0. Before Delving Into
0.1 What Is Normativity?
Finlay, S. (2019). Defining Normativity. In T. Kevin, P. David, & S. Scott (Eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (pp. 62–104). Oxford University Press.
Wedgwood, R. (2018). The Unity of Normativity. In D. Star (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. Oxford University Press.
0.2 Normative Concepts
Eklund, M. (forthcoming). Normative Concepts. In D. Copp & C. Rosati (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
Hernandez, S., & Laskowski, N. G. (2021). What Makes Normative Concepts Normative. Southwest Philosophy Review, 37(1), 45–51.
1. Naturalising Normative Concepts?
1.1 The Open Question Argument
Feldman, F. (2005). The Open Question Argument: What It Isn't; and What It Is. Philosophical Issues, 15 (1), 22–43.
1.2 Moral Twin Earth
Horgan, T., & Timmons, M. (1991). New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research, 16, 447–465.
Copp, D. (2000). Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth. Synthese, 124(1–2), 113–137.
2. Are There Normative Facts?
(Sec.1-2) FitzPatrick, W. J. (2022). Ethical Realism. Elements in Ethics.
McPherson, T. (2011). Against quietist normative realism. Philosophical Studies, 154(2), 223–240.
Streumer, B. (2013). Can We Believe the Error Theory? Journal of Philosophy, 110(4), 194–212.
3. The (Normatively) Fundamental Normative Property
3.1 Reasons-first
Schroeder, M. (2021). The Fundamental Reason for Reasons Fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies, 178(10), 3107–3127.
Hieronymi, P. (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy, 102(9), 437–457.
3.2 Fittingness-first
Howard, C. (2019). The Fundamentality of Fit. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 (pp. 216–236). Oxford University Press.
Hurka, T. (2023). Against the Fundamentality of Fit. In C. Howard & R. Cosker-Rowland (Eds.), Fittingness (pp. 58–79). OUP.
3.3 Value-based Theory
Rowland, R. (2023). Value-First Accounts of Normativity. In C. Howard & R. Rowland (Eds.), Fittingness (pp. 176–199). OUP.
3.4 Skepticism about X-first views
Wodak, D. (2020). Who's on First. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 15, 48–70.
