据ISR官网显示，来自中国科学技术大学的张鑫、程丽红和余玉刚、华盛顿大学的谭勇，合作的论文“To Partner or Not to Partner? The Partnership Between Platforms and Data Brokers in Two-Sided Markets”在国际信息系统顶刊《Information Systems Research》线上正式发表。
Title: To Partner or Not to Partner? The Partnership Between Platforms and Data Brokers in Two-Sided Markets
合作还是不合作？双边市场中的平台与数据经纪商之间的合作关系
张鑫
中国科学技术大学 管理学院
程丽红
中国科学技术大学 管理学院
余玉刚
中国科学技术大学 管理学院
谭勇
华盛顿大学 福斯特商学院
Data have become an important competitive asset, especially for online advertising platforms, leading to the emergence of a new data broker industry. Platforms can partner with data brokers to acquire external data to enhance their targeting capabilities, but this practice has stoked growing consumer privacy concerns. This study develops a game-theoretic model to examine the economic mechanism underlying the partnership between competing platforms and a data broker in a two-sided market. Interestingly, our analysis shows that increasing consumer privacy concerns caused by the data broker may encourage platforms to partner with the data broker rather than discourage them. The driving force is that, because of negative cross-side network effects from advertisers to consumers, increased privacy concerns can serve as a strategic lever to soften price competition on the advertiser side. However, when both platforms partner with the data broker, a prisoner’s dilemma may arise in equilibrium even when the data broker can greatly improve the targeting capabilities. We find that the platform-data broker partnership hurts consumer surplus when platforms adopt a pure ad-sponsored model without charging consumers, but it may benefit consumer surplus when platforms adopt a mixed model with ad-sponsored and subscription-based revenue. Moreover, our analysis indicates that platforms may not have incentives to adopt high levels of privacy protection and may instead adopt asymmetric privacy protection strategies, with one platform adopting high privacy protection and the other opting for low protection. A series of model extensions confirm the robustness of our key findings. We conclude with a discussion of managerial and policy implications.
数据已经成为一种重要的竞争资产，对于在线广告平台来说尤其如此，因此也导致了一个新的数据经纪商产业的出现。平台可以与数据经纪商合作，获取外部数据以增强其广告定位能力，但这种做法也引发了越来越多的消费者隐私担忧。本研究构建了一个博弈论模型，以检验双边市场中竞争平台和数据经纪商之间合作的经济学机制。有趣的是，分析表明，数据经纪商引起的日益严重的消费者隐私担忧，反而可能会鼓励平台与数据经纪商进行合作，而不是阻止他们。其驱动力在于，由于广告商和消费者之间存在负向跨边网络效应，隐私担忧的增加作为一种战略平衡，削弱了平台在广告商一侧的价格竞争。然而，当两个平台都与数据经纪商合作时，即使数据经纪商可以大大提高平台的广告定位能力，也可能在均衡中出现囚徒困境现象。研究发现，当平台采用纯广告赞助模式而不向消费者收费时，平台与数据经纪商的合作会损害消费者剩余，但当平台采用广告赞助和订阅相结合的混合模式时，这种合作可能会有利于消费者剩余。此外，分析表明，平台可能没有采取高水平隐私保护的动机，而是可能采取不对称的隐私保护策略，即一个平台采用高隐私保护，另一个平台采用低隐私保护。一系列模型扩展验证了本研究核心结果的稳健性。最后，本文讨论了研究结果的管理和政策启示。
Tips：“社科人工智能与人工智能经济学” 冬季学术研讨会即将举办，诺奖得主托马斯·萨金特等顶级学者分享，欢迎对人工智能经济学方法及其应用感兴趣的学者和学生报名！
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