据MS官网显示，来自香港城市大学的郭亮，撰写的独作论文“Designing Information to Engage Customers”，在国际管理学顶刊《Management Science 》线上正式发表。
Title: Designing Information to Engage Customers
设计信息以吸引客户
郭亮
香港城市大学
Collaborative customization is common in many markets. Sellers and customers can collectively discover the value of the product’s basic design. Customers’ willingness to pay can also be increased by being engaged to improve the product design. We study how a seller can design the information structure of collective learning about the product’s basic value to induce costly customer engagement. We consider a setting in which the parties’ expected payoffs are determined endogenously through the strategic interaction between seller pricing and customer engagement and purchase. The customer tends to be engaged in equilibrium, as the uncertainty on the product’s basic value becomes higher to dilute the responsiveness of the optimal price to customer engagement. Therefore, the seller seeks to maximize the probability of generating an intermediate posterior belief. Thus, the optimal information design involves either exaggerating or downplaying the product’s basic value when the prior is low or high, respectively. We show that considering restrictive information structures can generate qualitatively different implications. We also examine how the unobservability of engagement may influence the parties’ strategic interaction, their expected payoffs, and the seller-optimal information design. Interestingly, unobservability may lead to lower equilibrium engagement, hurt the seller, render the customer’s equilibrium expected payoff to increase as customer engagement becomes less important or more costly, and yield more or less information provision.
协同定制在许多市场中很常见。卖家和客户可以共同发现产品基本设计的价值。通过让客户参与改进产品设计，还可以提高他们的支付意愿。我们研究了卖家如何设计关于产品基本价值的集体学习信息结构，以激发客户进行高成本的参与。我们考虑了一个情境，其中各方的预期收益通过卖家定价与客户参与和购买之间的战略互动内生决定。随着产品基本价值的不确定性增加，客户倾向于在均衡中参与，这削弱了最优价格对客户参与的反应。因此，卖家寻求最大化生成中间后验信念的概率。因此，最优的信息设计涉及当先验较低时夸大产品的基本价值，或当先验较高时弱化产品的基本价值。我们表明，考虑有限的信息结构可能会产生 qualitatively 不同的影响。我们还考察了参与的不可观察性如何影响各方的战略互动、预期收益和卖家最优信息设计。有趣的是，不可观察性可能导致较低的均衡参与，伤害卖家，使客户的均衡预期收益在客户参与变得不那么重要或成本更高时增加，并可能导致更多或更少的信息提供。
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