据MS官网显示，来自上海财经大学的靳庆鲁和马慧、香港大学的Thomas Schmid和Guochang Zhang，合作的论文“Employee Board Representation and Capital Investment”在国际管理学顶刊《Management Science》线上正式发表。
Title: Employee Board Representation and Capital Investment
员工董事会代表权与资本投资
靳庆鲁
上海财经大学 会计学院院长
马慧
上海财经大学
Thomas Schmid
香港大学
Guochang Zhang
香港大学
We examine how parity employee representation (PER) on corporate boards affects firms’ capital investments. In Germany, PER is legally mandated for firms with more than 2,000 domestic employees, but not for those below this threshold. Exploiting this discontinuity, we show that PER has heterogeneous effects on firms operating in diverse environments. For firms experiencing positive growth, PER increases their responsiveness to investment opportunities, suggesting that employee participation increases firms’ ability to exploit growth options. The effect through growth options is particularly salient in situations in which growth options are highly valuable. In contrast, for firms experiencing negative growth, PER reduces investment responsiveness, suggesting that employees resist the exercise of abandonment options. This effect is more pronounced in firms with high labor intensity, in which employees are likely to have a strong voice. Furthermore, operational risk moderates the effects of employee representation––the positive effect through growth options is attenuated in high-risk firms and the negative effect through abandonment options is exacerbated, thereby suggesting that employee board representatives are less interested in pursuing growth where businesses are relatively risky, and they protect their constituents more forcefully in high-risk environments. Moreover, the positive effect of PER on exploiting growth options is attenuated by collective bargaining agreements, while its effect through abandonment options is little affected. Evidence from stock price behavior further supports the viewpoint that employee representation affects capital investment. Our findings are relevant to policymakers as well as to firms’ various stakeholders.
我们研究了平等员工代表（PER）在公司董事会中的存在如何影响公司的资本投资。在德国，对于拥有超过2000名国内员工的公司，法律强制要求实行PER，但对于员工人数低于此门槛的公司则不要求。利用这种不连续性，我们展示了PER对不同环境下运营的公司有着不同的影响。对于经历正增长的公司，PER增加了它们对投资机会的响应性，这表明员工参与增强了公司利用增长机会的能力。在增长机会非常有价值的情况下，通过增长机会产生的效果尤为显著。相比之下，对于经历负增长的公司，PER降低了投资响应性，这表明员工抵制放弃选择权的行为。在劳动密集度高的公司中，这种效果更为明显，员工在这些公司中可能有更大的发言权。此外，运营风险调节了员工代表的影响——在高风险公司中，通过增长机会产生的积极效应被削弱，而通过放弃选择权产生的消极效应被加剧，这表明员工董事会代表在相对风险较高的业务中对追求增长的兴趣较小，而在高风险环境中更强烈地保护他们的选民。此外，集体谈判协议削弱了PER对利用增长机会的积极影响，而对其通过放弃选择权的影响则影响不大。从股票价格行为中获得的证据进一步支持了员工代表影响资本投资的观点。我们的发现对政策制定者以及公司的各种利益相关者都具有相关性。
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