来自加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校的Robert M. Anderson、哈尔滨工业大学的端木昊随，合作撰写论文“ Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Meet Arrow-Debreu”，在计量经济学国际顶级期刊《Econometrica》线上正式发表。
Title: Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Meet Arrow-Debreu
配额交易和碳税遇上阿罗-德布鲁模型
Robert M. Anderson
加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校
端木昊随
哈尔滨工业大学
We propose two general equilibrium models, quota equilibrium and emission tax equilibrium. Government specifies quotas or taxes on emissions, then refrains from further action. All results remain valid regardless of how government chooses its emissions target. Quota equilibrium exists; the allocation of emission property rights impacts the distribution of welfare. If the only externality arises from total net emissions, quota equilibrium is Pareto optimal among all feasible outcomes with the same total net emissions. For certain tax rates, emission tax equilibrium may not exist. Every quota equilibrium can be realized as an emission tax equilibrium and vice versa. However, different quota prices may arise in equilibrium from a single quota, and different emission levels may arise in equilibrium from a single tax rate. This leads to inequivalence between quota and emission tax equilibria.
本文提出了两个一般均衡模型：配额均衡和排放税均衡。政府规定排放的配额或税收，然后不再采取进一步行动。无论政府如何选择排放目标，所有结果始终有效。配额均衡存在；排放产权的分配影响福利的分配。如果唯一的外部性来自总净排放，配额均衡在所有总净排放相同的可行结果中是帕累托最优的。对于某些税率，排放税均衡可能不存在。每一个配额均衡都可以实现为排放税均衡，反之亦然。然而，单一配额可能在均衡中产生不同的配额价格，单一税率可能在均衡中产生不同的排放水平。这导致了配额均衡和排放税均衡之间的不等价性。
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