「摩根大通」US-China贸易战对亚洲意味着什么？（含精校翻译）
China's deflation pressure continued in October. Both CPI and PPI came in below expectations. October CPI inflation moderated to 0.3% yoy on a 0.1% m/m sa decline (consensus: 0.4% yoy; JPM: 0.5%), compared to 0.4% yoy in September.
中国的通缩压力在10月份仍在继续。cpi和PPI均低于预期。10月CPI同比上涨0.3%，环比下降0.1%(市场预期：同比0.4%；摩根大通：0.5%)，9月份同比增长0.4%。
Recent policy support focused on risk mitigation, instead of supply-demand rebalancing
最近的政策支持侧重于降低风险，而不是供需再平衡
China launched a new round of comprehensive and coordinated policy easing in late September. In the latest development, the long-awaited NPC Standing Committee meeting was held in the past week, which announced a multi-year 10 trillion local government hidden debt swap program, including a 6 trillion yuan lift in the local government debt ceiling(supporting 2 trillion yuan special local government refinancing bonds per annum in 2024-26) and 800 billion yuan special local government bonds per annum from the existing quota. This fiscal package is helpful for mitigating fiscal stresses faced by local governments, but it focuses on risk mitigation and is not a conventional fiscal stimulus package. What disappointed the market includes:
中国在9月下旬启动了新一轮全面协调的政策宽松。在最新进展中，备受期待的全国人大常委会会议在上周举行，宣布了一项为期多年的10万亿元人民币地方政府隐性债务置换计划，包括将地方政府债务上限提高6万亿元（支持2024-26年每年2万亿元的特别地方政府再融资债券）以及每年从现有配额中增加8000亿元特别地方政府债券。这个财政包有助于缓解地方政府面临的财政压力，但它侧重于风险缓解，并不是一个传统的财政刺激计划。市场失望的点包括：
(1) the debt swap is born by local governments, not via expansion of central government debt; (2) no mention of funding support for housing stabilization efforts, though the MOF said the proposal to use some special local government bonds (from existing quotas) to support government purchases ofhousing inventory and idle land is work in progress, along with favorable tax code revisions for housing transactions; (3) no mention of expansion of central government bonds to support new capital injections for major banks, though theMOF said the process has been accelerated; (4) lack of consumption stimulus, though the MOF said that the government will increase the scale andscope of trade- in subsidies for consumer goods and increase the support for social welfare, and there is room to lift the budgetary fiscal deficit (vs. 3% of GDP this year), increase issuance of ultra-long Treasury bonds and special local government bonds going forward.
（1）债务置换由地方政府承担，而不是通过扩大中央政府债务；（2）没有提到为稳定住房市场提供资金支持，尽管财政部表示，使用部分特别地方政府债券（从现有配额中）支持政府购买住房库存和闲置土地的提议正在进行中，同时对住房交易的税法修订也较为有利；（3）没有提到扩大中央政府债券以支持对主要银行的新资本注入，尽管财政部表示该进程已经加快；（4）缺乏消费刺激，尽管财政部表示政府将增加消费品置换补贴的规模和范围，并增加对社会福利的支持，并且有空间提高预算财政赤字（与今年占GDP的3%相比），未来增加发行超长期国债和特别地方政府债券。
Overall, although the government has recently emphasized boosting consumption and domestic demand, the fiscal support has increased gradually, but overall consumption support is still weaker than policy support in other areas, and much lower than the market hopes to see.
总体而言，尽管政府最近强调提振消费和国内需求，财政支持逐渐增加，但总体消费支持仍比其他领域的政策支持弱，远低于市场的期望。
An additional risk into 2025 is that the risk of a tariff war2.0 has moved higher after theTrump win in the US election. We now assume a US tariff hike on China goods to60% in 1H25(effective in 2Q) as the new base case scenario (link), hence exports will face a big shock especially to the US market. Strong exports have been an important factor supporting economic growth this year (net exports contributed 23.9% of GDP growth in the first three quarters of this year) and mitigating the domestic demand-supply imbalance. The anticipated shock to exports will intensify the deflation pressure, in the absence of a meaningful policy re-direction to support consumption and boost domestic demand. Hence, we are concerned that the deflation pressure will continue to linger into 2025.
到2025年的额外风险是，在特朗普赢得美国大选后，贸易战2.0的风险已经上升。我们现在假设美国对中国商品的关税提高到60%作为新的基准情景（在2025年上半年生效，即第二季度），因此出口将面临巨大冲击，尤其是对美国市场的出口。强劲的出口一直是今年支持经济增长的重要因素（净出口在今年前三季度对GDP增长的贡献为23.9%），并缓解了国内供需不平衡。预计出口的冲击将加剧通缩压力，如果没有有意义的政策转向来支持消费和刺激国内需求。因此，我们担心通缩压力将持续到2025年。
While there is consensus support for the policy shift to boost consumption, the views are quite
divided on how to achieve the objective. Current measures focus on trade-in subsidies for durable goods and fiscal support via job creation (via investment, more hire and income growth), while some advisors call for cash handouts, a consumption voucher policy or improvements to the social safety network. In a recent study, we argued that weak consumption is driven by weak income and employment expectations, an insufficient social safety network and high household savings, and the negative wealth effect of house price declines. Hence, our policy recommendations to boost consumption include:
尽管大家普遍支持政策转向以促进消费，但对于如何实现这一目标，意见分歧较大。目前的措施主要集中在耐用商品的以旧换新补贴和通过创造就业机会（通过投资、增加雇佣和收入增长）的财政支持上，而一些顾问则呼吁发放现金、实施消费券政策或改善社会保障网络。在最近的一项研究中，我们认为消费疲软是由收入和就业预期疲软、社会保障网络不足和家庭储蓄过高以及房价下降带来的负面财富效应所驱动的。因此，我们提出的促进消费的政策建议包括：
(1) policies to support income growth, such as more balanced support between services and manufacturing, upgrades to revive sentiment and employment in the service sectors (which is the biggest hiring sector but has faced policy headwinds in recent years) and enhanced protection on workers rights (e.g. limit overtime working hours, minimum wage, addressing the salary overdue problem); (2) fiscal support to improve the social safety network especially for disadvantaged groups; (3) more forceful measures to stabilize the housing market, especially accelerating the pace ofhousing de-stocking. While recent measures have improved funding availability (e.g., from special local government bonds and the PBOC's re-lending), a major constraint is financial incentives as asset yields (rental yields or return of public housing) are too low to justify such operations. One possible way out is for the central government to provide interest subsidies, to increase asset returns so that the housing de-stocking can move on more quickly.
(1) 支持收入增长的政策，比如在服务业和制造业之间提供更平衡的支持，升级以重振服务业的情绪和就业（服务业是最大的招聘部门，但近年来面临政策逆风）以及加强对工人权益的保护（例如限制加班工作小时数、最低工资、解决工资拖欠问题）；(2) 提供财政支持以改善社会安全网，特别是针对弱势群体；(3) 更有力的措施来稳定住房市场，尤其是加快去库存的步伐。尽管最近的措施提高了资金的可用性（例如，来自地方政府专项债券和中国人民银行的再贷款），但一个主要的制约因素是金融激励，因为资产收益率（租金收益或公共住房的回报）太低，无法证明这样的操作是合理的。一个可能的解决方案是中央政府提供利息补贴，以增加资产回报，从而使住房去库存能够更快地进行。
China's deflation pressure continued in October. BothCPI and PPI came in below expectations. October CPI inflation moderated to 0.3% yoy on a 0.1%m/m sa decline (consensus: 0.4% yoy; JPM: 0.5%), compared to 0.4% yoy in September. Food prices fell 0.8%m/m sain October, due to falling pork prices (-3.7%m/mnsa) and vegetable prices (-3.0%m/m nsa). Non-food CPI also stayed soft, falling 0.3% yoy in October(-0.1%m/m sa), compared to -0.2% yoy in September. In detail, traffic and communication prices fell 0.7%m/m sa, along with a 0.1%m/m sa decline in clothing, household facilities and articles. Vehicle fuel prices fell 1.5%m/m sa in October(-10.5%oya, reflecting the global oil price trend). Excluding food and energy prices, coreCPI inflation rose 0.2% yoy (or staying flat in %m/m sa terms). Similarly, service prices also stayed flat in %m/m sa terms though picking up to 0.4% yoy (from 0.2%oya in September).
中国的通缩压力在10月份持续存在。CPI（消费者价格指数）和PPI（生产者价格指数）均低于预期。10月份CPI通胀率放缓至同比增长0.3%（环比下降0.1%，同比上涨0.1%，市场共识：同比增长0.4%；摩根大通：同比增长0.5%），相比之下9月份为同比增长0.4%。10月份食品价格环比下降0.8%，主要是由于猪肉价格下降（环比下降3.7%）和蔬菜价格下降（环比下降3.0%）。非食品CPI同样保持疲软，10月份同比下降0.3%（环比下降0.1%，同比持平），相比之下9月份为同比下降0.2%。具体来看，交通和通信价格环比下降0.7%，服装、家庭设施和用品价格环比下降0.1%。10月份车辆燃油价格环比下降1.5%（同比下降10.5%，反映了全球油价趋势）。剔除食品和能源价格后，核心CPI通胀率同比增长0.2%（环比持平）。同样，服务价格也环比持平，尽管同比增长至0.4%（9月份为0.2%）。
PPI deflation intensified further, as PPI dropped 2.9% yoy(consensus:-2.5%;JPM: -2.4%) on a 0.4%m/m sa decline, compared to -2.8% yoy in September. Consumer goods PPI fell 1.6% yoy (vs. -1.3% yoy in September), and producer goods PPI dropped 3.3% yoy (the same as in September). Details suggest moderate gains in prices of industrial metals and construction-related materials (e.g., steel and cement prices ended the decline and increased in %m/m nsa terms), reflecting the impact of the latest policy support measures especially the pickup in project- related special local government bond issuance and likely acceleration in proceeds deployment. Global oil price dynamics led to the decline in energy-related PPI. In addition, amid domestic price competition, PPI for equipment manufacturing eased in October, including PPI for computers (-0.3%m/m nsa), household appliances, as well as autos (-0.9%m/m nsa, though PPI for NEVs recovered modestly, up 0.6%m/m nsa, after 12 consecutive monthly decline).
PPI通缩进一步加剧，PPI同比下降2.9%（市场共识：下降2.5%；摩根大通：下降2.4%），环比下降0.4%，同比降幅较9月份的下降2.8%有所扩大。消费品PPI同比下降1.6%（9月份为下降1.3%），生产资料PPI同比下降3.3%（与9月份持平）。细节表明，工业金属和建筑相关材料（例如，钢铁和水泥价格结束了下降趋势，并在环比上有所增长）的价格有所适度上涨，这反映了最新政策支持措施的影响，特别是项目相关的专项地方政府债券发行量增加，以及可能加速的资金使用。全球油价动态导致了能源相关PPI的下降。此外，在国内价格竞争中，10月份设备制造业PPI有所缓解，包括计算机（环比下降0.3%）、家用电器以及汽车（环比下降0.9%，尽管新能源汽车PPI有所回升，环比增长0.6%，在连续12个月下降后有所回升）。
