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来源：土豆的经管Workshop
Journal of Political Economy JPE 2024年 7月刊 目录与摘要
刊发卷期：Volume 132,Number 7
刊发时间：July 2024
期刊等级：ABS 4*
出版厂商：University of Chicago Press
1.Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-Term Trends
Gerald Auten and David Splinter
2.Credible Persuasion
3.Granular Instrumental Variables
Xavier Gabaix and Ralph S. J. Koijen
4.Preschool Quality and Child Development
Alison Andrew, Orazio P. Attanasio, Raquel Bernal, Lina Cardona Sosa, Sonya Krutikova, and Marta Rubio-Codina
5.Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms
Adam Kapor, Mohit Karnani, and Christopher Neilson
6.Credit Markets, Property Rights, and the Commons
Frederik Noack and Christopher Costello
7.Persuasion and Welfare
Laura Doval and Alex Smolin
8.Tax Evasion and Capital Taxation
Shahar Rotberg and Joseph B. Steinberg
1.Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-Term Trends
Gerald Auten and David SplinterConcerns about income inequality emphasize the importance of accurate income measures. Estimates of top income shares based only on individual tax returns are biased by tax-base changes, social changes, and missing income sources. This paper addresses these shortcomings and presents new estimates of the distribution of national income since 1960. Our analysis of pretax income shows that top income shares are lower and have increased less since 1980 than other studies using tax data. In addition, increasing government transfers and tax progressivity have resulted in rising real incomes for all income groups and little change in aftertax top income shares.
2.Credible Persuasion
We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on the policy’s induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the sender’s ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender’s payoff is state independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller.
3.Granular Instrumental Variables
Xavier Gabaix and Ralph S. J. KoijenWe develop a new method to construct instruments in a broad class of economic environments. In the economies we study, a few large firms, industries, or countries account for an important share of economic activity. Idiosyncratic shocks to these large players significantly affect aggregate outcomes and are valid instruments. We provide a methodology to extract these idiosyncratic shocks to create granular instrumental variables (GIVs), which are size-weighted sums of idiosyncratic shocks. We show how GIVs enable us to estimate causal parameters, such as elasticities and multipliers, and are applicable in a broad range of empirically relevant settings.4.Preschool Quality and Child Development
Alison Andrew, Orazio P. Attanasio, Raquel Bernal, Lina Cardona Sosa, Sonya Krutikova, and Marta Rubio-CodinaGlobally, preschool enrollment has surged, but its quality is often poor. We evaluate strategies to improve quality of public preschools in Colombia. The first, designed by the government and rolled out nationwide, provided extra funding, mainly earmarked for hiring teaching assistants. The second also offered low-cost training for existing teachers. The first intervention had no effect on child development, while the second improved children’s cognitive development, especially for more disadvantaged children. This pattern can be explained by the interventions affecting teachers' behavior differently. The first led teachers to reduce their classroom time, including learning activities, while additional training offset the adverse effect on learning activities and improved teaching quality.5.Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms
Adam Kapor, Mohit Karnani, and Christopher NeilsonWe study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges’ (non)participation in Chile’s centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.6.Credit Markets, Property Rights, and the Commons
Frederik Noack and Christopher CostelloCredit markets and property rights are fundamental for modern economies, but their implications for the commons are unknown. Using a dynamic model of competitive resource extraction, we show that improving property right security unambiguously increases conservation incentives, but the effect of credit markets on resource extraction effort hinges on the security of property rights. We test these predictions using data on global fisheries, credit markets, and the largest ever marine property rights assignment. We find that property right security reduces resource extraction and that credit market development increases resource extraction under insecure property rights but reduces resource extraction under secure property rights.7.Persuasion and Welfare
Laura Doval and Alex SmolinInformation policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society’s choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare implications of information policies on a population of heterogeneous individuals. We define and characterize the Bayes welfare set, consisting of the population’s utility profiles that are feasible under some information policy. The Pareto frontier of this set can be recovered by a series of standard Bayesian persuasion problems. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which an information policy exists that Pareto dominates the no-information policy. We illustrate our results with applications to data leakage, price discrimination, and credit ratings.8.Tax Evasion and Capital Taxation
Shahar Rotberg and Joseph B. SteinbergWealth inequality has prompted calls for higher taxes on capital income and wealth but also concerns that rich households would respond by concealing their assets offshore. We use a general equilibrium model to study how taxing capital more heavily would affect offshore tax evasion and how this would affect the broader economy. Without evasion, tax revenue could be increased dramatically, inequality could be reduced, and widespread welfare gains could be achieved. After accounting for evasion, however, tax revenue would rise marginally or even fall, inequality would increase, and widespread welfare losses would result.
