廖理
清华大学
Xiumin Martin
华盛顿大学（圣路易斯）
王倪
量化派
王正位
清华大学
杨珺
印第安纳大学（现新加坡南洋理工大学）
Using two natural field experiments, we examine how warning individual retail borrowers that their loan performance will be reported to a public credit registry before and after the loan take-up affects their borrowing behavior. We show that credit warnings reduce default rates by 3.7 to 7 percentage points and increase loan take-up rates by 4.1 percentage points, which suggests that credit warnings benefit both lenders and borrowers. The main drivers appear to be borrowers’ anticipation of a reduction in lenders’ informational rents and improved repayment incentives. Moreover, the reduction in default rates is comparable for borrowers who receive the credit warning before and after the loan take-up. As credit warnings received before but not after a loan take-up can affect the borrower pool, and thus the overall credit risk of the pool, the results suggest that credit warnings have little net effect on the pool’s credit risk due to selection.
通过两个自然田野实验，我们检验了在贷款接受前后告知个人零售借款人他们的贷款表现将被报告给公共信用登记机构，这对他们的借款行为有何影响。我们发现信用警告可以降低违约率3.7至7个百分点，并增加贷款接受率4.1个百分点，这表明信用警告对借贷双方都有益。主要的驱动因素似乎是借款人预期贷款人的资讯租金减少和还款激励的改善。此外，在接受贷款前后收到信用警告的借款人中，违约率的降低是可比较的。由于在贷款接受前但不是之后收到信用警告可能会影响借款人池，从而影响整个池的信用风险，结果表明，由于选择效应，信用警告对池的信用风险几乎没有净影响。
信息租金效应：收到信用警示的借款人可能认为按时还款会帮助其在PCR中建立良好的信用记录，进而减少信息不对称，提升其在未来获得信贷的机会，同时削弱现有贷款人对信息租金的优势。 纪律效应：信用警示令借款人意识到违约可能带来的信用风险，因而提升了他们的还款努力，以避免影响未来的信贷准入。
