2004年伯克希尔股东会问答：
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I'm Bob Klein (PH) from Los Angeles.听众：你好，我是来自洛杉矶的鲍勃·克莱因。
You've touched on the issue of asset allocation — capital allocation — in response to previous questions. But I wonder if you could elaborate from a risk management perspective. Wall Street and financial planning firms charge a lot of money for their asset allocation models, say, 50 percent stocks, 40 percent bonds, et cetera.在回答之前的问题时，您已经谈到了资产配置——资本配置——的问题。但我想知道您能否从风险管理的角度详细阐述一下。华尔街和财务规划公司的资产配置模型收费很高，比如说，50%的股票，40%的债券，等等。
I know you take a more opportunistic approach to building your portfolio and managing risk, as you mentioned by — as you illustrated — by your junk bond example.我知道你在建立投资组合和管理风险时更多地采取机会主义的方法，正如你提到的——正如你举例说明的——垃圾债券的例子。
And so I just want you to hammer out how you use price and value as a tool of risk management and asset allocation as opposed to coming at it with a pre-conceived idea of how much should be allocated to each asset class.因此，我想请您阐述一下，您是如何利用价格和价值作为风险管理和资产配置的工具，而不是先入为主地认为每类资产应该配置多少。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we think the best way to minimize risk is to think. (Laughter)沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们认为把风险降到最低的最好办法就是思考。（笑声）
And the idea that you have — you know, you say, "I've got 60 percent in stocks and 40 percent in bonds," and then have a big announcement, now we're moving it to 65/35, as some strategists or whatever they call them in Wall Street do.而你的想法是——你知道，你说“我有 60% 的股票和 40% 的债券”，然后宣布一个重大消息，现在我们要把股票和债券的比例调到65/35，就像华尔街的一些策略师或他们所谓的那样。
I mean, that has to be pure nonsense. I mean, 60/40 or 65/30 — it just doesn't make any sense.我的意思是，这纯粹是无稽之谈。我的意思是，60/40或65/30——这根本说不通。
What you ought to do is have — your default position is always short-term instruments. And whenever you see anything intelligent to do, you should do it. And you shouldn't be trying to match up with some goal like that.你应该做的是——你的默认立场永远是短期工具。只要你发现有什么明智之举，你就应该去做。你不应该试图与那样的目标相匹配。
I found it entertaining — I was just reading yesterday in an article, I think it was, about the two fellows at Google and all of the problems they're going to have because they're each going to get a few billion dollars. I mean, it was — I want to send a sympathy card. I almost went down to Hallmark store because this article went on — they've got this terrible problem and that terrible problem and they're going to need lawyers, and they're going to need financial — they don't need anybody.我觉得这很有趣——我昨天刚读到一篇文章，好像是关于谷歌的两位研究员，以及他们因为每人将获得几十亿美元而将面临的所有问题。我的意思是，我想寄一张慰问卡。我差点就跑到霍尔马克商店去了，因为这篇文章写道——他们遇到了这个可怕的问题和那个可怕的问题，他们将需要律师，他们将需要财务——他们不需要任何人。
Those guys are smarter than the people that are coming to them. And they do not have a big problem, and they are very capable of thinking it through themselves.这些人比找他们的人更聪明。他们的问题并不大，他们自己也很有能力想清楚。
The people that have the problem are the people who want to sell their services to them and are going to have to convince them that they have a problem.有问题的人就是那些想向他们推销服务的人，他们必须让这些人相信他们有问题。
But so much of what you see when you talk about asset allocation — it's just merchandising. It's a way to make you think that if you don't know how to determine whether it should be 60/40 or 65/35, that you need these people. And you don't need them at all in investing.但是，当你谈论资产配置时，你所看到的很多东西都是在推销。这是让你觉得，如果你不知道如何决定是60/40是65/35，你就需要这些人。而在投资中，你根本不需要他们。
Most of the professionals that tell you that you're going to get in great trouble unless you listen to them and sign up for their services, you know, they're good at selling, but —大多数专业人士都会告诉你，如果你不听他们的话，不接受他们的服务，你就会有大麻烦。你知道，他们善于推销，但——
It's what my brother-in-law — former brother-in-law — that worked at the stockyards used to say was that people would bring in cattle or something. And I'd say to him, you know, "How do get the farmer to employ you to sell to Swift or Armour or Cudahy instead of the guy right next to you. I mean, you know, a cow is a cow and Armour's going to buy it the same way."我的姐夫——前姐夫——在畜牧场工作时常说，人们会把牛什么的牵进来。我会对他说，你知道，“如何让农场主雇用你，把牛卖给斯威夫特、阿莫尔或库达西，而不是你旁边的那个人。我的意思是，你知道，牛就是牛，莫尔公司也会以同样的方式购买它。”
And he gave me this disgusted look and he said, "Warren, it's not how you sell them, it's how you tell them." Well, there's a lot of that in Wall Street.他厌恶地看了我一眼，说“沃伦，问题不在于你怎么卖，而在于你怎么告诉他们。” 华尔街有很多这样的人。
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, people have always had this craving to know the future. You know, the king used to hire the magician or the forecaster and he'd look in sheep guts or something for an answer as to how to handle the next war. And so there's always been a market for people who purported to know the future based on their expertise.查理·芒格：人们总是渴望知道未来。你知道，以前国王会雇佣魔术师或预言家，他会从羊的内脏或其他东西中寻找答案，来决定如何应对下一场战争。因此，那些声称能根据自己的专业知识预知未来的人总是有市场的。
And there's a lot of that still going on. It's just as crazy as when the king was hiring the forecaster who looked at the sheep guts.现在仍有很多这样的事情在发生。这就像当年国王雇用预测师看羊内脏一样疯狂。
And people have an economic incentive to sell some nostrum. It can be sold over and over and over again.人们有经济动机去卖一些怀旧药。它可以一次又一次地被出售。
The really interesting figures are when you combine the underperformance of the market, say, by the mutual fund industry, which is probably a couple of points per annum. And that understates it.真正有趣的数据是，当你把市场表现不佳的因素（比如共同基金业）加在一起时，可能每年会损失几个百分点。这还低估了它的影响。
Now, if you take all of the investors in the mutual funds who are constantly whipsawing from one fund to another by a bunch of brokers who want commissions, now you take a sub-normal performance and it goes on another three or four percentages points due to the shuffling of the mutual fund investments.现在，如果你把所有在共同基金中不断从一个基金跳到另一个基金的投资者考虑在内，这些投资者受到一群想要佣金的经纪人的影响，那么，你将看到一个低于正常水平的表现，并且由于共同基金投资的频繁调整，这个表现还会再下降三到四个百分点。
So the poor guy in the general public is getting a terrible result from contacting the experts. And these guys are hitting the Scout troop and the Community Chest drive and are locally reputable people.因此，普通民众中的可怜人联系专家的结果很糟糕。而这些人却在打童子军和公益活动的主意，而且都是当地有名望的人。
I think it's disgusting. It's much better to make a living by being part of system that delivers value to the people who are buying the product. But nobody refrains from creating gambling casinos or something, on my theory.我觉得这太恶心了。如果能成为为购买产品的人提供价值的系统的一部分，谋生会好得多。但根据我的理论，没有人会不去开赌场什么的。
If it'll work to make money, why, we tend to do it in this country.如果这样做能赚钱，那么，我们在这个国家往往会去做。
资本配置模型是无稽之谈，但天生适合用来销售，因为它含有大量的术语、变量与数字，它与不可知的宏观经济联系在一起，它与随机性有关联，验证周期长，因此很难被证伪。它似乎与算命有点类似，如果算命先生预期的结果发生了，这说明他算得准；如果结果不一致，那是因为有其他的变量影响。当然，这并不是说只有股票才值得投资，债券等其他品种没有价值。当债券的性价比高于股票时，巴菲特也会买入债券。巴菲特的意思是人们不应该根据宏观经济等变量来决策资产配置的比例。资产组合的状态是一个结果，而不应该提前预设，它取决于投资者对拟投资对象价值的判断。
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