莱希之死对伊朗未来的意义

文摘   2024-06-22 12:35   北京  
美国纽约客网站于2024年5月21日发表题为《莱希之死对伊朗未来的意义》的文章。以下观点不代表任何译者立场,现将全文翻译如下:


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What Raisi’s Death Means for the Future of Iran
莱希之死对伊朗未来的意义

For a country facing deep challenges, and with an aging Supreme Leader, the President’s demise has spawned an existential question: Who can sustain the revolution?
对于一个面临严峻挑战的国家来说,在最高领袖年事已高的情况下,总统的去世引发了一个存在性的问题:谁能维持革命?

By Robin Wright

罗宾·赖特

May 21, 2024

2024年5月21日


Photograph by Arash Khamooshi / NYT / Redux
摄影:阿拉什·哈莫希 / 《纽约时报》 / Redux

I last interviewed Ebrahim Raisi, the ultra-hard-line President of Iran, during his début appearance at the United Nations, in 2022. He spoke belligerently and with such speed that the interpreter struggled to keep up. He was the same on the U.N. dais, where he furiously waved a photo of General Qassem Soleimani and demanded that Donald Trump be tried for ordering his assassination—a “savage, illegal, immoral crime”—in a U.S. drone strike, in 2020. Back home, Iran was in turmoil after nationwide protests erupted in response to the death, in police custody, of a twenty-two-year-old named Mahsa Amini. She had been arrested for improper hijab; too much hair was showing. Raisi’s government ordered a brutal crackdown; security forces eventually killed more than five hundred protesters and arrested nearly twenty thousand. During an interview with a handful of journalists, conducted in the chandeliered ballroom of a New York hotel, Raisi was asked about the protests. “We’re all professionals,” he said, and insisted that we focus on the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program “rather than diverting to other issues.”
我最后一次采访伊朗极端强硬派总统易卜拉欣·莱希,是在2022年他首次出席联合国大会时。他言辞激烈,语速极快,以至于翻译都难以跟上。他在联合国讲台上也是如此,愤怒地挥舞着一张卡西姆·苏莱曼尼将军的照片,要求对下令进行无人机袭击的唐纳德·特朗普进行审判,表示这是一次“野蛮、非法、不道德的犯罪”。那是在2020年,苏莱曼尼在美国的无人机袭击中被杀。回到国内,伊朗因一名22岁女子玛莎·阿米尼在警方拘留期间死亡而引发的全国性抗议而陷入动荡。她因头巾佩戴不当头发露得太多而被捕。莱希政府下令进行残酷镇压,安全部队最终杀死了500多名抗议者,逮捕了近2万人。在纽约一家酒店的水晶吊灯大厅里,莱希与少数记者进行了采访,他被问及抗议活动时说:“我们都是专业人士。”并坚持要求我们关注伊朗核计划的争议,“而不是转移到其他问题上”。

Raisi, who had a manicured white beard and wore a black turban signifying his descent from the Prophet Muhammad, offered no hint of diplomatic compromises over the growing tensions with the West, as three of his predecessors had done during their U.N. visits. He instead boasted of a shifting world order that mobilized America’s rivals. After his election, in 2021, Raisi oversaw Tehran’s expanding military coöperation with Russia, which included the transfer of hundreds of drones for its war in Ukraine. He tightened ties with China, which is now the main importer of Iranian oil, thus bailing Iran out of the sanctions noose created by Washington. At home, however, Raisi was “derided for incompetence” and often the butt of relentless Persian humor, Vali Nasr, the former dean of the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, told me. Raisi invoked tougher enforcement of the hijab and restricted personal freedoms, which in turn sparked the widest protests against the regime since the 1979 Revolution. He was arguably Iran’s most unpopular President. “Whoever succeeds him could be construed by the public as an improvement,” Nasr added. Raisi was also the first President to be personally sanctioned by the U.S.
莱希留着修剪整齐的白胡子,戴着象征先祖是穆罕默德先知后裔的黑色头巾,与他之前的三位前任在联合国访问期间表现出的外交妥协态度截然不同。他自豪地宣称,世界秩序正在发生变化,美国的对手正在动员起来。在2021年当选后,莱希主持了伊朗与俄罗斯不断扩大的军事合作,包括向俄乌战争中转移数百架无人机。他加强了与中国的关系,后者现在是伊朗石油的主要出口国,帮助伊朗摆脱了华盛顿制造的制裁困境。然而,在伊朗国内,莱希“因无能而被嘲笑”,常常成为波斯幽默的笑柄,约翰霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院前院长瓦利·纳斯尔告诉我。莱希加强了对头巾的严格执法,限制了个人自由,从而引发了自1979年革命以来针对政权的最广泛的抗议活动。他可以说是伊朗最不受欢迎的总统。纳斯尔补充说:“无论谁继任他的位子,公众都可能觉得是一种进步。”莱希也是第一位被美国亲自制裁的总统。

Raisi died in a helicopter crash on Sunday. He was flying back from the country’s border with Azerbaijan, in the northwest, where he had celebrated the opening of a new dam with his Azerbaijani counterpart—a symbol of Iran’s strengthening relations with nations in the Caucasus. He flew in a convoy of three helicopters. Two landed safely after navigating thick fog over remote and rugged mountains. Raisi flew in a vintage U.S.-manufactured Bell helicopter, a model purchased during the monarchy in the nineteen-seventies. (Bell stopped producing it more than twenty-five years ago.) Iran has struggled to maintain its aging aircraft, and U.S. sanctions have complicated access to spare parts. Despite early conspiracy theories about deliberate sabotage of Raisi’s helicopter, which spread feverishly across social media, Iran attributed the crash to a “technical failure” after the charred wreckage was finally found early on Monday in a dense mountain forest. Eight others, including Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, were also killed.
莱希于周日在一次直升机坠毁事故中身亡。他当时正从西北部与阿塞拜疆接壤的边境返回,他刚与阿塞拜疆总统共同庆祝一座新水坝的启用——这是伊朗与高加索国家关系加强的象征。他乘坐的机队包括三架直升机。两架在穿越偏远崎岖的山区浓雾后安全着陆。莱希乘坐的是一架美国制造的老旧贝尔直升机,该型号是在上世纪70年代君主制时期购买的。(贝尔公司在25年前就停止生产该型号了。)伊朗一直在努力维护这些老旧的飞机,而美国的制裁使得获取零部件变得更加复杂。尽管莱希直升机是被故意破坏的早期阴谋论在社交媒体上迅速传播,但伊朗在最终找到坠机残骸后将事故归因于“技术故障”。周一凌晨,残骸在一片茂密的山林中被发现。包括伊朗外长侯赛因·阿米尔-阿卜杜拉希扬在内的其他八人也在坠机中丧生。

Raisi died at a precarious time for a revolutionary regime that is ever more xenophobic, paranoid, and rigid. His legacy is “a sharp deterioration of Iran’s relations with the West, owing to the failed efforts to negotiate a return to the 2015 nuclear agreement, increasingly close military ties with Russia, and the perilous tit for tat with Israel,” Ali Vaez, an Iran expert at the International Crisis Group, told me. His successor will have to deal with “deep social and economic discontent, regional instability and tension, and, over the longer horizon, the fate of the Islamic Republic.”
莱希在一个革命政权愈发排外、多疑和僵化的危险时刻去世。国际危机组织的伊朗问题专家阿里·瓦埃兹告诉我,莱西的遗产是“伊朗与西方关系急剧恶化,原因在于未能恢复2015年核协议,与俄罗斯的军事关系日益密切,以及与以色列之间危险的针锋相对”。他的继任者将不得不应对“深刻的社会和经济不满、区域不稳定和紧张局势,以及长远来看,伊斯兰共和国的命运。”

The theocracy in Tehran is in deep trouble on every front. “The divide between the population and leadership has only increased—as evidenced by public apathy” at parliamentary elections held in March, Sanam Vakil, an Iran expert at Chatham House, told me. Only forty-one per cent of eligible voters cast ballots—the lowest percentage since the revolution. The reason for public disillusionment is partly economic. Inflation hovered at thirty-five per cent in February; the Iranian rial plummeted to an all-time low last year. Under Raisi, the government cut back on food and fuel subsidies and did little to sustain support for health, education, and welfare. The average Iranian feels trapped in economic purgatory. And, in April, the regime, which has the largest missile arsenal in the region, was humiliated militarily. It fired more than three hundred ballistic missiles and drones at Israel in retaliation for Israel’s attack on an Iranian diplomatic facility in Syria, which killed three top generals. Iran’s weaponry either failed, was shot down, or was intercepted by Israeli, U.S., and Jordanian forces, among unnamed others. The U.S. called Iran’s brazen operation “embarrassing” and a “spectacular” failure.
德黑兰的神权政体陷入了全方位的深重困境。查塔姆研究所的伊朗问题专家萨南·瓦基尔告诉我:“民众与领导层之间的鸿沟不断扩大,3月份议会选举中公众的冷漠就是证据。”只有41%的合格选民投票,是革命以来最低的投票率。公众幻灭的原因部分在于经济问题。今年2月,通货膨胀率徘徊在35%左右;伊朗货币里亚尔去年跌至历史最低点。在莱希的领导下,政府削减了食品和燃料补贴,并未采取措施维持对医疗、教育和福利的支持。普通伊朗人感觉被困在经济炼狱中。而在4月,坐拥地区最大导弹库的伊朗政权在军事上遭到了羞辱。以色列对伊朗驻叙利亚外交设施进行了袭击(导致三名高级将领死亡),出于报复伊朗向以色列发射了300多枚弹道导弹和无人机,但这些武器要么失灵,要么被以色列、美国和约旦等多方部队击落或拦截。美国称伊朗的鲁莽行动“令人尴尬”,是一场“壮观的”失败。

Raisi’s demise also comes at a time when the regime is down to a small core. Like other revolutions, Iran’s has eaten its own. Past Presidents of widely diverse views—including Hassan Rouhani, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Khatami, and Hashemi Rafsanjani—have been viciously sidelined, officially silenced, denied foreign travel, or prevented from running for office again. The first President, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, shaved his trademark mustache and secretly fled the country wearing a skirt. Vice-Presidents have been imprisoned. A former Prime Minister and a speaker of parliament have been under house arrest since 2011. The list of acceptable political candidates—who are tightly vetted by a twelve-man Guardian Council of Islamic clerics and jurists—is tiny. “Raisi was not a beloved or charismatic figure,” Vakil told me. He was best known among Iranians as a ruthless justice minister and earlier for his role on a “death commission” that dispatched some five thousand dissidents to the hangman over a matter of weeks in 1988. “He was a loyal apparatchik,” Vakil added. But “the circle of obvious functionary leaders continues to shrink, and it will be hard to find one person to tick the Presidential, ideological, and succession boxes that Raisi seemed to fit.”
莱希的去世正值伊朗政权的核心力量日益缩小之际。像其他革命一样,伊朗的革命也吞噬了自己。过去的总统——包括哈桑·鲁哈尼、马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德、穆罕默德·哈塔米和哈什米·拉夫桑贾尼——都被残酷地排挤、禁言、禁止出国,或被阻止再次竞选公职。第一任总统阿布哈桑·巴尼萨德剃掉了他标志性的胡子,穿着裙子秘密逃离了国家。副总统们被监禁。一名前总理和议会议长自2011年以来一直被软禁。十二人组成的宗教法学家和伊斯兰教士的监护委员会会严格审查政治候选人,但人选非常有限。瓦基尔告诉我:“莱希既不受爱戴也不具备魅力。”伊朗人最熟悉他的是他担任司法部长时的无情以及他在1988年“死亡委员会”中的角色,该委员会在几周内将约五千名异见者送上绞刑架。瓦基尔补充说:“他是一个忠诚的官僚。”但是“很明显,职能领导人的圈子持续缩小,很难找到一个人能满足莱希似乎符合的总统、意识形态和继任等要求。”

Iran’s policies—both foreign and domestic—are unlikely to budge even a bit. But the nation is deeply shaken about the future. For the regime’s supporters and dissidents alike, Raisi’s death has spawned an existential question: Who will lead Iran, especially with the looming death of Ayatollah Khamenei? The Supreme Leader, who has been the ultimate power in the Islamic Republic since 1989, turns eighty-six in July; he has suffered from prostate cancer. Raisi, who was a Khamenei acolyte from Mashhad, the holiest city in Iran and a pilgrimage site visited by millions of Shiites every year, was widely expected to oversee the transition. (He was due to run for reëlection next year and, if successful, would have held power until 2029.) Raisi had even been floated as a potential successor to Khamenei. “Raisi’s death disrupts the plans the hard right has had all along to consolidate power,” Nasr said. Vaez noted, “His death introduces a major element of uncertainty” and “heightens the already significant stakes for his successor.”
伊朗的政策——无论是对外还是对内——都不太可能有任何变化。但这个国家对未来深感不安。对于政权的支持者和异见者来说,莱希之死引发了一个存在主义问题:谁将领导伊朗,特别是在哈梅内伊大限将至的情况下?自1989年以来一直是伊斯兰共和国最高权力领导人的最高领袖将在7月满86岁;他患有前列腺癌。莱西是哈梅内伊的忠实追随者,来自伊朗最神圣的城市、每年有数百万什叶派信徒朝圣的马什哈德,人们普遍认为他将监督过渡工作。(他原本应在明年竞选连任,如果成功,他将掌权至2029年。)莱希甚至被认为是哈梅内伊的潜在继任者。纳斯尔说:“莱希之死打乱了极右翼强硬派一直以来巩固权力的计划。”瓦埃兹指出,“他的去世引入了一个重大的不确定因素”,并“加剧了继任者已经面临的巨大风险。”

The succession race is now “wide open,” Nasr added. The other name that has long been floated is Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader’s fifty-five-year-old son and closest adviser. But choosing him would create a clerical dynasty, and the revolution was all about ending one family’s control of all levers of power. A big question is who else can emerge as a viable candidate for President—a new election has been set for June 28th—who also has the credentials to be a potential successor to the Supreme Leader. Khamenei himself was President when he was elevated to the role of Supreme Leader after the death of Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the revolution. There have been no other transitions. “All viable candidates with name recognition, capable of winning without controversy, are from the more middle-of-the-road conservative camp or moderates of the Rouhani type,” Nasr told me. Insisting on a hard-right candidate who “no one believes is credible” is risky, he said. The regime needs turnout now more than ever to prove that the Islamic Republic can endure. If Tehran rehabilitates more moderate candidates, Vakil said, “it will point to the importance of building stronger domestic consensus at the élite and popular level.” The transition is already likely to be chaotic behind the scenes.
纳斯尔补充说,继任竞争现在“完全开放”。另一个长期被提及的名字是最高领袖55岁的儿子兼最亲密的顾问穆吉塔巴·哈梅内伊。但选择他会创造一个教权王朝,而革命的全部意义正是要结束一个家族对所有权力的控制。一个重要的问题是,谁还能成为一个有竞争力的总统候选人——新的选举定于6月28日举行——这个人也可能有资格成为最高领袖的潜在继任者。哈梅内伊本人在革命领袖鲁霍拉·霍梅尼去世后被提为最高领袖时担任总统,没有其他过渡。纳斯尔告诉我:“所有知名、能够毫无争议地情况下获胜的可行候选人,都来自于更中间保守派阵营或像鲁哈尼这样的温和派。”他表示,强硬推选一个“没有人认为有信誉”的极右翼候选人是有风险的。现在,政权比以往任何时候都更需要高投票率来证明伊斯兰共和国能够持续。瓦基尔说,如果德黑兰重新启用更温和的候选人,“这将表明在精英和民众层面上建立更强大国内共识的重要性。”这种过渡在幕后可能已经注定会混乱不堪。

The stakes are not just about one man at the top, however. Since the revolution, the central dispute has been whether the Islamic Republic of Iran is foremost Islamic or a republic. In other words, should it adhere rigidly to God’s law outlined in the Quran and bestow political supremacy on clerics? Or does it embrace man’s law, based on a modern constitution, and invest the most power in elected representatives of the people, with the clerics as advisers? Centrists like Rouhani (Raisi’s predecessor) and reformers like Khatami (three Presidents ago) wanted to nudge a revolutionary regime in the direction of a normal state that assured more personal freedoms and engaged with the world, including the U.S. This fundamental debate within the regime has resonated in all major policy decisions. In recent years, the absolutist ideologues have quashed all others.
然而,问题的关键并不仅仅在于领导者个人的更替。自革命以来,伊朗伊斯兰共和国的核心争议一直是它首先是伊斯兰的还是共和的。换句话说,它应该严格遵循《古兰经》中规定的神法,并将政治权力授予教士,还是应当遵循基于现代宪法的世俗法律,将最大的权力赋予民选代表,而教士仅作为顾问?像莱西的前任鲁哈尼这样的中间派和像三任之前的改革派哈塔米希望将革命政权推向一个正常国家,确保更多的个人自由并与包括美国在内的世界接触。这一根本争论影响了政权内的所有重大政策决策。近年来,绝对主义的意识形态者压制了所有其他声音。

After Raisi went missing, Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, quickly took to social media—including in English, on Twitter, which is otherwise banned in Iran—to reassure the nation. He pledged stability during the transition of power. “The nation doesn’t need to be worried or anxious as the administration of the country will not be disrupted at all,” he wrote. Mohammad Mokhber, the most senior of Iran’s twelve Vice-Presidents, will serve as acting President until a new election is held, within fifty days, as mandated by the constitution. Mokhber fought with the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq War, in the nineteen-eighties, then worked in the Mostazafan Foundation that oversaw benefits to the “oppressed” and families of the fallen. (The wealthy foundation and its fifty subsidiaries were sanctioned by the U.S. in 2020.) Mokhber also worked at Sina Bank. (It was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2018 for providing financial support to a paramilitary group that “recruits and trains child soldiers.”) He then joined Setad, a vast financial network controlled by the Supreme Leader. (It, too, has been sanctioned by the U.S.) But Mokhber may only be a placeholder, as Vice-Presidents have historically not been considered successors to the head of government. Ali Bagheri Kani, the lead Iranian negotiator in talks revived by the Biden Administration on Iran’s nuclear program, will become interim foreign minister. (In the end, Iran balked at the terms, and the initiative collapsed.)
在莱希失踪后,最高领袖哈梅内伊迅速通过社交媒体,包括在伊朗被禁的推特上的英文安抚全国。他承诺在权力过渡期间保持稳定。他写道:“国家不需要担心或焦虑,因为国家的行政不会受到任何干扰。”伊朗的十二位副总统中最资深的穆罕默德·穆赫贝尔将担任代理总统,直到根据宪法规定在五十天内举行新选举。穆赫贝尔在两伊战争期间曾与革命卫队并肩作战,随后在负责为“受压迫者”和烈士家属提供福利的莫斯塔扎法恩基金会工作。(2020年,美国对这个富有的基金会及其五十个子公司实施制裁。)穆赫贝尔还在西纳银行工作过。(2018年,美国因银行向一个“招募和训练儿童兵”的准军事组织提供金融支持而实施制裁。)随后他加入了由最高领袖控制的庞大金融网络塞塔德,也是被美国制裁的。然而,穆赫贝尔可能只是一个临时人选,因为历史上副总统通常不被认为是政府首脑的继任者。由拜登政府恢复的伊朗核计划谈判的首席伊朗谈判代表阿里·巴格里·卡尼将成为临时外长。(最终,伊朗对条款产生异议,倡议破产。)

The initial U.S. reaction to Raisi’s death was low-key. The State Department expressed “official condolences.” In a statement, it said, “As Iran selects a new president, we reaffirm our support for the Iranian people and their struggle for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” It confirmed that Tehran reached out to the U.S. for assistance after the crash and that the U.S. agreed, as it would do “in response to any request by a foreign government in this sort of situation,” the spokesman Matthew Miller told reporters. (Ultimately, the U.S. was not able to provide that assistance because of logistical issues.) The White House was tougher. John Kirby, the strategic coördinator for the National Security Council, told a small group of reporters on Monday that Raisi was responsible for “atrocious” acts of repression and had a major role in aiding proxies in ways that contributed to the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7th. “This was a man who had a lot of blood on his hands,” he said. Tehran charged that the U.S. was partly responsible for the crash, since U.S. sanctions had hampered Iran’s ability to get spare parts to maintain the aging American aircraft. “Utterly baseless,” Kirby said. “But it’s not surprising that the Iranian regime would once again try to find a way to blame the United States for problems of its own making.”
美国对莱希去世的初步反应相对低调。国务院表示了“官方哀悼”。在声明中称:“在伊朗选 出新总统之际,我们重申支持伊朗人民及其争取人权和基本自由的斗争。”声明还证实,坠机后德黑兰曾向美国寻求帮助,美国同意提供帮助,“就像在这种情况下对任何外国政府的请求一样”,发言人马修·米勒告诉记者。(最终,由于物流问题,美国无法提供帮助。)白宫的态度更为强硬。国家安全委员会战略协调员约翰·柯比周一在小规模记者会见中称,莱希对“骇人听闻的”镇压行为负有责任,并在援助代理人的过程中发挥了重要作用,这些行为促成了10月7日哈马斯对以色列的袭击。“这是一个手上沾满鲜血的人,”他说。德黑兰指责美国应对坠机负有部分责任,因为美国制裁阻碍了伊朗获取维护老旧美国产飞机所需的零部件。柯比回应称:“无稽之谈。”但他补充道,“但伊朗政权又一次试图将其自身问题归咎于美国,这并不奇怪。” ♦

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