《Review of Economic Studies》2025年1月刊目录及摘要

01.Labour Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Labour Market for the Disabled

劳动力市场筛选和社会保险设计：残疾人劳动力市场的均衡分析

Naoki Aizawa

Soojin Kim

Serena Rhee

摘要

This article studies how firms’ screening incentives in the labour market affect the optimal design of social insurance programs and quantitatively assesses the U.S. disability policies accounting for firms’ screening of the disabled. We develop an equilibrium search model where workers with different productivities have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage benefits and firms cannot offer an employment contract that explicitly depends on worker types. In this environment, firms may use contracts to screen out a certain type of workers, distorting employment rates and contracts in equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal structure of social insurance policies depends on firms’ screening incentives. We extend and structurally estimate this framework to quantitatively understand the inefficiencies arising from firms’ incentives to screen out disabled workers and examine the optimal joint design of disability insurance (DI) and various forms of firm subsidies. We find that hiring subsidies mitigate screening distortions; at the same time, they interact with DI by reducing the labour supply disincentives it generates. The optimal policy structure leads to a considerable welfare gain by simultaneously making firm subsidies and DI benefits more generous.

本文研究了企业在劳动力市场上的筛查激励如何影响社会保险计划的优化设计，并定量评估了美国的残疾政策，考虑了企业对残疾人的筛查。我们开发了一个均衡搜索模型，其中具有不同生产力的工人对非工资福利有异质的偏好，而公司无法提供明确依赖于工人类型的雇佣合同。在这种环境下，企业可能会利用合同来筛选出某种类型的工人，从而扭曲就业率和处于均衡状态的合同。因此，社会保险政策的最优结构取决于企业的筛选激励。我们扩展并结构性地估计了这个框架，以定量地了解公司筛选残疾工人的激励措施所产生的低效率，并检查残疾保险 （DI） 和各种形式的公司补贴的最佳联合设计。我们发现，招聘补贴减轻了筛选扭曲;同时，它们通过减少 DI 产生的劳动力供应抑制作用来与 DI 互动。最优的政策结构通过同时使公司补贴和 DI 福利更加慷慨，从而带来可观的福利收益。

02.Optimal Allocation via Waitlists: Simplicity Through Information Design

通过候补名单进行最佳分配：通过信息设计实现简单性

Itai Ashlagi

Faidra Monachou

Afshin Nikzad

摘要

We study non-monetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased-donor organs. An agent’s value for an object is supermodular in her type and the object quality, and her payoff is her value minus her waiting cost. The social planner’s objective is a weighted sum of allocative efficiency (i.e. the sum of values) and welfare (i.e. the sum of payoffs). We identify optimal mechanisms in the class of direct-revelation mechanisms. When the social planner can design the information disclosed to the agents about the objects, the optimal mechanism has a simple implementation: a first-come first-served waitlist with deferrals. In this implementation, the object qualities are partitioned into intervals; only the interval containing the object quality is disclosed to agents. When the planner places a higher weight on welfare, optimal disclosure policies become coarser.

我们研究非货币市场，其中随着时间的推移到达的物品被分配给具有私人类型的单位需求代理，例如在公共住房或已故供体器官的分配中。代理对对象的价值在其类型和对象质量上是超模的，她的回报是她的价值减去她的等待成本。社会规划师的目标是分配效率（即价值之和）和福利（即收益之和）的加权和。我们在直接启示机制类别中确定了最佳机制。当社会规划师可以设计向代理披露的有关对象的信息时，最佳机制就有一个简单的实现：一个先到先得的候补名单，并带有延迟。在此实现中，对象质量被划分为 intervals;只有包含对象质量的间隔才会向代理披露。当规划者更重视福利时，最佳披露政策就会变得更粗糙。

03.Inefficient Automation

自动化效率低下

Martin Beraja

Nathan Zorzi

摘要

How should the government respond to automation? We study this question in a heterogeneous agent model that takes worker displacement seriously. We recognize that displaced workers face two frictions in practice: reallocation is slow and borrowing is limited. We analyze a second best problem where the government can tax automation but lacks redistributive tools to fully alleviate borrowing frictions. The equilibrium is (constrained) inefficient and automation is excessive. Firms do not internalize that automation depresses the income of automated workers early on during the transition, precisely when they become borrowing constrained. The government finds it optimal to slow down automation on efficiency grounds, even when it does not value equity. Quantitatively, the optimal speed of automation is considerably lower than at the laissez-faire. The optimal policy improves efficiency and delivers meaningful welfare gains.

政府应该如何应对自动化？我们在一个认真对待工人流失的异构代理模型中研究这个问题。我们认识到，失业工人在实践中面临两个摩擦：重新分配缓慢和借款有限。我们分析了第二个最佳问题，即政府可以对自动化征税，但缺乏再分配工具来充分缓解借贷摩擦。均衡是（受约束的）低效，自动化是过度的。公司并没有认识到，自动化会在转型的早期压低自动化工人的收入，恰恰是当他们变得借贷受限时。政府发现，以效率为由放慢自动化速度是最好的，即使它不重视公平。从数量上讲，自动化的最佳速度远低于自由放任。最优政策提高了效率并带来了有意义的福利收益。

04.Migration and the Value of Social Networks 

迁移和社交网络的价值

Joshua E Blumenstock

Guanghua Chi

Xu Tan

摘要

How do social networks influence the decision to migrate? Prior work suggests two distinct mechanisms that have historically been difficult to differentiate: as a conduit of information, and as a source of social and economic support. We disentangle these mechanisms using a massive “digital trace” dataset that allows us to observe the migration decisions made by millions of individuals over several years, as well as the complete social network of each person in the months before and after migration. These data allow us to establish a new set of stylized facts about the relationship between social networks and migration. Our main analysis indicates that the average migrant derives more social capital from “interconnected” networks that provide social support than from “extensive” networks that efficiently transmit information.

社交网络如何影响迁移决策？先前的工作表明了两种历史上难以区分的不同机制：作为信息渠道，以及作为社会和经济支持的来源。我们使用一个庞大的 “数字追踪” 数据集来解开这些机制，该数据集使我们能够观察数百万人在几年内做出的迁移决定，以及每个人在迁移前后几个月内的完整社交网络。这些数据使我们能够建立一组关于社交网络和迁移之间关系的新的程式化事实。我们的主要分析表明，与从有效传输信息的“广泛”网络相比，普通移民从提供社会支持的“互连”网络中获得的社会资本更多。

05.Private Sector Provision as an “Escape Valve”: The Mexico Diabetes Experiment

将私营部门提供作为“逃生阀”：墨西哥糖尿病实验

Ari Bronsoler

Jonathan Gruber

Enrique Seira

摘要

Public health systems are dominant in much of the world but often face fiscal constraints that lead to rationing of care. As a result, private sector healthcare providers could in theory beneficially supplement public systems, but evaluating the benefits of private alternatives has been challenging. We evaluate a private supplement to the free public health system for one of the world’s deadliest health problems, diabetes. We estimate enormous impacts of the private supplement, increasing the share of those treated who are under control by 69%. This effect arises through both improved treatment compliance and health behavior. We find diabetes complications fall in the short run, and that the net costs of this intervention are one-third of the gross costs. The returns to private care do not appear to reflect more productive delivery but rather more attachment to medical care, offering lessons for improving the public system.

公共卫生系统在世界大部分地区占主导地位，但经常面临财政限制，导致护理配给。因此，私营部门医疗保健提供者理论上可以有益地补充公共系统，但评估私人替代方案的好处一直具有挑战性。我们评估了免费公共卫生系统的私人补充剂，用于治疗世界上最致命的健康问题之一——糖尿病。我们估计私人补充剂的巨大影响，使接受治疗的受控制者比例增加了 69%。这种效果是通过提高治疗依从性和健康行为而产生的。我们发现糖尿病并发症在短期内会下降，而这种干预的净成本是总成本的三分之一。私人护理的回归似乎并不反映出更有成效的交付，而是对医疗保健的更多依恋，为改善公共系统提供了经验教训。

06.Adaptive Estimation and Uniform Confidence Bands for Nonparametric Structural Functions and Elasticities

Xiaohong Chen

Timothy Christensen

Sid Kankanala

摘要

Harold L Cole

Daniel Neuhann

Guillermo Ordoñez

摘要

We develop a theory of information spillovers in sovereign bond markets in which investors can learn about default risk before trading in primary and secondary markets. If primary markets are structured as multi-unit discriminatory-price auctions, an endogenous winner’s curse leads to strategic complementarities in information acquisition. Shocks to default risk in one country may trigger crisis episodes with widespread information acquisition, sharp increases in the level and volatility of yields in risky countries, low and stable yields in safe countries, market segmentation, and arbitrage profits between primary and secondary markets. These predictions are consistent with the dynamics of auction informativeness during the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis, which we measure using the reaction of secondary market yields to primary market yields.

我们开发了主权债券市场信息溢出理论，投资者可以在一级和二级市场交易之前了解违约风险。如果一级市场的结构是多单位的歧视性价格拍卖，那么内生的赢家诅咒会导致信息获取的战略互补。一个国家违约风险的冲击可能会引发危机事件，包括广泛的信息获取、风险国家收益率水平和波动性的急剧增加、安全国家的低而稳定的收益率、市场分割以及一级和二级市场之间的套利利润。这些预测与欧元区主权债务危机期间拍卖信息量的动态一致，我们使用二级市场收益率对一级市场收益率的反应来衡量。

X D’Haultfœuille

C Gaillac

A Maurel

摘要

We study partially linear models when the outcome of interest and some of the covariates are observed in two different datasets that cannot be linked. This type of data combination problem arises very frequently in empirical microeconomics. Using recent tools from optimal transport theory, we derive a constructive characterization of the sharp identified set. We then build on this result and develop a novel inference method that exploits the specific geometric properties of the identified set. Our method exhibits good performances in finite samples, while remaining very tractable. We apply our approach to study intergenerational income mobility over the period 1850–1930 in the U.S. Our method allows us to relax the exclusion restrictions used in earlier work, while delivering confidence regions that are informative.

当在两个无法链接的不同数据集中观察到感兴趣的结果和一些协变量时，我们研究部分线性模型。这种类型的数据组合问题在实证微观经济学中非常频繁地出现。使用来自最优传输理论的最新工具，我们得出了尖锐识别集的建设性特征。然后，我们以这个结果为基础，开发了一种新的推理方法，利用了已识别集合的特定几何特性。我们的方法在有限样本中表现出良好的性能，同时保持非常易于处理。我们应用我们的方法来研究美国 1850 年至 1930 年期间的代际收入流动性。我们的方法使我们能够放宽早期工作中使用的排除限制，同时提供信息丰富的置信区。

Emmanuel Farhi

Jean Tirole

摘要

Authorities’ support policies shape the location and continuation of industrial and banking activity on their soil. Firms’ locus of activity depends on their prospect of receiving financial assistance in distress and therefore on factors such as countries’ relative resilience. We predict that global firms are global in life and national in death; and that they become less global when competition is more intense, times are turbulent, and international risk sharing (say, through swap lines) weak. We analyse the competitive benefits of industrial and banking policies as well as their limitations, such as currency appreciation.

当局的支持政策决定了工业和银行活动在其领土上的选址和延续。企业的活动地点取决于它们在困境中获得金融援助的前景，因此取决于国家相对韧性等因素。我们预测，全球公司在生活中是全球性的，在死亡上是国家的;当竞争更加激烈、时代动荡、国际风险分担（例如通过互换额度）较弱时，它们就会变得不那么全球化。我们分析了工业和银行政策的竞争优势及其局限性，例如货币升值。

Doris Folini

Aleksandra Friedl

Felix Kübler 

Simon Scheidegger

摘要

To analyse climate change mitigation strategies, economists rely on simplified climate models—so-called climate emulators—that provide a realistic quantitative link between  emissions and global warming at low computational costs. In this paper, we propose a generic and transparent calibration and evaluation strategy for these climate emulators that are based on freely and easily accessible state-of-the-art benchmark data from climate sciences. We demonstrate that the appropriate choice of the free model parameters can be of key relevance for the predicted social cost of carbon. The key idea we put forward is to calibrate the simplified climate models to benchmark data from comprehensive global climate models that took part in the coupled model intercomparison project, phase 5 (CMIP5). In particular, we propose to use four different test cases that are considered pivotal in the climate science literature: two highly idealized tests to separately calibrate and evaluate the carbon cycle and temperature response, an idealized test to quantify the transient climate response, and a final test to evaluate the performance for scenarios close to those arising from economic models, and that include exogenous forcing. As a concrete example, we re-calibrate the climate part of the widely used DICE-2016, fathoming the CMIP5 uncertainty range of model responses: the multi-model mean as well as extreme, but still permissible climate sensitivities and carbon cycle responses. We demonstrate that the functional form of the climate emulator of the DICE-2016 model is fit for purpose, despite its simplicity, but its carbon cycle and temperature equations are miscalibrated, leading to the conclusion that one may want to be skeptical about predictions derived from DICE-2016. We examine the importance of the calibration for the social cost of carbon in the context of a partial equilibrium setting where interest rates are exogenous, as well as the simple general equilibrium setting from DICE-2016. We find that the model uncertainty from different consistent calibrations of the climate system can change the social cost of carbon by a factor of 4 if one assumes a quadratic damage function. When calibrated to the multi-model mean, our model predicts similar values for the social cost of carbon as the original DICE-2016, but with a strongly reduced sensitivity to the discount rate and about 1 degree less long-term warming. The social cost of carbon in DICE-2016 is oversensitive to the discount rate, leading to extreme comparative statics responses to changes in preferences.

为了分析气候变化缓解策略，经济学家依靠简化的气候模型（即所谓的气候模拟器），这些模型提供了排放和全球变暖。在本文中，我们为这些气候模拟器提出了一种通用且透明的校准和评估策略，该策略基于来自气候科学的可免费且易于访问的最先进的基准数据。我们证明，自由模型参数的适当选择与预测的碳社会成本具有关键相关性。我们提出的关键思想是校准简化的气候模型，以对来自全球综合数据的基准数据进行基准测试 参与耦合模式比较项目第 5 阶段 （CMIP5） 的气候模式。特别是，我们建议使用四种在气候科学文献中被认为至关重要的不同测试用例：两个高度理想化的测试，分别校准和评估碳循环和温度响应，一个理想化的测试，量化瞬态气候响应，以及一个最终测试，以评估接近经济模型产生的情景的性能， 这包括外生强迫。作为一个具体的例子，我们重新校准了广泛使用的 DICE-2016 的气候部分，了解了模式响应的 CMIP5 不确定性范围：多模式平均值和极端，但仍然是允许的气候敏感性和碳循环响应。我们证明，DICE-2016 模型的气候模拟器的功能形式尽管简单，但其碳循环和温度方程校准错误，导致得出结论，人们可能希望对 DICE-2016 得出的预测持怀疑态度。我们研究了在利率为外生利率的部分均衡设置下碳社会成本校准的重要性，以及 DICE-2016 中的简单一般均衡设置。我们发现，如果假设二次损伤函数，气候系统的不同一致校准的模型不确定性可以将碳的社会成本改变 4 倍。当校准到多模型均值时，我们的模型预测的碳社会成本值与原始 DICE-2016 相似，但对贴现率的敏感性大大降低，长期变暖降低了约 1 度。DICE-2016 中碳的社会成本对贴现率过于敏感，导致对偏好变化的极端比较静态响应。