What would a US-China trade war mean for Asia? 1st thoughts
Tariffs as a baseline
中美贸易战对亚洲意味着什么？
第一反应
以关税为基准
A Trump 2.0 Presidency has significantly increased the odds of the U.S. imposing tariffs on China. Our base case therefore assumes effective tariffs of 60% on Chinese imports, as was telegraphed in the campaign. In turn, our China team estimates that, ceteris paribus, the damage to growth from such a move could be large—to the tune of almost 2 percentage points in 2025, reflecting a sharp drop-off in exports to the U.S., a hit on business confidence and investment and, therefore, on consumption.
在“特朗普2.0时代”，美国对中国进口商品征收高额关税的可能性显著增加。基于此，我们的基本假设是对中国进口商品征收60%的有效关税，这一政策动向在特朗普的竞选活动中已有所体现。据分析，这一关税政策若实施，将对中国经济产生重大影响。具体而言，到2025年，中国经济增长率可能因对美出口大幅下降而减少近2个百分点。这种减少不仅源于出口的直接下降，还可能因为商业信心和投资的下降而进一步影响到消费领域。
However, this is bound to attract a policy response from the Chinese authorities, both to mitigate growth pressures domestically, and retaliate externally. On the former we expect greater fiscal and monetary support and a potentially sharp depreciation of the Chinese Yuan (see details here). The latter is unlikely to offset the loss of competitiveness from the tariffs in the U.S. Instead, the goal is likely to be to improve competitiveness and increase export market share outside the U.S.
然而，这必然会引起中国官方的政策回应，旨在缓解国内增长压力并对外进行报复。预计中国会加大财政和货币政策支持，并可能让rmb贬值。虽然这些措施不太可能完全抵消美国关税带来的影响，但目的是提高竞争力，增加对其他国家的出口份额。
It must be noted that in the 2018 trade war, China’s export share fell in the U.S. but exports/GDP rose in the aggregate because China meaningfully increased its market share outside the U.S. All told, incorporating the fiscal and monetary policy response and the weaker currency, we expect Chinese growth in 2025 to be 3.9% vis-a-vis 4.6% in the absence of tariffs. While the first quarter is likely to benefit from a front-loading of exports before the tariff hikes are potentially implemented, growth is expected to be very weak (in the 1-2% range) in the middle of the year .
必须指出，在2018年贸易战中，尽管中国对美国的出口份额下降，但由于中国有意识地扩大了在美国以外的市场份额，其出口/GDP总量实际上上升了。综合考虑财政和货币政策的反应以及货币贬值，我们预计2025年中国的增长率为3.9%，若无关税影响则为4.6%。尽管第一季度可能因出口提前而受益，但预计年中增长将非常疲软，大约在1-2%之间。
The collateral damage
What does this mean for the rest of Asia? Before going into the magnitude of the growth hits, it’s important to identify the different channels of transmission:
附带损害
这对亚洲其他地区意味着什么？在讨论增长冲击的规模之前，重要的是要确定不同的传播渠道：
First, the region’s exports to China constitute almost a quarter of its total exports, though this has edged down in recent years and varies sharply across countries. But a large China growth hit will have a first-order impact through lower exports .
首先，该地区对中国的出口占其总出口的近四分之一，尽管这一比例近年来有所下降，且各国之间存在显著差异。如果中国经济受到严重打击，那么通过出口减少将产生直接影响。
Second, and often less appreciated, U.S. tariffs may increasingly induce China to redirect its excess capacity to the rest of Asia both in low-margin manufactured goods (e.g., textiles, steel) and high-value added products (e.g., electric vehicles), which risks rendering domestic businesses uncompetitive and making the transition to new economy sectors more challenging for economies in the region. For instance, Thailand has explicitly named China as the source of imported deflation while Indonesia has also announced tariffs against China across a suite of goods.
其次，往往被忽视的是，美国的关税可能会促使中国将其过剩产能转向亚洲其他国家，既包括低利润的制造业产品（如纺织品、钢铁），也包括高附加值产品（如电动汽车）。这可能会使区域内的本土企业竞争力下降，同时也增加了这些经济体向新经济领域转型的难度。例如，泰国已经明确指出中国是进口通缩的来源，而印尼也宣布对中国的一系列商品征收关税。
Third, if the CNY were to depreciate meaningfully, it’s likely that many regional currencies will have to depreciate but may be unable or unwilling (for financial stability concerns) to depreciate in tandem with the CNY—a phenomenon observed in the 2018-2019 trade war. This would result in a loss of competitiveness of Asian economies vis-a-vis China in third markets.
第三，如果人民币有意贬值，那么许多区域货币可能也必须跟随贬值，但它们可能由于金融稳定的考虑而无法或不愿意与人民币同步贬值，这是在2018至2019年贸易战期间观察到的现象。这种情况可能会导致亚洲经济体在第三方市场上相对于中国失去竞争力。
To be sure, ASEAN economies did not appear to lose market share to China in developed markets outside the U.S. during the 2018-19 trade war, but the latter did increase its market share in Africa and Latin America. So depending on how relative currencies evolve, the competitiveness channel in third markets will need to be closely watched.
可以肯定的是，在2018至2019年的贸易战期间，东盟经济体在除美国以外的发达市场并没有将市场份额让给中国。但与此同时，中国在非洲和拉丁美洲的市场份额确实有所增加。因此，考虑到货币相对价值的变化，我们需要密切关注中国与东盟在这些新兴市场的竞争力变化。
Fourth, to the extent that the region's currencies will face some depreciation pressures (both because the CNYis depreciating and also because, more broadly, the new administration’s policies would argue for a stronger dollar) it will become harder for some of the region's central banks to cut interest rates (as we discuss in more detail below) with its attendant effects on growth.
第四，由于该地区货币将面临一定的贬值压力（既因为人民币贬值，也因为更广泛的新政府政策将支持美元走强），这将使得该地区一些中央银行更难降息（正如我们在下文中更详细讨论的），降息对增长的影响也将受到影响。
Fifth, all of the aforementioned channels are likely to significantly dent business confidence and sentiment in the region.Together these channels are expected to deliver a non-trivial growth shock to some countries in the region. To be sure, there are potential growth mitigants. In the last trade war, some Asian economies benefitted from trans-shipment (Chinese goods being re-routed through them) but we expect the U.S. to take a hawkish view on this channel, this time around, and therefore presume no-transhipments.
第五，上述所有因素可能会显著影响该地区的商业信心和情绪。这些因素预计将给该地区的一些国家带来不小的增长冲击。确实，在上一次贸易战中，一些亚洲经济体因转运（中国商品通过它们转运）而受益，但我们预计美国这次将对这一渠道持强硬态度，因此我们假定没有转运发生。
Second, to the extent that some economies can substitute for China in the U.S. market, they may stand to benefit. But it's not clear large capacity exists to ramp up quickly.
In the long-run though, we think a renewed US-China trade war should hasten China+1 and de-risking out of China to the benefit of several Asian economies. We saw how ASEAN has benefitted from FDI flows since the last trade war, and we would expect that process to accelerate. In the medium-term, therefore, several Asian economies could gain. But that is a medium-term benefit that is preceded by near-term pain.
第二，如果一些经济体能够在美国市场上替代中国，它们可能会受益。但目前尚不清楚是否存在大规模且能够迅速扩大产能的情况。
然而，从长远来看，我们认为新一轮的美中贸易战应该会加速“中国+1”战略和减少对中国的风险依赖，这对一些亚洲经济体是有利的。我们已经看到自上次贸易战以来东盟如何从外国直接投资（FDI）流入中受益，我们预计这一进程将加快。因此，在中期内，一些亚洲经济体可能会获益。但这是一个中期利益，它之前会有一个短期的痛苦期。
Differentiated impacts across the region
As alluded to above, the growth impact is likely to be very differentiated across the region based on the exposure of each economy to the aforementioned transmission channels. Some economies are much more exposed and will see a significant growth shock in 2025 with Vietnam (-1.2%pt.), Singapore (-0.8%pt.) and Malaysia(-0.8%pt.) likely at the top of that list. To be sure, this presumes the US cracks down on trans-shipment flows from China and potentially implements sanctions against Chinese value-added elements in the ASEAN production chains, thereby particularly impacting countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia.
不同地区的经济增长影响可能会有很大差异，这取决于它们对上述传导渠道的暴露程度。一些经济体的暴露程度更高，将在2025年经历显著的增长冲击，其中越南（-1.2%）、新加坡（-0.8%）和马来西亚（-0.8%）可能位于这个名单的前列。当然，这是在假设美国会打击从中国的转运流，并可能对东盟生产链中的中国增值元素实施制裁，从而特别影响像越南和马来西亚这样的国家。
To be sure, pressures will spread beyond just ASEAN, to countries such as tw as well. In the first ten months of 2024, for example, more than 30% of tw's exports were directed to China/ HKSAR, a significant share of which was on account of China's final exports to rest of the world, including that to the US. Similarly, of the export orders received by tw manufacturers, almost 40% are still produced out of their production lines in China.
例如，在2024年的前10个月，中国台湾超过30%的出口是针对中国大陆/香港特区的，其中很大一部分是由于中国最终出口到世界其他地区，包括对美国的出口。同样，中国台湾制造商收到的出口订单中，近40%仍在中国大陆的生产线生产。
Hence, whilea US-China trade war will likely facilitate further supply chain diversification by Taiwan manufacturers in the medium term, it will still impose meaningful drag on tw's near-term export activity and the associated uncertainty is likely to impinge on their investment plans.
因此，虽然中美贸易战可能会在中期促进中国台湾制造商进一步的供应链多元化，但它仍将对中国台湾近期的出口活动造成重大拖累，相关的不确定性可能会影响他们的投资计划。
Conversely, a country like India should be impacted much less (prima facie) because a very small fraction of India's exports go to China and, to the extent that lower Chinese growth depresses commodity prices, India -as a large commodity importer -- will benefit from the associated positive terms-of-trade impulses. That said, the bigger threat to India is that increased Chinese excess capacity finds its way into Indian markets, which would hurt domestic manufacturing and reduce the incentives for the domestic private sector to invest.
相反，像印度这样的国家受到的影响应该要小得多（从表面上看），因为印度出口的一小部分流向中国，而且在某种程度上，中国经济增长放缓压低了大宗商品价格，印度作为大宗商品进口大国，将从相关的积极贸易条件中受益。话虽如此，印度面临的更大威胁是，中国过剩产能的增加会进入印度市场，这将损害印度国内制造业，降低国内私营部门投资的动力。
Importantly, these growth estimates assume there is no change to US growth from aUS-China trade war because downside risk from the trade war is offset by easier regulatory and fiscal policy in the US. However, if growth suffers, the growth hit to Asia would be even larger.
重要的是，这些增长估计假设中美贸易战不会改变美国的增长，因为贸易战带来的下行风险被美国更宽松的监管和财政政策所抵消。然而，如果增长受到影响，亚洲经济增长受到的打击将更大。
Inflation impact is more ambiguous
A trade war between the US and China should serve as an adverse supply shock for the world and, all else equal, be inflationary.
通胀影响则更为模糊
中美之间的贸易战应该会对全球供应造成不利冲击，在其他条件相同的情况下，还会引发通胀。
Furthermore, to the extent that Asian currencies experience a depreciation bias, that should be a source of inflation. Offsetting that, however, is the fact that increased imports from China into Asian economies should be deflationary. Furthermore, to the extent that growth is weaker through the region, that should be dis- inflationary over time. All told, the inflation impactis ambiguous within Asiaand will depend on which of these factors dominate in specific countries.
此外，就亚洲货币出现贬值倾向的程度而言，这应该是通胀的一个来源。然而，抵消这一点的是，亚洲经济体从中国进口的增加应该是通缩的。此外，在某种程度上，整个地区的增长都在减弱，随着时间的推移，这应该会抑制通胀。总而言之，通胀对亚洲的影响尚不明确，并将取决于这些因素中哪一个在特定国家占主导地位。
But tighter global financial conditionsshould induce less monetary easing
There is, however, no ambiguity that if global financial conditions remain tight - as manifested in a stronger US Dollar and higher US.treasuries - and put pressure on Asian currencies, that will impinge upon the ability of some Asian central banks to ease monetary policy.
Bank Indonesia (BI) is most sensitive to a tightening of global financial conditions, and the recent tightening is likely to keep BI on hold at 6% through the end of 2025. We therefore take off the remaining cuts that we had previously envisaged for BI.
全球金融状况的紧缩确实会对亚洲各国的货币政策产生影响。如果全球金融状况保持紧缩状态，比如美元走强和美国国债收益率上升，这将给亚洲货币带来压力。在这种情况下，一些亚洲国家的中央银行可能会发现降息的空间受到限制，因为它们需要维持货币的稳定和对抗外部压力。例如，印度尼西亚银行（Bank Indonesia，简称BI）对全球金融状况的变化非常敏感，近期的全球金融状况紧缩可能会导致BI在2025年底之前保持6%的利率不变，不再进行之前预期的降息。因此，全球金融状况的变化对于亚洲各国中央银行的货币政策决策具有重要影响，限制了它们通过降息来刺激经济增长的能力。
Our view on the BSP is more nuanced. We think the sensitivity to FX is less than BI due to stronger reserve buffers and BOP dynamics. To be sure, we have revised up BSP's terminal rate by 75bps (from 4.25% to 5.0% by end-2025) in tandem with the Fed, but there are opportunities to ease before the formal announcement of tariffs, assuming that FX depreciation pressures are not sharp or disorderly.
我们对菲律宾央行（BSP）的看法更为细致。我们认为，由于外汇储备缓冲更强和经常账户动态，BSP对外汇的敏感性低于印尼央行（BI）。当然，我们已经将BSP的终端利率预测上调了75个基点（从4.25%上调至2025年底的5.0%），与美联储保持一致。但在正式宣布关税之前，如果外汇贬值压力不是剧烈或无序的，BSP有机会放松货币政策。
For some other central banks, we hold on to some easing in 2025, but the risks are skewed towards doing less or moving later. In Thailand, we still pencil in one more 25bp rate cut for the Bank of Thailand in 1Q25, but the risk is skewed towards a rate hold, given that BOT officials have characterized the surprise rate cut in October as a one-off, recalibration of the neutral rate. With regards to MAS, we are still baking in a 50bp slope reduction in the $NEER policy band in January, premised on gradual disinflation in oil prices and domestic wages, although the bias is skewed towards a later move.
对于其他一些中央银行，我们预计2025年仍会有一些宽松政策，但风险倾向于减少宽松力度或推迟实施。在泰国，我们仍然预计泰国银行在2025年第一季度还会再降息25个基点，但由于泰国银行官员将10月份的意外降息描述为一次性的、对中性利率的重新校准，因此存在保持利率不变的风险。至于新加坡金融管理局（MAS），我们仍然预计在1月份对新元名义有效汇率（NEER）政策区间进行50个基点的斜率降低，这基于油价和国内工资逐渐降低通胀的预期，尽管存在推迟行动的倾向。
In other countries that are less sensitive to external conditions (India, Korea) we hold on to our easing calls in 2025, on the premise that their stronger external balance sheets will allow those central banks to calibrate monetary policy more towards addressing domestic growth inflation dynamics.
在对外部条件不太敏感的一些国家（如印度、韩国），我们预计2025年将继续实施一些宽松政策，前提是它们较强的外部资产负债表将允许这些国家的中央银行更多地根据国内增长和通胀动态来调整货币政策。
