【新刊速递】《国际研究季刊》(ISQ), Vol. 68, No. 2, 2024 | 国政学人

题目：Foreign Policy as Compensation: Why Brexit Became a Foreign and Security Policy Issue

作者：Benjamin Martill，英国爱丁堡大学政治与国际关系高级讲师兼欧洲研究所副所长，研究领域为外交政策的政治性，特别关注欧洲安全；Alexander Mesarovich，意大利欧洲大学学院马克斯·韦伯研究员，研究重点是民主化、国家和跨国治理及欧盟政治。

摘要：外生的改革要求可能会让领导人陷入困境，变革会遇到结构性障碍。然而，当各个领域的改革成本不对称时，领导人可以寻求重新构建从一个领域到另一个领域的变革动力。这种补偿行为很常见，但现有的关于联系政治、选择法庭或转移性冲突的研究并未充分捕捉到这种行为。本文提出了“补偿性外交政策”的概念，即当领导人在前一个领域拥有更大的能力和选择时，他们可以利用外交政策的变化来补偿不可行的经济改革。在实证方面，本文利用精英访谈来重建英国脱欧后的安全政策政治，展示当有利的经济安排被排除时，政党领导人如何关注外交政策的变化。本文通过展示领导人寻求外交政策改革以弥补经济疲软的条件，为联系政治的相关研究做出了贡献。

Exogenous reform demands can put leaders in a tight spot where change runs up against structural impediments. Yet, where asymmetries in reform costs occur across domains, leaders can seek to re-frame the impetus of change from one domain to another. Such compensatory behavior is commonplace but is not adequately captured by existing research on linkage politics, forum shopping, or diversionary conflict. This article develops the concept of compensatory foreign policy, whereby leaders use foreign policy change to compensate for unviable economic reforms when they have greater capacity and choice in the former domain. Empirically, we use elite interviews to reconstruct the politics of security policy in the post-Brexit United Kingdom, showing how party leaders focused on foreign policy change when beneficial economic arrangements were precluded. Our argument contributes to recent research on linkage politics by demonstrating the conditions under which leaders seek foreign policy reforms to compensate for economic weakness.

题目：Do Threats or Shaming Increase Public Support for Policy Concessions? Alliance Coercion and Burden-Sharing in NATO

作者：Brian Blankenship，美国迈阿密大学政治学系助理教授，研究领域为国际关系、国际安全和国际合作领域，重点关注美国外交政策和军事联盟政治。

摘要：现有文献表明，联盟成员可以利用其伙伴对被抛弃的恐惧来为自己获取有利的让步。然而，关于放弃威胁作为分担国防负担动机的有效性的证据仍然有限。本文利用在波兰和德国进行的一项调查实验来评估美国的支持信号和威胁抛弃如何影响公众对增加本国军费开支的支持。研究结果表明，威胁抛弃会增加公众对增加国防开支的支持，而对缴款不足的伙伴进行“点名羞辱”等方法则不会。然而，保护保证并没有减少对国防开支的支持，并且将威胁与保证相结合（如果有的话）会增加这些威胁的影响。因此，当威胁不会从根本上削弱目标对美国保护的信心时，才是最有效的。这些发现对于理解联盟政治和公众压力的效用以及关于鼓励分担国防负担的政策辩论具有重要意义。

Existing literature suggests that alliance members can use their partners’ abandonment fears to obtain favorable concessions for themselves. However, evidence on the effectiveness of threats of abandonment as motivation for defense burden-sharing remains limited. This article uses a survey experiment conducted in Poland and Germany to assess how American signals of support and threats of abandonment shape public support for increasing their countries’ military spending. The findings suggest that threats of abandonment increase public support for higher defense spending, whereas approaches like “naming and shaming” under-contributing partners do not. However, assurances of protection did not decrease support for defense spending, and combining threats with assurances if anything increased those threats’ effects. Threats are thus most effective when they do not fundamentally undermine targets’ confidence in US protection. The findings have implications for understanding alliance politics and the utility of public pressure, and for policy debates about encouraging defense burden-sharing.

题目：To Arrest or Not Arrest? South Africa, the International Criminal Court, and New Frameworks for Assessing Noncompliance

作者：Zoë Jay，芬兰赫尔辛基大学法律、身份和欧洲叙事卓越中心（EuroStorie）博士后研究员，研究重点是国际法政治、人权以及政治与流行文化之间的关系；Matt Killingsworth，澳大利亚塔斯马尼亚大学国际关系高级讲师，研究领域为国际人道法和国际刑事司法的演变。

摘要：在“失败”的规范冲突中，将一项义务优先于另一项义务会产生什么后果？这些艰难的选择如何影响我们如何理解不遵守国际法背后的意图？本文探讨了南非在面对来自多个国际和国内行为体的矛盾压力时，决定不逮捕时任苏丹总统奥马尔·巴希尔的行为。南非关于是否逮捕巴希尔的难题导致了所谓的“附带不遵守”：不遵守一项义务是遵守另一项义务的结果。理解这种不遵守行为可以揭示出，表面上看似恶意的不遵守可能是权衡相互冲突的义务的结果，而不是故意逃避或破坏未选择的规范。这提供了一种不同于将非洲国家不遵守国际刑事法院规定视为本质上有问题的观点的替代视角，而是促使我们更加批判性和反思性地理解不遵守和争议行为，认为它们是规范发展过程中自然的一部分。

What are the consequences of prioritizing one obligation over another in a norm conflict on the norm that “loses”? How do these difficult choices affect how we understand the intent behind noncompliance with international law? This article examines South Africa’s decision not to arrest the then-President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, in the face of conflicting pressures from multiple international and domestic actors. South Africa’s conundrum over whether to arrest al-Bashir resulted in what we call “collateral noncompliance”: noncompliance with one obligation as a product of compliance with another. Understanding noncompliance like this highlights how seemingly bad-faith noncompliance can be a consequence of weighing competing obligations, rather than a deliberate attempt to shirk or undermine the nonchosen norm. It offers an alternative to perspectives that frame African states’ noncompliance with the International Criminal Court as inherently problematic, contributing instead to more critical, reflexive understandings of noncompliance and contestation as a natural part of norm development.

题目：Democracy and Markets in a Partially Globalized World: Local and Global Financial Market Responses to Elections in Developing Countries

作者：Raphael Cunha，英国伦敦国王学院政治经济学系助理教授，研究领域为国际和比较政治经济学，重点关注国际金融政治和发展中国家的国家市场关系。

摘要：全球市场对选举的反应是发展中国家金融全球化争论的核心。虽然现有研究重点关注全球市场奖励和惩罚各国政府的能力，但对国内金融的作用知之甚少。本文认为，国内金融市场（1）由于国内政治风险过度暴露，对选举的反应比全球市场更强烈；（2）国内投资者拥有信息优势，从而引导全球市场对选举的反应。本文使用1988年至2015年间主要新兴市场的国家基金定价数据来支持这些假设。结果显示，国内投资者的反应更快、更剧烈，并传递到了国际市场。本文的结论强调，在有限的全球化背景下，国内投资者在国家市场关系中的作用并未得到充分重视。

Global market responses to elections are at the core of debates about financial globalization in developing countries. While existing research focuses on the ability of global markets to reward and punish national governments, much less is known about the role of domestic finance. I argue that domestic financial markets (1) react more strongly to elections than global markets due to excessive exposure to political risk at home and (2) lead global market responses to elections where domestic investors have an information advantage. I find support for these hypotheses using data on country fund pricing for major emerging markets between 1988 and 2015. The results show swifter and more dramatic reactions by domestic investors, which are transmitted to international markets. The findings underscore the underappreciated role of domestic investors in state-market relations under limited globalization.

题目：The Rise and Fall of Technological Leadership: General-Purpose Technology Diffusion and Economic Power Transitions

作者：Jeffrey Ding，美国乔治华盛顿大学政治学助理教授，研究领域为新兴技术领域的大国竞争与合作、创新的政治经济学以及中国的科技能力。

摘要：科技革命如何影响大国兴衰？学者们长期以来一直观察到重大技术突破会破坏经济权力平衡，但他们很少研究这一过程是如何发生的。现有研究表明，一个国家能否成功适应革命性技术取决于其制度与这些技术的需求之间的契合度。标准解释强调适合在快速增长的新兴行业（主导行业）中垄断创新的制度。本文概述了一种基于通用技术（GPT）的替代途径，这种基础性进步只有在跨多个部门的扩展扩散过程后才能提高生产力。具体而言，GPT的传播需要进行制度调整，以扩大与GPT相关的工程技能基础。为了验证这一论点，本文将GPT机制与主导部门机制相对立，分为三个案例，分别与过去的工业革命相对应：英国在19世纪初期崛起；美国在第一次世界大战前超越英国；二十世纪末日本对美国技术主导地位的挑战。研究结果支持了对技术驱动的权力转移的新颖解释，直接关系到人工智能等新兴技术（有些人认为人工智能正在推动第四次工业革命）如何影响可能的中美权力转移。

How do technological revolutions affect the rise and fall of great powers? Scholars have long observed that major technological breakthroughs disrupt economic power balances, yet they rarely investigate how this process occurs. Existing studies establish that a nation’s success in adapting to revolutionary technologies is determined by the fit between its institutions and the demands of these technologies. The standard explanation emphasizes institutions suited for monopolizing innovation in new, fast-growing industries (leading sectors). I outline an alternative pathway based on general-purpose technologies (GPTs), foundational advances that boost productivity only after an extended diffusion process across many sectors. Specifically, GPT diffusion demands institutional adaptations that widen the base of engineering skills associated with a GPT. To test this argument, I set the GPT mechanism against the leading-sector mechanism across three cases, which correspond to past industrial revolutions: Britain’s rise to preeminence in the early nineteenth century; the United States’s overtaking of Britain before World War I; Japan’s challenge to US technological dominance in the late twentieth century. The findings support a novel explanation for technology-driven power transitions, directly bearing on how emerging technologies like AI, which some regard as driving a fourth industrial revolution, could influence a possible US-China power transition.

题目：Against Diffusion: Power and Institutions in African - European Relations

作者：Jason C Sharman，英国剑桥大学政治与国际研究系帕特里克·希伊爵士国际关系教授，国王学院研究员，研究领域为近代早期世界的国际关系和国际体系的历史演变。

摘要：国际关系领域忽视了非洲和欧洲之间四个世纪前殖民时期的外交、经济和军事关系。本文驳斥关于欧洲统治的普遍假设，因为在大西洋奴隶贸易高峰之前、期间和之后，非洲统治者和商人在与欧洲人的关系中普遍处于平等或优越的地位。与长期互动通过从中心到边缘的制度扩散促进同质化的预期相反，非洲人普遍回避欧洲的政治、经济和军事模式，如威斯特伐利亚国家、公司和支薪常备军队。相反，他们利用外部机会来强化不断演变的当地差异或采用伊斯兰世界的制度。在非洲的欧洲人更有可能采用非洲模式，反之亦然。事实上，非洲政体抵抗欧洲统治的时间比更大、更富裕、军事更强大的亚洲政体更长，而且无国家的非洲社会抵抗欧洲统治的时间比亚洲政体抵抗的时间更长，从而引起对国际无政府状态下生存的基本假设的质疑。

Four centuries of precolonial diplomatic, economic, and military African–European relations have been neglected in international relations. Refuting common presumptions about European dominance, before, during, and after the heyday of the Atlantic slave trade, African rulers and merchants were generally in a position of equality or superiority in their relations with Europeans. Contrary to expectations that long-term interaction promotes homogenization via institutional diffusion from core to periphery, Africans generally eschewed European political, economic, and military models such as the Westphalian state, the corporation, and the salaried standing army. Instead, they utilized external opportunities in ways that reinforced evolving local differences, or adopted institutions from the Islamic world; Europeans in Africa were more likely to adopt African models than vice versa. That African polities held out against European dominance longer than larger, richer, and more militarily powerful Asian polities, and that stateless African societies held out longest of all, brings into question fundamental assumptions about survival under international anarchy.

题目：Understanding the Determinants of ICC Involvement: Legal Mandate and Power Politics

作者：Alyssa K Prorok，美国伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校政治学系副教授，研究领域为国际冲突，重点关注领导人的政治动机如何影响冲突行为、国际法和法律机构如何影响战斗人员的动机以及开发研究国际冲突的原始数据；Benjamin Appel，美国加州大学圣地亚哥分校全球政策和战略系副教授，研究领域为政府间组织和国际法在国际政治中的有效性；Shahryar Minhas，美国密歇根州立大学政治学系和社会科学数据分析项目副教授，研究领域为政治方法论、冲突研究和国际制度。

摘要：如何解释国际刑事法院（ICC）参与一个事件的开始和升级？鉴于对法院存在偏见的指控不断增加，了解国际刑事法院参与的决定因素至关重要。根据对国际法庭具有约束力的自由裁量权的研究，本文认为有两种潜在的对立力量影响着法院。虽然优先考虑公正性应该会促使法院将目标锁定在国内有罪不罚现象普遍存在的国家中最严重侵犯人权的肇事者，但优先考虑强国的利益表明法院可以避免卷入强国以及与强国保持密切联系的国家。本文使用国际刑事法院参与的原始数据和一个新的估值标准来评估这一假设，该估值标准解释了其活动的顺序性。本文发现法院在启动初步审查时更符合法律授权，但在正式调查阶段大国政治发挥更大作用。本文结论对国际刑事法院和国际法庭的学术和政策工作具有更广泛的影响。

What explains the initiation and escalation of International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement in a situation? In light of growing charges of bias against the court, understanding the determinants of ICC involvement is critically important. Building upon research on bounded discretion at international courts, we argue that two potentially competing forces influence the court. While prioritizing impartiality should lead the court to target perpetrators of the gravest violations of human rights in states with domestic impunity, prioritizing powerful states’ interests suggests that the court may avoid involvement in powerful states and those with close ties to powerful countries. We test these arguments using original data on ICC involvement and a novel estimator that accounts for the sequential nature of ICC activity. We find that the court acts more in accordance with the legal mandate when initiating preliminary examinations, but power politics play a more dominant role at the formal investigation stage. These findings have several implications for academic and policy work on both the ICC and international courts more generally.

题目：Race and International Organizations

作者：Kseniya Oksamytna，英国伦敦大学城市学院国际政治学高级讲师，研究兴趣为国际组织、国际安全与和平行动；Sarah von Billerbeck，英国雷丁大学国际关系学教授，研究兴趣为联合国维持和平、建设和平、国际组织和合法性。

摘要：虽然国际关系研究越来越多地注意到种族问题，但国际组织研究却在这方面进展缓慢，特别是忽视了种族在国际组织劳动力中的作用。基于种族化组织的社会学理论，本文提出了种族化国际组织的概念。与国内组织一样，种族化的国际组织的特点是种族群体的代理作用增强或受到抑制、资源的种族化分配、白人资格认证以及正式规则和非正式实践按照种族界限脱钩。然而，也有两个重要的区别。首先，由于国际组织依赖成员国提供资源，其秘书处需要适应强大的白人占多数的国家（宏观层面的压力）。其次，由于国际组织劳动力是多元化的，他们的员工可能会将社会中存在的一系列种族刻板印象带入他们的专业实践中（微观层面的压力）。本文以联合国维和行动为例，展示了种族化组织的四个特征如何在这些宏观和微观层面的压力下运作。本文表明，当地雇用的维和人员在行使代理权方面面临限制；非白人维和人员比白人维和人员执行更危险的工作；白种人是理想技能的代表，而非白人维和人员的知识则被贬低；来自白人占多数的国家的维和人员受到特殊待遇或偏离联合国范围内的程序。

While International Relations scholarship has increasingly addressed questions of race, the literature on international organizations (IOs) has been slower to do so. In particular, it has neglected how race functions within IO workforces. Building on sociological theories of racialized organizations, we develop the concept of racialized IOs. Like domestic organizations, racialized IOs are characterized by enhanced or inhibited agency of racial groups, racialized distribution of resources, credentialing of whiteness, and decoupling of formal rules and informal practices along racial lines. However, there are also two important differences. First, since IOs rely on member states for resources, their secretariats need to accommodate powerful white-majority countries (macro-level pressures). Second, since IO workforces are diverse, their employees may bring a range of racial stereotypes that exist in their societies into their professional practice (micro-level pressures). Using the case of UN peacekeeping, we demonstrate how the four features of racialized organizations operate in light of these macro- and micro-level pressures. We show that locally hired peacekeeping staff face constraints on exercising agency; that non-white peacekeepers perform more dangerous jobs than their white counterparts; that whiteness serves as a proxy for desirable skills while non-white peacekeepers’ knowledge is devalued; and that peacekeepers from white-majority countries receive special treatment or deviate from UN-wide procedures.

题目：Informally Governing International Development: G7 Coordination and Orchestration in Aid

作者：Ben Cormier，英国斯特拉斯克莱德大学政府与公共政策学院国际关系讲师兼校长研究员，研究金融和发展的国际政治经济学；Mirko Heinzel，英国伦敦政治经济学院国际关系助理教授研究员，研究国际组织在全球健康和发展中的作用；Bernhard Reinsberg，英国格拉斯哥大学国际关系的讲师，剑桥大学商业中心政治经济学的研究员，研究国际组织和发展合作的政治经济学。

摘要：七国集团等非正式组织旨在应对全球发展挑战，但缺乏直接推动变革的行政和预算能力。相反，七国集团寻求推动反映其优先事项的国际行动。例如，七国集团试图通过发布年度公报来制定国际发展议程，其中包含旨在影响七国集团捐助国、非七国集团捐助国和国际组织行为的可行承诺。但关于七国集团最终影响的问题仍然存在，因为批评者认为非正式的七国集团除了口头上应对发展挑战外无能为力。本文提供的实证证据表明，七国集团以两种方式塑造国际发展。首先，当七国集团在其年度公报中强调某个政策领域时，捐助者就会向该政策领域分配更多援助。其次，当七国集团在其年度公报中强调某个政策领域时，捐助者会在该政策领域设立更多信托基金。这表明七国集团在国际发展中同时发挥着协调和编排的作用：协调成员国的援助并协调非七国集团的双边和多边援助。本文的理论、方法和结果可以为进一步研究非正式组织是否以及如何最终影响国家、正式国际组织、国际合作和全球治理提供信息。

Informal groupings like the G7 aim to address global development challenges but lack the administrative and budgetary capacity to drive change directly. Instead, the G7 seeks to catalyze international action that reflects its priorities. For example, the G7 attempts to set the international development agenda by publishing annual communiqués with actionable commitments designed to influence the behavior of G7 donor countries, non-G7 donor countries, and international organizations. But questions about the G7’s ultimate impact persist, as critics contend the informal G7 can do little more than pay lip service to development challenges. We provide empirical evidence that the G7 shapes international development in two ways. First, when the G7 emphasizes a policy area in its annual communiqués, donors allocate more aid to that policy area. Second, when the G7 highlights a policy area in its annual communiqués, donors establish more trust funds in that policy area. This suggests the G7 serves simultaneous coordination and orchestration roles in international development: it coordinates its member states’ aid and orchestrates non-G7 bilateral and multilateral aid. The study’s theory, approach, and findings can inform further research on whether and how informal organizations ultimately affect states, formal international organizations, international cooperation, and global governance.

题目：Central Bankers in Crisis: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperation, and the Creation of the Fed Swap Network during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis

作者：Aditi Sahasrabuddhe，美国布朗大学政治学助理教授，研究领域为政治经济学、政治与历史、世界政治。

摘要：政策制定者如何应对全球危机？本文认为，人际信任使政策制定者能够在危机和不确定的情况下进行临时合作。2008年全球金融危机期间，领导人的不同程度的关系（更强、更松散或缺乏）影响了各经济体获得美联储互换额度的机会，而不是成本更高的单边和多边替代方案。利用这个框架，本文重新审视了美联储互换网络的出现，对危机期间在职央行行长的精英访谈以及美联储会议记录中的证据进行了三角分析。本文的研究结果强调了人际信任作为操作变量在塑造国际合作模式中的作用，并提出了技术官僚治理的政治问题。虽然这些危机管理政策是必要且成功的，但它们强化了全球等级制度，并加剧了中央银行的民主赤字。因此，本文提请人们关注全球金融安全网的争议性和不民主的基础。

How do policymakers respond to global crises? I argue that interpersonal trust enables policymakers to engage in ad hoc cooperation, in conditions of crisis and uncertainty. Leaders’ differentiated ties by degree - of stronger, looser, or absent—interpersonal trust influenced economies’ access to Federal Reserve swap lines over costlier unilateral and multilateral alternatives during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Using this framework, I re-examine the emergence of the Fed swap network. I triangulate evidence from elite interviews with central bankers in office during the crisis, and transcripts of Fed meetings. My findings highlight the role of interpersonal trust as an operating variable in shaping patterns of international cooperation and problematize the politics of technocratic governance. While necessary and successful, these crisis management policies reinforce global hierarchies and exacerbate the democratic deficit in central banking. This article thus draws attention to the contentious and undemocratic foundations of the global financial safety net.

题目：Rebel Institutionalization, Religious Holidays, and Political Violence

作者：Xin Nong，日本一桥大学国际与公共政策学院法学研究生院助理教授，研究兴趣包括领导者与战争、政治暴力、比较制度、中国政治、经济史；Chun-Ying Wu，西班牙巴塞罗那国际研究院博士后研究员，研究兴趣包括民族政治、政治行为和政治制度。

摘要：识别叛乱组织结构和暴力使用之间的明确关系时面临的一个挑战是，组织结构很少随时间变化。本文利用长时间宗教节日提供的分析优势，运用委托-代理框架来解决这个问题。宗教节日作为一个焦点，降低了组织协调成本，但也增加了暴力行为的社会成本。本文认为，反叛组织的领导者（委托人）比成员（代理人）对增加的社会成本更为敏感，因此试图在宗教节日期间限制其成员发动攻击。然而，这些限制尝试的成功取决于组织的制度化程度。长时间的宗教节日由于限制成员攻击行为的高成本而加剧了委托-代理问题，使其成为本文分析的最佳案例。本文首先通过对三个东南亚国家的伊斯兰分裂主义组织进行微观层面的分析，然后分析伊斯兰反叛组织的横截面样本来测试这一理论。结果显示，具有中央指挥系统和对其成员控制能力的高度制度化组织在长时间的宗教节日期间不太可能发动攻击，而制度化程度低的组织则相反。

Identifying a clear relationship between rebel group structures and the use of violence faces the challenge that group structures rarely change over time. We exploit the analytical advantage provided by long religious holidays to address this issue using the principal-agent framework. Religious holidays serve as a focal point and reduce group coordination costs, but also raise the societal costs of violence. We argue the principal of rebel groups is more sensitive to the increased societal costs than the agents and thereby attempts to restrain the agents from attacking during religious holidays. However, the success of these attempts depends on the group’s institutionalization level. Long religious holidays exacerbate the principal-agent problem due to the high costs of restraining agents from attacking for an extended period, making them the most likely case for our analysis. We test the theory by first conducting microlevel analysis of Islamic separatist groups in three Southeast Asian countries and then analyzing a cross-sectional sample of Islamic rebel groups. Results show that highly institutionalized groups that have a central command system and control over constituent groups are less likely to attack during long religious holidays than on other days, and vice versa for weakly institutionalized groups.

题目：The Mercurial Commitment: Revisiting the Unintended Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention and Anti-Atrocity Norms

作者：Hiroto Sawada，美国普林斯顿大学政治学博士生，研究兴趣包括武装冲突的政治经济学、内战中的第三方干预/调解、联盟政治、威慑理论以及形式建模。

摘要：关于军事人道主义干预和反暴行规范（如保护责任）是否会导致不良动机以及叛乱团体挑衅性暴力的辩论尚未达成共识。具体而言，现有理论无法充分解释为什么在某些情况下“被鼓舞”的叛乱团体挑衅政府，而在其他情况下则不会。本文通过论证调和了这一未决的争论，认为不是反暴行规范而是人道主义干预的暂时可行性诱使潜在的反叛团体实际挑衅政府。大规模干预可行性的固有暂时性导致了一个承诺问题：对暂时干预的预期会使权力平衡向潜在的反叛者倾斜，并打开一个迅速关闭的机会窗口。一个三方博弈表明，除其他发现外，人道主义干预的可能性越高，潜在反叛者战斗的动机就越低，这意味着对反暴行规范的批评是“不实指控”。该模型还（1）解释了为何较弱的团体能够在外部干预的阴影下反叛；以及（2）提出了一个新的含义，即当政府权力整合导致的国内承诺问题不重时，降低干预成本可能会加剧不良动机。

The debate on whether military humanitarian intervention and anti-atrocity norms, such as the responsibility to protect, cause perverse incentives, and provocative violence by a rebel group, has yet to reach a consensus. Specifically, existing theories are unable to fully explain why “emboldened” rebel groups provoke the government in some cases but not others. This paper reconciles this unresolved debate by arguing that it is not anti-atrocity norms but the temporary feasibility of humanitarian intervention that induces the potential rebel group to actually provoke the government. The inherent temporariness of the feasibility of large-scale intervention causes a commitment problem: An expectation of a temporary intervention shifts the balance of power toward a potential rebel and opens a quickly closing window of opportunity. A three-player game shows that, among other findings, a higher probability of humanitarian intervention alleviates the potential rebel’s incentive to fight, implying that the criticism of anti-atrocity norms is a “false charge.” The model also (i) explains why weaker groups can rebel in the shadow of external intervention and (ii) presents a novel implication that lowering the intervention cost can exacerbate the adverse incentive when a domestic commitment problem caused by the consolidation of government power is not severe.

题目：Elitist Remedies? Complaint Resources and Representation in International Human Rights Bodies

作者：Christoph Valentin Steinert，瑞士苏黎世大学博士后研究员，研究兴趣为国际关系、人权和国际组织。

摘要：本文研究了国际人权机构中代表性的决定因素。文章指出，社会经济因素决定了人权侵犯是否会转化为向国际人权机制的投诉。为寻求国际补救，人权侵犯的受害者必须知晓补救措施，并且需要具备投诉素养才能提出投诉。或者，他们需要与能够代表其案件的技能网络建立联系。此类投诉资源由社会经济因素系统性地塑造，这意味着国际人权补救措施往往代表着经济精英的自我选择。文章的理论主张在国家和个人层面上通过关于联合国特别程序（UNSP）运作的人权投诉机制的新颖数据进行了测试。尽管这一机制对所有人开放，但UNSP的后续声明在国家和个人层面上都反映了社会经济差异。在国家层面上，人权侵犯在较富裕国家中转化为更多的UNSP声明。在个人层面上，律师和教授更有可能被UNSP所覆盖。这些发现有助于我们理解国际人权补救措施中的代表性问题，表明这些机制在触及低收入国家的边缘群体方面存在困难。

This article investigates determinants of representation in international human rights bodies. It is argued that socioeconomic factors shape whether human rights abuses translate into complaints to international human rights mechanisms. To seek international remedy, victims of human rights abuse must be aware of remedies, and they require complaint literacy to file complaints. Alternatively, they need ties to skilled networks that might represent their cases. Such complaint resources are systematically shaped by socioeconomic factors, implying that international human rights remedies tend to represent a self-selection of economic elites. The theoretical claims are tested both on the national and individual levels with novel data on the human rights complaint mechanisms operated by the UN Special Procedures (UNSP). While this mechanism is universally open, the follow-up statements of the UNSP reflect socioeconomic disparities both on the national and individual levels. On the national level, human rights abuses translate into more UNSP statements directed at richer countries. On the individual level, lawyers and professors tend to be more likely to be covered by the UNSP. The findings contribute to our understanding of representation in international human rights remedies, suggesting that these mechanisms struggle to reach marginalized groups in low-income countries.

题目：Diversity without Adversity? Ethnic Bias toward Refugees in a Co-Religious Society

作者：Anna Getmansky，英国伦敦政治经济学院国际关系系副教授，研究兴趣包括国际安全、恐怖主义和内战；Konstantinos Matakos，英国伦敦国王学院政治经济系经济学副教授，主要研究领域包括政治经济学、实证政治科学、公共经济学和应用微观经济学；Tolga Sinmazdemir，伦敦大学东方与非洲研究学院（SOAS）政治与国际研究系政治方法论高级讲师，研究兴趣涉及冲突、移民和政治经济。

摘要：是什么因素影响了东道国人民愿意接受难民融入本国的社会、经济和政治生活？本文认为，难民的种族身份在直接和间接方面都在塑造支持难民成为邻居、获得工作许可或公民身份方面等方面发挥着关键作用。通过在土耳其进行的一项联合实验（样本数为2362），本文发现当地人歧视叙利亚阿拉伯和库尔德难民，相比之下，对土库曼人则没有。尽管大学学历、与当地人的社会联系以及语言知识会提升对难民的支持态度，但种族偏见可能会削弱其效果。例如，当地语言知识增加了对阿拉伯难民情况的支持，但仅在给予他们工作许可方面，而不涉及让他们成为邻居或授予公民身份。相反，它在所有三个领域都增加了对土库曼人和库尔德人的支持。因此，诸如学习当地语言之类的策略可能不会在所有方面推进所有难民的融入。

What shapes the host population’s willingness to accept refugees into social, economic, and political life in their country? We argue that refugees’ ethnicity plays a key role—both directly and indirectly—in shaping support for having refugees as neighbors and for granting them a work permit or citizenship. Fielding a conjoint experiment in Turkey (N = 2,362), we find that locals discriminate against Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees compared to Turkomans. Although a university degree, social ties with locals, and knowledge of language boost prorefugee attitudes, ethnic bias may attenuate their effect. For example, local language knowledge increases support for Arab refugee profiles, but only when it comes to granting them a work permit, but not having them as neighbors or granting citizenship. In contrast, it increases support for profiles of Turkomans and Kurds in all the three domains. Thus, strategies such as learning the local language may not advance all refugees in all domains.

题目：Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions?

作者：Claas Mertens，英国牛津大学国际关系博士生，研究兴趣为经济制裁、贸易冲突和环境经济学。

摘要：现有研究表明，经济胁迫成功影响目标国家行为的概率为38%。本文通过评估两种经济胁迫手段——经济制裁和暂停外国援助的相对有效性，将有关经济制裁和外国援助的研究结合起来。文章认为，暂停外国援助比实施经济制裁更有效，原因在于：（1）暂停援助对施行国在经济上有益，而制裁代价高昂；（2）暂停援助直接影响目标政府的预算；（3）市场力量会削弱制裁但不会影响暂停援助；（4）暂停援助不太可能引发不利的行为反应。定量分析估计，实施暂停对外援助的成功率为44%，经济制裁的成功率为26%。这一结果在两个关于经济胁迫的替代数据集中都具有稳健性，定性证据也证实了上述机制。研究结果表明，经济制裁的效果不如之前认为的那样有效，而大型援助国通过经济胁迫实现政治目标的机会更高。

Existing research shows that economic coercion successfully influences targeted states’ behavior 38 percent of the time. This article integrates research on economic sanctions and foreign aid by assessing the relative effectiveness of two types of economic coercion: economic sanctions and foreign aid suspensions. It argues that suspending aid is more effective than adopting economic sanctions because (1) aid suspensions are economically beneficial for the adopting state, while sanctions are costly, (2) aid suspensions directly affect the targeted government’s budget, (3) market forces undermine sanctions but not aid suspensions, and (4) aid suspensions are less likely to spark adverse behavioral reactions. A quantitative analysis estimates the success rate of imposed aid suspensions to be 44 percent and that of economic sanctions to be 26 percent. The results are robust across two alternative datasets on economic coercion, and qualitative evidence corroborates the outlined mechanisms. The findings suggest that economic sanctions are less effective than previously thought and that large donor states have a higher chance of achieving political goals through economic coercion.

题目：Effects of Self-Legitimation and Delegitimation on Public Attitudes toward International Organizations: A Worldwide Survey Experiment

作者：Farsan Ghassim，英国牛津大学女王学院政治学初级研究员，研究兴趣集中在全球治理和调查方法。

摘要：公众对国际组织（IOs）的看法已成为核心关注点。随着世界政治中的参与者越来越多地试图对国际组织进行合法化或去合法化，学者们也开始系统地研究这些现象。本文提供了迄今为止最全面的国际组织（去）合法化研究。基于线索理论，考虑输入和输出合法性，本文检验了去合法化和自我合法化对公众对国际组织看法的孤立和综合影响。本文集中研究政府批评和公民抗议这两种显著的去合法化实践。在研究自我合法化时，本文关注国际组织的公开声明和制度改革。本文研究了公众对联合国、世界银行和世界卫生组织这三种功能范围和显著程度不同的国际组织的看法。2021年，作者在全球十个国家（澳大利亚、加拿大、哥伦比亚、埃及、法国、匈牙利、印度尼西亚、肯尼亚、韩国和土耳其）的超过32,000名公民中进行了调查实验，这些样本按年龄、性别、地区和教育程度进行了加权。主要发现是：政府和公民抗议的去合法化对公众看法的影响有限，取决于具体的国际组织。尽管国际组织的自我合法化声明和改革本身并不能提高公众对国际组织的支持，但它们通常能够有效地中和政府和公民抗议的去合法化尝试。

Public views on international organizations (IOs) have become a matter of central concern. While actors in world politics increasingly try to legitimize or delegitimize IOs, scholars have begun investigating such phenomena systematically. This paper provides the most comprehensive IO (de)legitimation study to date. Building on cueing theory, and considering input as well as output legitimacy, I examine the isolated and combined effects of delegitimation and self-legitimation on public perceptions of IOs. I concentrate on government criticism and citizen protests as two salient practices of delegitimation. In investigating self-legitimation, I focus on IOs’ public statements and institutional reforms. I study public opinion on the UN, World Bank, and WHO, as IOs of different functional scopes and levels of salience. In 2021, I conducted survey experiments on more than 32,000 citizens in ten countries worldwide (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Kenya, South Korea, and Turkey) – weighted by age, gender, region, and education. My main findings are: Delegitimation by governments and citizen protests has some limited effectiveness, depending on the IO in question. While IO self-legitimization statements and reforms in themselves do not boost public support for IOs, they are generally effective at neutralizing delegitimation attempts by governments and citizen protests.

题目：Can “Soft” Advice from International Organizations Catalyze Natural Resource Sector Reform?

作者：Iasmin Goes，美国科罗拉多州立大学政治学助理教授，研究兴趣为政治经济学、国际组织、自然资源、主权债务；Terrence L Chapman，美国德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校政府系教授，研究涵盖国际组织、国际冲突和国际政治经济等领域。

摘要：国际组织能否改善自然资源治理？国际货币基金组织（IMF）因其在危机贷款中的作用而最为知名，它可以利用暂停贷款的“獠牙”来推动改革。但 IMF 官员也花费大量时间通过第四条磋商进行常规监督，评估一个国家的经济发展并提供不具约束力的建议。政府是否会遵循这些“无牙”的建议？为了回答这个问题，本文审视了2004年到2019年期间发布的所有第四条款工作人员评估的内容。通过文本分析和双重差分估计器，本文发现，在进行了广泛讨论自然资源部门并建议自然资源治理改革的第四条评估之后，资源丰富的发展中国家更有可能通过石油、天然气和采矿部门的改革立法。结果表明，技术官僚式的建议——一种在国际组织研究中常被忽视的工具——可以引向有助于缓解资源诅咒的政策采纳。

Can international organizations improve natural resource governance? The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is most noted for its role in crisis lending, where it can wield the “teeth” of loan suspensions to push for reforms. But IMF officials also spend a large amount of time conducting routine surveillance through Article IV consultations, which assess a country’s economic developments and provide non-binding recommendations. Do governments follow this “toothless” advice? To answer this question, we examine the content of all Article IV staff appraisals published between 2004 and 2019. Using text analysis and a difference-in-differences estimator, we find that resource-rich developing countries are more likely to adopt legislation reforming the oil, gas, and mining sectors in the wake of an Article IV appraisal that extensively discusses the natural resource sector and recommends natural resource governance reforms. Our results suggest that technocratic advice—a tool often overlooked in international organization scholarship—can lead to the adoption of policies that help ameliorate the resource curse.

题目：Colonial Redress and the Unintended Consequences of Global Opportunities

作者：Claudia Junghyun Kim，香港城市大学公共及国际事务系助理教授，研究领域涉及国际政治对当地和人类的影响、社会和跨国运动、规范与规避规范、地位，污名和地位等级制度、国际关系和东亚比较政治。

摘要：研究表明，进步全球规范的传播所带来的政治和话语机会的增加，使许多受委屈的地方行为者得到了赋权。通过对殖民受害者跨国补偿运动的研究，本文从两个方面为这一文献做出了补充。首先，本文拒绝了全球机遇与地方运动的促进和成功之间常见的关联，并提出了一个反直觉的论点，即早期机会的出现可能会无意中妨碍一项运动长期实现其目标的效力。其次，与大规模、备受瞩目的跨国运动应该比规模较小、鲜为人知的运动表现更好的隐含假设相反，本文证明了后者有时比前者更容易实现其目标。在提出这些论点时，本文展示了规范文献中对目标国家针对规范推广的抵制日益关注，可能忽略了同一枚硬币的另一面：全球规范性支持无意中破坏了它原本帮助宣传的地方事业的效力。在实证方面，本文研究了三个韩国殖民受害者群体及其在追求跨国赔偿方面的不同路径。

Research shows that the rise of political and discursive opportunities enabled by the diffusion of progressive global norms has empowered many aggrieved local actors. Drawing on colonial victims’ transnational redress movements, I add to this literature in two ways. First, rejecting the common association between global opportunities and local movement facilitation and success, I make a counterintuitive argument that the early availability of opportunities can inadvertently hamper a movement’s efficacy in achieving its goals in the long run. Second, contrary to the implicit assumption that large-scale, high-profile transnational movements should fare better than smaller, little-known ones, I demonstrate that the latter can sometimes achieve their goals more easily than the former. In making these arguments, I show that an increasing focus in the norm literature on backlash in target states against norm promotion risks neglecting the flip side of the same coin: Global normative support inadvertently undermining the efficacy of local causes it otherwise helps publicize. Empirically, I look at three Korean colonial victim groups and their divergent paths to transnational redress.

题目：No Safe Haven: Operation Condor and Transnational Repression in South America

作者：Francesca Lessa，英国伦敦大学学院（UCL）美洲国际关系的副教授，隶属于UCL美洲研究所，研究领域侧重国际关系、人权和过渡时期司法；Lorena Balardini，阿根廷布宜诺斯艾利斯大学（UBA）的社会研究方法教师和研究员。

摘要：跨国镇压，即国家在跨境范围内有意针对难民和异议人士，在国际关系中是一个相对研究不足的课题。本文分析了为什么国家会联合起来在国外迫害政治对手，并解释了这种做法的差异。本文提出了一个跨国镇压合作理论，并以20世纪70年代的秃鹰行动为例进行了检验。通过秃鹰行动，南美的专制国家自愿放弃了主权的关键方面，以建立一个复杂的合作体系来针对国外的异议人士。该计划是这些国家针对国内政治反对派镇压政策的关键延伸，使他们能够在任何地方针对政治活跃的难民。流亡者被认为对这些专制政权的生存构成了实质威胁，因为他们有可能破坏政权的内部和外部安全，因此必须予以消灭。本文采用了一种跨学科的方法，结合了档案研究、访谈、审判观察和法律判决分析，以及从我们的新数据集——南美跨国侵犯人权行为数据库（1969 - 1981年）得出的结论。

Transnational repression, i.e., the deliberate targeting of refugees and dissidents by states across borders, is a relatively understudied subject in international relations. This article analyzes why states act together to persecute political opponents abroad and explains variations in such practices. It proposes a theory of cooperation in transnational repression and uses the case study of Operation Condor in the 1970s to test it. Through Operation Condor, South American authoritarian states willingly forewent key aspects of their sovereignty to establish a sophisticated system of cooperation to target dissidents abroad. This scheme was a critical extension of these countries’ domestic-level policies of repression against political opposition and enabled them to target politically active refugees wherever they were located. Exiles were perceived as constituting an existential threat to these autocracies’ survival, given their ability to potentially undermine both their internal and external regime security, which therefore warranted their elimination. We draw on an interdisciplinary methodology, which combines archival research, interviews, trial observation, and the analysis of legal verdicts, alongside conclusions derived from our novel dataset, the Database on South America's Transnational Human Rights Violations (1969–1981).

题目：Terrorists versus Rebels: The Strategic Use of Implicit Amnesty in the Peace Process in Mali

作者：Sophie T Rosenberg，英国伦敦政治经济学院（LSE）国际关系研究员。

摘要：为何政府会阻碍追究侵犯人权行为肇事者责任的努力，包括那些与被取缔团体有关联的行为者？本文探讨了马里政府在2012年至2017年和平谈判期间对一些知名人士，包括与圣战组织有联系的人员，支持或暂停问责努力的决定。通过追踪决定某些人因犯罪而受到制裁而其他人未受制裁的微观过程，本文展示了马里当局如何将隐性特赦措施作为某些叛乱领导人战略合法化的工具。这有助于将某些行为者构成合法反对派的一部分，并掩盖他们被指控的侵犯人权责任以及他们参与被排除在谈判之外的圣战组织的情况。本文提出了一个框架，展示了围绕问责的精英交易如何遵循四种政治逻辑，并展示了政府对司法的选择性态度如何使行为者利用和平进程作为赦免和政治重建的手段。这揭示了隐性特赦措施的政治意义，其实现了与正式特赦类似的目标，但又没有越过为国际罪行和严重侵犯人权行为提供正式特赦的红线。

Why do governments block efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable, including against actors linked to proscribed groups? This article explores the Malian government’s decisions to support or suspend accountability efforts against prominent individuals during the peace negotiations between 2012 and 2017, including those with links to jihadist groups. By tracing the micro-processes determining how and why certain individuals faced justice for crimes and not others, the article shows how Malian authorities used implicit amnesty measures as a tool of strategic legitimation for certain rebel leaders. This helped constitute certain actors as part of the legitimate opposition and gloss over both their alleged responsibility for human rights abuses and their involvement in jihadist groups excluded from the talks. This article presents a framework that demonstrates how elite bargaining around accountability follows four political rationales and shows how a government’s selective approach to justice can enable actors to use peace processes as a means of impunity and political rehabilitation. This reveals the political significance of implicit amnesty measures, which achieve similar aims as formal amnesties yet without crossing the red line of providing formal amnesty for international crimes and serious human rights violations.