据JAE官网显示，来自弗吉尼亚理工大学的叶鹏飞、上海财经大学的曾庆生和张程，合作的论文“Sell-by-Plan Mandate and Opportunistic Insider Selling: Evidence from China”在国际会计学顶刊《Journal of Accounting and Economics》正式线上发表。
Title: Sell-by-Plan Mandate and Opportunistic Insider Selling: Evidence from China
卖方计划指令与机会主义内部人减持：来自中国的证据
叶鹏飞
弗吉尼亚理工大学
曾庆生
上海财经大学
张 程
上海财经大学
We examine whether requiring insiders to sell their stock shares based on pre-disclosed plans can mitigate opportunistic insider selling activities and, more importantly, to what extent insiders can circumvent this regulation. Using China’s mandate enacted in 2017 as the setting, we demonstrate that a sell-by-plan mandate can reduce opportunistic selling activities. However, insiders can circumvent this mandate by strategically initiating their plans before bad news. We find that this gaming practice is widespread in China. It is concentrated in firms with weak governance but largely absent in firms with strong governance. We also find that China’s stock market cannot discern whether a plan is opportunistically motivated upon its announcement. Overall, this paper highlights a new form of opportunism in insider trading—opportunistic planning—and proposes a method to identify such plans. Our results also suggest that government regulation, without strong governance, could be ineffective in curbing corporate executives' opportunistic behaviors.
本文检验要求内部人士根据预先披露的计划出售其股票是否能够减少机会主义内部人减持活动，更重要的是，内部人士能在多大程度上规避这一规定。以2017年中国实施的规定为背景，本文证明“按计划出售”指令可以减少机会主义出售活动。然而，内部人士可以通过在坏消息之前策略性地启动他们的计划来规避这一指令。本文发现，这种操纵行为在中国普遍存在。它集中在治理薄弱的公司，但在治理强大的公司中基本不存在。本文还发现，中国股市在公告时无法辨别一个计划是否出于机会主义动机。总体而言，本文突出了内幕交易中的一种新型机会主义——机会主义计划——并提出了识别此类计划的方法。本文的结果还表明，没有强有力的治理，政府监管可能无法有效遏制公司高管的机会主义行为。
Tips：“社科人工智能与人工智能经济学” 冬季学术研讨会即将举办，诺奖得主托马斯·萨金特等顶级学者分享，欢迎对人工智能经济学方法及其应用感兴趣的学者和学生报名！
疯狂暗示↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓
