据MS官网显示，来自新南威尔士大学的Ronald W. Masulis 、武汉大学的沈思晨、香港大学的邹宏，合作的论文“Director Liability Protection and the Quality of Independent Directors”在国际管理学顶刊《Management Science》线上正式发表。
Title: Director Liability Protection and the Quality of Independent Directors
董事责任保护与独立董事质量
Ronald W. Masulis
新南威尔士大学
沈思晨
武汉大学
邹宏
香港大学
We study whether legal liability protection helps companies to recruit and retain high-quality independent directors. We conduct difference-in-differences analyses exploiting the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling on the Silicon Graphics case, which substantially raised the bar for filing securities class action (SCA) lawsuits as a shock. We document supporting evidence for the talent attraction hypothesis by showing improvements in newly recruited independent director quality following the ruling, but only for candidates who are previously not exposed to SCA litigation risk. The effects are stronger for firms facing greater litigation risk ex ante or smaller local supplies of director candidates. Results are more evident for experience-based quality dimensions. We also analyze a sample of voluntary independent director departures and find little support for the talent retention hypothesis, suggesting that more complex factors enter into a director’s continuation decision once a director is already exposed to SCA litigation risk. A policy implication is that liability protection can be useful in attracting more unexposed high-quality candidates to the pool of public boards but does little to attract high-quality candidates who are already in the pool of public firms.
我们研究法律责任保护是否有助于公司招募和保留高素质的独立董事。我们利用1999年第九巡回上诉法院对硅图公司案的裁决作为冲击，进行了差异中的差异分析，该裁决大幅提高了提起证券集体诉讼（SCA）的门槛。我们通过显示裁决后新招募的独立董事质量的提高，为人才吸引假设提供了支持证据，但仅限于之前未暴露于SCA诉讼风险的候选人。对于面临更大诉讼风险的公司或当地董事候选人供应较小的公司，效果更为明显。对于基于经验的质量维度，结果更为显著。我们还分析了一组自愿独立董事离职的样本，发现对于人才保留假设的支持很少，这表明一旦董事已经暴露于SCA诉讼风险，更复杂的因素就会进入董事的继续任职决策。政策含义是，责任保护在吸引更多未暴露的高素质候选人进入公共董事会的池子方面可能是有用的，但对于吸引已经进入公共公司池的高素质候选人作用不大。
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