别了布林肯主义！缅怀一个远离我们的世界秩序
文摘
教育
2025-01-04 09:02
美国
离特朗普上任还有不到三周的时间，苏联解体后的自由主义秩序也将随着特朗普再次上任更进一步被多极世界的现实主义政治取代。即将卸任的布林肯，则集中见证并主导了这一时期自由主义秩序思想与政策。1994年至1998年，布林肯担任总统特别助理、战略规划高级主管以及国家安全委员会演讲稿撰写高级主管。那时，他就为克林顿撰写关于国际自由秩序的稿子，后面从副国务卿到国务卿，也只是这一思想的延续。
布林肯在芝加哥大学办讨论会，我（蓝色衬衣）在奋笔疾书 搭全球化便车的发展机遇时代远离，现实主义政治和大国博弈的世界将会更加不确定。人类命运共同体的结构性因素，其实更多的是正在消解。面对这样的世界形式，谨慎不乐观也许才是理性的。![]()
之前回顾了本人2017年专访布林肯，并从他的Spotify的音乐创作推断其外交路数。今天就2017年布林肯与我们的研讨会，从他的视角出发，缅怀这一逐渐远离我们的世界秩序。布林肯组织我们进行模拟国家安全会议，对每一组讨论认真询问 这里有必要补充一句，作为拜登的嫡系以及外交政策的正宗代言人，经历二十多年的共事与友谊，不说布林肯主义就是拜登主义，至少最接近拜登主义。然而，随着美国一个政治时代的落幕，我们需要暂别布林肯主义——今天我们就系统的回顾一下。布林肯与”芝麻街“主人公格罗弗就难民问题尬聊。该节目主要观众群是学龄前儿童，帮助他们在上学前开始识数认字。布林肯支持更加自由派的难民安置，并在71届联合国大会主持难民事务峰会。他的在难民问题上的理念，与他的继父是纳粹集中营幸存者加难民有莫大关联。（参考下面第二篇文章）
Tony Blinken - The World Order Right NowWhen I step back and think about where we are as a country, and what I found especially over the last two years at the State Department as Deputy Secretary—basically travelling around the world, I was gone on the road every two or three weeks—is that there is a great debate going on in our country and also in a lot of other countries around the world, and a great new division that has kind of emerged. But it's not the traditional division that we've often seen between Left and Right, Democrat and Republican, conservative and liberal. It is—as I've seen it—a division between those who, thinking about how do we deal with these incredibly complicated forces of change that are assaulting us—between those on the one hand, who feel like the best idea to deal with these forces of change is to play a really strong defense, to kind of hunker down and disconnect, versus those on the other hand, who think that the best way to deal with change is for the United States to remain open and connected. In shorthand, it's a division between those who think our future should be shaped by walls and those who think it should be shaped by bridges. And I don't mean that in a pejorative sense, I mean, and I'll come to this. There is a very powerful rationale for those who are attracted to the idea of walls, and attracted to—I've seen it, pretty much, everywhere I've gone, and I see it in this country.每当我回过头思考美国当下的处境，特别是在外交部担任副国务卿的两年——这段时间我基本上是在世界各地兜兜转转，每隔两三个礼拜便踏上征程——我发现一场大辩论正在展开，不仅在美国，也在世界各地的其它国家。与此同时，一场巨大分歧也在悄然发生。这一分歧不再局限于日常的左派与右派、民主党和共和党、或是保守派和自由派的传统区分。我见到的这场分歧源于纷繁复杂的变革之力，这些力量不断侵袭，迫使人们想出应对之策——一方面，人们主张严防死守，低调求生并且保持孤立；相对的，另一些人认为保持开放和联系才对美国更有利。简言之，这一分歧源于我们对未来的不同认知，是要建桥还是建墙？此处并无褒贬之意，稍后我会谈到这一点。有足够的理由支持人们着迷于高墙而非桥梁，这一点不仅在美国，在我去过其它国家同样屡见不鲜。You've got this extraordinary pace and scope of change that we're all confronted with in our lives through technology. It's through the unbridled flow of information. It's through the sense that borders are eroding. And all of that, I think—and I'll be curious to get your reaction to this—but for a lot of people, that feeds a sort of sense of chaos and confusion and vulnerability. Add to that the fact that for all the progress that we make, it doesn't get evenly shared and distributed and that puts fear, resentment, and anger into the mix for a lot of people. Then you've got the fact on top of that, that what we've seen over the last 15 to 20 years is dramatic shifts in power among countries and even in a sense beyond them. New powers have emerged on the scene, but particular, non-state actors of very different kinds have come into play in ways that they never did before, using the technology, using the information. It might be the mayor of a megacity, it might be the head of a multi-national corporation. It might be some kind of super empowered group or individual.由于科技发展，我们的生活节奏和视野遭遇了剧烈变化。或者是由于无节制的信息流，抑或是由于我们意识中的边界正在逐渐模糊。而这一切——我很想知道你们的感受——在很多人心中滋生出混乱、迷茫和脆弱感。再加上我们取得的所有进步，并没有得到均等分配，很多人感到恐惧、怨恨和愤怒。联系过去15到20年，我们看到国家甚至更高层面间的巨大权力变动。很多新势力逐渐登上舞台，尤其是一些区别于以往的非国家行为体，它们以前所未有的方式参与博弈，把技术和信息作为武器。崛起者可能是某个巨型都市的市长，可能是某个跨国公司的负责人，也可能是被赋予了巨大权力的团体或个人。And if you're in government, what that means is, all of a sudden, all sorts of new actors and people can basically veto the things that you're trying to do. And that makes it a lot more difficult to govern. And that sort of sends a message to people that government's not very effective, it's not very efficient, it can't deliver the results that they want. And that kind of feeds a crisis of confidence in our institutions and our leaders. So I think for all of these reasons, there's been a lot of momentum in the sails of those who think that the best response to all of this is to build a wall. Let's play defense. And they tap into real concerns that I've heard when I traveled around the United States as well as in Europe. All of a sudden, to many people, to many Americans, a refugee becomes a threat to your security, your physical security. An immigrant becomes a threat to your identity. A trade agreement, or some kind of new invention becomes a threat to your job. And all of these alliances and international organizations that we've been a part of, that we've led—they just entangle us in other people's problems. They cost a lot of money that would be better spent at home. They lead to a lot of free-riders who take advantage of our wealth and prosperity.如果你在政府工作，这意味着突然之间，各种新的行为体和民众基本上都有能力否决你努力在做的事情。治理比以前困难得多。在某种程度上，民众接受到信息是：政府的治理既没有效果，也没有效率，更无法提供他们想要的结果。进而导致人们对公共机构和领导者产生信任危机。综合以上这些因素，已经有足够多的动力促使人们倾向于最好的回应方式即是建一堵墙，把自己防守起来。而这些声音恰好回应了人们的真实担忧，正如我在美国和欧洲见到的一样。突然之间，在很多民众和美国公民眼中，难民开始对人身安全构成威胁。过多的移民会使公民身份贬值。而贸易协议或新发明则可能导致失业。所有联盟和国际组织——我们已经加入的和我们领导着的——它们只会将我们拖入他人的问题中。这些机构花费的巨额财产，用在国内本会更好。它们还带来很多搭便车的人，坐享我们的财富与繁荣。And so you have the emergence, in our politics and in our government, of this kind of relentless focus on economic nationalism, protecting our sovereignty, protecting our identity. And that leads to practical policies that push back against free trade, that push back against immigration, that push back against globalization. And policies that say that we shouldn't be spending our time in these international organizations and these alliances and we shouldn't really be spending a lot of time trying to spread our values around the world. Let's just hunker down, play defense, and the shorthand is, "America first."于是在政治活动和政府中浮现出这样的声音：持续关注本国的经济民族主义，保护主权与国民身份。进而又出现一些非常实际的政策，反对自由贸易，反对移民，反对全球化。一些政策认为我们不该花时间在这些国际组织和联盟上，也没有必要在世界各地宣传自己的价值观。何不低调一些保持孤立呢，简言之，“美国优先”有什么不好？That's basically taken to its extreme, a real difference between what we've had over the last seven years—which I'll come to—which is this open, connected world where we thought that the world could be organized in a win-win fashion. That is, the success, prosperity, and security of other countries would also be good for us, and vice versa—to a world that's much more Hobbesian, zero-sum where, again, the best answer to people's problems is to build these walls.So that's how I see the kind of picture that we're faced with right now and the choice and the debate that's starting to really happen, and part of it played out in our last election. We see it playing out in elections across Europe right now, in France in a few weeks, maybe in Germany in a few months. We just had an election obviously in the Netherlands too, where it played out.建墙思维发展到极致便是如此，但是相比于过去7年，未来世界仍然保持开放与联系，我们相信未来可以实现双赢。换言之，其它国家的成功、繁荣和安全对我们也有好处，反之，在霍布斯式的零和博弈模式下，人们要解决问题的最好办法仍然是修墙。这正是我们现在所面临的图景，一部分抉择和争论刚刚开始，另一部分争论已在上次选举中显现结果。我们看到这一争论正逐渐展现在欧洲大陆的选举中，也许是在几周后的法国，或是几个月后的德国。在不久前的荷兰选举中，它显然已发挥了作用。Now, just to put my own bias on the table, but I'm really eager for people to disagree, to say so and to argue. I think this nationalist, wall-driven vision will run into a barrier of its own that makes it unrealistic, and that barrier is actually reality. When I think about it—and just based on my own experience—if our country, the United States, is disengaged and hunkered down, we'll wind up being worse off even in this much more complicated world. It would be much harder to build the kinds of partnerships that we need to meet a lot of the challenges that we face that even as a superpower, we can't face and deal with alone, and there really is no wall high enough or strong enough to protect us against it. We have to deal and we have to deal future with epidemics that cross frontiers, with hackers that delete firewalls, that terrorists that forge global networks, with aggressive countries that ignore borders. And, I believe we have to contend with oceans that rise and a planet that warms. So none of that lends itself to a neat unilateral solution, and none of that can be dealt with by trying to stay away from it and be immune to it.现在，容我提出自己的一些看法，我真心希望人们能提出不同意见，无论同意与否。在我看来，这种民族主义的、以墙为主导的愿景将会遇到障碍而无法实行，这一障碍来自于现实。当我根据以往的经验思考未来——随着这个世界变得更加复杂，美国若是脱离现实，龟缩不前，情况无疑会更糟。届时再去建立我们需要的伙伴关系将会困难得多，特别是在面临诸多挑战之时，即便作为超级大国，也无法独自应对，没有哪堵墙能保护我们独善其身。我们必须应对的未来，有着跨越国界的传染病，破坏防火墙的黑客，穿梭在全球网络间的恐怖分子，以及无视边界的侵略国家。此外，我们还要应对海平面上升和全球变暖。没有哪一项问题适合依靠理想的单边主义方略，也没有哪个问题可以仅仅依靠躲避就能不受波及。The other thing I've learned in the 24 years that I've been doing this is that the world isn't self-organizing. It doesn't just happen. Either someone steps up, or someones step up to do the organizing, or one of two things: either it doesn't happen, and that's a recipe for chaos—chaos is often filled with a lot of bad things—or it does happen, but to be nationalistic about it, if we're not the ones doing the organizing, it'll probably be organized in a way that's less conducive to advancing our own interests. So I think we have to be in this mix, and I think that the open and connected country that we built in a more open, connected world is still the right way to go. But that is what is at stake right now, that is what's being argued, that is what's being debated. And just to take you back briefly to where this all started. For the United States, it really started a little over seventy years ago, when we emerged from the Second World War. And we had a really big decision to make back then. We emerged as the dominant force in the world. All the other major powers had either been defeated, or so decimated by war that they were in no position to really compete with us.在从政的24年里，我还学到了另一件事：这个世界并非一开始就井然有序。事情不会自然发生。或是有人站出来担起重任，或是有人站出来维护秩序。若是没有人愿意站出来做任何事情，要么就是什么都不会发生，最终只能引发混乱——混乱中充斥着各种糟糕的事情；要么发生了什么，但却充满了民族主义的味道，如果我们不去创造秩序，它可能会以不太有利于促进美国利益的方式组织起来。在我看来，我们不得不参与其中，目前开放互通的国家在这个开放互通的世界中仍然在沿着的正确方向行进。然而这一点现在吉凶未卜，这正是目前争论的焦点。回到这一切开始的地方，往前回溯70年左右，当时美国刚刚脱离二战，举国上下面临一项重大抉择。我们成为了二战后的主导力量，其它强国要么战败，要么毁灭在战争中，没有哪个国家能与我们匹敌。And the folks who were leading the country at that time, I think, had three possible approaches to take: they could have—and actually started to—listen to a really, really strong desire on the part of Americans to just come home. We really put ourselves out there in two world wars. We hadn't suffered nearly as much as many other countries, but we lost a lot of people. An entire young generation had been sent off to war, it was time to come back. Bring them back, let's focus on ourselves. And we started to do that. The other possibility was having this incredible power that was really unrivaled. We could basically lord it over every other country and impose our will. But there was a third choice, and ultimately over a few years, especially during the Truman Administration, it was this third course that the leaders in this country decided on, and it was not to come home, it was not to impose our will on others. It was to try and take the lead in building an international system with common rules, common norms, institutions, things like the United Nations, like NATO, like the international financial institutions that would bind everyone, including the United States.在当时的国家领导者面前，有三种可能采取的策略：领导人可以听从美国民众的强烈愿望，让士兵们回家。我们把自己置身于两次世界大战，虽未像其它国家一样遭受毁灭性打击，但也损伤惨重。一代年轻人被送去战场，是时候让他们回来了。带他们回国，专注于自己的事情。我们开始行动。当时的另一种可能是，鉴于美国的力量如此强大，近乎于无敌。我们本可籍此主宰其它国家，强行施加自己的意志。此外还有第三种选择，最终在几年以后，特别是在杜鲁门政府时期，国家领导人决定选择这条道路——既不悉数回国，也不把自己的意志强加给别人。而是尝试着带头建立一套国际体系，遵循共同的规则与标准，建立统一的机构，诸如联合国和北约，以及其它的国际金融机构，最终将由这些机构约束每位成员，包括美国在内。And on one level, that seemed to be against our interest, because we were subjugating ourselves to the same rules and requirements as everyone else, at least in the theory of this. But the wisdom of it was, that traditionally, when one country emerges more powerful than others, throughout history, other countries have banded together to try to check its power. And part of the idea was that in actually creating an open system that anyone could join, and it bound everyone to the same rules including the most powerful country, we could prevent this so-called "bandwagon-ing effect" and get others to work with us and try to advance common projects.And, for the most part, that system did pretty well. I mean, it got a lot of things wrong, and there was a lot of trial-and-error along the way. We had a gap between ideals and reality that you could see in many, many places. The sort of remaining vestiges of colonialism that took a long time to get rid of, apartheid in South Africa that took even longer. The United States faced real challenges in the way we approached particular parts of the world, including Latin America, including Southeast Asia, and of course, a Cold War, an arms race, proxy wars, et cetera.某种程度来说，这似乎有损于国家利益，因为我们也像其它国家一样屈服于同样的规则和要求之下，至少在理论上如此。但这一方案智慧之处在于，传统上每当一个国家变得异常强大，其它国家就会联合起来试图制衡它的力量。而当时美国的部分想法是创建一个任何国家都可以加入的开放体系，将这一体系下的所有成员约束在相同规则下，最强大的国家也不例外，籍此我们可以避免所谓的“各自抱团”，转而让其它国家与美国合作，努力促成共同利益。在大多数情况下，这套体系做得相当不错。即便事情进展得并不顺利，一路上有很多试错的过程，理想和现实间的差距随处可见。即便殖民主义的残留问题消磨了很多时间，南非的种族隔离制耗时更久。即便在接触其它地区的过程中，美国遭遇了不少挑战，包括在拉丁美洲和东南亚，冷战与军备竞赛，以及代理人战争，等等。But—but, at least in my contention—the big picture that we were trying to fill in came out pretty well. We really wanted to prevent more wars among the very powers that had decimated the first half of the 20th century, and we did. And we wanted to create an open, predictable, rules-based space in which other countries would have a chance to emerge, and by and large, they did. I mean, the second half of the 20th century witnessed a remarkable transition of countries out of abject poverty, and tens of millions, hundreds of millions of people heading toward the middle class. And that didn't happen in a vacuum, it happened in the structure.And basically, what we hoped and what we saw increasingly throughout the second half of the 20th century was a world in which people , products, ideas, information, capital—moved about relatively freely, relatively securely, based on these rules that we helped establish, and guided and protected by institutions in which we played a lead role.不过至少在我看来，我们期待的世界图景仍进行得相当不错。我们想要防止强国之间发生更多战争，避免20世纪上半叶的毁灭性悲剧，这一点我们做到了。我们想创造一个开放、可预测、基于规则的空间，好让其它国家也有出头之日，这一目标总体上也已实现。20世纪下半叶见证了显著的转型期，很多国家摆脱了赤贫，数千万计、上亿人步入中产阶级。这一切并非凭空发生，而是结构的力量。基本上，在20世纪下半叶，我们所希望的和我们所看到世界呈现出这样趋势：人力、产品、思想、信息、资本相对自由安全地流通着，基于我们帮助制定的规则，并受到国际机构的指导保护——我们在其中发挥了主导作用。And that's really sort of where we are now. And what I'm seeing—and the reason we're having this big debate is that order is under challenge and it's under threat. It's under threat from the outside, by various authoritarian countries, hyper-nationalist countries as well as non-state actors who are challenging some of the rules and challenging some of the institutions. And in a sense, from their perspective,the ongoing success of this system is a threat to their own system.The more this model of liberal internationalism is sustained and succeeds, the more difficult it is for them to justify their own models to their own people, so they may have an interest in trying to undermine it.Similarly, terrorist groups and others are trying to test the resilience of the system. And there, if they can get people to doubt that we have the means and ability and will to protect ourselves, that can also undermine the system. And then to circle back to where we started: there are systemic problems that we have to grapple with and as I said, in a nutshell, for all the progress we've made, too many people and too many of our countries feel like they're left behind, like they're left out and they question why we're doing all of this. And if we can't figure out how to answer their questions, then I think the legitimacy of the whole project is in danger.这就是我们如今的处境。我观察到，我们争论的原因在于过去的秩序正在遭受挑战与威胁。这些威胁来自外部形形色色的独裁者、高涨的民族主义情绪以及一些非国家行为体，它们挑战着部分规则和制度。在某种意义上，从挑战者的视角出发，现存国际体系的一帆风顺对它们自己的制度形成威胁。自由国际主义模式越是持续和成功，挑战者就越是难以向国内民众证明自身模式的合法性，所以它们总是对破坏自由主义显得显得兴致勃勃。类似地，恐怖组织和其它团体也在试图考验现有体系的韧性。如此一来，他们若能促使人们怀疑我们保护自己的方法、能力、和决心，现有的体系也会遭到破坏。回到我们开始的地方：我们必须努力解决一些结构性的问题，正如我强调的那样。总之，在目前所取得的进展中，仍有太多国家和民众感觉自己被抛弃，甚至已经出局，他们质问我们的努力有何意义。如果不能找出正确答案，整个体系的合法性将岌岌可危。So, to conclude, if the real debate that we're faced with now is between a future of bridge-building or wall building, on the one hand, and if you're a bridge-builder, you have a lot of work to do. We have a lot of work to do to contend with the downsides of all the progress that we've been able to achieve, to contend with the concerns of those who are left out, left behind. How do we, for example, manage the three great migrations of our time? A migration of people—and we can come to that, and we will in a couple of weeks—of goods, products, and of ideas and information, because for all the positives they do bring with them real challenges. How do we think about what role the United States should be playing in international organizations and institutions and alliances in continuing to try to shape beliefs? And finally, and maybe most importantly, for those who are on the bridge-building side, how do we better engage our fellow citizens to do a much better job understanding their concerns, addressing their concerns, and hopefully, convincing them of the benefits of a country that remains open and connected to the world in a world that remains increasingly open and connected?总而言之，摆在我们面前的真实辩论在于未来到底应该建桥还是建墙？如果你是一个建桥者，你还有很多工作要去完成。我们任重而道远，在取得进步的同时也滋生了很多弊端，一些人被遗漏抛弃，他们的关切同样需要照料。例如，我们应该如何应对当代的三次大迁徙？人力的迁移（这一问题将在几周后讨论）、货物和产品的迁徙，以及的思想和信息的迁徙，它们在带来积极影响的同时，也带来了切实挑战。如何思考美国在国际组织、机构和联盟中扮演的角色，以此来继续塑造信仰？最后，也许最为重要的一点在于，对于那些想建设桥梁的人们，如何更好地与同胞接触，理解他们的担忧，解决他们的关切，并且最大程度地说服他们：在一个日益开放互通的世界中，保持开放和联系有利于我们的国家利益。In short, for me, this is a little bit like a period that many of your probably studied or if not, will study, and that's a period that really started a little over a hundred years ago when capitalism was flourishing in this country, but in a sense over-flourishing. And it was creating tremendous wealth, concentrated in a relatively small number of hands, but it was also doing damage to a lot of people at the same time in its excesses. And so we had a progressive era in this country that tried to round off the rough edges of capitalism and in effect, save it. And that was followed over this lengthy period of about 40 years with the New Deal which had the same basic purpose and same basic effect, which was to make sure that people in a capitalist system were nonetheless protected from its downsides. And I think that between progressivism and the New Deal Era, we basically saved capitalism from itself and it was able to flourish. Now, everything that we've stood for the last 70-plus years, in building this open and connected world, needs something similar, I think, if it's going to retain its legitimacy, and retain the support of people in this country, and people in countries around the world.简言之，对我来说，此时类似于你们已经了解或者将要研究的一个时期，那段时期起始于100多年前，当时资本主义在美国蓬勃发展，某种意义上可以说是过度繁荣。当时创造出巨大的财富使少数人成为巨富，同时由于其不加节制的属性对很多人造成损害。随后美国经历了一个进步的时代，努力绕开资本主义的不足之处并从实际上拯救它。在这之后，从罗斯福新政出台大约40年的漫长时期，我们怀有同样的目的和基本结果，这是为了确保民众从资本主义体系本身的缺陷中保护自己。在我看来，在进步主义和新政时代之间，我们基本上把资本主义从自身的缺陷中间拯救了出来，使它能够继续蓬勃发展。现在，为了建设一个开放互通的世界，我们过去70多年所坚持的一切亟需延续下去，尤其当我们努力保有其合法性，以及美国与世界各地民众支持的时候。关注羊说公众号：
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