重温佐尔坦：布雷顿森林体系III

We are witnessing the birth of Bretton Woods III – a new world (monetary) order centered around commodity-based currencies in the East that will likely weaken the Eurodollar system and also contribute to inflationary forces in the West.

我们正在目睹布雷顿森林体系III的诞生——一个以东方大宗商品货币为中心的新世界（货币）秩序，这可能会削弱离岸美元体系，也会助长西方的通胀力量。

A crisis is unfolding. A crisis of commodities. Commodities are collateral, and collateral is money, and this crisis is about the rising allure of outside money over inside money.

Bretton Woods II was built on inside money, and its foundations crumbled a week ago when the G7 seized Russia’s FX reserves…

一场危机正徐徐展开——这是关于大宗商品的危机。大宗商品是抵押品，而抵押品就是货币，而这场危机的关键在于外生货币相对于内生货币的吸引力越来越大。布雷顿森林体系II就建基于内生货币之上，而一周前，当七国集团没收俄罗斯外汇储备时，它的根基就坍塌了。

The beautiful paradox of linear rates (the stuff you trade and I write about) is that you need to think linear to find relative value most of the time, but you have to think non- linear to recognize and survive regime shifts. We are seeing a regime shift unfold in funding markets currently (which, as always, will pass), and a sea change in inflation dynamics and FX reserve management practices.

线性利率的美丽悖论在于：大多数情况下，你需要用线性思维来找到相对价值，但在制度更迭中你必须考虑非线性变化，才能生存下来。目前，我们正在看到融资市场的制度转变（一如既往，这一转变将会过去），通胀动态和外汇储备管理实践也将发生翻天覆地的变化。

We have two convictions today. First, June FRA-OIS spreads can widen more, to at least 50 bps, both due to funding premiums driven by commodity prices and the market taking out Fed hikes, and second, it’s a good time to get long shipping freight rates. Yes, freight rates, which, at the current juncture are linked to “geo-monetary” dynamics. Freight rates are the price of balance sheet for “commodity RV traders” (the commodity trading houses) and for sovereigns that can take the risk of moving and storing subprime, sanctioned commodities.

今天有两件事我们可以确定：首先，6月份FRA-OIS利差可能会进一步扩大，至少达到50个基点，这是由大宗商品价格造成的融资溢价和市场对美联储加息反应所共同推动的。其次，运费进入了涨价的好时节。在当下，运费与“地缘货币”动态息息相关。运费构成了“商品RV交易者”（商品贸易公司）和那些转移并储存受制裁大宗商品的主权国家的资产负债表价格。

First, funding. Since the start of the conflict in Ukraine, spot U.S. dollar Libor, FRA-OIS, and FX swaps have been showing signs of stress. Not much, but we hear two things from funding desks: cash is bid, and term cash is hard to come by. Normally, where o/n points trade in the FX swap market determines how the rest of the curve trades (low premia in o/n space mean low premia in term space). But these aren’t normal times. We have a crisis of sorts unfolding, and in a crisis, like in 2008, everyone lends at short maturities and the collapse in o/n premia is at the expense of term premia – in a crisis, term funding premia increase on the back of compressed o/n premia, as opposed to decline as they normally would.

首先，融资方面。自俄乌冲突开始以来，即期美元Libor、FRA-OIS和外汇互换一直显示出压力迹象。虽然不多，但我们从融资交易台听到两件事：现金需要竞价才能得到，而定期现金很难获得。通常情况下，外汇互换市场中的隔夜交易决定了曲线上其余期限的交易（隔夜的低溢价意味着较长期限的溢价也低）。但现在并非正常时期。我们正面临着某种危机，在危机中，比如2008年，每个人都只在短期借出资金，隔夜溢价的崩溃是以期限溢价为代价的——在危机中，定期融资溢价在隔夜溢价坍缩的背景下上升，而不是像通常那样随之下降。

Who drives the bid for cash, i.e. whose bid is driving term funding premia in this environment where lenders are less willing to lend cash for longer tenors? The commodities world, for three reasons. First, non-Russian commodities are more expensive due to the sanctions-driven supply shock that basically took Russian commodities “offline”. If you are a (leveraged) commodities trader, you need to borrow more from banks to buy commodities to move and sell them.

谁推动了对现金的追逐，即在贷款人不太愿意在更长期限放贷的环境下，谁的竞价推动了定期融资溢价？答案是大宗商品世界，有三个原因：首先，由于欧美制裁驱动的供给冲击，俄罗斯大宗商品被迫“下线”，非俄大宗商品的价格更高。如果你是（杠杆驱动的）大宗商品交易员，你需要从银行借更多的钱来购买大宗商品，并将其转移和出售。

Second, if you are long non-Russian commodities and short the related futures, you are likely having margin calls that need to be funded. Anyone in the commodities world is experiencing a perfect storm as correlations suddenly shot to 1, which is never a good thing. But that’s precisely what happens when the West sanctions the single-largest commodity producer of the world, which sells virtually everything. What we are seeing at the 50-year anniversary of the 1973 OPEC supply shock is something similar but substantially worse – the 2022 Russia supply shock, which isn’t driven by the supplier but the consumer.

第二，如果你做多非俄大宗商品，并做空相关期货合约，你可能需要追加保证金。大宗商品领域的任何人都在经历一场完美风暴，因为相关性突然飙升至1，这从来都不是一件好事。但这正是西方制裁世界上最大的单一大宗商品生产国时发生的事情，该国几乎什么都卖。在1973年欧佩克供给冲击50周年之际，我们看到了类似的情况，但实质上更糟——2022年的俄罗斯大宗商品供给冲击，并不是由供给者驱动的，而是由消费者驱动的。

Third, if you are short Russian commodities and long the related futures, then you are likely having margin calls too that also need to be funded like above.

第三，如果你做空俄罗斯大宗商品，并做多相关的期货合约，那么你可能同样需要追加保证金，这也需要像上面所说那样获取融资。

The aggressor in the geopolitical arena is being punished by sanctions, and sanctions- driven commodity price moves threaten financial stability in the West. Is there enough collateral for margin? Is there enough credit for margin? What happens to commodities futures exchanges if players fail? Are CCPs bulletproof?

俄罗斯正受到制裁的惩罚，而制裁驱动的大宗商品价格波动威胁着西方的金融稳定。保证金是否有足够的抵押品？保证金是否有足够的信用？如果参与者失败了，商品期货交易所会发生什么？CCP是防弹的吗？

I haven’t seen these topics in the wide offering of Financial Stability Reports, have you? Is the OTC commodity derivatives market the gorilla in the room? The commodities market is much more financialized and leveraged today than it was during the 1973 OPEC supply crisis, and today’s Russian supply crisis is much bigger, much more broad-based, and much more correlated. It’s scarier.

我还没有在各类金融稳定报告中见到这些相关话题，你呢？场外大宗商品衍生品市场的风险是如此之大，却被视而不见。今天的大宗商品市场比1973年欧佩克供给危机时期更加金融化和杠杆化，而且今天俄罗斯的供给危机规模更大、范围更广、相关性也更强。这是更加可怕的。

The higher non-Russian commodity prices get and the lower Russian commodity prices fall, the wider FRA-OIS will get, and if you want to express all this in the credit space, look at what CDS spreads on some bigger commodity traders have done since we published our Dispatch on commodity derivatives on Friday.

非俄大宗商品价格越高，俄罗斯大宗商品价格就越低，FRA-OIS利差就会越宽，如果你想在信用领域表达这一切，看看我们上周五发布大宗商品衍生品快讯以来，一些大型大宗商品交易商的CDS利差。

Spot on! Next, let’s move on to the freight rates and Bretton Woods III angles.

接下来，让我们转向运费和布雷顿森林体系III的角度。

Regular readers of this publication know of Perry Mehrling: my “Keynes” and father of the money view. As Perry Mehrling taught me, money has four prices:

本刊的老读者都知道佩里•梅林（Perry Mehrling）是我的“凯恩斯”和货币观之父。正如 Perry Mehrling所教导我的，货币有四种价格：

• Par – which is the price of different types of money and which means that cash, deposits, and money fund shares should always trade 1:1.

• 平价——是不同类型货币的价格，这意味着现金、存款和货币基金份额应该总是以1:1的比例互相交易。

• Interest – which is the price of future money and which refers to OIS and spreads around OIS across all possible money market segments.

• 利率——是未来货币的价格，它指的是OIS，以及所有可能的货币市场角落中基于OIS的利差。

• Exchange rate – the price of foreign money, i.e. U.S. dollars vs. the rest.

• 汇率——外国货币的价格，即美元对其他货币的价格。

• Price level – which is the price of commodities (all of the Russian, non-Russian stuff) and, via commodities, the price of everything else.

• 价格水平——指大宗商品（所有俄罗斯、非俄罗斯商品）的价格，以及受大宗商品价格影响的其他所有商品的价格。

Recall our conversation in Friday’s Dispatch about the parallels between the currently unfolding crisis and the crises of 1997, 1998, 2008, and 2020, and the conclusions that we drew from the review of these crises. These were that every crisis occurs at the intersection of funding and collateral markets and that, in the presently unfolding crisis, commodities are collateral, and more precisely, Russian commodities are like subprime collateral and all other stuff is prime. Now, back to the four prices of money and how they link up with these themes:

回想我们在周五简报中关于当前正在发生的危机与1997年、1998年、2008年和2020年危机之间的相似之处的对话，以及我们从这些危机回顾中所得出的结论。每一次危机都发生在融资和抵押品市场的交叉点，在目前正在展开的危机中，大宗商品是抵押品，更准确地说，俄罗斯大宗商品就像次级抵押品，而所有其他东西都是优先级抵押品。现在，回到货币的四种价格以及它们如何与这些主题联系起来：

• Par – this is what broke in 2008 when money funds broke the buck and funding markets froze from fearing subprime mortgage collateral.

• 平价——这就是2008年货币基金跌破美元面值，融资市场因担心次贷抵押品而冻结的情景。

• Interest – this is what broke in 2020 when bond RV trades crashed as the drawdown of credit lines pulled funding away from good collateral.

• 利率——这是 2020 年新冠疫情爆发时发生的情况，当时债券相对价值（RV）交易崩盘，因为争相提取信用额度使得资金从优质抵押品中撤出。

• Exchange rate – this is what broke in 1997 when collateral (FX reserves) went missing and U.S. dollar funding staged a sudden stop in Asia.

• 汇率——这是1997 年东南亚金融危机中，东南亚国家耗尽抵押品（外汇储备）后，美元融资在亚洲戛然而止。

• Price level – this is what’s in play as we speak…

• 物价水平——这就是现在正上演的......

…and if you see the pattern I see, you should be concerned. Commodities used to trade at tight spreads until now. There was one global market across all commodities that the large commodities traders arbitraged, much like a bond RV hedge funds arbitrage the cash-futures basis. Mortgages were like that too before 2008 – public or private, prime or subprime, they all traded at par until they didn’t.

若见我所见之趋势，汝应深感忧虑。到目前为止，大宗商品交易的价差一直很小，因为存在一个统一的全球市场可以套利，恰如很多债券RV对冲基金从事美债现券和期货基差的套利。房屋抵押贷款在 2008 年之前也是如此——无论是公共的或私人的，优先级或次 级，皆以平价交易，直到危机爆发，然后分崩离析。

Commodities no longer trade at par. There are Russian commodities that are collapsing in price and there are non-Russian commodities that are rallying – this rally is due to the 2022 Russia supply shock that we referred to above, which, once again, is driven by present and future sanctions-related stigma.

大宗商品不再以平价交易。俄罗斯大宗商品价格暴跌，而非俄大宗商品价格暴涨——这种上涨正是由于我们上面提到的2022年俄罗斯供给冲击所致，它受到当前和未来制裁相关的污名所推动。

It’s a buyers’ strike. Not a seller’s strike, to make things all the more absurd…

这是一场买家罢工，而不是卖家罢工，这让事情变得更加荒谬……

Russian commodities today are like subprime CDOs were in 2008. Conversely, non- Russian commodities are like U.S. Treasury securities were back in 2008. One collapsing in price, and the other one surging in price, with margin calls on both regardless of which side you are on. The “commodities basis” is soaring!

今天的俄罗斯大宗商品商品就像2008年的次级CDO一样。与之相反的是，非俄大宗商品就像2008年的美国国债一样。一个价格暴跌，另一个价格暴涨。无论你押哪一边，两边都会追加保证金。“大宗商品价差”正在飙升！

Commodity correlations are also at 1, which, to stress, is never a good thing.

大宗商品相关性也为1，强调一下，这从来都不是一件好事。

From the 1997, 2008, and 2020 crises, we also learned that every crisis is about the core vs. the periphery (large New York banks refusing to roll U.S. dollar funding in Southeast Asia in 1997; secured funding against subprime collateral to SIVs, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers in 2008; and secured funding against good collateral to RV hedge funds during 2020).

从1997年、2008年和2020年的危机中，我们也了解到，每一场危机都是核心 vs 外围：1997年，纽约大型银行拒绝在东南亚为美元融资展期；2008年，向结构性投资工具（SIV）、贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟提供以次贷为抵押品的抵押融资；以及2020年，向RV对冲基金提供以优质抵押品为担保的抵押融资。

And from these crises we also learned that someone, somehow must always provide a backstop – or as Perry Mehrling would say, an “outside spread” (the IMF in Southeast Asia in 1997 in exchange for Washington consensus-type structural reforms; the Fed backstopping the shadow banking system with a range of facilities in 2008 in exchange for Basel III; and the Fed backstopping RV funds with QE and the SRF in March 2020, in exchange for “we don’t yet know what,” but history says there will be a price).

从这些危机中我们也了解到，总得有人以某种方式提供后备支持，或者就像Perry Mehrling所说的“外部价差”：1997年，国际货币基金组织在东南亚进行华盛顿共识式的结构改革；2008年，美联储用一系列工具支持影子银行体系，以换取巴塞尔协议III的建立；2020年3月，美联储通过 QE 和常备回购便利SRF来支持RV对冲基金，以换取“我们尚未可知”的东 西，但历史将证明这一切都是有代价的。

Which brings us back to today – the present – and shipping freight rates.

这就把我们带回到今天——当下——和航运运费。

If we are right, and if this is a “crisis of commodities” —— a 2008 of sorts thematically, if not in terms of size or severity – who will provide the backstop?

如果我们是对的，如果这是一场“大宗商品危机”——主题上类似于2008年，如果不是从规模或严重程度上讲的话——那么谁将提供后备支持？

We see but only one entity: the PBoC!

我们只看到一个实体：中国人民银行！

Western central banks cannot close the gaping “commodities basis” because their respective sovereigns are the ones driving the sanctions. They will have to deal with the inflationary impacts of the “commodities basis” and try to cool them with rate hikes, but they will not be able to provide the outside spreads and won’t be able to provide balance sheet to close “Russia-non-Russia” spreads.

西方各国央行无法缩减巨大的“大宗商品价差”，因为正是它们各自的主权是推动制裁的力量。它们将不得不应对“大宗商品价差”引起的通胀，并试图通过加息为其降温，但他们将无法提供外部利差，也无法提供资产负债表空间来消除“俄罗斯与非俄罗斯”之间的价差。

Commodity traders won’t be able to either. Remember that Glencore rose from the ashes of Marc Rich + Co, and with Switzerland along with the sanctions, Swiss-based commodity traders will think twice about arbitraging the spreads.

大宗商品交易商也无法做到这一点。记住，嘉能可是从马克.里奇的灰烬中崛起的，再加上瑞士的制裁，总部位于瑞士的大宗商品交易商在进行价差套利时将三思而后行。

But the PBoC can…

但是中国人民银行可以......

…as it banks for a sovereign who can dance to its own tune. To make things more complicated, China is probably thinking deep and hard about the value of the inside money claims in its FX reserves, now that the G7 seized Russia’s.

因为它背靠着一个能随自己曲调起舞的政权。让事情变得更复杂的是，既然七国集团冻结了俄罗斯的外汇储备，中国可能正在深思其外汇储备中的价值。

The PBoC has two “geo-strategic” = “geo-financial” options…

中国人民银行有两个“地缘战略”或“地缘金融”选项：

…sell Treasuries to fund the leasing and filling of vessels to clean up subprime Russian commodities. That would hurt long-term Treasury yields and stabilize the commodities basis and would give the PBoC control over inflation in China, while the West would suffer commodity shortages, a recession, and higher yields.

其一，出售美国国债，为清仓俄罗斯大宗商品而租赁的船只和装卸设备提供资金。这将损害美国长期国债收益率，但能稳定中国的大宗商品价格，并让中国人民银行控制中国的通胀。而西方国家将面临大宗商品短缺、衰退和更高的收益率。

Yuck.

噫。

That can’t be good for long-term Treasury yields.

这对长期国债收益率来说不可能是好事。

The PBoC’s second option is to do its own version of QE – printing renminbi to buy Russian commodities. If so, that’s the birth of the Eurorenminbi market and China’s first real step to break the hegemony of the Eurodollar market. That is also inflationary for the West and means less demand for long-term Treasuries.

其二，实施自己版本的量化宽松。——印钞以购买俄罗斯大宗商品。如果是这样，这就是欧洲人民币（离岸人民币）市场的诞生，也是中国打破离岸美元市场霸权的第一步。这对西方国家来说也是通货膨胀的，并且意味着对美国长期国债的需求减少。

Yuck.

噫。

That can’t be good for long-term Treasury yields either.

这对长期国债收益率来说同样也不是好事。

The idea behind going long shipping freight rates is simple: the price the PBoC will be paying to lease ships to fill them up with Russian commodities can in theory rise as much as the collapse in the price of Russian commodities: a lot. Renting boats is like renting balance sheet at a dealer to fund inventory, and if China does not have enough storage capacity on the mainland, it will store Russian commodities on vessels floating on the seas, encumbering not balance sheet (the PBoC is funding all this by printing money) but shipping capacity, which, for the rest of the world, will also be inflationary.

看多海运运费背后的逻辑也很简单：从理论上讲，若将租赁船只装满俄罗斯大宗商品，中国央行将支付的租船价格涨幅，可能与俄罗斯大宗商品价格暴跌的幅度相当。租船就像交易商用资产负债表来为库存提供融资，如果中国大陆没有足够的存储容量，它将把俄罗斯大宗商品存储在海上漂浮的船只上，这不会使资产负债表受限（中国人民银行通过印钞为所有这一切提供资金），但会影响航运能力。而对世界其他地区来说，航运能力被挤占也会导致通货膨胀。

Once again: if you believe that the West can craft sanctions that maximize pain for Russia while minimizing financial stability risks and price stability risks in the West, you could also believe in unicorns. What G-SIBs are for financial stability...Glencore is for price stability.

再次重申，如果你相信西方的制裁能最大限度给俄罗斯带来痛苦，同时尽量降低西方金融稳定风险和价格稳定风险，那么你也可以相信世间还有独角兽。正如全球系统重要性银行（G-SIBs）之于金融稳定一样，嘉能可之于价格稳定也是同等重要。

In this instance, price instability (surging and collapsing commodity prices) feeds financial instability: margin calls may trigger the failure of some smaller commodity traders and maybe even some CCPs – the commodity exchanges.

在这种情况下，价格不稳定（大宗商品价格暴涨和暴跌）加剧了金融不稳定：追加保证金可能会引发一些规模较小的大宗商品交易商，甚至一些CCP（大宗商品交易所）的破产。

Again, commodity correlations are at 1, which is never a good thing…

再一次地，大宗商品相关性为1，这并不是个好事......

The Fed and other central banks will be able to provide liquidity backstops, but those will be Band-Aid solutions. The true problem here is not liquidity per se. Liquidity is just a manifestation of a larger problem, which is the Russian-non-Russian commodities basis, which only China will be able to close.

美联储和其他央行将能够提供一定的流动性支持，但这些解决方案治标不治本。这里真正的问题不是流动性本身，流动性只是一个更大问题的表象，这就是俄罗斯-非俄大宗商品价差，并且只有中国才能弥合。

Do you see what I see?

Do you see inflation in the West written all over this like I do?

汝见我所见乎？君不见这西方经济“字里行间”都写着通胀吗？

This crisis is not like anything we have seen since President Nixon took the U.S. dollar off gold in 1971 – the end of the era of commodity-based money.

自1971年尼克松总统将美元跟黄金脱钩以来，以大宗商品为基础的货币时代终结了，而这场危机与我们之前所看到的都不同。

When this crisis (and war) is over, the U.S. dollar should be much weaker and, on the flipside, the renminbi much stronger, backed by a basket of commodities.

当这场危机（和战争）结束时，美元应该会更加疲软，而另一方面，人民币应该更加坚挺，并得到一篮子大宗商品的支持。

From the Bretton Woods era backed by gold bullion, to Bretton Woods II backed by inside money (Treasuries with un-hedgeable confiscation risks), to Bretton Woods III backed by outside money (gold bullion and other commodities).

从黄金支撑的布雷顿森林体系时代，到内生货币支撑的布雷顿森林体系II（具有不可对冲的罚没风险的国债），再到外生货币支撑的布雷顿森林体系III（金条和大宗商品）。

After this war is over, “money” will never be the same again and Bitcoin (if it still exists then) will probably benefit from all this.

战争结束后，“货币”将不再是原来的样子，比特币（如果它仍然存在的话）可能会从这一切中受益。