魏尚进：欧盟对中国电动汽车的关税如何影响全球市场？

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注：中国电动汽车进入拉美乘用车市场。

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■作者：魏尚进 复旦大学国际金融学院学术访问教授、哥伦比亚大学终身讲席教授、亚洲开发银行前首席经济学家

■公众号：复旦金融评论

2024年6月12日，欧盟根据其对中国电动汽车补贴的估算，宣布了对中国纯电动汽车的“临时”关税。这些关税是在欧盟经过数月的调查之后确定的，并会加在当前已经有的10%关税之上。之所以称其为“临时”补贴，是因为如果中国生产商能够拿出证据证明实际补贴更低，关税可能会被下调。另外，如果欧盟能够与中国政府达成协议，以某种方式减少中国电动汽车对欧洲的出口量，这些关税也可能不实施。

关税的具体数额体现了欧盟专家对中国汽车生产商在整个供应链中获得的各级政府补贴总额测算的上限。欧盟的调查团队首先向所有中国的电动汽车制造商发出了合作要求。在那些承诺合作的企业中，调查团队选择了三家公司进行深入分析，它们分别是总部位于深圳的比亚迪、杭州的吉利以及上海的上汽集团。他们广泛审查了这些公司的记录，并与公司内部人士及行业专家进行了访谈。随后，调查团队得出结论：比亚迪的补贴率为17.4%，吉利为20.0%，而上汽集团为38.1%，并据此宣布了相应的关税。对于那些已经承诺合作但未被选为样本的电动汽车制造商，临时关税被设定为上述三家公司补贴率的加权平均值，也就是21%。对于那些未承诺合作的纯电动汽车企业，将按照最高的38.1%的税率征收关税。

欧盟对补贴的调查结果让人们注意到，一个月前美国政府宣布对中国电动汽车实施100%的“反补贴”关税是多么荒诞无稽。美国的决策并未经过深入调查，其关税水平却远远超出了合理的补贴估算范围。美国决策者凭空选出这个三位数的整数，表明它甚至没有试图掩饰其贸易保护主义的本质。

有一种观点认为，鉴于中国在成本方面的巨大优势，30%的关税差距并不足以抑制中国对这些市场的电动汽车出口。然而，这种观点忽略了两个关键因素。首先，由于各市场在安全和其他标准上的差异，汽车制造商往往需要对车型进行调整才能销售到一个新的市场，这限制了单一车型的全球销量。例如，中国的汽车安全标准注重发生车祸时行人和车外人员的保护，而美国更侧重于保障驾驶员和车内乘客在车祸时的安全。这意味着为美国市场设计的电动汽车与中国市场的版本存在足够多的区别。其次，汽车的盈利性依赖于一定的销售量。因此，如果新的关税会显著降低预期销量，那么中国车企就可能打消出口到该市场的念头。

一些中国电动汽车制造商正在考虑在美国本土建立工厂，这一举措有望为美国带来就业机会并增加税收。然而，美国政府的外国投资审查程序（CFIUS）被许多中国企业认为对中国投资有歧视性，可能导致许多中国生产商完全放弃了美国市场。

电动汽车作为推动全球向低碳生活方式转变的关键工具，有一定的补贴比没有补贴好。假设无法实施足够高的全球性碳税的话，对新能源车的最优补贴还应该高一些。欧盟和美国倾向于对进口商品使用关税而不是对本国新能源车增加补贴，部分原因在于两国政府均面临高额债务的财政压力。

新实施的关税无疑将对中国企业的利润和就业造成冲击。然而，这一政策同样对欧盟和美国产生负面影响，它不仅推高了本国家庭的生活成本——由于国内竞争者不再面临同等的降价压力——还延缓了这些地区从高碳排放的传统汽车向更环保的替代品转型的步伐。

新关税在全球范围内形成了两股相互抗衡的力量。从一方面看，将中国电动汽车挡在美国和欧盟市场之外，可能会促使中国增加对其他地区的出口。这对于第三国的消费者而言是个利好消息，也有助于它们加速从传统汽车向电动汽车的转变。在没有本土汽车产业的国家，如澳大利亚和新西兰，这一变化似乎没有明显的输家。然而，对于那些拥有成熟汽车工业的国家，欧美新关税意味着它们将面临更激烈的市场竞争。这些国家的政府可能会感受到去效仿美国和欧盟措施的政治压力。

如果世界主要国家能够就电动汽车的生产，从管理气候变化角度出发，进行协同的补贴与碳排放税进行谈判，世界将会变得更好。

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What Do the New EU Tariffs on the Chinese EVs Mean for the World?

Shang-Jin Wei

Editor-in-chief of Fudan Financial Review

Professor of Finance and Economics of Columbia University

Former Chief Economist of Asian Development Bank

The European Union on June 12 announced provisional tariffs on Chinese battery electric vehicles (BEVs) based on its estimate of the Chinese subsidies. They come after months of investigations by the EU, and are meant to be imposed on top of the 10 percent tariffs already in place. They are called “provisional” because they might be revised downwards if the Chinese producers can show evidence that the actual subsidies are lower. They may not be implemented if the EU can reach an agreement with the Chinese authorities to somehow reduce the quantity of Chinese EV exports to Europe.

The magnitude of the tariffs represents EU experts' upper bound estimate of the total subsidy per vehicle that the Chinese producers receive from all levels of governments throughout the supply chains. The EU investigators first sent a request for cooperation to all Chinese EV producers. Among the companies that have pledged cooperation, they selected 3 (BYD, which is headquartered in Shenzhen, Geely in Hangzhou, and SAIC in Shanghai) and poured over the company records, and interviewed company insiders and industry experts. They then concluded that the rates of subsidies are 17.4% at BYD, 20.0% at Geely, and 38.1% and announced the tariffs accordingly. For other EV producers who have pledged cooperation but are not selected in the sample, the provisional tariff is the weighted average of the three numbers, namely, 21%. For BEV producers who have not pledged cooperation, the tariff will be the maximum of the three, namely, 38.1%. 

The EU finding on subsidy puts spotlight on Biden Administration's “anti-subsidy” tariff of 100% on Chinese EVs introduced only a month ago (with no serious investigation). Because the US tariff is so much higher than any reasonable estimate of the subsidy, and because the US has chosen a “nice” round number, it is not even trying to hide its protectionist nature. 

Even before President Biden's 100% tariff, the US tariffs on Chinese imports, erected under President Trump and largely maintained by President Biden, have already been at a similar level of the infamous US Smoot-Hawley tariffs in the 1930s. A panel at the World Trade Organization – consisting of trade experts from countries other than the US and China - ruled in 2020 that these tariffs are inconsistent with the US legal obligations at the WTO. Both the Trump and the Biden administrations have chosen to ignore the WTO rules. 

Most other governments have chosen to say nothing publicly, partly because the US tariffs, by reducing the Chinese products' competitiveness in the US market, have raised the relative competitiveness of their own products in the same market. Indeed, following the Trump tariffs, the US direct imports from China have declined precipitously while its imports from Mexico, India, Vietnam and many other countries have increased. The primary victims of the US tariffs, besides Chinese exporters and American consumers, are producers from smaller countries who now face an elevated risk of larger countries imposing protectionist measures with seeming impunity.

It is sometimes said that since the Chinese cost advantage is so big, a 30 percent increase in tariffs is not enough to stop Chinese EV exports to these markets. That is wrong due to a combination of two factors. First, because different markets have different safety and other standards, auto producers often have to adjust car designs, which reduces the quantity of sale per model. As a small example, the Chinese safety standard requires maximum safety to pedestrians and others outside a vehicle in the event of a collision, whereas the US standard emphasizes the safety of the driver and other people inside a car. This means an EV sold in the US market is not identical to the one in China. Second, a given car model needs to be sold for enough quantities to be profitable. Therefore, a new tariff that can reduce the expected quantity of sale sufficiently could stop its exports to the foreign market altogether.

Some Chinese EV producers may contemplate setting up a production plant in the US, which could be good for US job creation and tax revenue. However, the US government’s review process for inward foreign investment (known as CFIUS) is perceived by Chinese firms as biased against them. This may cause many Chinese producers to give up on the US market entirely.

Because EVs are a tool for the world to move away from a carbon-intensive lifestyle, the globally efficient subsidy rate for EV production and consumption is not zero, but probably on the order of 20-50%. This is especially true if we continue to fail to impose a sufficiently high carbon tax globally. EU and US prefer tariffs to subsidies because both governments are already burdened by high levels of debt.

The new tariffs certainly hurt the profit and jobs of the Chinese firms. But they are bad for the EU and US as well by both raising the cost of living on their households (as domestic competitors do not now have the same pressure to lower their prices) and delaying their transition out of climate-unfriendly traditional automobiles. 

The new tariffs create two opposing forces in the rest of the world. On the one hand, by shutting the Chinese EVs out of the US and EU, there may be an increase in Chinese exports to other markets. This is beneficial to the consumers in these countries and ease their transition from traditional vehicles to EVs. For countries with no domestic auto industry such as Australia and New Zealand, there are no obvious losers. But for countries with a sizable auto industry, this represents an even greater competitive pressure. The governments in these countries will face political pressure to imitate the US and EU measures. 

The world would have been better off if the major countries could negotiate for a common pro-climate subsidy scheme for EVs and a common tax on carbon emissions.

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