讲座题目
Information Asymmetries in College Admissions
内容简介
This paper provides quasi-experimental evidence on the value of information provision in centralized college admissions. The variation in access to information stems from a batched dynamic matching mechanism adopted in the Chinese province of Inner Mongolia. Students are grouped into batches based on test scores and face different deadlines to finalize their choice submission: students just above the cutoffs (JACs) finalize their choices along with their higher-scoring peers and thus only observe the tentative choices, whereas students just below the cutoffs (JBCs) can observe the finalized choices of higher-scoring peers. Using administrative data linked with university post-graduation outcomes, we find that JBCs are more likely to apply for colleges considered reach options and are admitted to significantly more selective colleges. These colleges are more likely to be out-of-province and with graduates having higher starting salaries and higher graduate school attendance rates. The effects are more pronounced near batch cutoffs where access to such information is more important.
主讲人
康乐 特任副研究员
（南京大学教育研究院）
讲座时间
2024年12月5日（周四）
13:00—14:30
讲座地点
求是楼347会议室
讲座语言
中英文
主持人
王非 副教授
参与人员
热烈欢迎广大师生参加。
编辑：杨璧源 蔡丽琪 王鸿飞
审核：陈姚
