一体化组织评估俄罗斯的区域领导地位，对俄罗斯与区域伙伴国家的关系进行了创新的理论和方法探索。正如本文所论证的那样，俄罗斯主导的欧亚大陆可以理解为区域国家间社会的一个例子，俄罗斯霸权是一种社会赋予的、具有约束力的机构。但由于俄罗斯无法平衡霸权的“权利”与“责任”，这种霸权本质上是不稳定的。乌克兰战争并没有造成这个问题，但它为该地区的领导权过渡创造了条件。

The Russo–Ukraine War raises important questions on the dynamics of regional leadership and followership in what may be termed “Russian-led Eurasia.” These questions, in particular, the strength of Russian leadership in the region is complicated by the ambiguity in existing literature and competing images of Russia’s relations with long-standing allies—notably Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—which are often portrayed in terms of a “community of fate” or partners destined for closer integration but also as a “community of fortune” or ad hoc, situational partners, loosely centered on Russia. This article offers an innovative theoretical and methodological exploration of Russia's relations with regional partner states by utilizing the English School of International Relations and regional integration organizations to assess Russia's regional leadership. As argued in this article, Russian-led Eurasia may be understood as an example of a regional interstate society with Russian hegemony serving as a socially conferred, binding institution. But this hegemony is inherently unstable owing to Russia's inability to balance hegemonic “rights” with “responsibilities.” War in Ukraine did not create this problem, but it has created the conditions for leadership transition in the region.

题目：The Ripple Effects of the Illegitimacy of War

作者：Joseph O’Mahoney，雷丁大学政治与国际关系系副教授，研究主要探讨战争、武力使用和核武器的规范和规则如何影响国家行为，以及它们如何变化、持续和被操纵。

摘要：最近的数据显示，外交和战争实践发生了系统性变化。征服、和平条约、宣战和国家边界变更已经减少或消失。战争仍然存在，但它们越来越成为既成事实，其结果往往不被承认为合法。如何解释这种广泛但看似矛盾的转变？现有的解释，例如基于领土完整规范的解释，并不能充分解释这些变化。本文使用规范动力学理论来表明，所有这些变化都可以解释为战争作为解决国际争端的不合法方式的“连锁反应”。国家可以令人信服地为参与暴力行为提供的修辞理由类型已经发生了变化。各国正在通过合法性管理行为来应对这种变化的国际社会环境。本文指定了三种类型的连锁反应，即重新构建、置换和一致性维护，分别对应于国家言论、行动和受众反应的变化。本文展示了该理论如何将所有现有数据统一为一个解释框架。还将该理论应用于和平条约的衰落，以更详细地展示连锁反应如何发挥作用。

Recent data show systematic changes in the diplomacy and practice of war. Conquests, peace treaties, declarations of war, and state boundary changes have declined or disappeared. There are still wars, but they are increasingly fait accomplis, and their outcomes are often not recognized as legal. How can we explain this wide-ranging but seemingly contradictory transformation? Existing accounts, such as those based on a territorial integrity norm, do not adequately explain these changes. This paper uses norm dynamics theory to show that all of these changes can be explained as ‘ripple effects’ of war becoming illegitimate as a way to solve international disputes. The kinds of rhetorical justifications states can convincingly give for engaging in violence have changed. States are navigating this changed international social environment through legitimacy management behaviors. The paper specifies three types of ripple effect, Reframing, Displacement, and Consistency-Maintenance, corresponding to changes in what states say, the actions they perform, and how the audience reacts. We show how this theory unifies all of the existing data into a single explanatory framework. We also apply the theory to the decline of peace treaties to show how ripple effects play out in more detail.

题目：How Bureaucrats Represent Economic Interests: Partisan Control over Trade Adjustment Assistance

作者：Minju KIM，雪城大学政治学系助理教授，研究兴趣为国内和国际机构中的官僚个体。

摘要：根深蒂固的自由主义主张对全球化所伤害的工人进行补偿，但政府补偿计划经常因缺乏响应性而受到批评。本文通过阐明批准补偿计划的第一线官僚来解释缺乏响应性。作者研究了职业官僚如何分配贸易调整援助（TAA）福利，这是美国最大的联邦计划，用于补偿因国际贸易而流离失所的工人。利用将TAA请愿书准随机分配给职业生涯不同阶段的个别调查员，作者发现职业官僚在共和党总统任期内不太可能批准TAA请愿书，并且更有可能推迟调查，而民主党总统任期则不然。然而，这种党派表现只适用于非终身职业官僚，并且在劳工和民主党高度一致期间更为明显。全球化的政治可持续性取决于塑造官僚职业激励的制度设计。

Embedded liberalism prescribes compensating workers hurt by globalization, but government compensation programs are often criticized for their lack of responsiveness. I explain the lack of responsiveness by illuminating bureaucrats who approve the compensation programs in the frontline. I examine how career bureaucrats distribute Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) benefits, the single largest federal program in the United States that compensates workers displaced by international trade. Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions to individual investigators at different stages of their careers, I find that career bureaucrats are less likely to certify TAA petitions and are more likely to delay investigations during Republican presidencies relative to Democratic presidencies. This partisan performance, however, applies uniquely to career bureaucrats who are not tenured and increases in magnitude during periods of high alignment between labor and the Democratic Party. The political sustainability of globalization depends on an institutional design that shapes the career incentives of bureaucrats.

题目：National Identity and the Limits of Platform Power in the Global Economy

作者：Tyler Girard，普渡大学政治学系助理教授，研究主要探讨数字技术和技术变革的政治经济学。

摘要：当代全球经济的显著特征包括经济部门的数字化颠覆以及随之而来的政治和监管冲突。在世界各地，跨国科技公司已动员消费者作为这些冲突中的关键盟友，这是它们所拥有的平台权力的一个关键要素。在本文中，作者将研究非消费者身份如何限制这些公司行使平台权力。通过将平台权力的概念与政治消费主义和国家认同的研究相结合，作者认为激活国家认同可以引发对有利于跨国科技公司的政策的反对，进而削弱它们争取公众支持的能力。从实证角度来看，本文使用了在加拿大进行的一项在线、具有全国代表性的调查。通过三个问题领域的小插图实验，探讨了支持全球监管合作和国内政策现状的决定因素，以及消费者和国家认同框架的因果效应：银行、电信和税收。研究结果表明，激活消费者身份会持续改变支持，但国家认同的影响则更具可变性。因此，本文对数字经济转型和全球经济中商业权力的运用的学术研究做出了贡献。

Among the defining features of the contemporary global economy are the digital disruption of economic sectors and the accompanying political and regulatory conflicts. Across the world, multinational technology firms have mobilized consumers as a key ally in these conflicts, a critical element of the platform power they wield. In this article, I examine how non-consumer identities can limit the exercise of platform power by such firms. By synthesizing the concept of platform power with research on political consumerism and national identity, I argue that activating national identity can generate opposition to policies favorable to multinational technology firms and, in turn, curtail their ability to appeal to public support. Empirically, this article uses an online, nationally representative survey fielded in Canada. I explore the determinants of support for global regulatory cooperation and the domestic policy status quo, as well as the causal effect of consumer and national identity framing using vignette experiments across three issue areas: banking, telecommunications, and taxation. The findings reveal that activating consumer identities consistently shifts support but the effect of national identity is more variable. This article thus contributes to scholarship on the digital economic transformation and the exercise of business power in the global economy.

题目：The Politics of Punishment: Why Dictators Join the International Criminal Court

作者：Leslie Johns，加州大学洛杉矶分校政治学与法学副教授，研究兴趣是国际法和国际关系的交叉领域，特别关注世贸组织的国际贸易争端、外国投资者的财产权以及国际法院和条约的设计；Francesca Parente，克里斯托弗·纽波特大学政治学助理教授，研究兴趣是遵守人权法院的裁决；国际组织的制度设计；国际法对国家行为的影响；从观察数据中推断等。

摘要：学者们普遍认为，国际法和国际组织通过帮助独裁者可信地致力于问责、个人权利和透明度来促进民主。然而独裁者通常会加入条约和国际组织而不过渡到民主。国际法和国际组织可能会给国内行为者带来不对称成本，因为国际规则通常适用于政府和非国家行为者，但独裁者可以限制这些规则在国内和国际层面的维护方式。本文认为，当独裁者面临激烈的国内政治竞争时，他们最有可能加入此类条约和国际组织。作者利用国际刑事法院（ICC）来阐述其论点，该法院拥有广泛的权力，可以起诉犯有国际罪行的个人，包括危害人类罪、种族灭绝罪和战争罪。研究表明，国际刑事法院的调查和起诉已成为现任独裁者针对国内对手的工具。文章研究了理论对多个结果变量的影响，包括加入国际刑事法院的决定、暴力以及当权独裁者的生存。证据表明，独裁者在面对强大的政治对手时最有可能加入国际刑事法院，从而不太可能实施暴力，更有可能在办公室生存。

Scholars commonly argue that international law and organizations promote democracy by helping dictators to credibly commit to accountability, individual rights, and transparency. Yet dictators routinely join treaties and international organizations without transitioning to democracy. International law and organizations can generate asymmetric costs for domestic actors because international rules often apply to both governments and non-state actors, yet dictators can limit how these rules are upheld at the domestic and international level. We argue that dictators are most likely to join such treaties and international organizations when they face strong domestic political competition. We illustrate our argument using the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has extensive powers to prosecute individuals for international crimes, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. We show that ICC investigations and prosecutions have become a tool for incumbent dictators to target their domestic opponents. We examine the implications of our theory for multiple outcome variables, including the decision to join the ICC, violence, and the survival of dictators in power. Our evidence suggests that dictators are most likely to join the ICC when they face strong political opponents and are subsequently less likely to commit violence and more likely to survive in office.

题目：Individuals, Disaggregation of the State, and Negotiation Tactics: Evidence from the European Union

作者：Nicola Chelotti，拉夫堡大学外交和国际治理讲师，研究兴趣集中在谈判、外交和区域/国际组织，尤其是欧盟。

摘要：本文旨在研究领导层以下的个人在多大程度上、如何以及何时影响国际政治的进程和结果。本文通过分析一组领导层以下的行为者——欧盟外交政策中的外交谈判人员——来实现这一目标。本文首先展示了尽管身处所有官僚层级，但个别谈判人员实际上已获得最终的决策责任，最突出的是选择策略。这种对个别外交官的赋权是通过双重国家分解的过程实现的：决策责任已从政治层面转移到官僚层面；然后在后者中，从首都行政部门转移到通常以单一身份参与谈判的官员。接下来，本文根据欧盟外交官完成的138份问卷和17次访谈的原始数据集测试了三个个人特征（经验、风格和身份）。结果表明，谈判人员的个人特质可以解释某些但不是全部策略的使用。具体而言，当谈判者必须以重要且明确的方式做出国家承诺时，例如威胁/行使否决权时，个人特征的影响较小。当这种情况没有发生时（例如，在代表团的立场上表现出灵活性或使用说服力），个人特征的影响反而很大。

This article intends to investigate to what extent, how, and when individuals who are below the leader’s level affect the processes and outputs of international politics. It does so by analyzing one group of below-leader actors—diplomatic negotiators in EU foreign policy. It first shows how, despite all the bureaucratic layers they are embedded in, individual negotiators have de facto acquired ultimate policymaking responsibilities, most prominently in the selection of tactics. This empowerment of individual diplomats occurs through a process of double state disaggregation: Policymaking responsibilities have shifted from the political to the bureaucratic level; then, within the latter, from the capital-based administration to the officials involved, often in single capacity, in negotiations. Next, it tests three individual characteristics (experience, style, and identity) against an original dataset of 138 questionnaires completed by EU diplomats and 17 interviews. It shows that negotiators’ personal traits explain the use of some, but not all, tactics. Specifically, they are less likely to matter when negotiators have to commit the state in significant and explicit ways, e.g., when threatening/exercising veto. When this does not happen (e.g., showing flexibility in the delegation’s position or using persuasion), the influence of individual characteristics is instead strong.

题目：Organizational Bricolage and Insurgent Group Effectiveness in Cities: The Formation and Initial Urban Campaign of the Movement of the 19th of April in Colombia（1973–1980）

作者：Simon Pierre Boulanger Martel，斯德哥尔摩大学政治学博士后，研究兴趣包括军事组织的政治社会学、政治暴力的遗产以及商业对欧盟政策制定过程的影响。

摘要：叛乱团体如何在城市中形成？是什么让以城市为基础的叛乱组织有效？由于城市的政治、经济和人口意义，城市武装冲突已成为重要的研究课题。然而，学界对城市背景下叛乱团体形成和效力的机制知之甚少。本文以哥伦比亚M-19的形成和初始城市运动（1973-1980年）为例，认为来自多个组织并面临内部竞争的叛乱领导人有强烈的动机采用组织拼凑来组建他们的组织。组织拼凑通过产生适合实现某些目标但不适合其他目标的结构来塑造叛乱效力。M-19的组织拼凑结合了武装先锋队、知识集体和民粹主义政党形式。这种结构有效地获得了公众支持，但无法建立强大的社会基础并在镇压下维持城市行动。该研究采用组织库分析和过程追踪来追溯M-19的形成和初始城市运动。实证材料包括一份原始数据集，其中包含M-19创始人的传记数据、档案文件和对前战斗人员的采访。研究叛军领导人如何运用组织拼凑法，有助于了解叛乱组织在战后如何形成、行为和转变。

How do rebel groups form in cities? What makes urban-based insurgent organizations effective? Urban armed conflicts have become an important subject of research due to the political, economic, and demographic significance of cities. Yet, we know little about the mechanisms of insurgent group formation and effectiveness in urban contexts. Building on the case of the formation and initial urban campaign of M-19 in Colombia (1973–1980), this article argues that rebel leaders originating from multiple organizations and confronted with intramovement competition have strong motives to employ organizational bricolage to form their organization. Organizational bricolage shapes insurgent effectiveness by producing structures that are fit for achieving certain objectives but not others. M-19’s organizational bricolage combined the armed vanguard, intellectual collective, and populist party forms. This structure was effective to foster public support but ineffective to establish a robust social base and maintain urban operations under repression. The research employs the analysis of organizational repertoires and process tracing to retrace M-19’s formation and initial urban campaign. Empirical material includes an original dataset comprising M-19 founders’ biographical data, archival documents, and interviews with ex-combatants. Studying how rebel leaders employ organizational bricolage sheds light on how insurgent organizations form, behave, and transform after war.

题目：The Dynamic Effects of UN SEA Reporting on the Actions of Peacekeeping Contributing Countries

作者：Angie Torres-Beltran，美国密歇根州立大学政治学系院长助理研究员（博士后），研究领域为性别暴力的政治原因和后果、国内和国际行为体在暴力问题上的作用以及性别、公众舆论和公民参与的交叉点，重点关注受冲突影响国家的妇女政治行为和发展；Cameron Mailhot, 美国亚利桑那大学政府与公共政策学院助理教授，研究领域为国际安全、和平与冲突进程、国家建设和民主化，重点关注国际社会在国家政治（冲突后和独裁后）转型中的作用。

摘要：联合国关于性剥削与性虐待（SEA）的报告对维和任务中提供部队和警察的国家（TPCCs）的行动有何影响？尽管以往的研究已经探讨了点名批评对国家人权记录的影响，本文在此研究了联合国对其成员国人员所犯人权侵犯行为的报告与这些国家政策及人员响应之间的关系。聚焦于维和任务中的SEA报告，本文提出了一个理论，即联合国对SEA的报告可能引发两种截然不同的回应：TPCCs可能会颁布法律框架，以示合规并处理SEA问题，或者他们可能通过减少人员投入来退出维和任务。基于一项原创的、跨国数据集（2010-2020年）——其中包含了联合国对SEA指控的报告，以及TPCCs发布框架和人员投入的模式——本文发现，相比于未被报告的国家，被SEA报告的TPCCs更有可能发布法律框架并减少人员贡献，而且这种关系在第一次报告后尤为强烈。由于被点名的TPCCs表现出更强的政策合规性和人员撤出行为，本文的研究结果强调了联合国关于SEA报告对TPCCs行动的动态影响。

What effect does sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) reporting by the United Nations (UN) have on the actions of peacekeeping missions’ troop and police contributing countries (TPCCs)? While past scholarship has studied the effect of naming and shaming for states’ human rights records, we examine the relationship between the UN’s reporting on human rights abuses committed by its Member States’ personnel and their policy and personnel responses. Focusing on SEA reporting within peacekeeping missions, we theorize the ways in which the UN’s reporting of SEA may lead to two distinct responses: TPCCs may issue legal frameworks to demonstrate compliance and address SEA, or they may withdraw from peacekeeping missions by reducing their personnel commitments. Using an original, cross-national dataset of UN reporting on SEA allegations and the patterns of framework issuance and personnel commitments among TPCCs (2010–2020), we find that TPCCs with SEA reports are more likely to issue legal frameworks and to reduce personnel contributions than their nonreported counterparts, and that this relationship is particularly strong following the first instance of reporting. With targeted TPCCs demonstrating both greater policy compliance and personnel withdrawal, our findings highlight the dynamic impact that UN reporting for SEA can have on the actions of TPCCs.

题目：The Tyranny of Supply: Natural Resources and Rebel Territorial Control in Civil Conflicts

作者：Jacob Aronson，美国马里兰大学国际发展与冲突管理中心助理研究科学家，研究领域为国家之间以及国家与非国家行为者之间的强制谈判；Kyosuke Kikuta，日本贸易振兴机构发展中经济研究所研究员、教授，研究领域为国际关系和政治方法论，主要应用定量方法和地理信息系统探索发展中国家冲突（例如武装冲突、抗议）的原因和后果；Michael Findley，美国德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校教授，研究领域为政治暴力、国际发展、非法金融、道德和方法论；James Igoe Walsh，美国北卡罗来纳大学夏洛特分校政治学、数据科学和公共政策教授，研究领域为武装冲突的原因及其对平民的后果。

摘要：领土控制的逻辑是研究内部冲突的核心。现有的研究考虑了领土控制的后果，却没有回答一个关键问题：首先是什么激发了反叛分子的领土控制？领土控制需要仔细解释。虽然它带来了重要的好处，但实现起来也代价高昂，并使反对派暴露在政府的攻击之下。本文认为，当领土控制为叛军提供可靠的组织供应来源时，收益大于成本。高价值的可掠夺自然资源——储量丰富、易于提取和运输销售的资源——是叛军供应链的关键组成部分。为了检验该理论的含义，我们引入了撒哈拉以南非洲地区新的跨国家和次国家领土控制时间序列数据，并将其与当地自然资源价值的新数据集相结合。本文使用工具变量方法来解决核心内生性问题。结果既证实了本文的理论方法，也提供了与现有论点相反的证据。这些发现表明，宝贵的自然资源、后勤供应限制，以及更广泛地说，叛军军事战略至关重要，需要纳入内战、领土控制和叛军治理的工作中。

The logic of territorial control is central to the study of internal conflict. Existing studies consider the consequences of territorial control without answering a critical question: what motivates rebel territorial control in the first place? Territorial control requires careful explanation. While it confers important benefits it is also costly to achieve and exposes rebels to state attack. This paper argues that benefits exceed costs when territorial control provides rebels with a reliable source of organizational supply. High-value lootable natural resources—resources available in abundance that are easy to extract and transport for sale—represent key components of a rebel's supply chain. To test the theory's implications, we introduce new cross- and sub-national time-series data on territorial control in sub-Saharan Africa and couple it with a new dataset of local natural resource values. We use an instrumental variable approach to address core endogeneity concerns. Results both substantiate our theoretical approach and provide evidence running contrary to existing arguments. These findings demonstrate that valuable natural resources, logistical supply constraints, and, more broadly, rebel military strategy, are critically important and need to be incorporated into work on civil war, territorial control, and rebel governance.

题目：Trading with Frenemies: How Economic Diplomacy Affects Exports Get access Arrow 

作者：Don Casler，美国伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校政治系助理教授，研究领域为国际安全；Matthew Connelly，美国哥伦比亚大学国际和全球史教授；Raymond Hicks，美国哥伦比亚大学国际和全球史副研究员。

摘要：贸易本身就有风险，涉及到进口商和出口商的承诺问题。前者必须处理出口商是否会按承诺提供商品或服务的事先不确定性，而后者必须确定愿意交易产品的进口商。那么，企业如何建立贸易关系，尤其是在新市场？尽管古典和新兴的贸易理论都倾向于淡化政府在贸易中的作用，但本文认为，政府机构在解决这种不确定性方面发挥着至关重要的作用。具体而言，出口促进机构和外国大使馆审查潜在的贸易联系，并在潜在的争端变得过于严重之前阻止它们，从而防止贸易的基本风险。本文假设，这种制度支持将在大国与经济发展中和政治上异质性较大的国家之间的贸易中产生更强的出口促进效果。通过分析1970年代大量涉及出口促进的美国国务院电报，本文发现，当经济贸易壁垒较高且在与美国政治上不相似的国家中，促进努力的效果最为显著。政府官员并非被动参与贸易，而是在帮助企业建立贸易关系方面发挥了重要作用。

Trade is inherently risky, involving a commitment problem for both importers and exporters. The former must deal with ex ante uncertainty about whether exporters will deliver the goods or services as promised, while the latter has to identify an importer willing to trade a product. How, then, do firms establish trading relationships, especially in new markets? While both classical and newer trade theories tend to downplay the role of government in trade, we argue that government institutions play a crucial role in resolving this uncertainty. Specifically, export promotion agencies and embassies in foreign countries vet potential trade contacts and head off potential disputes before they get too serious, thus insuring against the basic risks of trade. We expect that this institutional backing will have stronger export-promoting effects on great powers’ trade with economically developing and politically dissimilar countries. Using a large collection of U.S. State Department cables from the 1970s that concern export promotion, we find strong evidence that promotion efforts had the largest effect when economic trade barriers were high and in countries that were politically dissimilar to the U.S. Rather than passively participating in trade, government bureaucrats play a large role in helping firms establish trading relationships.

题目：Border Barriers and Illicit Trade Flows

作者：David B Carter，美国圣路易斯华盛顿大学政治学系教授，研究领域为国际关系，涉及冲突和安全主题及安全和国际政治经济的交叉领域；Bailee Donahue，美国北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校政治学博士、数据分析师；Rob Williams，美国北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校政治学博士、数据分析师。

摘要：全球筑起的边境屏障数量急剧增加。这一围墙激增现象是全球化“反弹”趋势的重要组成部分，各国因应经济开放和全球化带来的不良后果，而非法贸易和走私活动的增加便是一个显著的例子。尽管“筑墙以打击非法流动”的观点广为流传，但至今没有系统的研究探讨围墙对非法贸易的总体影响。这一缺失值得注意，主要有两个原因。首先，关于筑墙的最主要解释就是为了打击非法贸易。其次，最近的研究发现，围墙显著减少了合法贸易，认为这一发现源于边境防御将非法贸易转移至入境口岸，从而导致更多的检查、安全和交易成本。本文利用超过五十年的产品级别数据，开发了一种新的非法贸易流动测量方法，并提供了一系列证据，表明边境屏障在入境口岸增加了非法贸易流动。

The number of fortified borders around the world has risen precipitously. This surge in walls is an important part of the larger globalization “backlash,” as countries react to the unwanted consequences of economic openness and globalization, with a rise in illicit trade and smuggling being a prominent example. Despite the prominence of the idea that walls are built to combat illicit flows, no research systematically explores how walls generally affect illicit trade. This is a notable omission for at least two reasons. First, the most prominent explanations for wall construction put combating illicit trade front and center. Second, recent work that finds walls significantly reduce legal trade argues that this finding derives from border fortifications diverting illegal trade to ports of entry, which leads to more inspection, security, and transaction costs. We develop a new measure of illicit trade flows using over five decades of product-level data and provide a battery of evidence that shows border barriers increase illicit flows at ports of entry.

题目：Reputations and Change in International Relations

作者：Ekrem T Baser，美国雪城大学麦克斯韦学院政治学系博士后研究员，研究领域为国际关系和政治经济学，理论重点为声誉和信号动态、地位问题以及具有执行力的制度。

摘要：在国际关系中，坚定性的声誉对于威慑对手和安抚伙伴至关重要。然而，一个国家的坚定性是不可观察的，并且可能在不为外界所知的情况下发生变化。那么，未被察觉的变化可能性会如何影响声誉动态呢？本文通过一个涵盖冲突和合作领域的正式模型，提出了一个关于在坚定性变化下长期声誉的理论。在该模型中，当前声誉可能基于过时信息，这使得观众会对声誉不佳的国家给予怀疑的好处。这导致国家根据其当前声誉来建立或消耗其声誉。重要的是，当受损的声誉可以重建时，声誉较好的国家更容易产生消耗声誉的强烈诱惑。因此，声誉约束对声誉不佳的国家影响最大。此外，由于展示坚定性会改善声誉，而声誉的提升又会减少未来展示坚定性的动机，冲突与合作呈现出一种周期性的节奏。一个重要的影响是，即使国家的坚定性未变、利益攸关相同，国家的行为也会随其声誉变化而改变。声誉执行确实有效，但代价是偶尔的信任破裂。这些结果也解决了国际关系声誉文献中的一些长期争议。

Reputations for resolve are critical in international relations for deterring adversaries and reassuring partners. However, a state’s resolve is unobservable and can change unbeknownst to its audience. How does the possibility of unobserved change impact reputation dynamics? I provide a theory of long-run reputations with changing resolve via a formal model covering conflict and cooperation domains. In the model, the possibility that current reputations are based on outdated information makes the audience extend the benefit of the doubt to states with poor reputations. This leads to states building or spending their reputations depending on their current reputations. Importantly, when damaged reputations can be rebuilt, states with better reputations face stronger temptations to spend them. Thus, reputations constrain states with poor reputations the most. Further, because demonstrations of resolve improve reputations, which, in turn, reduce incentives for future demonstrations of resolve, there is a cyclical rhythm to conflict and cooperation. A major implication is that a state’s behavior changes with its reputation even if its resolve is unchanged and the stakes are identical. Reputational enforcement works, but the price is occasional breaches of trust. These results also settle a few long-standing controversies in the IR-reputation literature.

题目：Gender Wars? Diplomacy as a Depolarizing Practice in International Politics of Gender and Sexuality

作者：Monika de Silva，瑞典哥德堡大学政治系博士研究生，研究兴趣为与性别和性相关的政策、国际规范、外交政策实施、背景法律，关注中欧和东欧地区。

摘要：外交在多大程度上是国际社会的去极化工具？本文提出了一个关于国际性别和性政治去极化的全新理论和实证视角。它将极化和去极化的概念进行操作化，并将其与国际关系中的自我/他者理论相结合。本文提出了一个论点，即尽管不完全明确，但外交的逻辑与去极化的逻辑在很大程度上是相容的。为了支持这一观点，本文通过对波兰的性别平等和LGBT+权利外交的案例研究进行了说明。基于实证研究的结果，本文认为，外交主要是一种去极化的实践。

To what extent is diplomacy a depolarizing tool of international society? This article proposes a novel theoretical and empirical focus on depolarization in international politics of gender and sexuality. It operationalizes the concepts of polarization and depolarization and integrates them with Self/Other theory in international relations. It puts forward an argument that the logic of diplomacy is, although not unequivocally, compatible with the logic of depolarization. The claim and the application of the framework are illustrated with a case study of gender equality and LGBT+ rights diplomacies in Poland. Based on the empirical findings, the article contends that diplomacy is primarily a practice of depolarization.

题目：Promoting Law Beyond the State 

作者：Geoffrey Swenson，英国伦敦大学城市学院国际政治系研究员，研究重点是冲突后重建、国家建设、民主与法治、法律多元化、国际关系理论和对外援助等。

摘要：在接受外国援助的国家，根植于习俗或宗教的非国家司法系统通常处理大多数法律纠纷。这极大地影响了国际法治推广的前景，然而学者们对非国家司法的外交政策关注甚少。本文探讨了2008年至2018年间，九个最大的法治援助提供国如何参与非国家司法，揭示了捐助国政策背后的理论和现实。本文提出了一种新的分类方法，详细描述了捐助者对非国家司法的五种策略（否认、承认、接受、转变和拒绝）和四个目标（司法改革、象征性承认、国家建设和反叛乱）。接着，通过对政策文件的结构化比较以及对五个具有最全面方法的捐助国的案例研究，探讨了九个最大法治援助捐助国如何处理非国家司法问题。捐助者普遍倾向于规避风险的方法，即使这使成功的可能性降低。在某些政策目标（如国家建设或反叛乱）的推动下，有时会做出更冒险的选择，但仅在有令人信服的理由和合理的成功前景的情况下才会如此。总体而言，主要的法治捐助国表现出规避风险的、表面的政策，有限的利益相关方参与，未能应对法律多元化的复杂性，且缺乏支持现行政策的证据。

In countries receiving foreign aid, non-state justice systems rooted in custom or religion generally handle most legal disputes. This dramatically influences the prospects of international efforts to promote the rule of law, yet scholars have paid little attention to foreign policy toward non-state justice. This paper explores how the nine largest rule-of-law-assistance providers engaged non-state justice between 2008 and 2018, illuminating the theory behind, and the reality of, donor-state policy. It proposes a new classificatory typology of donor approaches to non-state justice detailing five strategies (denial, acknowledgment, acceptance, transformation, and rejection) and four goals (judicial reform, symbolic recognition, state-building, and counterinsurgency). It then explores how the nine largest rule-of-law-assistance donor states addressed non-state justice through a structured comparison of policy documents as well as case studies of the five donors with the most comprehensive approaches. Donors strongly favored risk-averse approaches, even when this made success unlikely. Certain policy goals—such as state-building or counterinsurgency—sometimes prompted riskier choices, but only with a compelling justification and a reasonable prospect of success. Overall, major rule-of-law donors displayed risk-averse, superficial policy, minimal stakeholder engagement, a failure to grapple with the nuances of legal pluralism, and a lack of evidence to support existing policies.

题目：Developing-Country Representation and Public Attitudes toward International Organizations: The Case of IMF Governance Reform

作者：Daniel McDowell，美国雪城大学麦克斯韦公民与公共事务学院麦克斯韦国际事务顾问委员会教授、大西洋理事会地缘经济中心的高级研究员，研究领域为货币和金融的国际政治，重点关注美国和中国；David Steinberg，美国约翰·霍普金斯大学国际政治经济学副教授，研究领域为国际货币和金融政治；S Erdem Aytaç，土耳其伊斯坦布尔科奇大学国际关系系政治学副教授，研究关注情感极化如何影响民主态度；Dimitar Gueorguiev，美国雪城大学麦克斯韦公民与公共事务学院政治学助理教授，研究领域为比较政治经济学、威权制度。

摘要：许多著名的国际组织（IOs）在决策结构中存在对发展中国家的代表性不足的问题。本文认为，发展中国家的个人更支持与那些赋予其他发展中国家更大话语权的国际组织合作。本文假设，决策权的平衡通过改善对输入合法性和输出合法性的看法来影响对国际组织的支持。实证上，本文聚焦于国际货币基金组织（IMF），并在四个发展中国家——阿根廷、中国、南非和土耳其——进行了原创的调查实验。结果显示，增加发展中国家的代表性能够提高公众对IMF参与的支持。本文还发现，这种效果通过输入合法性机制起作用，特别是通过改善对程序公平性的看法。研究结果表明，公众对国际组织的支持受到这些组织内部决策权平衡的影响。

Several prominent international organizations (IOs) maintain decision-making structures that under-represent developing countries. This paper argues that individuals in developing countries are more supportive of engaging with IOs that give a greater voice to fellow developing countries. We posit that the balance of decision-making power influences support for IOs by improving perceptions of both input legitimacy and output legitimacy. Empirically, we focus on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and draw on original survey experiments in four developing countries: Argentina, China, South Africa, and Turkey. Results reveal that increased representation of developing countries increases public support for IMF participation. We also find consistent evidence that this effect works through an input legitimacy mechanism, specifically by improving perceptions of procedural fairness. These findings suggest that public support for IOs is affected by the balance of decision-making power within these organizations.

题目：Network Context and the Effectiveness of International Agreements

作者：Brandon J Kinne，美国加州大学戴维斯分校政治系副教授，研究政治暴力、国际合作和全球安全。

摘要：为什么一些国际协议比其他协议更能促成合作？本文认为，协议的网络环境决定了其有效性。本文重点分析双边防务合作协议（DCAs），这类协议促进诸如联合军事演习、维和、武器贸易以及机密信息共享等防务活动。由于DCAs强调持续的合作行动，它们为评估条约的有效性提供了理想的环境。分析表明，当协议嵌入于具有广泛共同第三方联系的“朋友的朋友”关系中时，它们会产生更高水平的合作。本文认为这种网络效应是政策趋同的结果。当国家与共同第三方有联系时，它们的政策会变得更加一致，这种一致性反过来降低了合作行动的成本并增加了收益。这一理论和发现适用于多个问题领域的广泛合作互动。国际协议的有效性取决于网络环境。

Why do some international agreements yield more cooperation than others? I argue that the network context of agreements conditions their effectiveness. I focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote defense activities like joint military exercises, peacekeeping, arms trade, and the sharing of classified information. Because DCAs emphasize ongoing cooperative actions, they offer an ideal setting to assess treaty effectiveness. The analysis shows that when agreements are embedded in transitive “friend of friend” relations, characterized by extensive ties to common third parties, they generate higher levels of cooperation. I argue that this network effect is the result of policy convergence. When states share ties with common third parties, their own policies become more closely aligned, and this alignment in turn reduces the costs and increases the benefits of cooperative actions. The theory and findings developed here apply to a wide array of cooperative interactions across multiple issue areas. The effectiveness of international agreements depends on network context.

题目：International Conflict, Border Security, and State Capacity: Case of British India

作者：Jeongmin Park，美国普林斯顿大学国际关系博士研究生，研究国际冲突的分配后果，重点关注基于性别的排斥政策。

摘要：主流的战争与国家建设理论将国家发展归因于战争期间对掠夺性能力的增长。然而，我们对掠夺性能力如何在中央政策层面之外的行政基础上进行空间扩展了解甚少。本文以作为国家建设的资产的铁路为例，重新审视了外部威胁对国家建设的作用，证据来源于19世纪印度在英俄对抗关键时期的详细历史数据。本文发现，与俄罗斯的冲突导致了在西北边境（即英属印度与俄罗斯之间的缓冲地带）扩建铁路，这提升了地方税务管理人员的表现。研究结果表明，外部冲突通过提供物流网络来促进国家发展，从而提高了地理上遥远边境的行政效率。

The dominant approach to war and state-building attributes state development to wartime growth of extractive capacity. Yet we know little about the administrative foundation through which extractive capacity is increased spatially, beyond the central policy level. Using railways as an example of a state-building asset, I revisit the role of external threat on state-building, with evidence drawing upon detailed historical data from nineteenth-century India during a crucial period of Anglo–Russo rivalry. I find that conflict with Russia led to expansion of railways in the Northwest Frontier bordering Afghanistan, the buffer between British India and Russia, which led to improved performance of local tax administrators. The findings suggest that external conflict promotes state development through provision of logistical networks enabling greater administrative efficiency in geographically distant frontiers.